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Abstract 	  
By 1991, Britain retained responsibility for 14 overseas dependent 
territories. A policy of accelerated decolonisation that took shape under 
British Governments between the early 1960s and the late 1970s had, by 
the early 1980s, given way to what Drower has called an ‘era of colonial 
permanence’.1 This was because territories such as Bermuda refused to 
take the hint and move towards independence. This thesis examines the 
way in which Britain appeared to lose control of the process of 
decolonisation. It will do this by studying power-sharing dynamics in 
Bermuda between 1963 and 1977. It is argued that Britain did not exercise 
full control in Bermuda in 1963; her role was characterised by London’s 
dependence upon Governors who accommodated themselves to the 
dominant white minority both for pragmatic reasons and out of shared 
cultural and racial affinities. It was this dynamic that suffused three 
forums of Anglo-Bermudian collaboration: constitutional reform in 1963-
1968; the internal security state in 1968-1973; and the colonial justice 
system in 1973-1977. This period saw a rapid diminution of British power 
in Bermuda, a process accelerated by proliferating constitutional 
ambiguities and metropolitan decline. In contrast, the power of Bermudian 
conservatives was entrenched via electoral advantages and enhanced local 
autonomy. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Drower, Fistful of Islands, x.  
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A note on terminology 	  
Three points need to be made about the terms employed throughout this 
thesis. Firstly, the term oligarchy is ‘one of the most widely used yet poorly 
theorised concepts in the social sciences’.2 It derives from the Greek word 
oligarkhia (government of the few), which is composed of oligoi (few) and 
arkhein (to rule)”.3 Leach defines oligarchy as the ‘concentration of entrenched 
illegitimate authority and/or influence in the hands of a minority’.4 Winter 
meanwhile suggests ‘oligarchy refers to the politics of wealth defense by 
materially endowed actors’.5 A second feature of this definition implies that 
oligarchical power ‘extends so widely across [a] space or community that exit is 
nearly impossible or prohibitively expensive’.6 Finally, a distinction must be 
made between oligarchical power, which is informal and individualistic, and 
elite power which is the use of power by actors who hold formal political office. 
The combination of these informal and formal forms of power is a prevalent 
feature of failed states.7 The study of how Bermuda’s oligarchy adapted during 
a period of local and global change provides an opportunity to test the idea 
that ‘oligarchy is generally thought to be overcome by electoral democracy’.8 
 
Secondly, this thesis aims to understand how realities of racially-infused 
oligarchy interacted with ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’. While imperialism 
‘presupposes the will and the ability of an imperial centre to define as imperial 
its own national interests and enforce them worldwide’9, colonialism is defined 
by Osterhammel thus:  
 
A relationship of domination between an indigenous society [or 
forcibly imported] majority and a minority of foreign invaders. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Winters, Oligarchy, 1. 
3 Indridason, Oligarchy, 36. 
4 Leach, Iron Law of What Again?, 329 
5 Winters, Oligarchy, 7. 
6 Ibid, 4. 
7 Op. cit., 15. 
8 Op. cit, 2.  
9 Osterhammel, Colonialism, 21. 
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The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of colonised people 
are made and implemented by the colonial rulers… [who are] 
convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate 
to rule.10 
 
Since Bermuda has a history of English and British hegemony and also a black 
majority descended from slavery, colonialism seems an apt term. Meanwhile, 
colonialism impinges on identities while imperialism focuses more on 
conceptions of interest. This thesis, suggests that differences between these 
concepts could be viewed during the process of decolonisation via different 
discourses of imperial disengagement.  
 
Thirdly, the term Dependent Territory is used throughout to describe 
Bermuda. This thesis studies a period during which much of the nomenclature 
of the British imperial system was rapidly changing. A Colonial Office (CO) 
report submitted to Cabinet in June 1956 recommended that the use of the 
word ‘Colony’ be officially discontinued. From that year, ‘the term “Dependent 
Territory”’ was gradually brought into official usage’. However, as Drower 
points out, the term colony continued to be used until the closure of the 
Colonial Office in July 1966. Dependent Territories included Colonies, 
Protectorates, Protected States and Trust Territories. The term is therefore, 
the correct ‘parent term’ for all British overseas possessions during the period 
under study.11 The term remained in use until a consultation by the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), during the preparation of the 1999 White 
Paper, ‘found there was support for a change of name to British Overseas 
Territories, or something similar’.12 
 
 	  	  	  	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid, 16-17. 
11 Drower, Fistful of Islands, xvii-xviii. 
12 FCO White Paper, Partnership for Progress and Prosperity, 9.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Hail to Bermuda, my island in the sun.  
Sing out in glory, to the nation we’ve become.  
We’ve grown from heart to heart, and strength to strength, the 
privilege is mine… 
to sing long live Bermuda, because this island’s mine! 
 
Hail to Bermuda, my homeland dear to me. 
This is my own land built on faith and unity.  
We’ve grown from heart to heart, and strength to strength, for 
loyalty is prime, so sing long live Bermuda, because this island’s 
mine.13 
 
 
The lyrics of Bermuda’s National Song, written in the early 1980s, symbolise 
the climax of an inchoate process of political devolution that began in 1963. 
The period sits between two significant points in the history of late British 
decolonisation. First of all, Harold Macmillan’s African Wind of Change tour 
in early 1960 was a ‘synonym for the rapid pace of decolonisation’ and for the 
‘disintegration of white solidarity across the empire’.14 However, the finality of 
such a process was called into question by another event, the Falklands War, 
in 1982. This was described by Conservative MP Alan Clark as a ‘battle fought 
in obedience to a blood tie’. For, as soldiers who fought in the conflict 
reportedly told Clark, it was much better ‘saving our own people’ than 
‘mucking around in the Third World’.15 This conflict has, however, also been 
seen as a ‘bizarre footnote to empire’ and ‘a marginal, atavistic gesture’ that 
was nevertheless ‘blustery and costly’.16  
 
These two milestones, symbolising both pragmatic withdrawal and racially-
infused irredentism, form parts of Bermuda’s unfinished decolonisation story. 
In 1967, a Labour MP described how, while at a cocktail party in Bermuda, he 
had been accosted by a gaggle of local whites who told him that they were 
‘disgusted not only with us, but presumably with [the Conservatives] who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Bermuda Sun (henceforth Sun), July 3, 2011. 
14 Ward, Whirlwind, Hurricane, Howling Tempest, 49-50.  
15 Clark, Into Politics, 366 and 370. 
16 Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 329.  
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began the Wind of Change in Africa’.17 This sense of bitterness was bound up 
with a sense of ‘betrayal’ because Britain was straining to get rid of its last 
colonies in 1960s and 1970s, while turning away from the Commonwealth 
towards Europe and dismantling the Sterling Area. Following the Falklands 
War, however, Britain ‘seemed resigned to keeping its remaining 
dependencies’.18 This period thus witnessed Britain losing control of the very 
process by which it was trying to divest itself of empire. Why and how did this 
happen? 
 
This thesis takes this as its main research question and it will focus on 
Bermuda in attempting to provide part of the answer. It will do this with the 
help of two main themes. The first theme involves the process of 
constitutional evolution which saw a reform towards ‘Responsible 
Government’ in 1968. It is argued that this led to a tangible crisis of confusion 
in how Britain understood its role on the island.  
 
The second theme focuses on the question of local political change. The period 
1963-1977 witnessed the birth of Bermudian party politics. Within the context 
of constitutional change, this helped enshrine a form of contested legitimacy 
and institutionally-inflated power for conservatives in the ruling United 
Bermuda Party (UBP). This process of moderate liberalisation and 
modernisation may also, however, have closed off avenues of healing in the 
midst of bitter legacies of racial discrimination. 
 
The period begins with the arrival of a new Governor, Lord Martonmere, to 
‘pomp and pageantry’ at the harbour wharf in the capital city of Hamilton in 
June 1964.19 It takes a brutal intermission with the assassination of a different 
Governor, Sir Richard Sharples, as he walked his dog at Government House in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Robert Howarth MP, Debate on the Bermuda Constitution Bill, Hansard, HC Deb June 14, 
1967 vol 748 cc480-519. 
18 Aldrich, The Last Colonies, 30.  
19 For photos and documentation pertaining to Martonmere’s arrival ceremony on June 15, 
1964, see CO 1031/4369, National Archives, London, UK (henceforth TNA). 
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March 1973.20 And it ends with the deaths of four men and one woman in 
executions and rioting in December 1977.21  
 
The juxtaposition of sun-drenched pageantry and violence underscores the 
fact that Bermuda, an English settlement and then Crown Colony from 1609 
and 1684 respectively, was a divided island with a black majority that felt shut 
out of the political process by an entrenched white settler minority.22 This 
happened on an island in which, in 1968, about 35.7 per cent of Bermuda’s 
population of 50,355 was white, while the other 64.3 per cent was of African, 
native-American or mixed descent.23  
 
A legacy of racialised brutality would be memorialised in 2009 with the 
erection of a statue of the slave Sally Bassett in front of Hamilton’s Cabinet 
Office.24 Bassett had been burned at the stake in the 1730s after being accused 
of attempting to poison the couple that claimed to own her as well as another 
slave.25 The debates such divisions engendered invoked the institutional 
realities and symbolic power of a British colonial tradition rapidly losing 
confidence in itself as the number of British territories around the world 
shrank. 
 
Between 1957 and 1964, Britain divested herself of 18 of colonies. From 1964 
until 1970, 13 enclaves gained their sovereignty.26 Then, between 1970 and 
1983, 16 further territories, none of which had a population of more than 
505,000, gained independence.27 However, ‘white settler opposition’ to racial 
emancipation and British decolonisation from Central-Southern Africa could 
act as a ‘brake on the process of imperial withdrawal’.28  This meant that 
technically Rhodesia remained a responsibility of Britain until 1980 and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Letter from Acting Governor IAC Kinnear, May 1, 1973, FCO 63/1095, TNA. See also Ball, 
Assassination Culture of Imperial Britain, 244.  
21 See especially files FCO 44/1463, 1464 and 1465, TNA. For work on the police investigation 
however, see MEPO 26/223/1, TNA, and for a first-hand account from one of the police 
officers involved in the investigation, see Darrell, Acel’dama.  
22 Dunn, Downfall of the Bermuda Company, 487. 
23 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 181. 
24 Gazette, February 10, 2009. 
25 Burchall, Freedom’s Flames. 23. 
26 Self, Foreign and Defence Policy, 58. 
27 Drower, Fistful of Islands, xv. 
28 Self, Foreign and Defence Policy, 61. 
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Union Jack was kept (albeit in shrunken form) on the South African flag until 
1994. According to Darwin, colonial remnants clung ‘like barnacles to the old 
hull of Empire’ during the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Of these, Rhodesia, the 
Falkland Islands and Hong Kong ‘caused British governments no end of 
trouble’.29 
 
 
Figure 3: Statue of the executed slave Sally Bassett in the grounds of Hamilton’s Cabinet office 
© Repeating Islands Blog 
 
The linkages between settlers in Kenya, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and 
British metropolitan political processes during late decolonisation have been 
documented thoroughly.30 Attention has also rightly focused on the tortured 
negotiations and ‘bitter divisions between Commonwealth states’ that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Darwin, Unfinished Empire, 380. 
30 See in particular, Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation and Howe, Anticolonialism in 
British Politics, while Benn, Out of the Wilderness, 63, for example, provides a leading 
politician’s first-hand account of the response of the Labour Party to the issues of South 
African apartheid and the prospect of Rhodesian UDI from 1963 to 1967. 
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accompanied Britain’s attempt to deal with the problem of Rhodesia following 
its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965.31   
 
Yet, some historians treat the colonies that remained under the British crown 
after, say, 1968 or 1970 with an air of dismissal. 32 There appears to have been 
an assumption in literature about British foreign policy in the 1970s that the 
dominance of English-descended settlers in what were then called British 
Dependent Territories simply evaporated once the overarching global struts of 
imperial power had fallen away. Self suggests that by the late 1970s all that 
remained of the once mighty British Empire were a few ‘limpet 
colonies…possessing tiny populations and even less political and economic 
significance’.33 
 
In an account that inadvertently lends support to this myth, Craton has 
detailed how the white minority in black-majority Bahamas clung onto power 
during a time of universal suffrage but with the aid of gerrymandering in a 
last-ditch holding-action from the late 1950s until 1967. By 1973, though, the 
Bahamas had become independent and the white minority’s political vehicle, 
the United Bahamian Party, had been disbanded. The question was: would 
Bermuda’s oligarchy fare any better in managing change on their terms? 
 
One of the aims of this study is therefore to re-insert a story of settler 
resistance, and especially race, into the literature about British foreign policy 
and the remaining dependent territories in the 1970s. Drower perhaps 
underplays the effect that racial legacies of colonialism could have on the 
‘prevailing keenness’ by the British to withdraw from colonies during this 
period.34 This omission is part of a wider neglect of the idea that racism was 
‘fundamental to sustaining imperial power’, highlighted by Bush and James.35  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Murphy, By Invitation Only, 249. 
32 Self, Foreign and Defence Policy; Harrison, Finding a Role. 
33 Self, Foreign and Defence Policy, 70. 
34 Drower, Fistful of Islands, 31. 
35 Bush, Imperialism, Race, and Resistance, 18; James, ‘What we put in black and white’, 18-
21. 
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This thesis also aims to re-invoke a sense of the global context that is missing 
from much of the scholarship that has appeared about Bermuda. This has 
been dominated by two trends. The first is an understandably partisan debate 
over Bermudian political history. On the one hand, Bermuda is cast as an 
example of how a racist oligarchy effectively stole power from the island’s 
black majority.36 Some of this work underplays the role of individual agency, 
accident and apathy in British colonialism, while it sees colonial relationships 
and nationalism in Manichean terms. This argument emphasises the ending 
of the British institutional connection at the expense of questions of 
governance. In this view, the British Government ‘planned to double its 
military presence in the region’ [in 1970] and Bermuda ‘played a key role in 
Britain’s plans for continued hegemony in the West Indies’.37 Such assertions, 
however, fly in the face of evidence of Britain’s desire in the period to end at 
least formal colonial relationships in the region. 
 
On the other hand, conservative historians portray Bermuda as a stable and 
prosperous territory that moved into an era of democracy relatively 
peacefully.38 The shortcomings of this approach are that they accept the 
claims that the British Empire was a ‘liberal’ exercise without offering any 
critique.39 Such a liberal view of empire, in James’ words, sees empire as ‘a 
uniquely caring welfare project’ that ‘protected the weak and improved the 
lives of “backward” peoples through enlightened industrial, economic, social, 
and political practices’.40  
 
Bermuda needs scholarship that recognises the complex nature of different 
‘racial’ communities and can view the British Empire as a unique, flawed and 
path-dependent world system. Meanwhile, the mere linkage implicit in the 
term ‘liberal imperialism’ should make one question the very meaning and use 
of the term ‘liberal’. If the British Empire was liberal at times, this surely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda; Hodgson, Second Class Citizens; First Class Men; Brown, 
Struggle for Reform; Brown, Race and party politics, 103-126. 
37 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 56. 
38 See for example Harries Hunter, Beyond the Crossroads, Zuill, Bermuda and her People; 
Williams, Peaceful Warrior, Williams, Man of Stature. 
39 Lewis. The British Empire and world history, 26-8.  
40 James, What we put in black and white, 21.  
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points to the compromising, rationalising use of language implicit in this 
ideology, similar to the ‘situational’ pragmatism implicit in the ideology of 
conservatism.41  
 
This thesis argues that the very exercise of ‘liberal imperialism’ in Bermuda 
exposes how political language consists ‘largely of euphemism, question-
begging and sheer cloudy vagueness’.42 The story this thesis will tell suggests 
that the word ‘liberal’ has been irretrievably tainted. Because of this a new 
concept is needed to describe an ideology that affirms liberal principles but 
does not allow for the manipulation of language to explain away instances of 
the denial of meritocracy, equal opportunity and miscarriages of justice. As 
Orwell argues, ‘political language is designed to make lies sound truthful and 
murder respectable’.43 This thesis argues that liberalism as an ideology 
inherently presupposes the manipulation of language to explain away 
injustice. An alternative may be found amongst theories of Romantic left-
libertarianism which recognise the importance of individual expression, self-
actualisation and notions of justice in parallel with social solidarity.44  
 
Meanwhile, studies also need to place Bermudian political change within the 
framework of a fascinating period of fragmentation and reconfiguration in 
British history, during which resistance to non-white immigration meant 
‘beleaguered whites in the colony came to serve as a means for 
comprehending the racial situation at home’.45 This study aims to address 
these lacunae by focusing on the space where colony and metropole meet: the 
power-sharing dynamics of late colonial government in Bermuda. It will do so 
by bringing local manifestations of racial division, and the connections of 
these with latent sympathies, both in Government House and Whitehall, back 
into the discussion of British policymaking. Drower does acknowledge that 
Dependent Territories did not move to independence in part because they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Altermatt, Conservatism in Switzerland, 583. 
42 Orwell, Politics and the English Language, 115.  
43 Ibid, 120.  
44 See, for example, Wilde, Soul of Man under Socialism. 
45 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 396-7. 
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perceived themselves as having ‘a direct and sentimental link’ with Britain.46 
It is important to analyse this and understand the content and relative force or 
weakness of this link, both in structuring political debate and also in setting 
the tone for how decisions on constitutional change were made. 
 
This thesis will place this late imperial moment in the context of work 
studying the effects of ‘post-colonial globalisation’ and ‘new nationalism’ in 
the former British territories of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South 
Africa.47 This school of thought suggests that traditional accounts of 
decolonisation in Asia and Africa need to be complemented with a study of a 
‘more subtle process [which] affected the cultural mindscape’ of the former 
Dominions. Here, it is argued, a ‘self-styled’ Britishness was naturally more 
pervasive and entrenched than in many African and Asian territories.48 
According to Hopkins, for instance, this was catalysed by a ‘novel synthesis’ of 
‘post-colonial globalisation… [which] washed over and eventually eroded the 
boundaries that had marked out both Greater Britain and the colonial 
dependencies’.49 
 
Because of Bermuda’s divided nature, a study of the island will provide an 
insight into how different approaches to decolonisation interacted with 
individuals and institutions charged with making and influencing key 
decisions. The 1960s and 1970s saw ancient habits and codes in Bermuda 
confronted by both local and international pressures to ‘reinvent’ themselves 
‘in the light of the fading certainties of the imperial world’.50 This was linked 
to a Caribbean-regional phenomenon that ensured that, by the 1940s, ‘the 
intense nationalism and anti-colonialism which marked the African and Asian 
colonies had not developed’ as powerfully.51  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Drower, Fistful of Islands, 62.  
47 See Davidson, De-Dominionisation of Australia; Ward, ‘Post-Imperial’ Australia; Hopkins, 
Rethinking decolonisation; Ward, Echoes of Empire; Østergaard Nielsen and Ward, Cramped 
and restricted at home?; see also the Embers of Empire project at the University of 
Copenhagen (http://embersofempire.ku.dk/) for new research being conducted in this area. 
48 Ward, Post-Imperial Australia, 1. 
49 Hopkins, Rethinking Decolonisation, 216.  
50 Ward, Post-Imperial Australia, 1. 
51 Johnson, British Caribbean, 617. 
	   20	  
Parkinson argues, meanwhile that in the British West Indies, ‘the common law 
legal tradition was not viewed with distrust, as was the case in much of Africa, 
but was deemed to be the fount of justice’.52 This is grossly overstating the 
case, since the colonial justice system was also viewed by many as a racist 
institution, which, as in South Africa, ‘enabled white citizens to engage in high 
levels of private violence with little fear of punishment’.53 However, the 
comparatively later and weaker growth of nationalism, combined with a more 
deeply-rooted British legal culture, may have coincided with demographic and 
institutional factors to weigh in favour of what the author calls affinity 
decolonisation - that is an approach dominated by racial and cultural 
attitudes. This may have reflected a ‘penchant for euphemism’ in articulating 
white supremacy through the coded use of words such as ‘stability’, 
‘responsibility’, ‘efficiency’, ‘influence’ and ‘moderation’.54 
 
However, this thesis also argues that pragmatic decolonisation – relating to 
conceptions of strategic, economic or more general global interests - also had 
an influence in determining action. In attempting to unpack these concepts, it 
is important to acknowledge that ideas of shared heritage could be closely 
linked to ideas of shared interest. Meanwhile, both British and American 
strategic interests were at stake in Bermuda, while officials also believed 
Britain’s global prestige and reputation could be affected by what happened 
there.  
 
This was a time of riots, in 1965, 1968, 1970 and 1977, executions, 
assassination and rising crime. The operation of the security state and of the 
systems of both colonial justice and mercy are a subject of focus, as 1976 saw 
two men tried for five murders and then hanged on December 1, 1977. That 
these hangings immediately sparked riots in which three people died suggests 
the new Responsible Government constitution of 1968, and the granting of 
universal suffrage in the 1960s, did not address the racial divisions that 
festered at the heart of the Bermudian polity. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonisation (networked e-book). 
53 Evans, Cultures of Violence, 211. 
54 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 401. 
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This introduction will suggest that the dynamics affecting the process of 
decolonisation may have caused two key processes to occur. Firstly, the 
unique dynamics of oligarchical power in Bermuda, complemented by an 
inward-looking government in the metropole, may have led to British 
interests and responsibilities becoming marginalised vis-à-vis the still 
powerful white minority. In this context, British ministers and civil servants 
seem to have been unwilling to take the risks necessary to honour Britain’s 
historically-accrued responsibilities on the island by addressing fundamental 
political iniquities. They also seem to have been inclined to escape blame for 
this failure through the use of legalistic defences and by pointing to ideas of 
decline and the exigencies of short-term political survival. 
 
It is suggested in this thesis that the pursuit of ‘good government’ was an 
important objective of British civil servants and politicians. It involved 
something of a paradox, since by 1968 the British government had officially 
passed powers over most domestic matters, except internal security, to local 
ministers in Bermuda. However, the concern with promoting ‘good 
government’ seems to have remained through the 1970s and, if anything, has 
grown since the late 1990s. Under Labour governments, the more politically-
correct term ‘governance’ tends to replace the term ‘government’.55 
 
In Black Power in Bermuda, Swan refers to the type of cooperation that this 
confluence of interests and affinities may have produced as the ‘Bermuda 
Triangle of Imperialism’. He details the way in which local manifestations of 
the Black Power movement were founded as part of an internationally-framed 
reaction to what was seen as institutional racism, political conservatism and 
symbolic displays of imperial power.56 While not agreeing in every respect 
with Swan’s argument, this thesis takes inspiration from his work, and aims to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For instance, the FCO’s 2012 White Paper on Overseas Territories suggested: “Territories 
must ‘abide by the same basic standards of good government as in the UK’”, FCO, Security, 
Success and Sustainability, quoted in Clegg, UK and…Caribbean Overseas Territories, 55; 
See also Clegg and Gold, Decade of progress and prosperity?, 15; for the reference to 
‘governance’, see the FCO’s 1997 White Paper, Partners in Peace and Prosperity, 30, which 
describes Britain’s mission ‘to support the good governance’ of the Overseas Territories. 
56 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 53.  
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emphasise how two sets of evolving power-dynamics interacted and either 
reinforced or challenged one another.  
 
This links to the second theme, in which ‘Britain’s final abandonment of 
empire forced settler societies to refashion their own self-images’.57 This 
process seems to have occurred, moreover, as Britishness itself was being 
refashioned by narratives of international and economic decline twinned with 
the rise of a ‘new morality’ focusing on material possession, individual 
freedom and iconoclasm.58 There was also wider global change in which ‘the 
flow of ideas [was] expanding in volume and increasing in speed, across 
national borders’, and ‘new concepts of universal human rights [were being] 
enshrined in the charter and resolutions’ of the United Nations (UN).59 It will 
be argued that this period presented both a challenge and an opportunity to 
the Bermuda oligarchy to embark on a project of change on their terms; 
something that altered the nature of, but essentially protected, its hold on 
power.  
 
This chapter will analyse relevant secondary literature on the politics of race, 
decolonisation and white settlers while setting out an overall argument. It will 
begin with an account of the centuries-old oligarchy that, in 1963, firmly 
retained control of the 343-year-old legislature, as well as the key segments of 
the economy. This introduction will then suggest political reform in Bermuda 
was occasioned by popular protest and elite adjustment in the context of 
population growth and growing prosperity. These three factors structured 
political debate during the period 1963-1977.  
 
The final stage of the argument will suggest that conceptions of British 
responsibilities and interests (principle and pragmatic approaches) were 
overwhelmed in the process of decolonisation by affinity linkages that 
operated primarily through the office of the British Governor but also between 
colonial and metropolitan political actors and institutions. What Lester calls 
‘imperial networks’ or ‘discourses’ were manifested in the form of collusion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ward paraphrased in Darian-Smith, Grimshaw and Macintyre, Britishness abroad, 10.  
58 Peter Mandler, English National Character, 215-6. 
59 Hopkins, Rethinking Decolonisation, 233.  
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over the constitution, cooperation in the internal security state and shared 
understandings in the operation of processes of justice and mercy. Finally, 
there will be a discussion of methodology and structure.60 
 
 
1. Bermuda’s Oligarchy and its minority complex: 
Racism, insecurity and the Anglo-Saxon connection 
 
Five characteristics defined Bermuda’s white minority in January 1963, the 
start of the period of study: insularity, institutionalised racial discrimination, 
insecurity, violence, and the British cultural connection. In the words of Sir 
Stephen Luke, ‘the unplumbed, salt estranging sea’ remained a powerful 
element dividing Bermuda from its Caribbean and American neighbours.61 
The Atlantic Ocean, however, was also one of the island’s key resources. Both 
white and black Bermudians primarily ‘found economic survival, if not 
prosperity, in the mundane commodities of Atlantic trades’ such as 
shipbuilding, privateering and salt-raking.62 Burchall argues that this may 
have created a ‘silent, unspoken pact’ that ‘enabled black slave crews and 
white masters to go to sea, with each depending on the cooperation of the 
other’.63  
 
Because it was dependent largely on slavery, however, Brown has called 
Bermuda an example of ‘racially-structured capitalism’, involving 
paternalism, ‘meshed with racism’ which was ‘the ideological apparatus 
implemented to justify the degradation of people of African dissent’.64 
Indentured servitude for blacks began in 1616, only seven years after the first 
settlers arrived. This quickly evolved into a barbaric system of chattel slavery 
whose victims were black.65 By the early 19th century, blacks formed a majority 
in Bermuda. Despite the emancipation of slaves in 1834, segregation and 
discrimination in employment, leisure, housing, education and a restricted 
property franchise, continued to ensure deep divisions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Lester, Imperial Networks, 4.  
61 Cox-Alomar, Anglo-Barbadian Dialogue, 672. 
62 Mancke reviews Jarvis, In the Eye of all Trade, 672. 
63 Burchall, Fine as Wine, 112. 
64 Brown, Race and Party Politics, 9.  
65 Paquette, Review of Bernhard, Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 479. 
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Racial division was the product of a dominant oligarchy that controlled 
Bermudian economic life and its legislative chamber, the House of Assembly. 
This was a Caribbean phenomenon in which ’intersecting ideologies of Empire 
and race…had long been internalised’ and ‘wealth was coterminous with 
whiteness’.66 The oligarchy that this produced was also insecure. Writing 
about Europeans in Rhodesia, Kennedy suggests that the distinguishing 
feature of settler culture was to be found ‘not in the cherished values of the 
settlers’ heritage, but in the centripetal forces that distorted that heritage by 
securing it against all change’.67 “To be white was to be privileged, but it was 
also to be conscious of the tenuous and exclusionary character of that 
privilege.”68 The insecurity of the Bermudian oligarchy was focused on both 
the facts of the island’s remoteness and size, but also on demographics.69 Fear, 
however, was based on irrational paranoia rather than experience. Unlike the 
United States or Jamaica, Bermuda experienced ‘no recorded slave rebellions 
after 1761’ although there were several alleged plots before this, for instance in 
1656 and 1731.70 
 
Bermuda’s demographics are fundamental to understanding the culture of her 
oligarchy and the dynamics of her race relations. Bermuda’s white population 
was larger proportionally than other islands of similar or larger size in the 
Caribbean vicinity. By the 1670s, in the sugar colony of Barbados, the island 
with one of the largest white minorities, there were 44,000 backs to 21,000 
whites. In Bermuda, there were 1,500 blacks and 4,500 whites.71  
 
By 1731, whites made up about 57.2 per cent of the population,72 while in 
1834, Bermuda’s population of 10,000 had a white majority of about 5,200 to 
4,800.73 By 1968, just over 35 per cent of Bermuda’s overall population was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Johnson, British Caribbean, 597 and 599-600. 
67 Kennedy, Islands of White, 192.  
68 Ibid, 6.  
69 Bernhard, Slaves and slaveholders in Bermuda, 83. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Op. cit, 66. 
72 Op. cit, 216-217. 
73 Jones, Bermuda: Five Centuries, 86. 
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white.74  In contrast, in the Bahamas in 1953, people of Anglo-Saxon or 
European descent consisted of only 12.6 percent of the entire population.75 
The existence of a black majority in Bermuda from the early 19th century 
onwards led overtly racist oligarchs in the House of Assembly to ‘virtually 
double’ the property value qualifications for voting just before slaves were 
emancipated in August 1834.76  
 
Another feature characterised the culture of Bermuda’s white settlers: racially-
infused Britishness that had a defensive air to it. It was linked to insecurity. 
There are parallels with elites in other British Caribbean territories. Guyana’s 
white minority, as the ‘principle bearers of British civilisation….in a ‘sea of 
blackness’ felt physically and culturally vulnerable’. As a result, they 
‘harboured a psychological need to reassure themselves…that they were still 
British’.77 Lester shows how this Britishness had a global dimension; it was 
formed not just locally but also in ‘trans-imperial discourse’ in response to a 
‘critique elaborated by British humanitarians’.78  
 
Many white Bermudians took part, or expected their children to take part, in 
this identification. From 1905 until 1958, for example, celebrations of Empire 
Day, as in Malta, Gibraltar and Australia, were held in Bermuda’s schools.79 
According to Johnson, this was a Caribbean-wide phenomenon following the 
death of Queen Victoria in January 1901, in which schools ‘continued the 
tradition of presenting British monarchs as ‘all-knowing and all-caring’.80 
There is evidence Bermuda was regarded, at least by her oligarchy and British 
expatriates, as having similarities with Britain’s settled colonies, on the same 
lines as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
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2. Bermudian political reform in the midst of popular 
protest, growing prosperity and demographic change  
 
In the 1950s, legal segregation permeated Bermuda. Burchall describes how at 
white-owned movie theatres blacks ‘were only allowed to sit downstairs’ and 
‘down front and on the sides’, while the black-owned movie theatres ‘could 
only get old re-runs, and late runs and played-out movies’. Meanwhile, ‘almost 
all table service restaurants were closed to blacks’, as were most hotels. 
Schools were also segregated.81 Bermudian political change and the 
parameters of debate were structured by three key factors – protest, 
population growth and prosperity. Firstly, political change in this period 
would not have happened in the way it did without civil rights 
demonstrations, labour confrontations and lobbying in parliament. A protest 
movement amongst black Bermudians took inspiration from the Civil Rights 
Movement in the United States.  
 
In June 1959, activists led by the Progressive Group stirred a successful 
boycott of white-owned theatres that led to their desegregation.82 Burchall, 
who took part in the boycott as a 17-year-old, notes that the demonstration 
‘attracted much Police attention’ and ‘there was an exciting air of danger with 
a feeling of revolution’. In Burchall’s view the Progressive Group ‘galvanised 
black Bermudians and created a strong impetus and desire for change’. 83 
 
Contextual factors also contributed to the atmosphere in which political 
changes were made and also became entrenched in political debate. Cox-
Alomar argues that a similar ‘confluence’ of ‘powerful catalysts’, including a 
tourism boom, economic and social development and rising prosperity ‘led to 
constitutional reforms that enabled ‘Barbados to go it alone’.84 Similar 
changes were occurring in Bermuda. Firstly, the island’s population more than 	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doubled from 20,12785 in 1931 to 52,610 in 1971.86 Part of this population 
growth was linked to the government’s active focus on European immigration 
in the post-war years.87 As Brown argues, during the 1960s, the number of 
non-Bermudians on the island increased by about 66 percent. Of this increase, 
83 per cent was of European descent.88  
 
However, this population boom was also connected with the boom in tourism 
that produced unequally distributed prosperity. Although the first signs of 
Bermuda becoming a prime tourist location were seen in the early 1880s, the 
tourism boom did not really begin until the 1920s.89 In that decade, a 
community of about 400 black Bermudians, mainly farmers, fishermen and 
boat-builders living in Tucker’s Town, ‘were forced out to make way for the 
creation of an exclusive enclave for wealthy white American tourists’. Acts 
such as this [which] laid the foundation for Bermuda’s success in tourism for 
most of the 20th Century’, also laid the foundations for more discrimination, 
namely the 1930 Hotel Keepers Protection Act, which gave hotels the right to 
turn away black and Jewish guests.90  
 
Anxieties and opportunities associated with the growth in tourism would have 
the potential to tap into some of the most painful corners of Bermuda’s racial 
divide. By the 1950s, conservative Members of the Colonial Parliament 
(MCPs) such as Sir Henry Tucker, who went on to head the UBP and served as 
Bermuda’s first Government Leader between 1968 and 1971, were pointing to 
the prejudices of American tourists as justification for allowing the 
continuation of segregation in the island’s hotels.91 Tucker’s excuses were as 
craven and bigoted as they were inaccurate. After blacks won basic civil rights 
in the 1960s, the industry continued to grow at breakneck speed. The number 
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of visitors to the island had risen from 71,000 in 1950 to 193,000 in 1962.92 
Over the next ten years the figure more than doubled. To put this in regional 
perspective, the much larger island of Barbados welcomed 35,535 visitors in 
1960, 64,418 in 1965 and 91,000 in 1967.93 Bermuda’s boom continued in the 
1970s. Between 1972 and 1979, the period considered to be the most 
successful period of Bermudian tourism, arrivals jumped from 420,950 a year 
to a stunning 599,145 per annum.94 By the time the tourism decline started in 
the 1980s, Bermuda had begun to carve out a new lucrative position as a 
centre of global reinsurance. 
 
Thus, Bermudian political change took place in the context of rising yet 
unequally distributed prosperity. A Colonial Office report in June 1964: “The 
result [of the tourism boom] is a high national income, a high standard of 
living for all, high population densities and full employment.”95 According to 
Stewart, Bermuda’s relative prosperity rested on the ‘performance of the 
tourist industry and [from the early 1980s] international business’.96  Both 
Bermuda’s prosperity and artificially managed population growth through 
expatriate immigration became key components in conservative political 
discourse during the period 1963 and 1977. Demands for constitutional reform 
and anxieties over internal security were filtered through a lens that tied fear 
of racial emancipation to Bermuda’s identity as a ‘thriving tourist resort’ and 
the island’s perceived need for its ‘steady and continuous’ expansion.97 In the 
view of King, ‘civil disorder’ was seen as having ‘the potential to damage …the 
tourism and international business on which Bermuda’s economy entirely 
depend[ed]’.98  
 
However, because prosperity was ‘structurally dependent’ on the importation 
of foreign workers, immigration also had the power to threaten the oligarchy’s 
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hold on power.99 This is because it formed a hinge point between questions of 
prosperity in an increasingly globalised and competitive economy100 and 
cleavages of race, Britishness and other questions of identity. These tapped 
into issues of political disenfranchisement, labour relations and resentment 
towards the island’s police force. Because this force was predominantly white, 
male and expatriate, it became ‘an identifiable focus of pro-independence 
sentiment and resistance’.101 King and Sigler argue that, across the remnants 
of empire, police forces became ‘symbols of colonial power’, which made them 
attractive to some conservative officials who saw them as a pliable tool with 
which to manage security.102 
 
This thesis argues that prosperity and immigration became two sides of a 
same coin of Bermudian political debate. In 1963 and 1964, two political 
parties were founded to take shape this debate. The Progressive Labour Party 
(PLP) founded in February 1963 was set up by progressive activists in a bid to 
challenge conservative MCPs (Members of the Colonial Parliament), all 
independents at that point, at the polls in the May 1963 election. After the PLP 
won six of the nine seats it contested, the United Bermuda Party (UBP) was 
founded in August 1964 with Bank of Bermuda chairman Tucker as its leader.  
 
After being founded in August 1964, the UBP went on to win eight successive 
elections between 1968 and 1998. The UBP’s journey within this period also 
might be understood as part of the elaboration of an identity that depended on 
incumbency and oligarchical entrenchment, as well as on the colonial 
connection. Arguably, this was being attenuated by ’the destruction of the core 
concept of Britishness’ that Hopkins argues occurred during this period.103  
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Figure 4: Sir Henry Tucker, Government Leader of Bermuda (and leader of the 
United Bermuda Party), from May 1968 until December 1971.  
© Gordon Phillips, First, One Thousand Miles…:Bermudian Enterprise and the Bank of 
Bermuda, (Cambridge, 1992). 
 
 
 
As the debate over reforms to the Parliamentary Act 1945 had raged in the 
early 1960s, one member of the House of Assembly reminded fellow 
parliamentarians of the ‘almost dominion-like status’ that Bermuda had 
enjoyed over the previous 280 years.104 Through constitutional means that 
entrenched the oligarchy’s hold on power, now with the benefit of a nominally 
democratic overcoat, the elite discourse that surrounded Bermuda’s political 
journey took on an air of ‘de-dominionisation’.105 This entailed an ‘ambiguous 
emergence from the imperial era’, something of a ‘subtle process [which] had 
begun to alter the cultural mindscape of countries that had once identified 
with Empire and Britishness’.106 However, because the island’s majority had 
every reason to reject this forced heritage, a clash was in the making. 
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It was in the 1960s and 1970s that Bermudian Britishness ostensibly began to 
slip in influence, even among the oligarchy. For example, there was the 
symbolic change in the name of the public holiday on May 24. As in the rest of 
the British Empire, Queen Victoria’s birthday had from 1905 been celebrated 
as Empire Day. It was renamed Commonwealth Day in 1958. By 1979, 
however, this holiday had been renamed Bermuda Day, which is still 
celebrated on May 24 with a marathon and a float parade through the capital 
city of Hamilton.107 The day ceased to be Commonwealth Day in the 1960s. 
Commonwealth Day moved again in the mid-1970s to the second Monday in 
March. On similar lines, Ward has pointed to how ‘new nationalism’ in the 
1960s across territories such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and even in 
Scotland, may have reacted to the decline of metropolitan Britain and of the 
Commonwealth with a focus on civic institution-building. These territories 
‘did not actively struggle for liberation from imperial rule’ but ‘exhibited 
profound nationalist tendencies that would transform their civic 
landscapes’.108  
 
It is uncertain whether Bermuda’s ruling oligarchy was consciously influenced 
by the apparent need to ‘move the idea of the nation beyond the bounds of 
Britishness’.109 It may be difficult to argue that Bermuda exhibited ‘profound 
nationalist tendencies’, although the nominally pro-independence PLP did 
consistently win between 33 and 45 per cent of the vote in elections between 
1968 and 1976. A referendum in August 1995, boycotted by the majority of 
PLP supporters, was ‘clearly won’ by opponents of independence by a majority 
of 74.1 per cent to 25.9 per cent, on a turnout of just under 59 per cent.110  
 
The rejection of independence could have been as much about ‘cost and 
benefit’ assessments as it was about sentimental ties. “The British 
constitutional link was thought to underwrite the political stability which the 
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territory’s economy was believed to need to flourish.”111 Thus, the claim to 
prosperity and oligarchical incumbency may have been linked to the 
subconscious fallback on a buttress of Britishness. This supervening 
ideological context implied white supremacy in cultural terms if not overtly in 
a strict racial sense. Moreover, this linkage seems to have played a part in 
forming the complex bundle of attitudes with which key actors approached the 
prospect of British decolonisation. 	  
3. Affinity-based, Pragmatic or Principled: Three 
discourses of decolonisation 
 
This thesis sets out a typology of three discourses of decolonisation. All of 
these relate to differences in what the British Empire, and consequently the 
prospect of decolonisation, would have meant to individuals who made and 
influenced key decisions. One or a combination of them may have, in the 
words of Wiener, ‘exert[ed]…pressure’ on the way in which decisions were 
made.112  
 
The first discourse of decolonisation is a normative one that may have seen 
the empire as a vast burden of duty and responsibility – a trust or a bundle of 
legacies. This decolonisation of principle relates to the notion of imperial 
trusteeship in which British decision-makers saw themselves as holding a 
moral responsibility to act for the welfare of the colonies. However, a 
normative approach could also signify the recognition of imperial legacies of 
racism that, it was suggested, entailed Britain taking a more, not less, 
interventionist stance in colonial affairs before decolonisation could be 
completed. As Howe argues, in lobbying to tackle the racist legacies of British 
imperialism, anticolonialist campaigners became ‘retrospective captives to an 
ideology of trusteeship which they had never accepted’.113 
 
The second discourse of decolonisation is one that places emphasis on 
strategic, economic or more diffuse ‘global’ interests, and an appeal to 	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national ego and prestige that it believed to be linked to such notions. This will 
be called pragmatic decolonisation. Colonial policy during the 1940s began to 
be ‘scrutinised from the broader perspectives of national interest’.114 
Reference to national interests is common throughout the historiography of 
decolonisation. Gallagher and Robinson, for example, suggest that 
‘throughout the Victorian period Responsible Government was withheld from 
colonies if it involved sacrificing or endangering British paramountcy or 
interests’.115 More recently, Clegg argues:  
 
If independence is not an option [in Overseas Territories], the UK 
government must gain reassurance that greater autonomy for 
the territories will not jeopardise its interests.116  
 
Interests could be political, cultural, economic or strategic but could also 
relate to more nebulous ideas such as prestige or ‘influence’. Hyam suggests 
that decolonisation accelerated during the 1960s because Labour ministers 
especially considered it was ‘now…threatening [Britain’s] prestige and 
reputation, and becoming a liability’.117 However, notions of influence could, 
but did not always, relate to affinity-based decolonisation in denoting shared 
cultural understandings. 
 
The final discourse relates to feelings of affinity, or alternatively the 
alienation, that actors might feel in relation to common and contested 
identities of Britishness or race. Ward argues that the Wind of Change speech 
by Macmillan in February 1960 came at a ‘decisive moment in a long-standing 
dialogue about Britain’s obligations to “kith and kin” abroad’.118 Kith and Kin 
means ‘blood relatives or members of one's own nation or race’.119 It is 
important to study how much influence such affinities, whether cultural, 
racial or both, could exert as orienting mechanisms in influencing 
decolonisation.  	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While constitutional reform and justice processes seem to have led to a 
critique of Bermudian decolonisation on anticolonialist, moral responsibility 
grounds, overarching policy seems to have been shaped more by an affinity-
based approach, which emphasised linkages between Government House, 
UBP ministers and certain civil servants in Whitehall. This captured the 
pragmatic approach by cloaking itself in its language; in notions of 
metropolitan decline and reconfigured priorities. It had to express itself 
through this language, moreover, because the language of overt white 
solidarity was becoming rightly ostracised from elite discourse, as is evoked by 
Enoch Powell’s removal from the Conservative shadow cabinet following his 
explosive ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech in April 1968.120 The affinity-based 
approach was also bolstered by the decentralised, institutional realities of 
empire. As this introduction will go on to argue, a habitual, although by no 
means uniform, collusion between Governors, local politicians and certain 
London-based officials dominated the course of Bermudian ‘de-
dominionisation’ more than any appeal to notions of wider British interest, 
international prestige or historical responsibility. 
 
 
3.1 Principled decolonisation 
 
The first type of decolonisation may have been more normative in 
emphasising espoused principle, over interest or affinity/alienation. This 
suggests decision-makers such as MPs, ministers and civil servants may have 
used as a guide for their actions the rhetoric that increasingly accompanied 
the operation of foreign and colonial policy from the 1950s onwards. This 
could include vocal commitments to democracy121, racial equality122 or to 	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individual human rights123. Such a view may also have stemmed from the view 
that ‘colonialism was an evil for British society as well as for the colonised’; it 
was something ‘morally corrupting’ and ‘inimical to the better self of British, 
or English, national identity’. Principled decolonisation was thus part of a 
‘moral case for change’, part of a campaign ‘against hunger, poverty and 
racism’124 and a belief in ‘basic human rights’.125 
 
This thesis will argue, however that such an appeal to ‘principle’ in 
decolonisation also entailed a recalibration of traditional understandings of 
anticolonialism. Decolonisation of principle was the object of Bermuda’s civil 
rights reformers who appealed to the better angels of Britain’s nature from at 
least 1946 onwards. It entailed an argument not for less intervention, but for 
more robust intervention on liberal lines to tackle ancient legacies of racism 
and the iniquities of settler capitalism. Hitchens tentatively labels the 
recognition of this ‘inheritance of responsibility’ as the ‘global man’s 
burden’.126 Principled decolonisation in Bermuda would be characterised by a 
new ‘trusteeship’ of internationalism and by sensitivity both to the legacies of 
division wrought and exacerbated by Britain and the need to face down 
‘attempts by… white settler communities, to retain one or other form of 
control’.127 This thesis will argue, however, that decolonisation of principle 
was overwhelmed both by a real weakening and reorientation of where Britain 
considered its interests to be and by a decolonisation of affinity that could 
sometimes cloak itself in a discourse of pragmatism. 
 
3.2 Pragmatic decolonisation and changing perceptions of 
British interests  
 
A discourse of pragmatism was occasioned by major changes in Britain’s 
world role during the 1960s. These stemmed in part from international 
circumstances but also from problems with the country’s balance of payments. 	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Focus on the potentials for embarrassment on a global dimension were 
increasingly played upon in the expanding UN.128 Britain was also increasingly 
‘ritually harangued’ by ‘anti-western rhetoric’ in the Commonwealth.129 In this 
way, one set of interests, (strategic and economic national interests) were 
pitted against another set (estimations of global influence and prestige).  
 
Secondly, Wilson’s government from 1964 until 1970 ‘squirmed and 
wriggled’130 between conflicting commitments to maintain both full 
employment and the fixed value of Sterling at $2.80, with a symbolic 
devaluation in November 1967. As a result, Britain took the decision in early 
1968 to cut back on her strategic commitments East of Suez, a move that 
symbolised ‘the final collapse of the postwar campaign to remain a great 
power’.131 There was also a ‘sharp surge in the awareness of Britain’s relative 
economic decline’ and a shift in policy by Britain as she turned away from 
empire as a whole as her trade shifted towards Europe.132  
 
Yet these changes were refracted through three particular regional realities 
that characterised the challenges associated with decolonisation in the 
Caribbean. These three factors were: the proximity of the United States, 
occasional local reluctance to countenance independence and fragmentation, 
which encouraged policy incoherence and abortiveness.  
 
Although, for example, £14.4 million worth of British goods were exported 
from Britain to Bermuda in 1976, Britain had no major commercial stake in 
Bermuda.133 But Britain’s strategic role in Bermuda was more substantial, 
although it lessened after the Royal Naval Dockyard, which had been open 
since the early 19th century, shut down in the late 1950s. Interests were 
subsequently linked either to Britain’s use of Bermuda as an air-staging 
facility or to the presence of the United States Air Force and then Naval Base 	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between 1941 and 1995. ‘Ground stations for controlling submarine listening 
devices were located in… Bermuda’ while ‘American aircraft which observed 
naval movements in the North Atlantic were allowed to operate from 
Bermuda’.134  
 
This American dimension was important. Britain was compelled to care how 
the Americans felt about the way in which she decolonised, particularly as the 
Cold War ‘change[d] political calculations’ so that ‘by the late 1950s an 
overriding concern was the need to manage transfers of power in the manner 
least likely to facilitate the spread of communism’.135 As a result, American 
perceptions were influential in helping to speed up or slow down 
constitutional evolution in the Caribbean.136 
 
Secondly and thirdly, it must be noted that decolonisation policy in the 
Caribbean displayed two particular features of reactivity, exacerbated by 
fragmentation, and a local reluctance on the part of small islands to 
countenance independence. By 1991, Britain still had responsibility for 14 
overseas territories, six of which were to be found in the Caribbean or North 
Atlantic region. It was between 1979 and 1982 that the ‘era of decolonisation’ 
ended and a ‘new era of colonial permanence’ began.137 If true, this suggests 
Britain was far from being able to dictate the pace or shape of events during 
the period of late decolonisation.  
 
The reluctance of colonies such as Bermuda to countenance independence in 
the face of Labour’s drive to disengage and refocus on domestic matters was 
met with a pragmatic response in the late 1960s. In the words of 
Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson: “The wishes of the people 
concerned must be the main guide to action.”138 Although during the 1970s, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Drower, Fistful of Islands, 12; for a fairly comprehensive account of especially the later 
years of the the United States military presence in Bermuda until 1995, see Grearson, USS 
Bermuda; for an account of the way in which the presence of the US base could affect both 
criminal court proceedings and race relations in Bermuda, see High, Racial Politics of 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 77-105. 
135 Stockwell, British Empire, 279.  
136 Cox-Alomar, Anglo-Barbadian Dialogue. 
137 Drower, Fistful of Islands, xi. 
138 Drower, Fistful of Islands, 20 and xv. 
	   38	  
Britain’s ‘wish to be rid of the dependent territories grew’, Britain was also 
committed to not forcing colonies into independence if they did not wish it.  
 
This reluctance helped to engender a series of ill-fated and disjointed policy 
solutions. The West Indies Federation had been seen as ‘a method by which 
Britain's financial responsibility for the smaller, less-developed territories 
would be gradually shifted to the larger islands’.139 With the collapse of this 
entity in May 1962, British policy was essentially fragmented, forced to deal 
with all of the islands, some of which did not want independence, as separate 
entities. Similarly, a new policy of creating more autonomous Associated 
States in the Eastern Caribbean from 1967 onwards floundered following the 
much-criticised British military intervention in Anguilla in March 1969.140  
 
Local reluctance and fragmentation combined to breed incoherent and rather 
ad hoc constitutional solutions. In 2000, former Governor of Montserrat 
David Taylor wrote a scathing critique of the constitutional model of Overseas 
Territories, claiming that the division of powers it encompassed effectively 
sabotaged Britain’s ability to head off and manage potential crises while 
‘provid[ing] continuous opportunities for turf wars’ between local ministers 
and Government House.141  
 
As the later 1960s and especially the middle and later 1970s were a period 
during which Britain was keen on relinquishing its remaining colonial 
commitments, much would depend on how much weight Britain placed on its 
strategic interest in Bermuda vis-à-vis the embarrassment it could suffer in 
the UN as a result of oligarchical excesses. Yet this would also depend upon 
the remaining power of the various repositories of affinity located in imperial 
networks of Britishness.  
 
This section has suggested that various conceptions of British interest, and of 
the relative importance of specific interests vis-à-vis perceptions of Britain’s 
wider global role, could play a powerful part in shaping decolonisation 	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approaches. The practice of choosing successors was encouraged by the 
United States, for instance during British decolonisation from British Guiana. 
But it could also lead to tensions at the international level because it could 
play, should such policies lead to ongoing and expanding security 
commitments, into a sense of strategic ‘overstretch’.142 Meanwhile, where it 
was believed British interests would be served by territories moving to 
independence, the FCO was faced with a dilemma of having to convince 
territories they could make in on their own.  
 
 It will be argued that, in the case of Bermuda, this desire helped Britain to 
agree to confidence-boosting constitutional engineering proposals for local 
governments that were incoherent. Disengagement of pragmatism provided 
the overriding institutional context in which decolonisation was justified and 
conceived. However, as the next sub-section will argue, while notions of 
British interest and pragmatic withdrawal were significant motives for action, 
in Bermuda’s case assessments of British interest could be overwhelmed by 
affinity-based decolonisation, in part because of the differences in 
interpretation of what interests meant across the different levels of the 
colonial state.  
 
3.3 Affinity-based decolonisation 
 
The language of pragmatism does not tell the whole or even most of the story 
of late British decolonisation in Bermuda because race was always lurking 
beneath the surface. James points to the way in which Darwin underplays ‘the 
racial implications of British imperial policy’ in his analysis of Seretse 
Khama’s exile from Bechuanaland.143 However, Darwin does perceptively note 
the way in which archives could ‘turn their readers into captives’ through ‘the 
self-serving official minute [which was] insidiously transformed into historical 
narrative’.144 A focus on interests may have been the received Whitehall 
discourse of decolonisation but it did not necessarily embody the source of 
motivations and sympathies. While the role of racism in both imperial 	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expansion and disengagement has been theorised and contested,145 the official 
record was cultivated to reflect an ‘image of orderliness’, while in places such 
as Northern Rhodesia ‘whites felt no Wind of Change’ and high-sounding 
rhetoric left ‘the issue of race to fester’.146  
 
Despite this there has been a resurgence in efforts to theorise an idea of 
whiteness as a political organising function in its own right.147 For instance, 
racial attitudes ‘changed and hardened’ in conjunction with events such as the 
1857 Indian Rebellion and the 1865 Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica, 
meaning notions of coloniser and whiteness became intermingled.148 Whites 
were deemed to be constituents of what was known as Greater Britain, 
‘precisely because they were not natives’.  As Schwarz suggests, ideas of 
rarefied white colonisers who were repositories of British cultural superiority, 
juxtaposed against a broad mass of ‘natives’, may have been a structural 
component in notions of imperial liberalism:  
 
The liberality of one, based on an imagined kinship, was a 
function of the illiberality of the other, based on an equally 
imaginary conception of inherent racial authority.149 
 
The question of how this ‘imagined kinship’ affected decolonisation in 
Bermuda is fascinating because there ideas of indigeneity were not simple 
dichotomies. There were no native people in Bermuda and whites arrived a 
few years before blacks. As a result of the history of slavery and segregation, 
race relations were in some respects, therefore, more akin to those in the 
Caribbean where native populations had been largely decimated and 
descendants of African slaves formed a majority of the population. 
 
However, as a result of Bermuda’s continued colonial status, the uprootedness 
and dissonance of a race relations characterised by slavery led to a 	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confrontation with transnational imperial identities of whiteness that gained 
strength from the idea of its international element. British-infused and legally 
formalised white power seems to have been consciously refashioned into an 
identity of repressed fragility and fear, expressed in the language of prosperity 
and order, as Britain seemed to evolve into a decidedly ‘irritated’ and 
‘impatient’ imperial power.150 
 
By the 1960s, notions of bounded whiteness could still impact approaches to 
decolonisation. If racism did not play an active part here, it at least seemed as 
if some British civil servants were not averse to an idea of the Federation as a 
‘white man’s country’ in which ‘Africans [would] never be likely to achieve full 
political equality in any foreseeable time’.151 Meanwhile, Lewis argues that 
during his ostensible attempt to revive Britain’s ‘liberal image’ with the Wind 
of Change tour, Macmillan displayed little inclination to listen to African 
nationalists while visiting Northern Rhodesia.152 Visiting Bermuda in 1957, 
Macmillan summed his own insouciance when he noted: “I heard no 
complaints of treatment which bore unjustly on the colonial citizens of the 
Island.”153 
 
At least after 1960, however, there was very little open talk of ‘pride of race’ in 
discussions of the colonies of settlement.154 This is not to say that progressive 
forces won out. Watts argues that at least a subconscious sympathy to ‘kith 
and kin’ may have been used by the Wilson government as a ‘convenient 
pretext to avoid the use of force’ against rebellious Europeans in Rhodesia in 
the mid-1960s.155 It may be more accurate to argue this was a period in which 
changing perceptions of the utility of the Commonwealth for notions of British 
prestige were interacting with evolving perceptions of race in Britain as ‘the 
steady demise of Empire was instrumental in reconfiguring the multifarious 
meanings of Britishness’.156 	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This study will not suggest that the racism implicit in the notion of affinity 
always operated as a conscious force. Such an attitude may have been as 
powerful for what it ruled out as it was for the actions it engendered. A 
particularly interesting parallel for Bermuda’s case may have been the 
situation in Rhodesia. It has been argued that the white supremacist regime 
was something the British believed they could ‘tolerate’ in light of what it 
believed were the alternatives of ‘instability and authoritarianism which 
rapidly began to characterise many post-independence African states’.157 In 
this way, the use of force was ruled out because it was believed the British 
body politic and the higher echelons of the military could not countenance it. 
In September 1963, Labour MP Tony Benn suggested, with regards to 
Southern Rhodesia, that he could see in his party ‘all the elements that led the 
French socialists astray on Algeria and it is rather frightening’.158 
 
It will be argued that in the case of Bermuda, legitimate grievances of the 
island’s black majority, who had been shut out of the democratic process, were 
undervalued or dismissed by both London and Government House as a result 
of the continuing power of a transnational identity of whiteness. This impeded 
practical action precisely because the empire was decentralised and 
dependent upon the actions of Governors and locally-based officials more 
than on any centrally directed policy. It is towards the role of these white, 
English ‘men on the spot’ that this introduction now turns. 
 
3.4  Governors looking down from Langton Hill:  Evolving 
affinities, the pursuit of divergent interests and continuing 
responsibilities 
 
Constitutional reform and ‘post-colonial globalisation’ may have formed a 
part of the complex views of the four men who filled the office of Governor 
during the period under study. Significantly, three of the men who occupied 
the office were former Conservative MPs (Lord Martonmere 1964-1972, Sir 	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Richard Sharples 1972-3 and Sir Edwin Leather 1974-1977) while one of them, 
Sir Peter Ramsbotham (1977-1980), was the son of a Conservative MP but had 
been Britain’s Ambassador to the United States before his precipitous 
demotion. It will be suggested during this thesis that the personalities of the 
different Governors profoundly affected their assessments of both British 
interests and responsibilities as well as more fluid feelings of cultural affinity 
or alienation. The role of Governors was defined by three characteristics of 
image, constitutional responsibilities, and the shaping power they could apply 
to Whitehall’s perceptions of colonial realities.  
 
Hyam evokes something of the elitist romance attached to residence in 
Bermuda’s Government House when he describes the ‘studied remoteness, 
vigorous presentation and demi-god aloofness’ implicit in the imperial 
project.159 In contrast, Stockwell suggests that Governors could be ‘downright 
nasty’.160 Yet the job of Governor in Bermuda increasingly demanded ‘creative 
leadership’, riddled as it was by contradictions that pitted a rhetoric of self-
rule and autonomy against a desire by territories such as Bermuda to ‘have 
their cake and eat it’.161  
 
 
Figure 5: Ariel shot of Bermuda’s Government House, Pembroke Parish. © Gordon Hireson, 
Kiwanis Club of Bermuda pictorial tribute to Sir Richard Sharples: Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief (Bermuda, 1973). 	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In this battle of wills, Governors were on the front line. From the early 17th 
century until the 1960s, the Governor had, as in the Bahamas and other 
colonies, exercised full executive power at the head of an Executive Council, 
from which he and other members could initiate most legislation. Both the 
Executive Council (based on a previous and powerful Governor’s Council) and 
an upper legislative chamber called the Legislative Council were created by 
Letters Patent in the 1880s. 
 
Williams notes that a survey of Governors conducted by the Colonial Office in 
the 19th century revealed that many sounded ‘exhausted, beleaguered and 
ill’.162 Although Ramsbotham suggested to his successor that the job provided 
a good opportunity for hobbies such as bird-watching163, for most of its 
history, Bermuda was no holiday for those posted there. In the late 17th 
century, one Governor had described the island as a ‘pittyfull place ...that 
none but an indigent man is fitt for’.164 Bermuda governors were assaulted by 
settlers on more than one occasion.165 In the 1970s, despite perceptions of 
Bermuda as a ‘peaceful paradise’, the job would get more dangerous, not less. 
 
Apart from a phlegmatic manner in the face of peril, much would depend on 
how these men, three of whom were English and one Canadian, interpreted 
their continually evolving constitutional responsibilities, as it would depend 
on a mixed atmosphere of siege and tranquility. Indeed, as islands gained 
more self-government in the 1960s and 1970s, the position of a once 
influential, if not all-powerful, Governor could be weakened. Governors could 
‘sometimes become isolated and unaware’.166 However, a more important 
question regards how Governors were able to exercise their mix of public and 
private roles alongside the requirement of promoting their territory whilst 
also defending British interests. 	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Finally, even though their powers were curtailed as decolonisation progressed, 
Governors remained important. These diplomats were not just ‘tea-sipping, 
zoo-going, map-gazing, armchair proconsuls’.167 Even if they did struggle to 
balance British and local interests, London officials still ‘hung on the advice of 
the Governor’, who was, in spite of the close contact established by plane and 
phone between Colonial Office and Government House, ‘still in an unrivalled 
position to strike bargains with nationalist politicians’.168 A key source of 
information was the Governor’s Annual Report, usually sent at the end of 
January or beginning of February each year. Sometimes Whitehall was able to 
break through this quasi-dependency, with direct meetings with local 
ministers. Indeed, this practice was to occur more frequently during the 
period under study. However, by far the largest amount of communications 
traffic would be between Government House and Whitehall.  
 
This chapter will suggest that Bermuda’s Governor began the period under 
study in an influential, although not all-powerful, position from which he was 
able to reinforce or refract impulses and directives from London, while he also 
acted as a cipher through which local elites communicated with the metropole. 
This was evoked in three forums of British-Bermudian collusion: 
constitutional reform, the internal security state and through the processes of 
justice and mercy. Even as the Governor’s power was attenuated and lost 
coherence during the period in question, legacies of affinity retained the 
power to structure decolonisation beneath the surface. This process was 
overlain, meanwhile by the evolution of party politics in Bermuda itself and 
the embodiment of a new yet imperfect and contested form of legitimised local 
leadership in the form of the UBP. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
To explore these issues, the author has chosen to pursue three different 
research methods. Firstly, the greatest use has been made by the author of 	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sources in historical archives, both in the United Kingdom and in Bermuda. 
The Bermuda Archives are a comfortable, air-conditioned set of rooms in the 
basement of the Government Administration Building in Hamilton. The 
crucial records examined in these subterranean vaults were mainly the 
memoranda of Executive Council meetings between 1968 and 1976. The 
Bermuda Archives also yielded two valuable microfilms of records from the 
British Government dating from 1970 to 1973.  
 
At the National Archives in London, meanwhile, the author examined 41 files 
of correspondence between London and Bermuda and internal office 
communications written between 1963 and 1977. Most of these were Colonial 
(CO) or Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) records but some were 
from 10 Downing Street or from Metropolitan Police files. Records were rarely 
complete and were often filed arbitrarily. Many appeared to leave key details 
left out, requiring detective work on the part of the researcher, and sometimes 
records and documents were not dated or ascribed to any particular author. 
Finally, records were sometimes clearly slanted, both with regards to 
individual authors but also from an institutional point of view; an 
embodiment of what Benn calls the ‘inner Civil Service network’ which is 
adept at ‘protecting itself’.169 
 
The second type of source relied on in this study are newspaper accounts. 
Records were accessed either at the British Newspaper Library in Colindale, 
London or at the Bermuda National Library, in Hamilton. In total, eight 
newspapers in the UK were studied (The Times, The Guardian, the Daily 
Mail), and four newspapers in Bermuda were accessed. Of the latter, The 
Royal Gazette was the daily newspaper at the time and has the most 
extensive, if highly biased, quotidian account of events. The Royal Gazette’s 
slant is not remedied by reliance on the the weekly Bermuda Sun, which 
during the mid-1970s was edited by someone who later became a UBP MP. 
However, the Bermuda Sun does seem to make more of an effort to provide a 
balanced account of events, both in its framing of news stories and in its 
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comment section. The author also researched the archives of the black-owned 
Bermuda Recorder. 
 
A great deal of caution must be exercised in using press accounts. As well as a 
conscious slant to reporting, framing and editoralising, unintentional biases 
can creep into newspaper accounts. Quotes can often be misheard and events 
poorly recorded. Despite this, newspapers can provide a cumulative portrait of 
an age, not just an account of events as they happened, but also a commentary 
on these events. As long as the potential for bias is taken into account, 
newspapers are an extensive, detailed source that cannot be ignored as a day-
to-day record of events. 
 
The third method of research used by the author was the use of interviews 
with former politicians, journalists, civil servants and soldiers, both in 
Bermuda and in the United Kingdom. In total this involved 23 separate 
interviews with 19 subjects, since three subjects were interviewed on two 
separate occasions. One interview was conducted in the United Kingdom. Of 
the Bermuda subjects, 13 were former parliamentarians (either Members of 
the House of Assembly or Members of the Legislative Council), while two were 
journalists active in the period of study, one was a former senior ranking 
officer in the Bermuda Regiment, while two were civilians (one a former 
teacher and historian; the other a former bank clerk). Four interview subjects 
served as Premier of Bermuda at one time or another and one interview 
subject was a former British Cabinet Minister. 
 
The author believes interviews are invaluable for providing a personal, 
context-laden glimpse into a period. The background provided by each 
interviewee also provided immeasurable contextual information that added to 
the author’s general understanding and feel for the period. In this way, it is 
believed interviews provide an authentic, personal dimension to historical 
events that cannot be completely replicated by documentary audio-visual 
records. However, the author also believes that interviews need to be 
supplemented with documentary evidence so that events can be understood 
from different dimensions, with a gradual attenuation of the effect of bias on 
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the part of the author and interview subjects. It is also hoped that the cross-
referencing of three different research methods will provide a way of filtering 
out inaccuracies. 
 
5. Structure 
 
Two overriding themes will be intertwined throughout this thesis. Chapters 
one, three and five will look at the connected process by which Governors and 
the metropole increasingly lost the ability to set agendas in the Bermuda 
political arena via constitutional evolution and the onset of internal security 
crises. Chapters two and four will look at how a system of party politics 
evolved following electoral reforms in 1963 and 1966, under a new 
constitution in 1968 and a new office of Premier from 1973. Finally, a sixth 
chapter will examine how a mix of affinity and uncertainty on the part of 
Governors induced a distracted and inward-focused metropole, with the help 
of party political exigencies, to permit the last hangings on British soil to take 
place in Bermuda in December 1977. 
  
Chapter one examines the British perspective on Bermuda between 1963 and 
1968 during the last year of the Governorship of Sir Julian Gascoigne and first 
four years of Lord Martonmere’s eight years as Governor until May 1968. 
Firstly, the chapter suggests that both Government House and Whitehall were 
overtly biased towards Tucker’s UBP and gave them a dominating role in 
producing proposals for a new constitution via the forum of a Constitutional 
Conference in November 1966. This support also bolstered the UBP’s ability to 
entrench gerrymandered constituencies in their favour.  This chapter climaxes 
with the enactment of Bermuda’s new written constitution in 1968.  
 
Chapter two will look at the domestic politics of Bermuda during the period 
from 1963 until 1971. The period begins with the passing of a major election 
law reform in January 1963 and ends with the stepping down of Tucker as 
Government Leader in December 1971. This chapter will suggest that the 
creation of the UBP in August 1964 symbolised an establishment reaction to 
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local grassroots demands for civil rights reforms, party political developments 
and international shifts towards racial equality that were being refracted 
through Government House.  The UBP was both a departure from Bermudian 
conservatives’ individualistic culture and an embodiment of oligarchical 
paternalism. Finally, it repressed discussion of racial legacies in favour of its 
quixotic ‘United’ branding and rationalised this with reference to Bermuda’s 
burgeoning tourism industry. 
 
The third chapter will engage in a study of reactions by both local politicians 
and British officials to security issues and violence between 1968 and 1973. 
The period begins in the aftermath of the riots of April 1968 and ends with the 
assassination of Police Commissioner George Duckett in September 1972 and 
Governor Sir Richard Sharples in March 1973. It argues that the oligarchy, in 
the form of the UBP, responded to security challenges by pursuing a ‘stability’ 
agenda, endorsed by London, that assaulted two key civil liberties – the right 
to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial - only recently protected 
in a new bill of rights attached to the 1968 constitution.   
 
The fourth chapter will take the changeover of leadership from Tucker to Sir 
Edward Richards in December 1971 as its starting point in analysing the 
maturing of a new political system emphasising incumbency, secret 
negotiations and leadership but in which the party’s key branding claim of 
‘unity’ was undermined by personal animosities and an attempt at internal 
party lobbying by a UBP Black Caucus. As a result of these and other 
pressures, Premier Jack Sharpe, who had taken over from Richards in 
December 1975, was ousted from the job by his own party in August 1977.  
 
The fifth chapter will focus on the same time period, from December 1971 to 
the summer of 1977, but this time on the British perspective on events. 
Contradictions in the role of ‘man on the spot’ became more difficult to 
manage but also were exposed to the light during the incumbency of one of 
Bermuda’s more flamboyant and controversial Governors, Sir Edwin Leather 
(1973-1977). This was also a period during which Britain became more 
forthright about its policy of accelerated decolonisation. Finally, the chapter 
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critically examines the tortuous process by which Leather’s successor was 
chosen.  
 
The sixth chapter will focus on the process of colonial justice as it was 
exercised in the cases of Larry Tacklyn and Erskine Burrows in 1977. Both 
men had been tried, convicted and sentenced to death following five murders 
between September 1972 and April 1973. The chapter attempts to answer the 
question of why the men’s death sentences were not commuted. It is 
important to find this out for three reasons. Firstly, as there had not been an 
execution in Bermuda since 1943, hanging was an unusual occurrence in 
Bermuda. Secondly, the hangings in December 1977 would spark riots and 
lead to the deaths of two men and one woman in a fire. Thirdly, the practice of 
hanging had been discontinued in Britain in 1965 and banned permanently in 
1969. Why did the British government allow executions to occur in this case, 
when they had effectively been discontinued in territories such as Hong Kong? 
 
It will be suggested that legacies of affinity, institutional racism and 
metropolitan political fragility all played a part in ensuring that this period of 
‘new nationalism’ in Bermuda climaxed with a mixture of state-sanctioned 
and civil violence. This was a period of contradictions; in which racial 
discrimination was addressed but then discussion of race was suppressed with 
appeals to prosperity. It also saw Britain disengaging from her colonies yet 
covertly supporting a calcified oligarchy in its assault on civil liberties. The 
story highlights the image of quotidian orderliness of late British 
decolonisation and also its recurrent lapse into crisis, reaction and 
retrenchment. Finally, Bermuda shows that even a place with one of the 
highest standards of living in the world could not escape unscathed from its 
colonial legacies.   
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Chapter One 
British influence and debates over Bermudian 
constitutional reform, January 1963 - May 1968 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Three themes form the backbone of Chapter One. First it details the process 
by which Bermuda’s constitution was transformed from one that embodied 
the ‘oldest remaining example of governance in the pre-revolutionary 
American colonies’ into a Westminster-style  ‘Responsible Government’ 
democracy where the executive became partially responsible to Bermuda’s 
House of Assembly.1  
 
This was part of a process that had seen several generations of Caribbean 
leaders inducted into the Westminster model and its adaptation to different 
island theatres throughout the 1950s and 1960s.2 Whilst constitutional reform 
in the UK has been ‘evolutionary’ and organic, however, Bermudian 
constitutional change was rather deliberate and vertiginous.3 Codification of 
Bermuda’s constitution proceeded as Britain’s constitution remained 
unwritten, abstruse and virtually impenetrable. The process moreover was 
propelled and shaped by a context of collapsing imperial scenery. 
 
Secondly, this chapter is about the interaction of party political affiliations in 
both the UK and in Bermuda with Gubernatorial power. Records from the UK 
National Archives will be used to show how Bermuda’s Governor, who 
retained full executive power in Bermuda until 1968, worked with the FCO to 
help Tucker become the island’s first Government Leader. It will show how 
Bermuda Governor Lord Martonmere, who served from 1964 until 1972, 
arranged the 1966 Constitutional Conference to support his and Tucker’s 
shared conservative vision of constitutional change. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Report of the Bermuda Constitutional Conference, November 22, 1966, DO 118/365, TNA. 
2 Anthony Payne, Westminster Adapted, 59; Bishop, Slaying the ‘Westmonster?, 420-437.  
3 UCL Constitutional Unit Blog. 
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This chapter is also about the UK political debates that accompanied the 
process of decolonisation both within Whitehall’s changing colonial 
bureaucracy and in the halls of Westminster. It uses Hansard and FCO 
records to analyse how Ministers and MPs debated the dilemmas thrown up 
by issues of entrenched oligarchical power and race in Bermuda. Howe argues 
that ‘anticolonialism’ is defined by five characteristics: the right to national 
self-determination, the interdependence of global struggles for such a goal, 
the belief in the equality of European and non-European cultures, the 
commitment to opposing the colonialism of one’s own nation and the belief 
that colonialism is a ‘necessary consequence of modern capitalism’.4   
 
However, as Porter argues, “The exploitation and extermination that are often 
attributed to British imperialism could be said rather to be the results of a lack 
of imperial control.”5 To this ‘lack of control’ may be added apathy, ‘ignorance 
and complacency’ with regard to intervention.6 This chapter suggests Howe’s 
definition should be supplemented by the suggestion that, in some contexts, 
such as Rhodesia and Bermuda, ‘anticolonialism’ in the later 1960s sometimes 
involved a commitment to more, nor less, intervention, as part of the need to 
tackle the legacies of Britain’s past indulgent or complicit approach to 
rapacious white minorities. 
 
Although, there have been several narrative histories of this period, which rely 
largely on press accounts and on interviews, no in-depth analysis of 
documentation and correspondence between London’s FCO and Bermuda 
during the period of constitutional reform has ever been done. It is important 
that this lacuna is addressed. However, it should be remembered that around 
1.2 million of the most sensitive files relating to the British Empire either 
remain ‘unlawfully’ concealed at the Government’s communications centre at 
Hanslope Park or have been ‘simply destroyed – sometimes shredded, 
occasional dumped at sea, but usually incinerated’.7 While they may not tell 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics, 1-2. 
5 Porter, Absent-minded imperialists, 14. 
6 James argues that ‘popular ignorance and complacency’ were one of the key mechanisms by 
which metropolitan racism operated throughout the British Empire, What We Put in Black 
and White, 20.  
7 Guardian, April 18, 2012 and October 18, 2013. 
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the entire story, however, the files that have been released about Bermuda 
provide new insights into the interaction of decolonisation processes with 
political change.  
 
Bermuda’s constitution became the subject of political dispute in the field of 
party politics that it helped to enshrine as soon as it came into effect in June 
1968. Constitutional change in favour of what had been known as 
‘Responsible Government’ was sold by its champions in the conservative UBP  
as a reform which would ‘safeguard individual rights in a bi-racial society’8, as 
a ‘giant stride forward politically’9, and as a reform that would lead to a ‘more 
streamlined and efficient government’.10 
 
Such claims were contested at the time and remain so. Brown, for instance, 
argues that the new constitution of 1968 placed conservatives ‘in a strong 
position to replicate their hegemony in the new democratic order’.11 Swan 
takes this line of argument further, suggesting that the new constitution was 
foisted upon Bermuda by London’s Privy Council to ‘keep the natives in 
check’.12 Even conservative historians, such as Harries Hunter, concede 
constitutional reform was an act of pragmatism aimed at satisfying ‘the 
desires of the white Bermuda for security’ while going far enough towards 
‘alleviating the grievances of the coloured people so as to check the 
revolutionary feeling in the air.’13  
 
The controversy that raged over the constitution until at least 2009, has 
focused on two issues: the Governor’s continued role in exercising executive 
authority over matters such as internal security, external affairs and defence14 
and, until this situation was altered in 2003, the way in which electoral 
boundary changes were constitutionally-bound to remain delimited within the 
boundaries of Bermuda’s nine parishes. These parishes were drawn up by, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 ET Richards quoted in Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 174. 
9 Dr John Stubbs, quoted in Gazette, April 4, 1968. 
10 Sir Henry Tucker, quoted in ibid, April 20, 1968. 
11 Brown, Struggle for Reform, 118.  
12 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 109. 
13 Harries Hunter, Beyond the Crossroads, 165.  
14 Guardian, June 12, 2009. 
	   54	  
eight were named after, the shareholders in the Bermuda Company that 
governed the island following its settlement in the early 17th century until the 
British crown took over in 1684 (see map below). This chapter (and this 
thesis) will help shed light on these ongoing debates. 
 
Along with attempting to get to grips with the political controversy in which it 
has been claimed by critics that the constitution was ‘foisted on us in 
England’,15 it is important to examine how issues of democracy, sovereignty 
and race were taken up in metropolitan debates about decolonisation during a 
period when the ‘run-down of the formal Empire had already passed the point 
of no return’ and when ‘the British government was coming to terms with the 
full complexity of the legacy of empire’.16  
 
The late 1960s were the moment when a ‘sectional rearguard defence against 
the loss of Empire’ in parts of Britain’s Conservative Party mutated into a 
populist reaction against non-white immigration in the form of Powellism.17 
Meanwhile, Britain’s Labour government from October 1964 until June 1970 
was increasingly subject to ‘bitter recriminations and denunciations from the 
left’18, in part because of the way in which Rhodesia’s UDI had revealed an 
‘embarrassing impotence’ on the part of metropolitan power.19 Bermudian 
constitutional reform offers a glimpse of how colonial legacies collided with 
metropolitan politics as the British Empire rapidly ‘trimmed its sails’.20 
 
The story of Bermudian constitutional reform between 1963 and 1968 is the 
starting point for the overall argument of this thesis, which is put forward in 
two broad themes. One of these relates to the growing freedom of action 
enjoyed by the UBP vis-à-vis Government House and London during a period 
of party politics begun in 1964 that it dominated first informally via an 
unofficial legislative majority and then, from 1968, electorally. The second 
theme relates to the manner in which, due to constitutional shifts, the British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Gazette, May 13, 1972. 
16 Young, Review of Ashton and Louis, British Documents on the End of Empire, 646-7. 
17 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 385. 
18 Howe, Anticolonialism in British politics, 308. 
19 Darwin, Empire Project, 646. 
20 Dubow, Macmillan, Verwoerd and the…‘Wind of Change speech, 41. 
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Government gradually lost its already admittedly circumscribed ability to set 
agendas in Bermuda, while retaining a significant degree of increasingly 
unwelcome responsibility. 
 
 
Figure 6: Satellite image of Bermuda. 
 © Times Group and Bermuda Government, Bermuda: 400 Years of Commerce, (Bermuda, 
2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Map of Bermuda showing parish boundaries.  
             © Keith Archibald Forbes, Bermuda Parishes and Municipalities, 
bermuda-online.org/bermudaparishes.htm 
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This chapter will focus on the second of these themes. It will be argued that 
Britain willingly channeled constitutional reform in a way amenable to the 
UBP for two reasons. Firstly, this bias was a result of racial, cultural and 
political affinity on the part of Bermuda’s Governor between 1964 and 1972, 
Lord Martonmere. Secondly, it was a part of a stability-emphasising approach 
London took towards imperial disengagement from colonies occasioned by 
Cold War sensitivities, the Special Relationship with the US and a 
paternalistic view that amalgamated racism and fears of subversion into a fear 
of what Martonmere would call ‘extreme black elements’. This, however, was 
paralleled by an ambivalence within Britain’s governing Labour Party about 
the nature and implications of decolonisation in societies where Anglicised 
minorities still maintained ‘a firm political and economic grip on the island’s 
major industries and institutions… to the exclusion of blacks’.21  
 
This introduction will start by examining three of the contexts in which reform 
took place from November 1963 onwards. Firstly, the triptych of pre-reform 
colonial power-sharing was balanced on one side by a powerful settler elite 
with a base in ‘the second oldest parliament in the Western Hemisphere’, 
which first met in the town of St George’s in 1620.22 Secondly, this strength 
was offset by British imperial power that was undergoing a process of steep 
transition in the mid-1960s. Finally, these two parts were mediated through a 
third element, the office of Governor.   
  
1.1 The operation of legislative power in Bermuda, January 
1963-May 1968 
 
Control of Bermuda’s legislature by its ruling oligarchy may have helped 
create the ‘channel’ through which demands for change were controlled ‘like 
the cascade in an eighteenth-century jardin sauvage’.23 ‘Effective government’ 
between 1963 and 1968 depended on the ‘cooperation’ of the Governor with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 6. 
22 Horton, Speech to Hamilton Rotary Club, 5. 
23 Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy, 49.  
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the Bermuda House of Assembly. As UK Minister of State Judith Hart noted 
in June 1967, this was because ‘the Legislature is supreme in the field of 
legislation, and because all expenditure needs the approval of the elected 
House of Assembly’.24 Indeed, Governors could often fall ‘under the sway’ of 
the House of Assembly.25  
 
It should be remembered that Britain had overseen the implementation of 
universal suffrage in Jamaica as early as 1944, at least in part due to demands 
by nationalist politicians.26 Through the late 1940s and 1950s, even as places 
such as Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, the Leeward and Windward Islands, 
British Guiana and British Honduras were gaining universal suffrage27, 
oligarchical control of Bermuda’s House of Assembly, and the failure or lack of 
desire on the part of British Governors to effectively challenge this, meant 
demands for such change by disenfranchised citizens were resisted through 
the 1940s and 1950s.  
 
This was demonstrated when on November 1, 1946, the leader of the Bermuda 
Workers’ Association, the Trinidadian-born Dr Edgar Fitzgerald Gordon, ‘the 
hero of the working classes’28, hand-delivered a petition on behalf of ‘the great 
majority of the underprivileged and suffering inhabitants of Bermuda’ to 
Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones in London. The petition demanded 
investigation into ‘a litany of grievances relating to Bermuda, including the 
restricted franchise, segregation and limited occupational opportunities’ for 
Bermudians.29  
 
In the petition it was estimated that ‘only 12 per cent of the voting age 
population was eligible to vote’. Although the number of black voters 
outweighed the number of white voters in 1946, the practice of plural voting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Debate on the Bermuda Constitution Bill, Hansard, HC Deb June 14 1967 vol 748 cc480-
519. 
25 Wiener, Empire on Trial, 109. 
26 Howard Johnson, British Caribbean, 615.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Williams, Lois, 44.  
29 Smith, Evolution of Bermuda’s Franchise, 11; see also oral answers to questions on the 
Bermuda Workers’ Petition by Arthur Creech-Jones, Hansard, HC Deb April 16, 1947 vol 436 
cc180-1. 
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‘which allowed an individual to vote in each parish he or she met the land 
qualification’ in gave whites a greater electoral strength - 1,352 votes for 
blacks and 1,634 votes for whites. Petitioners said they believed ‘almost all of 
the political, economic and social disabilities’ suffered by the inhabitants of 
‘this ancient and loyal Colony’ had ‘their foundation in the fact that the 
Parliamentary franchise is extremely limited’.30 They added: “This state of 
affairs permits the vested interests or monied classes to have a distinct and 
definite control over the election results.”31 
 
Creech Jones’ response to the BWA petition provides a fitting example of the 
emerging gap between espoused principles and the unwillingness to lobby for 
them that would also pervade much of Whitehall’s dealings with Bermuda in 
the period 1964 to 1977. This is prefaced by Creech Jones’ missive to Governor 
Sir Ralph Leatham, in which he politely invited ‘the Legislature of Bermuda to 
take [the BWA’s petition] into consideration’.32 
 
Creech Jones’s official response was contained in a ‘strongly-worded’ 
document (labelled Command Paper 7093) arguing that the House of 
Assembly should examine the problems alluded to ‘with a view to making 
positive and progressive revisions’ to Bermuda’s electoral system.33 By 
January 1948, a joint committee of members of the Legislative Council and of 
the House of Assembly had been appointed to report on the problems. The 
White Paper that resulted recommended… 
 
…the gradual extension of the franchise, the eventual 
elimination of plural voting and the measured expansion of 
employment opportunities in the Public Service for the black 
population. 34 
 
Despite the fine words, however, segregation was not ended and no major 
reforms were made to the electoral system until the early 1960s. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hansard, June 19, 1967.  
31 Brown, Race and Party politics, 104. 
32 Hansard, April 16, 1947. 
33 Smith, Evolution of Bermuda’s Franchise, 11 
34 Arthur Creech-Jones, Bermuda (Workers’ Association Petition), Hansard, HC Deb, 
January 28, 1948 vol 446 cc998-9. 
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Following on from the peaceful and successful Theatre Boycott of 1959, it had 
been a joint effort, between a series of public meetings held by the Committee 
for Universal Adult Suffrage (CUAS) and parliamentary lobbying by black 
MCPs such as EF Gordon, ET Richards and WL Tucker, that brought about 
shift in the political landscape with the Parliamentary Elections Act of 1963.35 
This ‘effectively increase[d] the electorate from approximately 5,500 landlords 
to about 22,000 potential voters’, by ending property restrictions and giving 
every Bermudian above the age of 25 the right to vote.36 Despite this progress, 
property owners were also granted a single extra ‘plus’ vote.37 These changes 
were built upon with a change in the law in 1966 that ended the ‘plus vote’ and 
lowered the voting age to 21, whilst retaining the vote for Commonwealth 
subjects who had been on the island for three years or more.38 
 
These changes led to the ‘emergence of the modern party system’.39 In 
February 1963, Bermuda’s first political party, the PLP was founded by a 
group of seven men meeting in a garage on the outskirts of Hamilton – Walter 
Robinson, Dilton Cann, Austin Wilson, Edward deJean, Albert Smith and 
Wilfred Allen.40 The party’s founding platform included ‘talks with Britain 
regarding full responsible government’ as part of a host of political and 
constitutional reforms.41 At a General Election in May this new force won six 
of the nine seats it contested.42 This event acted as a wake-up call that 
nevertheless led leading white MCPs to co-opt demands for change.  
 
It is impossible to understand Bermudian constitutional change between 1963 
and 1968 without first understanding that oligarchical power was 
institutionalised at the legislative level as a result of iniquitous electoral 
arrangements. The House of Assembly that drove the reform process had been 
elected in the May 1963 election, during which 6,662 people had ‘claimed an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Hodgson, Second class Citizens; First Class Men, 140. 
36 Bermuda-Island.net, “Government”. 
37 Hart, Hansard, June 14, 1967. 
38 James E Smith, Evolution of Bermuda’s Franchise, 15. 
39 Brown, Race and party politics in Bermuda, 103. 
40 Williams, Lois, 57. 
41 Ibid, 63, 
42 Brown, Race and Party Politics, 106. 
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additional vote as property owners’.43 As a result, this was an assembly that 
only had eleven black members (out of a total membership of 36) in a majority 
black country.44 It also contained only two women.45  A Colonial Office 
memorandum perhaps overstated the case in 1964 when it noted that ‘real 
power rests with the House of Assembly, which has full control over finance 
and [which is] where legislation is normally initiated’.46 However, entrenched 
institutional inertia meant oligarchs possessed an advantage in any potential 
power-struggle over constitutional reform. 
 
1.2 International and domestic dimensions on British 
decolonisation policy, 1963 - 1968 
 
Between 1963 and 1968, policymakers undertook a reassessment of Britain’s 
global role following the Suez Crisis of 1956, which ‘exposed as a sham [Prime 
Minister Anthony] Eden’s vision of Britain as a major and fully independent 
player on the world stage’.47 As Britain decolonised from territories such as 
Malaya, Cyprus, Nigeria and Kenya, and as this ‘acceleration of the 
decolonisation process brought a decisive change in the character of the 
Commonwealth’,48 the ‘twin issues of Rhodesia and immigration encouraged a 
right-wing backlash against the Commonwealth in the UK’.49 Attitudes 
towards decolonisation were a function of international pressures, racial 
anxieties and a ‘specific notion of decline’ which, ‘in the late 1950s and early 
1960s…was widely propagated and accepted in Britain’.50    
 
The idea that the ‘transfer of power’ involved in decolonisation was achieved 
‘smoothly’ and ‘with sentiments of mutual regard’ has been described as 
‘fatuous’ by Howe.51 While the first part of the 13-year period of Conservative 
rule between 1951 and 1964 saw ‘a number of events which seemed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Cover note by Bermuda Special Branch, April 10, 1963, 1031/4766. 
44 Special Branch report for May 1963, June 3, 1963, ibid. 
45 Election results, May 1963, Bermuda Parliamentary Registry. 
46 Bermuda and the UN, June 4, 1964, CO 1027/610, TNA. 
47 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation, (networked e-book). 
48 Ibid.  
49 Murphy, Britain and the Commonwealth, 271. 
50 Tomlinson, Politics of Decline, 9. 
51 Morgan, Official History of Colonial Development, 343-4; Howe, Anticolonialism in British 
politics, 8.  
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demonstrate Britain’s continued capacity to play a constructive and decisive 
role in world events’,52 as the 1960s approached, ‘glimmers of triumph were 
succeeded by crises and failures’.53  
 
Three conditioning aspects of Britain’s approach to reform in Bermuda could 
be identified. Firstly, international institutions such as the UN were exerting 
an ever-growing influence on decision-making. Conversely, especially in the 
Caribbean, Britain remained highly sensitive to the demands of the US within 
the paradigm of the global superpower confrontation. Finally, growing British 
domestic ‘material weakness’ was increasingly making the continued assertion 
of a world role difficult.54 
 
As constitution-making became something of a systematic practice in the 
process of decolonisation, the use of bills of rights in the constitutions of 
newly independent countries proliferated during the 1950s and 1960s. The 
first of these enacted in advance of independence in a territory under British 
control appeared in 1953, while in 1962, the CO released a policy mandating 
bills of rights for new constitutions. As a result, bills of rights were inserted 
into 13 constitutions and, after sustained debate, rejected in two territories.55  
 
AW Brian Simpson argues that the British government supported these 
international human rights guarantees as an instrument of foreign policy. In 
part this was influenced by Britain’s signing up to the European Convention 
on Human Rights in 1950.56 However, bills of rights also came to be used in 
the Caribbean to ‘minimise…political uncertainty after independence’ in the 
context of the Cold War and anxieties about race. For instance, the first bill of 
rights instituted during British decolonisation in the Caribbean, in British 
Guiana in 1961, was partly viewed by the Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, as a 
protection ‘against the dangers of communism and racialism’.57 British Guiana 
thus set helped set the precedent for non-independent territories being 	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granted a Bill of Rights. This was because of the country’s history of unrest 
and the British suspension of its constitution following the election of the left-
wing People’s Progress Party in 1953.58 
 
Because of a close American-Anglo relationship in the context of the 
superpower confrontation, the US ‘was the critical determinant of British 
policy’ in British Guiana and in the Caribbean region.59 This territory was seen 
as posing ‘a serious strategic risk to the US mainland’ and was ‘ideal as a 
location for Russian missiles’.60 Although colonial rule ‘came to be seen as a 
liability by the 1960s’, this did not ease American sensitivities about radical 
regimes on what it considered to be its doorstep.61 As the Wilson government 
was a firm believer in the Anglo-American alliance, this had the potential to 
profoundly affect how Britain viewed the prospects of Bermudian 
decolonisation too. In 1966, US policy towards the island included protecting 
the rights to its two bases and also ‘ensuring that Bermuda had a moderate 
and friendly-disposed government’.62  
 
An ostensible commitment to liberal constitutional machinery combined with 
a tendency towards ‘stability’ was encouraged by the Cold War and the 
alliance with the US. But this belief in ‘stability’ was also a product of British 
habits. As Hyam argues, such concerns in post-colonial Swaziland trumped 
any commitment Britain had to ensuring democracy. This was demonstrated 
when Britain handed power over to an ‘unreconstructed’ monarchy in 1968. 
The Labour Government had ‘conceded to a ruler widely regarded as 
“reactionary” what their Conservative predecessors had steadily refused’.63  
 
That decolonisation could be a hurried and unprincipled affair was illustrated 
by the rush to independence in Barbados in 1966, where the pace of the 
transfer of power to the government of Errol Barrow was guided more by the 
fact that the British ‘wanted out’ than by whether Barrow’s government had a 	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sufficient electoral mandate.64 A similar process later occurred in Grenada in 
the early 1970s, planting the seeds for a communist coup in 1979.65 
 
Yet such an emphasis on ‘stability’ vis-à-vis democracy was also linked to a 
‘shared memory of whiteness in the metropole’.66 This mindset may have 
encouraged senior politicians such as Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd 
into ‘backing the wrong horse…from the doomed Central African Federation to 
the leaders of the “multi-racial” parties in East Africa’.67   
 
It seems also to have had a direct effect on Bermuda. Conservative backbench 
MP Roland Robinson, who would take office in 1964 as Bermuda’s Governor, 
saw parties such as Sir Michael Blundell’s New Kenya Group (NKG) as key to 
‘the building-up of a multi-racial Kenya’ in which no culture was ‘submerged in 
a mere sea of numbers’.68  This platitudinous language hid the fact that 
‘multiracialism’ was a euphemism; another way of describing a form of 
government that artificially inflated the power of Europeans in a black-
majority country with a population ratio of 93 Africans to 1 European.69 
 
The new Labour government, from October 1964, displayed ambivalence on 
decolonisation. On the one hand, as demonstrated by the presence of 60,000 
British personnel in South East Asia in early 196570, it ‘clung to the military 
trappings of imperialism’.71 However, the suggestion in the 1964 Labour 
Manifesto that ‘the first responsibility of a British Government’ was ‘to the 
Commonwealth’72 was counterbalanced by a ‘growing national weakness and 
insecurity’ that also ‘provided the conditioning context for decolonisation’.73 
‘Devaluation in 1967 hastened the lingering death of the Sterling Area’74 and a 
sense of economic and cultural decline was increasingly palpable in literature, 	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for instance in Arthur Koestler’s 1964 suggestion that ‘we are at the moment 
dying by the mind’.75 
 
Meanwhile, the ‘absorption of the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) by 
the Foreign Office [in 1968] silenced the one voice in Cabinet’ charged with 
championing the Commonwealth.76 Whitehall responsibility for Bermuda 
came under the Colonial Office (CO) until 1966 when it was closed; an event 
that served as a ‘reflection and a symbol of imperial demission’.77 Then the CO 
became part of the Commonwealth Office (CWO) from August 1966 to October 
1968. On October 17, 1968 the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices were 
merged to form the FCO.78  
 
The issue of Bermudian constitutional reform was rarely the responsibility of 
any one Cabinet minister for more than a year. Winston Churchill’s son-in-law 
Duncan Sandys, who ‘had notoriously little patience for the processes of 
parliamentary debate or Cabinet discussion’79, was Colonial Secretary from 
July 1962 until the General Election of October 1964. Sandys was replaced by a 
former Royal Air Force intelligence officer, Labour’s Anthony Greenwood, 
until December 1965. Then the Colonial Office (CO) was headed by the 
eccentric and homophobic penal reform campaigner Frank Pakenham, the 
Earl of Longford, until April 1966. Former Mancunian engineer Fred Lee, from 
April 1966 until January 1967, oversaw the transition from CO to 
Commonwealth Office (CWO). The first Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Affairs, who officially took over in August 1966, was Herbert Bowden. He was 
replaced in August 1967 by the Dundonian former journalist George Thomson 
until October 1968. 
 
This astonishing administrative turnover cannot have helped provide 
coherence to policy during a period in which Britain was undergoing a 
‘lengthy, tortuous and muddled reappraisal’ of her world role.80 Greenwood, 	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for instance, was both a Cabinet minister who had been told by Wilson to ‘work 
himself out of a job’81 and a leading member of the anti-colonial Movement for 
Colonial Freedom (MCF).82 The political debates engendered by the issues 
raised by decolonisation can help show how empire could filter into the politics 
of decline, in which the Wilson government, on issues such as Rhodesia and 
Vietnam, ‘appeared to compromise, to vacillate, and sometimes to be less than 
honest and honourable’.83  
 
Political confrontations over decolonisation could be neutralised by what 
Schwarz has called a ‘passive revolution’, which involved the official ‘shunting-
off [of] awkward issues to an appropriate sidings until the situation 
quietened’.84 However, as Ward argues, the strains of imperial decline ‘were 
not safely constrained within the realm of high politics’.85 Just as disputes over 
Rhodesia and immigration could split the right during this period, the left was 
riven by the onset of post-colonial realities. Brownell suggests the MCF came 
under pressure to distance itself from the Communist Party of Great Britain as 
Wilson ‘was anxious to prove Labour's dependability as a party in power’.86 As 
Howe suggests, some of the ‘deepest divisions’ over decolonisation in Britain 
were ‘within rather than between parties’.  
 
The MCF was ‘among the most important post-war British political pressure 
groups’ and ‘from 1955 to 1964, between 30 and 40 per cent of all Labour MPs 
were MCF sponsors at any one time’.87 The issue of Bermudian constitutional 
reform will provide a portrait of how opinion in the Parliamentary Labour 
Party diverged during the late 1960s as a ‘radical-liberal’ strain of the MCF 
focused the movement on recalcitrant ‘white settler communities’ and ‘racial 
antagonisms which were seen as the legacies of colonialism’.88 This study will 
also discuss the way in which a broad consensus of parliamentarians from all 
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three main parties allowed to go through ‘on the nod’ the grant of autonomy to 
a white minority-regime bolstered in power by gerrymandering.89 
 
As the next subsection will suggest, both the domestic context described in 
sub-section 1.1 and British decolonisation policy and debates had to be filtered 
through a powerful mediating figure who remained influential in Bermuda in 
1963-1968, the occupant of Government House. 
 
1.3 The mediator: Bermuda’s governor and the exercise of 
executive power 
 
According to Hyam, transfers of power depended on a ‘conjunction of interest’ 
between metropole and colony that was ‘not difficult to achieve when there 
was mediation by a proconsul “on the spot” trusted by both sides’.90 The way 
in which Bermuda’s oligarchy responded to demands for change in the 1960s 
was filtered through and partly depended on Government House. 
 
During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Governors had traditionally had a 
greater degree of freedom of action in Bermuda vis-à-vis settler interests, as a 
result of their role running a ‘strategically important outpost’.91 However, the 
island’s Royal Naval Dockyard shut down operations in 1951 and the British 
Army garrison was finally withdrawn in 1957, ending a 256-year connection.92 
Party politics created a new dynamic in a situation where the Governor’s 
power had rested on a fine balance of theoretical absolute powers tempered by 
the need to manage the white-dominated Legislature. However, ‘almost all 
legislation emanated from Executive Council’, chaired by the Governor and on 
which sat three unofficial members, appointed by him, and three official 
members. The latter included the island’s Colonial Secretary, the Colonial 
Treasurer and the Attorney General.93 With this buttress of expatriate, official 
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support, Governors were leading figures and wielded theoretical absolute 
power.  
 
In 1963, moreover, Bermuda had a Governor who was at least nudging the 
oligarchy towards modernisation of its ancient system of government. Whilst 
the more pervasive context in which change was spurred was popular, political 
and international, Government House was instrumental in setting the context 
in which these reforms occurred. Governor Julian Gascoigne (1959-1964) for 
example, suggested the replacement of Bermuda’s ‘unusual system of 
Government Boards with an Executive Council which was responsible to 
Parliament. The Board system meant that ‘some Government departments 
[were] controlled by statutory executive Boards whose members were not 
officials but [were] nominated by the Governor’. Boards had no connection 
with the legislature, although often members of the legislature were also 
appointed to them.94  
 
As early as January 1961, two years before the creation of the PLP, Gascoigne 
proposed modernising this system. He decried the fact that ‘no central policy 
over…major questions exists at all’ and proposed that the Boards be replaced 
in their role of policy initiation by an Executive Council made up of elected 
members of the legislature.95 In January 1964, only a few months after a 
legislative select committee headed by Tucker had begun to meet in the House 
of Assembly, Gascoigne would attempt to influence that process. Bermuda had  
‘to plan to organise to become a modern state’.96  
 
In June 1964, Gascoigne’s successor would be someone with strong political 
views but also with multifarious connections across Whitehall, Westminster 
and the Commonwealth. Schoolchildren ‘in their brightest holiday 
garb…perched in the trees’ as they observed John Roland Robinson, enobled 
as Baron Martonmere, disembark from a launch at Hamilton’s wharf on June 
15. Born in 1907, Martonmere had studied law at Cambridge and became a 
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wing commander in the RAF during World War Two.97 He was also 
Conservative MP for Widnes and then Blackpool from 1931 until 1964 and 
chairman of the Conservative Commonwealth Affairs Committee from 1954 to 
1964. At his arrival ceremony, he pledged that he now ‘belonged to no party’.98 
However, this chapter will show that Martonmere would become biased in his 
allegiances when it came to Bermudian politics. This evolution was couched in 
what a senior civil servant would later describe as Martonmere’s ‘broad 
humanist, but specifically paternalistic approach to the problems of 
Bermuda’.99 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Bermuda Governor Lord Martonmere, June 14, 1964.  
© The Royal Gazette Newspaper 
 
 
As the first part of this chapter will show, both Martonmere’s and the CO’s 
bias would prove significant as the creation of the UBP and party politics 
became bound up in the process of constitutional reform. This began when a 
joint select committee of the legislature (containing members of both the 
House of Assembly and members of the Legislative or Executive Councils) 	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started considering change from November 1963 onwards.100 The second part 
of this chapter will tell the story of the Bermuda Constitutional Conference 
held in London in November 1966. Finally, it will analyse debates at 
Westminster over the Bermuda Constitution Bill.  
 
2. ‘A cautious but sensible conclusion in their own good 
time’: A hands-off approach to constitutional reform 
 
The Colonial Office seemed rather wary of upsetting Bermuda’s ruling 
oligarchy.  A June 1964 note suggested that, though Britain was ‘ready to help’ 
with driving political reform, she was also ‘careful to avoid offending a self-
reliant community’.101 This attitude was reflected again in February 1965, 
when the Assistant Secretary at the Colonial Office and head of the West 
Indian Department ‘B’, RW Piper, argued in a note to assistant under-
secretary of state with superintending responsibility for the West Indies, WIJ 
Wallace, that while ‘Bermuda is very conservative and treats any proposals for 
progress with great care and caution, it has… tended to keep just ahead of 
popular pressure’. Piper added:  
 
The Bermudians… are independent by nature and any attempt 
to push them faster on constitutional change would probably at 
this stage be counter-productive. They are likely to reach a 
cautious but sensible conclusion in their own good time.102 
 
In part this reticence to get too involved in London stemmed from the belief 
that Bermuda was ‘no ordinary territory’. Unlike other small islands in the 
Caribbean region, Bermuda was understood to be ‘prosperous’, ‘economically 
independent’ and ‘autonomous’.103 Boyd had noted to Macmillan in 1958 that 
there could be ‘no question of independence for the West Indies until they are 
viable both financially and in other respects’.104 As the next section of this 
chapter argues, because Bermuda was seen as a good candidate for 
independence on ‘viability’ grounds, with the implication that the oligarchy 
was a suitable successor elite regardless of their racial proclivities, the CO 	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largely deferred to Tucker. Both Government House and the Colonial Office 
were only to provide gentle hints for how the process should proceed. 
 
2.1 ‘Starting from scratch’?: The global and local contexts of 
Bermudian constitutional reform, June 1963 – August 1964 
 
The early stages of the House of Assembly’s deliberations on constitutional 
reform were affected by two events: the introduction of party politics to 
Bermuda in early 1963 and the enactment of a new constitution in the 
Bahamas in January 1964. At the General Election in May 1963, the new PLP 
won six of the nine seats it contested.105  This result seemed to put fear into 
the heart of Tucker, then an independent representative in the House of 
Assembly for Paget. The following month, Tucker met with Piper. According 
to a record of the meeting: 
 
[Tucker] recognised that… the formation of the PLP would make 
it necessary for those who had hitherto preferred to stand as 
Independents to band themselves together in a party…. He 
expected too that constitutional change would have to be 
considered. 106 
 
This hint of Tucker’s state of mind immediately after the shock of the election 
concurs with other evidence.107 For instance, Sir John Swan, who served as 
Tucker’s successor as representative in Paget parish and later as Premier of 
Bermuda between 1982 and 1995, noted his belief that constitutional reform 
had been largely reactive on the part of Tucker. In his view: “The Progressive 
Labour Party was calling for a constitutional conference, the UBP acquiesced 
to the conference.”108  
 
Tucker was therefore, responding to nudges from both the Governor and the 
new block vote of the PLP. With 16 per cent of members in a legislature where 
all 30 opposing MCPs were fragmented as independents (the UBP was not 
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created until August 1964) the six PLP MCPs could go a ‘long way towards 
deciding whether certain policies would be adopted or rejected’.109 
 
The joint select committee was appointed following a vote in the House of 
Assembly on November 13, 1963.110  Members from the Legislative Council 
included VO King, Edmund Gibbons and Sir Harry Butterfield, while 
members from the House of Assembly included Tucker (who chaired it), Sir 
Bayard Dill, Sir Henry Vesey and Arnold Francis of the PLP.111  This 
committee was heavily biased towards a conservative viewpoint. It was 
advised by Attorney General John Summerfield, who consulted closely with 
the CO in devising its report. It would not submit a majority report until the 
summer of 1965, which was then passed through both legislative chambers in 
December that year.  
 
Bermudian constitutional reform was also shaped by the wider process of 
decolonisation. Tucker pointed to the fact of change ‘elsewhere’ including the 
fact that the CO ‘must be in its last days’. While the Colonial Service had 
rendered ‘satisfactory’ service to Bermuda, he added that he was ‘sure the duty 
of the CO would be transferred to some other authority’ and it was important 
to ‘take account’ of this.112 
 
In recognition of this global context, constitutional evolution in the Bahamas 
was evident as an influence on Bermuda’s debate. On the announcement of 
the select committee, Francis championed the ‘possibility of Bermuda’s 
copying the Bahamas and installing a Cabinet system of Government’.113  
There may have been more behind the strong resonance of the Bahamian 
events than just timing. Bermuda and the Bahamas shared some similar 
characteristics. The two colonies’ histories of slavery and oligarchical control 
had endendered similar political events in the 1950s and 1960s.114  Although 
the Bahamas’ white minority was proportionally much smaller, its 	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constitution came into force after the almost completely white United 
Bahamian Party ‘rode the economic boom and the black people’s lack of self-
confidence (especially that of newly enfranchised women) to win a stunning 
victory in the May 2, 1962 General Election campaign’.115 
 
Gerrymandering, which saw the number of seats in what were then known as  
Out Islands exceed the number of seats in New Providence where the majority 
of the population lived, meant that, even though the local Progressive Liberal 
Party won the most votes, the UBP won the most seats, in the first election in 
the Bahamas on the basis of universal suffrage. 
 
It seemed that officials in London were gently nudging Tucker towards using 
the new Bahamas scheme as a blueprint. In one early conversation regarding 
how to offer ‘helpful advice’ to Tucker in his task as joint select committee 
chairman in Bermuda, assistant undersecretary of state with superintending 
responsibility for the West Indies AR Thomas opined: “The Bahamas White 
Paper will of course also be relevant … the new Bahamas constitution offers the 
best pattern for Bermuda to study.”116 And regarding his work on the select 
committee, Tucker told British officials that ‘he was very much starting from 
scratch and that in Bermuda they had very little to go on, although he had had 
sight of the Bahamas scheme’.117  
 
However, it is also clear that the CO was rather sceptical of Tucker’s ‘moderate’ 
credentials. The question was: what sort of political force would Tucker lead 
when he finally got around to setting up a political party? Gascoigne advised 
CO staff shortly after leaving Bermuda that London’s response to Tucker’s 
report should ‘presumably turn on what sort of party it was [that Tucker set 
up] and the general political picture’.118 
 
Thus, constitutional reform was spurred in part by political developments on 
the ground, including the formation and relative success of the PLP in early 	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1963. It was also the result of pressure from Gascoigne, who had been arguing 
for ‘modernisation’ of Bermuda’s political system since 1961 if not earlier, and 
of constitutional reform in the Bahamas. 
 
2.2. ‘The most able and influential of the far-sighted’: Growing 
Colonial Office bias towards Sir Henry Tucker 
 
After a period of initial scepticism, the CO identified Tucker as a collaborator 
in a process of ‘passive revolution’ that was ingrained in the habits of senior 
CO decision-makers and Martonmere but also made to seem more urgent by 
an industrial dispute that turned violent in February 1965.119  This pivotal 
event seems to have been the catalyst in both spurring the fledgling UBP to 
concede to the abolition of the ‘plus’ vote for property owners and accept 
unadulterated universal suffrage, whilst also ending official sanction for 
segregation in schools. This in turn may have allowed the CO, now under a 
Labour government, to rally its support behind Tucker, from around 
February 1965 onwards.  
 
Born on March 13, 1903 at Villa Mont Clare in Flatts Village, Bermuda, 
Tucker was the son of a sporting goods shop owner and the grandson of an 
Archdeacon, who was the local overseer of the Church of England in 
Bermuda.120 In 1920, he was sent away to school at Sherborne in Dorset, 
England. In 1923, he headed for the oil fields of Oklahoma where he spent 
several months as a labourer. ‘After nine months of poor wages and no quick 
fortune’, he returned home to Bermuda.121  Then, following a period working 
in at banks in New York’s Wall Street for a decade or so, during which Tucker 
witnessed suicides from skyscrapers following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, 
he returned home again to work for the Bank of Bermuda, and he became its 
manager in 1938. That year he was also elected as one of four representatives 
for Paget parish in the House of Assembly and was appointed to the Finance 
Committee.  
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Over the next twenty years, Tucker established a reputation as a leading 
figure in Bermudian legislative politics but also a key figure not just at the 
head of Bermuda’s most successful bank. He also sat on the broadcasting 
commission and was a director of the Bermuda Telephone Company. In 
November 1942, Tucker was appointed to the Executive Council, where he 
was able to start building relationships with successive Governors.122  
Through the 1950s, he consolidated his position as the most powerful 
legislator on the island, while resisting campaigns by fellow MCPs for the 
ending of segregation and universal suffrage. He was knighted in June 
1961.123 
 
Tucker’s hero was Winston Churchill, with whom he had negotiated over lend-
lease issues in the 1940s.124 Yet he also had senior contacts within the CO 
during the 1950s. He had attended Sherborne School with Boyd as a child. 
Boyd would tell a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting in the 
mid-1960s: “Whatever I could do, Jack Tucker could always do better. It did 
not matter if it was games or academe.”125 Although this clearly did not mean 
they agreed on all matters, it was also true that Martonmere, who Tucker 
developed a strong relationship with, indicated his own support for Boyd’s 
project of ‘multi-racial social-engineering’.  
 
As a backbencher, Martonmere had supported Boyd’s parliamentary 
championing of Sir Michael Blundell’s NKG when it was founded in April 
1959, suggesting the party represented an opportunity to ‘consolidate 
moderate opinion in Kenya on a multi-racial basis’.126 Perhaps these 
connections are circumstantial, yet the formation of 24 black and white MCPs 
into the UBP in August 1964 is reminiscent of the way in which the white-
dominated yet multi-cultural NKG had materialised following agreement 
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between 21 nominated members of Kenya’s legislative council under 
Blundell.127 
 
However, it was not until a strike by workers at the Bermuda Electric Light 
Company (BELCO) in February 1965 that London really took notice of how 
precarious the situation was in Bermuda. Seventeen police officers were 
injured in the violence, one seriously. The riot had been sparked on January 
19 by the refusal of the company to recognise the Bermuda Industrial Union 
(BIU) as the main representative of linesmen and garage employees of the 
company, which was the island’s monopoly electricity provider. On February 1 
and 2, the BELCO workers were joined by sympathy strikers. Police officers 
were attacked when they attempted to ‘break the picket line and …to pick up 
makeshift weapons hoarded by the strikers’.128  
 
The governor’s security advisers worried about what the strike meant for 
Bermudian race relations. Government House’s Local Intelligence Committee 
(LIC), which depended on information collected by Bermuda’s Special Branch, 
noted: “The most disturbing factor in the strike was the way in which it 
developed on racial line.”129  
 
This was the expression of a fear that Bermuda’s economic divisions were 
fusing with racial divisions to form a powder keg, waiting to explode into 
communal violence. Martonmere’s security committee, made up of Police and 
officials such as the Attorney General, had seen the BELCO strike as a 
‘struggle by organised labour to challenge the paternalism of Front Street [a 
derogatory name for the oligarchy], for long the citadel of economic and 
political power’.130 They were also concerned by the increase in strength of the 
BIU, whose membership had more than doubled in less than a year, from 517 
in April 1964 to 1079 at end of February 1965.131  	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On the other hand, the CO believed there to be a threat from the extreme 
right, as the strike had prompted ‘the desire of some sections of the white 
population to form “vigilante” groups.’132 In July 1965, after several of those 
who had been prosecuted for leading the strike and for attacking police 
officers were acquitted by juries, Martonmere noted that there were ‘now 
murmurings among the white reactionaries that the Jury system should be 
abolished’.133 
 
The previous Conservative government had revealed its sensitivity about 
Bermuda’s racial situation in June 1964 when it briefed the UK mission to the 
UN on how to handle an expected petition to the Committee of 24 by 
Bermudian WG Brown, who had been ‘conducting a one-man campaign at the 
UN for the decolonisation of Bermuda’.134  The briefing listed Brown’s 
personal history, which representatives were expected to use to smear Brown 
if his name was ‘quoted as authority on conditions in Bermuda’.135 
 
It was not until after the violence occasioned by the strike that the UBP began 
advocating the abolition of the contentious ‘plus’ vote.136 These developments 
turned apparent British scepticism about Tucker into support. British 
Attorney General Lord Elwyn-Jones arrived in March with a parliamentary 
delegation for talks with American legislators on a separate matter. While 
there he met Tucker. In the record of the meeting, by Piper, Tucker was 
described as ‘an outstanding Bermudan [sic] leader’. Another civil servant 
suggested: “The most able and influential of the far-sighted is Sir Henry 
Tucker, a banker by profession.”137  
 
In June 1965, Greenwood met Tucker in London. Tucker’s committee had 
completed an interim report that recommended voting reforms. Greenwood 
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came away thinking that this was ‘a good document which should represent a 
satisfactory basis for constitutional reform’.138  
 
There is evidence, moreover, that the CO saw in Tucker a way of holding to a 
moderate course of change that would avoid the prospect of further violence 
and would find a middle ground between the extremes of radical change 
under the PLP and the more reactionary whites beginning a rearguard action. 
In the aftermath of Rhodesia’s UDI, the fear of white minority backlash is 
palpable in the CO files. In March 1966, a CO study reported that there was 
‘no real alternative to the present moderately conservative government except 
an ultra conservative one’. It added: 
 
Any attempt to accelerate the pace of constitutional change … is 
likely to be counterproductive and lead to a sharpening of racial 
divisions.139  
 
A report written in late 1966 suggested: “Any threat to political stability would 
come from the right wing rather than the left.”140 Despite this, there is no 
evidence that Bermuda’s ultra-conservatives, such as Cox, ever even aimed to 
organise in pursuit of their reactionary vision because many were also 
individualists who were strongly against political parties. 
 
A few months after the strike in Bermuda, Wallace was telling the CO’s 
conservative permanent under-secretary of state Sir Hilton Poynton: “It is not 
too much to say that successful constitutional change in Bermuda depends on 
Sir Henry Tucker in particular and on a few others like him.”141  Meanwhile, 
Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood was being told by AR Rushford: 
“There is little doubt that if all goes well Sir Henry will be the first Premier of 
Bermuda.”142  
 
Tucker’s constitutional committee majority report was introduced in the 
House of Assembly on November 12, 1965 by the chair and by ET Richards, AD 	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Spurling and NHP Vesey.143 It proposed the abolition of the ‘plus vote’, 
reduction in the voting age to 21, and a ‘fully responsible party system of 
government’. Under this, the Governor would still preside over the Executive 
Council but this body was to have no ex-officio members, while the chairman 
of each executive board was to be an Executive Council member.  
 
Finally, the Legislative Council was to have eleven members, all appointed by 
the Governor. Four of these were to be appointed on the recommendation of 
the Government Leader, two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition and 
the remaining five at the discretion of the Governor.144 On presenting the 
report, Tucker, who had previously been an ardent opponent of political 
parties145, announced: “The surest way to avoid a dictatorship is to have a 
healthy party system. It is only when all the parties have been suppressed that 
dictatorship arises.”146 The report passed in the House of Assembly in August 
1965 but was rejected in the Legislative Council by six votes to four. The 
majority report was then finally approved in both houses by December 1965. 
 
This was a part of the process of ‘passive revolution’ that underplayed 
backgrounds of racism in a bid to find pragmatic solutions on decolonisation. 
Tucker and the UBP had moved towards acceptance of the principle of 
universal suffrage just after the BELCO strike. Because of this concession, the 
CO did not undergo the process of ‘uncoupling from kith and kin’ that it had 
embarked on in Central Africa in 1960 with the Wind of Change tour.147  
Working with Tucker was part of the process of finding ‘local representatives 
with whom business could be done’.148  
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2.3 ‘Without… reform of constituency boundaries [the UBP] 
could stay in power forever’: Greenwood’s rush to decolonise 
and his unease over gerrymandering 
 
Through the crucial period of 1965, Greenwood seemed to have conflicted 
feelings about Bermuda. On one hand he expressed frustration that the 
process was not moving fast enough. Tucker’s committee met 22 times and 
took two years to introduce its majority report to the legislature.149  
Greenwood, who was one of Wilson’s ‘trusted left wingers’150 and one of the 
MCF sponsors in Cabinet,151 expressed his impatience with the speed, asking 
his officials whether it would be possible to set a date for ‘final status’ for 
Bermuda ‘before 1970’.152 His officials warned him off such ‘prodding’. After 
all, in Poynton’s words, Bermuda had ‘the oldest parliament in the 
Commonwealth outside of this country and are inordinately proud of it and of 
their ability to manage their own affairs’.153  There is a sense that that civil 
servants such as Poynton and Wallace rather than Greenwood were calling the 
shots, and that they favoured gradualist reforms on Tucker’s terms. 
 
Discussions over the contentious issue of constituency boundaries reveals 
unease on the part of Greenwood about the UBP’s conservative vision. The 
subject of potential gerrymandering was understood by London to be at ‘the 
heart of Bermuda’s constitutional problem’.154  The 1962 boundary reform had 
ensured a white majority electorate in eight out of eighteen districts. Harries 
Hunter describes gerrymandering bizarrely as ‘a way of drawing electoral 
boundaries to protect minority interests’.155  It is true that, demographically at 
least, whites were in a minority, but they had maintained an enforced 
dominance over Bermuda’s political, economic and judicial systems since the 
early 17th century.  
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Despite Greenwood’s desire to nudge Bermuda towards ‘final status’, he also  
expressed opposition to Tucker’s desire, encouraged by previous CO officials, 
to bring in a Bahamas-style Boundaries Commission, containing five people 
and chaired by the Speaker of the House of Assembly. Wallace suggested to 
Martonmere that, based on a trip to the Bahamas, where he had heard about 
the ‘difficulties’ experienced there, Greenwood would ‘be very unhappy about 
seeing the Bahamas model adopted for Bermuda’.156 Instead, officials 
suggested a three-member commission. Despite this, the Boundaries 
Commission that was eventually implemented in Bermuda in 1967 contained 
five members, although the chair would now be a judge from abroad instead 
of the Speaker. Greenwood’s opposition was blunted by a compromise that 
still saw the UBP dominate the committee, with two places for its nominees 
against only one for the PLP. 
 
The UBP’s resistance on the question of reforming constituency boundaries 
was the one area where the Colonial Office expressed unease. The Governor’s 
security committee predicted that the fact that ‘the party sees no need for any 
further change in the franchise’ would be ‘bitterly contested’ by the PLP and 
added: “Without the reform of constituency boundaries [the UBP] could stay 
in power forever.”157   
 
However, on this issue, Tucker and his colleagues appeared to have the full 
support of Martonmere. The Governor had written to Wallace in January 
1966, noting that Tucker ‘feels it is very important that there should be a limit 
to the number of seats per parish’.158 Martonmere believed the UBP had 
‘undoubtedly taken a calculated risk’ in abolishing the plural vote and 
reducing the voting age in 1966. He said: “I doubt if it would be practical for 
them to make more concessions and they must inevitably dig in their toes on 
the boundary issue.”159  
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Five years later, he was even more explicit about rejecting the need to create 
more equal constituencies whose frontiers could be drawn outside parish 
lines. He noted with concern that such change could ‘lead in due course to 
power falling into the hands of more extreme black elements’.160 Although 
Martonmere would claim that his role was ‘to maintain complete neutrality in 
political matters’,161 he was clearly not as ‘middle-of-the-road’ as a 
Conservative MP would later suggest.162  
 
Therefore, throughout its oversight of the process of drawing up of Bermuda’s 
constitutional reform majority report, the CO was reluctant to confront 
Bermuda’s ruling oligarchy to express Greenwood’s misgivings over following 
the Bahamas model, preferring to take a hands-off approach. Just as in 1947, 
it tip-toed around the oligarchy, channelling requests through a Governor who 
was on the side of white settlers, whilst deferring to local institutions such as 
the heavily-biased House of Assembly.  
 
3. ‘Loading the dice’ in the UBP’s favour: The November 
1966 Constitutional Conference  
 
Two points need to be made about the run-up to the organisation of the 
Bermuda Constitutional Conference at Marlborough House in London in 
November 1966. Firstly, this was a very busy period of transition for the CO, 
which was overseeing ‘a long list’ of constitutional conferences including those 
for the Leeward and Windward Islands and for the Bahamas through the 
‘whole of the spring’ of 1966.163  This meant Bermuda’s conference was 
suggested for either June or October but, eventually, was not scheduled to 
begin until early November. It also occurred during a period of transition for 
the CO, which had officially closed in August 1966. Bermuda matters were 
moved over to the Commonwealth Office. However, Colonial Secretary Fred 
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Lee stayed on during a period of transition164 and he presided over the 
Bermuda Conference.165  
 
Secondly, the British Government should be ascribed full responsibility for the 
way in which constitutional reform panned out.  The change was to be made 
by an Order-in-Council. Such orders are signed off by the Monarch at a 
meeting with, and on the advice of the Privy Council, a body ‘shrouded in 
mystery’ dating back to the 12th or 13th centuries, whose orders ‘bypass 
Parliament but have the same force as democratically passed legislation’.166  
This meant that there would be no binding vote at the Conference and its role 
would only be ‘advisory’ for the Colonial Secretary.167 Whilst the build-up to 
the process of change through 1963-1965 had been farmed-out to the UBP 
leaders in the legislature, there was no way the British Government could 
wash its hands of its responsibility for what occurred.  
 
3.1 Membership and delegation 
 
The conference was dominated by people from the majority 
party elected on the old unjust boundaries.168 
 
As the quote above suggests, the process by which attendees were selected for 
the conference was open to question. As a result of the conference’s advisory 
role, a CO memorandum noted that ‘it was not necessary to have each group 
represented in strict numerical proportion to its strength’. As a result, 
Bermuda’s Chief Secretary JW Skykes seemed to pluck a number out of the air 
in suggesting a delegation size of between 12 and 15.169 Nevertheless, the PLP 
challenged the legitimacy of holding a constitutional conference such as this 
before more electoral reform and a general election. It insisted that the 
delegation drawn from the present legislature was ‘not competent’ to discuss 
constituency changes because the existing constituencies from which 
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members had been elected ‘had been drawn in a way which must be 
changed’.170  This objection was ignored. 
 
Since both parties broadly agreed on the change in the constitution that would 
bring about Responsible Government, the most crucial of the issues to be 
decided at the conference was the question of the extent to which electoral 
boundaries would be redrawn. However, it was also important that Whitehall 
officials decided, in consultation with Martonmere and Tucker, the makeup of 
the delegation. As Martonmere reminisced: “I remember at the time I was 
asked to bring the delegation from here to London and they let me choose 
them”.171  
 
In the summer of 1966, there were debates across the Atlantic by telegram and 
in the Bermudian press about who should make up the delegation. 
Martonmere’s description of the people he had selected to take part revealed 
his own chauvinistic and racial biases clearly. Tucker, for example was 
described ‘as the most able and influential political figure in Bermuda’. 
Another white UBP politician Bayard Dill was ‘broad-minded and judicious’ 
and Dudley Spurling was ‘widely respected for his stability and integrity’. 
Finally, UBP co-founder Sir Henry Vesey was ‘very able and industrious’.  
 
In contrast the PLP delegates were described as ‘venomous’ (Lois Browne-
Evans), ‘racially conscious’ (Walter Robinson) and ‘quite irresponsible and 
impractical’ (Dorothy Thompson).172 The proposed group of 18 included eight 
UBP MPs, three PLP MPs, four independent MPs, two of whom were black 
and two of whom were white, and three members of the Legislative Council, 
all of whom sympathised with the UBP. Twelve out of 18 members of the 
proposed delegation were white.173  
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3.2 The conference reports  
 
The delegation essentially included three different factions. The UBP group, 
supported by a host of independents; a more right-wing faction of two 
independents led by the reactionary Speaker of the House, Cox; and a faction 
of three PLP MPs. The PLP delegation were being assisted by former Labour 
MP, Geoffrey Bing, a Queens Counsel and member of the MCF who had 
recently served as Attorney General to Kwame Nkrumah’s government in 
Ghana. While in Africa, Nkrumah had found Bing’s ‘legal brilliance invaluable’ 
because he was ‘adept at finding legal ways to “use” the law’. According to 
London’s Observer, Bing had ‘worked out a constitutional way for Nkrumah 
to remove his Chief Justice’.174 As a result, according to Browne-Evans he was 
‘blamed for everything that was radical and dictatorial in Ghana’.175 Bing’s 
advocacy on the part of the PLP was seen as effective by CO official TM 
Jenkins, who noted in January 1967 that his intervention ‘enabled the PLP to 
make out a much more forceful case at the conference than they would 
otherwise have done’.176 
 
Before going in to the conference, the UBP faction had been warned by 
Conservative MP Nigel Fisher ‘to accept a compromise which went further 
than they had wanted to go’, because, in Fisher’s view, Lee ‘could not possibly 
propose any settlement which was not a compromise’. As Fisher would later 
say, ‘that is how it worked out’.177 As the next section will show this 
compromise slightly improved on the inequalities of constituency size 
inherent in the 1962 boundaries but kept boundaries delimited within 
parishes. However, the PLP delegation won a concession in the creation of two 
extra constituencies (with two MCPs each) in the most populous parish of 
Pembroke, increasing the number of seats in the House of Assembly from 36 
to 40. However, the distortions implicit in the fact that boundaries were 
forced to remain within parish lines, meant, as the FCO noted:  
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Three of the nine parishes which contain the bulk of the population 
will only return sixteen out of the 40 proposed MPs (sic), while the 
other six representing the wealthier area but containing a 
minority of the population will return 24 members. 178 
 
Lee would later defend this compromise in the House of Commons by arguing 
that, despite the inequalities, it had ‘brought about a situation in which there 
will be far and away greater equality in voting than there has ever been 
before’.179 Lee suggested on the closing day of the conference that Bermuda 
could be a ‘shining example to the world of two races living together and 
enjoying peace and prosperity’. He tempted fate by adding: “If with these 
conditions, you in Bermuda cannot make a success of race relations, I don’t 
know who can.”180  
 
This majority report, which the PLP group rejected, essentially formalised the 
link between executive and legislature, creating a type of quasi-parliamentary 
sovereignty in which the chairmen and women of boards now sat on an 
Executive Council (a Cabinet in all but name) also appointed from the 
majority group in the House of Assembly. This was in contrast to the situation 
before, in which, ‘in theory’ the Governor’s powers were ‘virtually unlimited 
and the elected House of the Legislature [had] no say in executive 
government’.181  
 
An empowered House of Assembly would be supplemented by a nominated 
Legislative Council which would then have the power to delay taxation bills 
(whereas before it could veto them). Another important part of the proposed 
constitution was a bill of rights, similar to that already in effect in the 
Bahamas following the constitutional change of January 1964.182  
 
The move towards a version of parliamentary sovereignty however was held in 
check by reserved powers for the Governor. Under section 62, the Governor 
retained responsibility for internal security, the police, external affairs and 	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defence.183 For looking after these areas, the Governor was allowed to 
withdraw money from the Consolidated Fund ‘acting in his discretion’ and 
without the need for parliamentary approval.184  The Governor also retained 
the right, under section 14, to declare a state of emergency. Thus he had 
discretion to do anything ‘reasonably justifiable . . . for the purpose of dealing 
with a security situation’.185 As will be shown in later chapters, the splitting up 
of executive power in this way may have created a situation in which the 
coherence of governance was undermined. 
 
The conference majority report was accompanied by two minority reports. 
One, by white reactionaries Cox and Henry Watlington, advocated direct 
democracy that would have put Bills rejected by the House of Assembly to a 
public vote in a referendum.186 The PLP put forward more wide-ranging 
objections to the majority report. In particular, the PLP attacked the fact that 
constituency boundaries put in place in 1962 had been decided on a ‘racial 
basis’ and were being essentially left unchanged, apart from the creation of 
new seats in heavily populated Pembroke Parish. As a result, the PLP believed 
the majority report was ‘unsatisfactory’ as they would ‘almost certainly to lead 
to the election of a House of Assembly not representative of the electorate’. 
The party also disagreed with the provision that allowed the upper chamber to 
delay tax bills and suggested that the Governor should be ‘elected’ and should 
also not be able to withdraw money without the legislature’s agreement.187  
 
The PLP also attacked the proposals for being based on the Bahamas model. 
The minority report argued that the ‘experience, to date, in the working of the 
Bahamas constitution is not such as to justify a similar constitution being 
enacted for Bermuda’.188  The knowledge of how a white-led government in 
the Bahamas had clung on to power through gerrymandering was fresh in the 
mind. The suggestion by PLP leader Walter Robinson that Bermuda risked 
becoming a ‘second Rhodesia with largely white business and property 	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interests maintaining minority rule by gerrymandering’ may have been an 
exaggeration but it also had a grain of truth to it.189   
 
The PLP, meanwhile, had been busy making use of Bing’s MCF network in 
London. On November 3, three PLP MCPs met with the Labour Party’s 
Commonwealth and Colonies Parliamentary Group.190  In solidarity with their 
Bermudian comrades, 35 Labour MPs ‘signed a parliamentary motion of 
protest’ because of the unequal proportions of the constituencies.191 The 
majority report also only made minor concessions to PLP anxieties about 
gerrymandering, with the creation of two new seats in Pembroke. As the next 
section will show, there was a mix of support for and opposition to the 
majority report in the House of Commons and the House of Lords in June and 
July 1967. 
 
4. A passive metropole: Debates at Westminster over 
Bermudian constitutional reform 
 
Britain’s role in Bermudian constitutional reform exposed a metropolitan 
political posture of affinity towards kith and kin. However, this was contested 
by a small block of MPs on the left of the Labour Party. The MCF had become 
the UK’s key anticolonialist pressure group since it had been formed in April 
1954. However, by the 1960s, its raison d’etre seemed to have been sapped by 
the rapid acceleration of decolonisation. The key ‘explosive’ issue of 
constituency boundaries in Bermuda, taken up by MCF member Bing, and 
passed on to other MPs such as Tom Driberg, however, afforded a new 
glimpse of the group taking on colonial legacies from a left-libertarian 
perspective.192 
 
This faction found inspiration in the journal The New Reasoner, which 
combined stories about colonial issues with the espousal of ‘the liberal and 
radical traditions’. It also emphasised moral battles, such as the fight for racial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 The Morning Star, November 8, 1966. 
190 Harries Hunter, Beyond the Crossroads, 176. 
191 Ibid, 179-180. 
192 Howe, Anticolonialism in British politics, 248. 
	   88	  
equality, over economic arguments against colonialism.193 The response, on 
the part of Conservative, Labour and Liberal representatives, to these 
suggestions of racial iniquity is instructive in exposing the combination of 
apathy and delusion on such questions of racist colonial legacies in the 
political centre and on the right. 
 
4.1 Cross-party indifference and irrationality on issues of 
racism 
 
The key battles in the constitutional conference and during the Westminster 
debate that followed centered on the question of whether Bermuda’s 
constitutional reforms were enshrining a fair form of democracy or not. 
Courageous lobbying by the PLP faction, aided by Bing, led to a key 
concession over representation in Pembroke. This was ‘the one parish with an 
outstandingly large electorate’ which included the capital city of Hamilton and 
its predominantly black northern and north-eastern suburbs. Representation 
here would be ‘doubled’ from two seats (and four MCPs) to four seats (and 
eight MCPs).194 
 
However, a more crucial UBP victory at the conference, despite the increase in 
the number of the MPs, was the fact that it was decided, with the PLP 
dissenting, ‘that the constituency Boundaries Commission should consider 
only boundary divisions within’ Bermuda’s nine parishes.195 Hence, disparities 
were ‘written into the constitution’ and could ‘only be rectified by a 
constitutional amendment’.196 The denial of ‘unrestricted’ terms of reference 
for potential boundary changes, as in fact the CO had ‘sought to introduce in 
other colonies before independence’, meant… 
 
There is a wide disparity between the value of a vote in the 
mainly white rural areas and the mainly black urban areas of 
Pembroke.197 
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More specifically, the PLP argued that their calculations indicated that the 
three most populous parishes in terms of black Bermudians – Pembroke, 
Devonshire and Sandys – which contained a majority of inhabitants on the 
island, or 23,672 people out of 42,640 in total (according to the most recent 
1960 census) - would return only 16 out of the 40 members of the House of 
Assembly, while ‘the remaining six parishes ‘containing a minority of the 
population’ – 18,968 – would return 24 members.  
 
Despite these objections, the majority report had passed through both 
Bermudian houses of parliament by February 7, 1967. Because of the UBP’s 
huge caucus of 23 out of a total of 36 MCPs, passage of the bill was ‘a foregone 
conclusion’.198 Browne-Evans later charged that Speaker Cox, an independent 
who had signed the majority report despite producing his own minority 
report, ‘admitted’ that the parish boundaries had been drawn on ‘racial lines’, 
while she added: “What they did in London…was to entrench it into the 
written constitution, making it hard to change.”199  
 
Another little-noticed part of the package meant that ‘the eight-year period 
that resident foreigners had to wait before applying for Bermudian status’ was 
decreased to five years.200 This package, which effectively inflated white votes 
and British input, was passed in the midst of coded rhetoric on the part of 
Tucker, who had suggested in May 1966:  
 
If we ever…allow the government of these islands to get into hands 
which do not have the experience to promote trade, to expand and 
maintain it, then we are in for a bad time.201  
 
The new Boundaries Commission, meanwhile, began its work during April 
and in May its report had been accepted in Bermuda House of Assembly by a 
vote of 17 votes to nine. However, the report was only signed by four out of 
five members of the commission. The PLP’s Walter Robinson refused to sign it 
as he believed the two constituencies of Devonshire had been divided ‘along 	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racial lines’.202  This suggests that even though constituencies were limited to 
within parish lines, the Boundaries Commission still had limited potential to 
make them fairer or not. In 1967, the creation of the safe PLP seat of 
Devonshire North and the safe UBP seat of Devonshire South suggested it was 
not interested in allowing the creative destruction of democracy to do its work. 
 
Minister of State Judith Hart introduced the Bermuda Constitution Bill to the 
House of Commons on June 14, 1967, arguing that the Bill would replace 
Bermuda’s ‘frankly archaic’ constitution with a ‘modern form of 
Government’.203 MPs Tom Driberg, James Johnson, Gerry Fitt, Hugh Jenkins 
and Joan Lestor rallied against it, suggesting ‘the constituency boundaries will 
continue in many cases to be rigged’; ‘unequal on a racial basis’. Whereas 
before ‘a coloured man’s vote’ had been worth ‘one-ninth of the vote of a white 
man, now it would be worth one-third’ and ‘coloured’ constituencies were 
‘almost four times the size of wealthy and white ones’. As a result, the UBP 
was placed in a ‘privileged position’ and the ‘dice’ was ‘loaded against the 
Opposition party ever winning’.204 
 
The defence of the Bermuda Constitution Bill, and of the new boundaries, by 
Labour, Conservative and Liberal parliamentarians included the argument, 
mainly put by moderate Labour MPs such as Christopher Rowland, that the 
constitution was a compromise brokered by a ‘neutral’ Colonial Secretary, and 
had to be accepted as a ‘cautious advance’.205  
 
Yet, there was also a veiled reference to the politics of affinity, put most 
pungently by Bermuda property-owner and Conservative MP Sir Frederic 
Bennett, who had been a member of the Primrose League, was a regular 
attendee of Bilderburg Group Conferences and had served as an Advocate on 
the High Court in Southern Rhodesia in the 1940s. Bennett’s view, apparently 
supported by Minister of State Judith Hart, was that an increase in black 
representation might lead to ‘racialism’ and confrontation that could hurt the 	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island’s economy, dependent on the US base and on tourism. As he put it: 
“One must be very careful not to damage, for the sake of a political theory, a 
structure which is of great value to the island.” This argument seemed 
founded in the idea that racial tension was not home-grown but ‘a reflection of 
the race troubles in the United States’.206   
 
The language is evocative of Tucker’s language. Although the UBP claimed 
they had ‘refrained from seeking the assistance of lobbies or pressure groups’ 
in building parliamentary support for this bill, 16 Conservative MPs tabled a 
motion congratulating Bermuda’s parliament on ‘establishing a multiracial 
society untrammeled by poverty or direct taxation’.207  Bennett represented a 
key champion of the reform at Westminster.208 As the owner of a home on St 
David’s Island, he revealed that he had been approached to stand as a 
candidate for the UBP in the upcoming General Election. Thus, whilst PLP 
lobbying occurred in the open, UBP lobbying occurred more behind the 
scenes. Like other supporters of the bill, he spoke in veiled terms of anxiety, 
trying to downplay ‘racial differences’ but employing the ridiculous argument 
that tackling deep racist legacies through institutional reform might shatter 
the island’s fragile tourist economy.209 
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Figures 9 and 10: Constituency boundaries proposed by Boundaries Commission and 
accepted by the House of Assembly, 1967.  
© Foreign and Commonwealth Office, National Archives, London, UK 	  	  
4.2 ‘The only means we have left’: Bermuda as an ‘English 
market town’ 
 
British politicians from all three parties who argued in favour of the Bermuda 
Constitution Bill seemed to have been convinced that Bermuda was a cross 
between an idyllic paradise and what Liberal Peer Lord Ogmore called an 
	   93	  
‘English market town’. These arguments did not focus on the merit of the 
reforms themselves since it was conceded even by supporters that these were 
‘elaborate’ and that they enshrined unequally-sized constituencies. However it 
was countered by the argument that such disparities were even more stark in 
Britain.210 Proponents of this view were forgetting, however, that Britain’s 
majority population, had not been subjected to slavery and segregation by a 
narrowly-based oligarchy. As Benn would note in 1963: “Race is an explosive 
issue and cannot be pushed under the carpet.”211 
 
The moderate and Conservative argument in favour of the Bill depended on an 
emphasis on Bermuda’s relative prosperity, hopeful arguments that the UBP’s 
‘liberal wing’ would win out, and a strange concession that Britain no longer 
had the means to impose a solution. Hart had discussed Bermuda’s prosperity 
in vivid terms on introducing the Bill. It was noted that ‘96 per cent of all 
households have a refrigerator, 82 per cent have radio and 66 per cent have 
television’ while Bermuda had ‘one of the highest standards of living in the 
world, and the prosperity extends throughout the community’.212 These facts 
were deployed as if they were relevant to a discussion about new 
constitutional or electoral machinery.  
 
The notion of prosperity also fed into a ‘declinist’ ideology which had specific 
roots in the British politics of the late 1950s and 1960s’.213 Bermuda’s 
prosperity starkly contrasted with anxieties about British weakness. Bennett 
noted that Bermuda had a ‘North American’ standard of living, while she was 
also ‘a very valuable and significant contributor to the hard currency reserves 
of the Sterling Area’.214 Because of this the ‘boot’ was ‘on the other foot’. 
Britain was at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the oligarchy because, economically, 
Bermuda was ‘completely secure and independent’.215 
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Secondly, there was an attempt to displace the decision by championing  
Bermuda’s white oligarchy vis-a-vis other white minorities throughout the 
world to make them seem ‘moderate’. Bermudian oligarchs were depicted, 
even by Driberg, as much more ‘civilised, gentle people’ than the Rhodesia 
Front ‘savages’.216 Rowland, who had been ‘kicked, punched and had a jug of 
water poured over him’ by supporters of Ian Smith during a visit to Rhodesia 
in January 1966, also suggested Bermuda posed a less intractable problem 
than that posed in Central and Southern Africa.217 Yet Bermuda, he added, 
was also ‘not a Kenyan situation where the white minority was so small…that 
its interest could be rolled over by the British government of the day’.218 Thus, 
a compromise was in order.  
 
A similar exercise was attempted on behalf of Martonmere. During the 
Westminster debate, Conservative MP Nigel Fisher had praised the ‘tact and 
good sense’ of Martonmere, who was also held up as a ‘sheet anchor of 
stability’.219 In the Lords, the praise was even more fulsome, and 
Martonmere’s ‘wisdom and assiduity’ and ‘political sagacity’ were lauded.220 
With a person of this caliber overseeing reform, how could it possibly go 
wrong? 
 
Finally, the argument for the Bill obliquely alluded to Britain’s changing place 
in the world. Firstly, it expressed something of an increasing disillusion with 
the Commonwealth as independent countries became one-party states and 
jettisoned their British links. This engendered something of a prejudice 
against the PLP’s resistance to the reform because of Bing’s work in 
authoritarian Ghana. As Robert Howarth noted: “I was staggered by their 
choice of constitutional adviser. His role in Africa…makes him very 
suspect.”221 
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Secondly, abdication of Britain’s responsibility towards black Bermudians was 
rationalised by an evocation of Britain’s weakness and the fact that she had 
abandoned ‘the pretence of being a great imperial power’. In this context, 
Bennett suggested softer understandings of ‘influence’ and vague ‘hopes’ were 
all that remained of British power in the context of Bermuda: 
 
To talk of imposing a settlement is wholly unreal. While one 
hopes to see further advances, they can only be made by ties of 
mutual confidence and friendship between us and Bermuda, 
because these are the only means that we have left.222 
 
Thus the idea of imposing a settlement on ‘kith and kin’ was as unrealistic or 
ludicrous, in Clark’s words, as Jeremy Thorpe’s ‘celebrated suggestion that V-
bombers should be used to devastate the Rhodesia railway system’.223 
 
The reverse of this debate identified something of a contradiction within the 
Labour Party’s approach to radicalism in the context of imperial legacies, 
which was anti-colonial at the same time as advocating liberal intervention. 
Since decolonisation was now a cross-party orthodoxy, the argument of MCF 
members such as Driberg and Bing would have to take on a new language in 
which it was not afraid to suggest a less timid association with the English 
tradition of liberty. As Hart put it:  
 
Those who argue…that the British House of Commons should 
legislate to change [electoral iniquities] are the first people to 
argue for self-government for dependent territories. They 
cannot have it both ways.224 
 
The Bill received its second reading in the House of Commons in late June. It 
passed through its second and third readings in the House of Lords, with little 
dissent, on July 21.  The Bermuda Constitutional Order was passed as a 
statutory Order in Council in London on February 14, 1968, and the first 
election based upon the new electoral arrangements and recommendations of 
the new Boundaries Commission took place on May 22.225 The rest of the 
constitution came into effect in June, after the UBP had won a landslide 	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victory over the PLP in the election, taking 30 of the 40 seats in the House of 
Assembly.226 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the process of Bermudian constitutional reform, liberal influences 
such as Greenwood seemed impotent in the face of the combined efforts of 
Martonmere, Tucker, officials such as Poynton and a cross-party consensus of 
‘decolonising’ MPs and Peers. This highlights how a decolonisation of affinity 
loosely cloaked in a rhetoric of ‘decline’ and compromise could be used to 
rationalise the abdication of British responsibilities towards Bermuda’s 
majority. These duties had been imposed not by some sacred, divine or racial 
trust. Rather they were accrued by Britain’s history of using Bermuda as a 
strategic outpost and her regular bolstering of the white minority in power, for 
instance via Governor Sir Ralph Leatham’s tacit acquiescence in Bermudian 
iniquities in 1946-8.  
 
With support from Whitehall officials, Martonmere took the lead in 
organising the Constitutional Conference in November 1966. The make-up of 
the delegation needed to be approved by the Secretary of State himself. He 
showed his power when he created a delegation dominated by conservative, 
white men. As Schwarz notes, often communications between imperial actors 
‘resided in the undertone or in what was left unsaid, or in a shrug of the 
shoulder largely lost to the historical record’.227  Along these lines, it seems the 
make-up of the delegation was the product of a gentleman’s agreement 
between Tucker and Martonmere, with support from officials in London such 
as Poynton. 
 
On top of this, Martonmere actively encouraged Tucker in his resistance to 
progressive demands that constituencies be redrawn so they were able to cross 
parish lines. This helped undermine the legitimacy of the new democracy from 
its inception. An increasingly close relationship between Tucker and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Sun, June 8, 1972. 
227 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 349.  
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Martonmere, who was viewed with respect across party lines in Britain, led to 
a situation in which the British government was supporting what they viewed 
as the ‘moderate’ and ‘sensible’ government of Bermuda. This policy, rarely 
explicitly acknowledged, nevertheless came to be justified by officials in terms 
of ‘stability’ and the need for ‘racial harmony’, despite knowledge that racial 
violence in 1965 had been founded in a reaction against economic iniquities 
perpetuated by the oligarchy. 
 
Hopeful and emollient suggestions in Westminster that ‘riots’ and ‘racial 
strife’ were ‘unthinkable in the Bermuda of today’ came only two years after a 
strike in which seventeen Police officers and unknown others had been 
injured. This blindness to reality suggests that the mix of affinity and 
pragmatic approaches suggested by the Conservative, moderate Labour and 
Liberal view were based upon a false image of Bermuda; one where ‘harmony’ 
had prevailed until the island started becoming infected by ‘race troubles’ 
from the United States.  This mythical view could only be founded in 
approaches to decolonisation that placed interest, influence, ‘mutual 
confidence’ and ‘friendship’ between London and kith and kin in Bermuda 
ahead of any supposed commitment to democracy. 
 
While the UBP may have consciously or unconsciously played upon this 
linkage between ‘kith and kin’, there was also an appeal to the better angels of 
Britain’s nature. The BWA petition and response to it by Creech Jones in 1946 
suggests the oligarchy was so entrenched in Bermudian life by that point that 
Bermuda’s working class felt the only option was to appeal over their heads to 
London. This was a demand for principled decolonisation, which incorporated 
an appeal for more intervention by Britain along liberal and progressive lines 
before finally pulling out.  
 
Indeed, Bermuda’s black community may have been more threatened by the 
local oligarchy when the progressive face of a Janus-like Britain came down 
on the side of not confronting Bermuda’s deeply entrenched iniquities. 1967-8 
was the moment, therefore, that the ability to set agendas in Bermuda began 
to slip from Britain’s fingers. This may have happened in part because politics 
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in Britain were beginning in the 1960s to be dominated by some of the same 
questions of race that had been endemic in Bermuda’s fabric for centuries.  
 
What Tony Benn called a ‘colour bar’ existed in Britain, for instance in Bristol, 
until 1963.228 Throughout the mid-1960s, Labour attempted to tackle racism 
with two Race Relations Acts.229 These attempts were characterised however 
by ‘lurchings and stumblings, contradictions and the abandonment of 
principles’.230 The extent of populist racism to non-white immigration was 
revealed following a speech by Conservative MP Enoch Powell in April 
1968.231  White solidarity was an undercurrent, officially denounced by 
political elites, but retaining a striking, often unspoken, power. 
 
The response of radicals to the combination of white solidarity and ‘declinist’ 
rationalisation, however, was revealed to be inadequate because they were 
divided between an old economic interpretation of anticolonialism and a new 
discourse of liberties and rights. On the one hand, there was a generic, largely 
bi-partisan drift towards ‘liquidating colonialism’. This had been most 
symbolically enshrined in 1947-8 by the hasty and chaotic withdrawals from 
India and Palestine, and would soon be replicated with Britain’s ejection from 
Aden in November 1967.232 This was the anti-colonialism of pragmatism, 
because it also played into a vision that emphasised a more inward-focused 
British posture; the decolonisation of the little Englander. 
 
However, the anti-colonialist movement was also pervaded by an 
undercurrent of liberal radicalism. As espoused by MPs such as Driberg and 
Fenner Brockway, it was characterised by a view of the ‘danger’ of ‘white 
settler communities’. This necessitated ‘intense efforts to overcome the racial 
antagonisms which were seen as legacies of colonialism’. Bermuda, 
meanwhile, was a testing ground for a form of rhetoric ‘in which colonial 
questions were increasingly articulated in the language of race’. It provided an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, 15. 
229 Cabinet Memorandum by Home Secretary, February 17, 1965, C. (65) 23, TNA. 
230 Lapping, Labour Government, 109. 
231 BBC News, Ten Key Moments in Race Relations. 
232 Lapping, Labour Government, 59. 
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opportunity for the anticolonialist left to emphasise ‘radical-liberal 
humanitarian appeals’ founded ‘in traditions symbolised’ by John Stuart 
Mill.233 As a symbol of this evolution, it was no accident that the MCF would 
be re-named Liberation in 1970.234 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Howe, Anticolonialism in British Politics, 300, 301 and 325. 
234 Nelson Mandela Foundation website. 
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Chapter Two 
The pragmatic conversion of Sir Henry Tucker, 
oligarchical paternalism and the denial of racial 
legacies, 1963 –1971   
 
Racial harmony is closer and better today than it had been in 
my recollection….We have a solid basis of understanding today, 
which means we can dismiss this problem in the future.  
-  Sir Henry Tucker, May 3, 1963 1 
 
The same government has been in power since black people have been 
slaves. 
-  The words of an unidentified teenager during riots in Hamilton, 
December 1977 2  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Tucker’s words above, spoken to 200 people at an election meeting in the leafy 
surroundings in his family’s former land in the constituency of Paget, 
suggested either willful blindness or striking ignorance about Bermuda’s 
historical legacies. What Tucker seemed to be ignoring was that, in the words 
of James Baldwin: “People are trapped in history and history is trapped in 
them.”3 The other quote above, and the context in which it was said, suggests 
that by 1977, the UBP had failed, after 13 years of effective legislative power, to 
convince many Bermudians it was a genuinely ‘multi-racial’ entity with an 
interest in building a modern and progressive Bermuda.  
 
Despite Tucker’s hope of ‘dismissing this problem’, race relations in the period 
1963 until 1971 progressively deteriorated. The 1960s was something of a false 
dawn for racial emancipation that ended with ‘a thorough pacification’ of 
blacks in the early 1970s.4 Between the passing of the Parliamentary Elections 
Act in January 1963 and Tucker’s retirement as Government Leader in 
December 1971, British troops were called to Bermuda three times by 
Governor Lord Martonmere, while riots engulfed the island in February 1965, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gazette, May 3, 1963 
2 The Times, December 4, 1977. 
3 Lambert and Lester, Imperial Spaces, Imperial Subjects, 16. 
4 Reed, ‘Black Revolution’, 62. 
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April 1968 and October 1970.5 Although parts of the historiography seem to 
underplay or even forget the 1968 riots6, they were not limited to the City of 
Hamilton, but spread right through the island.7 Finally, in 1977-1978, a new 
set of riots would occasion the report of a Royal Commission under Lord Pitt 
of Hampstead. It identified a host of economic and social iniquities and 
governance problems festering under the surface of what seemed to be, to the 
island’s many tourists at least, a tranquil and prosperous island.8 
 
The purpose of the first two chapters of this thesis is the adumbration of two 
key themes that characterised Anglo-Bermudian power-sharing. Firstly, the 
process of laissez-faire constitutional devolution through which a rationalising 
British elite gave comfort to a frightened yet controlling oligarchy. This 
process also further diminished the metropole’s ability to set agendas, while 
confusing responsibilities and accountability in Britain’s remaining territories 
up to the present day.9  
 
The second theme is the birth of a Bermudian party politics tempered by UBP 
incumbency between 1964 and 1977. This theme focuses on the manner in 
which the party presented itself as a mixture of a break from the past but also 
as the protector of prosperity and stability. In the process, however, it 
repackaged a repressed racial politics of confrontation for a new democratic 
age. The process of party creation and growth detailed in this chapter was part 
of the legitimation of the oligarchy’s incumbency, through elections and via 
the creation of new trappings of power and symbols of local autonomy. 
 
The previous chapter showed how the process of constitutional reform was 
tarnished by the historical iniquities that it hardwired into the electoral 
landscape. This chapter will focus on the same period, 1963-1968, placing the 
spotlight on the origins of Bermuda’s second political party, the UBP. These 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 E Vadre to JAN Graham, June 23, 1969, PREM 13/2885, TNA. 
6 The 1968 riots are not even mentioned in Zuill, Story of Bermuda and her People. 
7 Wooding, Springer and Browning, Bermuda Civil Disorders, 21. 
8 Pitt et al., Report…into the 1977 Disturbances. 
9 Taylor, British Colonial Policy in the Caribbean; political squabbles between the two halves 
of the Bermuda executive branch still occur, for instance, over appointments to the 
Department of Public Prosecutions. Gazette, January 11, 2014. 
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two chapters will show how UBP politicians were set on a path that helped to 
marginalise the black Bermudian majority, at the same time as helping to spur 
a period of atrophy and reassessment of British power in Bermuda.  
 
This chapter will first argue that the party was part of a wider elite response to 
local and global currents of change. The party was founded in the context of a 
reassessment of race at the level of Government House. Some writing about 
Bermudian political history in this period fails to take account of the colonial 
context in discussion of the causation of events.10 It is essential, however, to 
view this period in the context of the wider process of decolonisation.   
 
Government support for segregation in schools ended in 1965, as did the 
integration of the (black) Bermuda Militia Artillery and the (white) Bermuda 
Rifles into the Bermuda Regiment and the top ranks of the civil service.11 This 
chapter will not suggest that the UBP was a product of British design, simply 
that different processes of change, at the grassroots, legislative, executive and 
high political levels, occurred simultaneously.  
 
Segregation was already under pressure as a result of Cold War paradigms 
which saw the West under pressure internationally over the gap between its 
rhetoric of freedom and the reality of Jim Crow.12 In Bermuda, it was also an 
elite response to popular protest and rising racial tension, filtered through 
confrontations over labour relations in 1964 and 1965.13 Former PLP strategist 
Calvin Smith describes how Martonmere’s fears of ‘racial war’ following the 
1965 BELCO strike, during which 17 police officers were injured, was 
instrumental in bringing about a pragmatic shift in government policies on 
race.14 
 
Secondly, the UBP was also something of a painful, pragmatic departure from 
Bermuda’s individualist political culture by an oligarchy that was aware of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Brown, Struggle for reform, 105.  
11 Harries Hunter, Beyond the Crossroads, 183 and 227; Burchall, Fine as Wine, 46.  
12Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 61-120. 
13 Dr Eva Hodgson interview with the author on December 16, 2011 in Hamilton Parish, 
Bermuda. 
14 Calvin Smith interview, April 3, 2012. 
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need to adapt in order to survive. ‘Conservatism’, after all, ‘is the most flexible 
political philosophy’.15 According to an aide to David Cameron, the UK 
Conservative Party’s mission should be ‘preserving what is good, being radical 
where we need to be and pragmatic where we must be’.16 Because of such 
pragmatism, Tucker and other UBP founders such as Henry Vesey, who had 
been opposed to integration during the 1950s, embarked on a host of reforms, 
including the desegregation of schools, the creation of a Race Relations Board 
to tackle discrimination, investment in education and healthcare, the passing 
of a Workmen’s Compensation Act and the beginning of old age pensions and 
a land tax.17  
 
Tucker’s ‘national unity’ message was ‘conciliatory, pragmatic - and vote-
getting’18. However, this chapter argues that this broad-church was not one 
rooted in principle but one founded in perceived necessity. The UBP’s small 
island lineage and its history of racial cleavages may have combined with the 
relative homogeneity of Bermuda’s white community to structure the new 
politics. Swan is correct to note the insignificance in Bermuda of a ‘liberal 
White left’ of the kind that expressed support in the US for the Black 
Panthers.19 Because of this, the 1960s may have been a period in which a new 
gradualist politics was enshrined, with diversity only at the margins, reflecting 
the fact that ‘the gains of the Sixties’ (ie the ending of formal segregation and 
the onset of universal suffrage) ‘only removed a fetter blocking the possibility 
of emancipation’ and did not constitute emancipation itself.20 
 
This agglomeration was no more diverse than the UK Conservative Party. It 
may have encompassed religious conservatives and moderate liberals while 
aiming also to appear multi-racial. Yet, like its British counterpart, both the 
UBP’s caucus and the membership were generally white, male and ‘posh’.21  In 
the creation of this loose coalition, it will be argued that the founders of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Huffington Post blog, February 5, 2012. 
16 The Spectator, December 11, 2010.  
17 UBP election manifesto, May 1968. 
18 Brown, Race and Party Politics, 107. 
19 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 114. 
20 Reed, ‘Black Revolution’, 63. 
21 Totnes Conservative MP Sarah Woolaston describes how she feels her party is ‘far too posh, 
male, and white’, South Devon Herald Express, March 12, 2013. 
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UBP were both inspired and warned by the experience of the white-minority’s 
United Bahamian Party, which held power from the late 1950s until 1967 
when it lost power. Like the Bahamas, Bermuda should be seen as part of the 
wider north Atlantic story of ‘European conquest, slavery and colonialism’ 
that shaped the Caribbean.22  
 
Because of the tight control exerted by Front Street, the party was always in 
danger of being identified with the oligarchy rather than with popular or 
grassroots demands. It will be argued that, partly because of this, Tucker and 
his colleagues colluded to deceive the public. The claim was that a party 
cooked up over drinks at the then whites-only Royal Bermuda Yacht Club and 
at the Royal Hamilton Amateur Dinghy Club had been founded as a result of 
popular grassroots pressure for a non-racial conservative movement.23   
 
Another old habit included a belief in white and British tutelage of blacks in 
political ‘responsibility’ and the use of the levers of power. With regards to the 
first of these, Tucker’s conservative stance in the face of demands for reform 
had for two decades and more been based on the idea that the universal 
franchise may be appropriate for Bermuda at some point ‘but not’ as he 
argued in 1947, ‘for between 25 and 50 years’.24 As he elaborated six years 
later, suffrage for all would ‘only work when our population as a whole is 
sufficiently educated and disciplined to cast a vote properly and not for the 
demagogue’.25 This belief in paternalistic gradualism had a long lineage 
throughout the British Empire. In the mid-19th century, Colonial Secretary 
James Stephen suggested white racists in colonies could count on the 
acquiescence of the British Government in this practice:  
 
There may be a more general convenience and safety in 
allowance of the actual supremacy of the whites for a while, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Saunders, Racial Discrimination in The Bahamas, 169; Lewis, Growth of the Modern West 
Indies, 324-347. 
23 Manning, Bermudian Politics in Transition; Elsie (Rick) Marson describes how she was not 
allowed to go to the Yacht Club because she was a woman (interview, April 9, 2012); Dr David 
Saul points out that while the Yacht Club was reserved for the social elite, while the Dinghy 
Club was reserved for the economic elite (interview, April 4, 2012); see also Brown, Bermuda 
and the struggle for reform, 95. 
24 Williams, Man of Stature, 96. 
25 Ibid, 109-10. 
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the legal extinction of it; and so to depart from it by degrees than 
to reach the same end, by a more abrupt method.26 
 
This chapter will argue that this belief in gradualism had to find a new 
language to express itself in a time of democratic participation and ‘post-
colonial globalisation’.27 The UBP found it in the accusation that the PLP were 
‘inexperienced’ and so could not be trusted with power.28 
 
Thirdly, however, it will be argued that the Bermudian party succeeded where 
the Bahamian conservatives failed in recruiting some black candidates to its 
ranks, in part because of the power of oligarchical paternalism and, in part, 
because Bermuda’s relative prosperity had created a larger black middle-class 
on which the UBP could draw. It is not quite accurate to say that the UBP 
became a party ‘that black people of many different backgrounds could 
support’.29 More persuasively, black UBP candidates were usually, but not 
always, middle class men who were, as in Crown Colonies of the Caribbean, 
‘not necessarily spokesmen for the black majority’.30  
 
Some members of the black middle class, which in the first half of the 20th 
century had formed into Parish Political Associations to maximise their 
strength in the era of restricted franchise, ‘wanted not so much to open up the 
system to all but rather to secure for themselves an equal footing with the 
white ruling class’.  To do this, they had to play ‘by the rules of the game’.31 
Yet, owing to Bermuda’s precariously balanced racial demographics, the UBP 
would depend on a crucial sliver of the black vote to maintain it in power.32 As 
a result, black members of the UBP would become ‘the pivotal group in the 
partisan confrontation’.33 
 
The final section of this chapter will examine how the UBP’s multi-racial 
image was a precarious manifestation of old habit by which, since the early 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Quoted in Brown, Struggle for reform, 10. 
27 Hopkins, Rethinking Decolonisation, 216. 
28 UBP parliamentary candidate Lancelot Swan, quoted in Gazette, April 4, 1968.  
29 Harries Hunter, Beyond the Crossroads, 135.  
30 Johnson, British Caribbean, 608. 
31 Brown, Race and Party Politics, 105. 
32 Manning, Bermudian Politics in Transition, 199. 
33 Ibid, 208. 
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1880s at least, a particular de-racialised vision of Bermuda was being 
cultivated to appeal to tourists.34 Issues of race and tourism-based prosperity 
were intimately linked because of the oligarchy’s success at creating a process 
of ‘meticulous social engineering’ in which black tourists were ‘discouraged’ 
and ‘economic and social injustice’ was exacerbated.35 The perceived need to 
protect prosperity, despite its unevenly concentrated nature, was used as a 
rationalisation for the failure to tackle racial legacies.  
 
By the late 1970s, the old simplicity of elite-managed tourism’ had 
disappeared.36 The 1960s thus provide an opportunity for a study of the way 
in which conservative political rhetoric, race and the fetishisation of 
prosperity all fused together to establish the UBP’s early identity and rhetoric, 
while also helping to stymie Bermudian democracy as it theoretically came of 
age. 
 
2. The oligarchy’s hesitant response to colonial and local 
pressures, 1963-1965  
 
As Chapter One suggested, the creation of the UBP came at a particular 
moment when world and local events were nudging both Government House 
and the oligarchy to feel that their long hold on power was being threatened. 
World and colonial trends were inducing the end of formal racial 
discrimination in the US and Britain. The ‘ideological battle with the Soviet 
Union’ was a ‘powerful’ incentive for Britain and the US to ‘reduce the gap 
between the rhetoric of freedom and the reality of continuing subordination’.37 
Meanwhile, by 1959, the British government was also under international, 
local political and media pressure following the Hola Massacre in Kenya and 
the Devlin report on British repression in Nyasaland.38 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For a brilliant evocation of the cultivation of this image, see Williams, When Voices Rise 
(film). 
35 Wilkinson, review of MacDowall, 246. 
36 MacDowall, Another World, 227 and 213. 
37 Hopkins, Rethinking Decolonisation, 244-7. 
38 Lewis, Daddy wouldn't buy me a Mau Mau, 227-250. 
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In that year, Major General Sir Julian Gascoigne was, ‘sent to Bermuda from 
London to get things moving on the racial front’.39 Gascoigne, a career 
military man, had been educated at Eton and Sandhurst and commissioned 
into the Grenadier Guards in 1922.40 After taking over from Sir John Woodall, 
he served as governor until the summer of 1964. Gascoigne was a paternalistic 
liberal who challenged the oligarchy on the status quo of racial segregation, 
both in his personal example and his rhetoric. Reporter Bryan Darby, who 
began working at The Royal Gazette in the early 1960s, described how this 
‘archetypal colonial governor with a big monocle…horrified Front Street’ by 
regularly going to Swinging Doors, a bar in the northern section of 
Hamilton.41 
 
Despite this, it should be remembered that since Gascoigne exercised full 
executive power he could have begun appointing blacks to senior positions in 
the civil service immediately if he chose. This did not happen during his 
tenure. In 1963, he called for an end to segregation in schools which seemed to 
lead to moves by the Board of Education, with UK government support, to 
bring about such changes.42  However, his commitment to racial equality was 
also somewhat cold and rationalistic. He noted that bringing blacks into the 
civil service was necessary, partly because the ‘employment of expatriates 
[who by 1963 formed one fifth of the island’s total workforce] was extremely 
expensive’.43  
 
Change would have to wait until after Martonmere took over in June 1964. 
“There was one high ranking black registrar general but there was nobody 
black in central government.”44 Reform was pushed by events. In February 
1965, the BELCO riot was sparked by a mix of longstanding industrial and 
racial grievances. Historian Eva Hodgson, teaching at a school near the site of 
the strike at the time, recalled that she was ‘far more aware of the racial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ebbin, Bermuda Biographies. 
40 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Major General Sir Julian Gascoigne. 
41 Bryan Darby interview, April 7, 2012.  
42 January 8, 1963, quoted in Gazette, January 16, 1964; Bermuda and the UN, June 4, 1964, 
1027, 610. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Smith interview, April 3, 2012. 
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divide during the strike’ and pointed to its significance in the Bermuda 
Government’s approach to race relations.45 
 
That strike became not just about labour but also about race... 
After that they began to hold conversations between blacks and 
whites.46 
 
Evidence suggests that this riot caused a shift in strategy by Martonmere. 
Although noises on these lines had been made by Gascoigne, from this time 
Martonmere began the process of appointing blacks to a few senior positions 
in the civil service. According to Calvin Smith, who was hired by Martonmere 
to the top ranks of the civil service a few months later:  
 
The BELCO riot was the thing that gave him the impetus to bring 
me in. Martonmere said this has to stop. Every time we have a 
dispute it erupts into a racial war and we’ve got to change this.47 
 
Smith was working in Canada as a statistician when he had applied for the 
post of Chief Statistician on a dare from a PLP politician friend of his. He 
recalled how he applied and ‘the next thing I hear’ he was offered an interview 
with Lord Martonmere at the Governor’s son-in-law’s home in the upmarket 
Toronto neighbourhood of Forest Hills. After being greeted at the door of the 
mansion by the butler, Smith was met by Martonmere who told him that it 
was not actually an interview, because he had already decided to offer Smith 
the job. Smith said he thought the fact he had been working in Canada for 
three years made him especially attractive as a candidate for the job because: 
 
He wants to integrate the higher ranks of the civil servants and 
he is in a racist society. You can’t just put in a black person who 
had no contact with white people at all.48 
 
Smith also remembered that Martonmere told him in the ‘interview’.  
 
‘I’m here to persuade you to return home, and really to help us to 
change Bermuda.  I want blacks to have equal opportunity to 
everyone else.’49  
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Smith noted that the move was met with much resistance by conservative 
whites in Bermuda. ”They were taking a big risk in terms of the attitude of 
white Bermudians.”50 
 
Meanwhile, the PLP’s success in 1963 had created the circumstances in which 
independent and individualistic conservative politicians began to view the 
prospect of a new conservative party as conducive, rather than inimical, to 
their interests. The passage of the Parliamentary Elections Act of January 
1963, which abolished the property qualification requirement for voting (but 
still gave freeholders a single extra plus vote) led in February to the creation of 
the PLP and its winning six seats during a General Election in May.51  
 
According to former UBP politician David Saul, who also worked as a senior 
civil servant in the Department of Education in the early 1970s, part of 
Tucker’s task was to ‘drag (conservatives) kicking and screaming into the 
latter part of the 20th century’.52 It may have been true that Tucker was a 
crucial bridge between the conservative and slightly more paternalistically 
liberal factions of the white community and between blacks and whites within 
the party itself.  
 
But the UBP was not founded as a result of any grand political vision, nor was 
it spurred on by a set of political grievances or aims. The party was a 
pragmatic albeit conservative response to events on the ground. The party’s 
early philosophy was clearly influenced by the political pedigree of founding 
members such as John Plowman, who had at the age of 23 become the 
‘youngest Borough councillor in England’ after standing on a Conservative, 
‘anti-socialist’ ticket in London’s Ealing in November 1931. After moving to 
Bermuda, Plowman would become one of the first members of the UBP 
appointed to the Legislative Council in June 1966. 53 
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However, Plowman also noted the UBP was formed partly as ‘a matter of 
survival’.54 The PLP’s creation and success in 1963 pushed the leading 
members of Bermuda’s oligarchy to make a mental leap and organise 
collectively. However, their reactions were strangely sluggish (it was only after 
eight-months of discussion and planning behind the scenes that the party was 
actually founded) while they were also constrained by the Bermudian heritage 
of individualism, which led some conservative MCPs to oppose the innovation 
of party politics altogether.55  
 
The first of the events to which conservatives reacted was the organisation of 
the first meeting of the PLP on February 14, 1963.56 On February 20, 
Bermuda’s Special Branch, in a report for the Colonial Secretary in London, 
documented the first meeting of a ‘semi-political party known as the 
Bermuda Voters Association’. This meeting was held at Hamilton’s Chamber 
of Commerce. The Hamilton merchant and champion of the tourist industry 
Henry Vesey, elected to the legislature in 1938, was chair and its only speaker 
was Tucker. The meeting attracted 125 people. Other founders of the 
Association were reported to be Tucker, Speaker of the House John Cox, 
described by Bermuda’s Chief Secretary as ‘independent to the point of being 
reactionary’ and affluent businessman MA Gibbons.57   
 
Significantly, this new organisation was ostensibly in favour of basic 
desegregation, for instance in government-funded schools. It also pledged 
itself to ‘sound and conservative financial administration’. This organisation 
should be seen as the prototype of the UBP. It committed itself to ‘remedial 
action’ on ‘any matters which remain as points of difference between the 
races’, ‘religious, social and economic freedom’ for ‘everyone in Bermuda, 
regardless of race, creed or colour’, to the improvement of education, the 
encouragement of a ‘satisfactory relationship between employer and 
employee’ and to ‘expand the economy along proper, prudent and intelligent 	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lines’.58 Tucker said the organisation was trying to attract the ‘middle of the 
road’ type; the ’sound, conservative, stable people’ of Bermuda.59  
 
The presence of Cox amongst the founding members was not a propitious 
sign for this ‘semi-political party’. As Speaker of the House of Assembly, Cox 
was the most powerful MCP in Bermuda. However, Cox was a well-known 
opponent of party politics. On January 8, 1964 he told MCPs: “As an 
individualist I incline to the philosophy that, at any age, to belong only to a 
group is to be less than a complete person.”60 Despite this, the group insisted 
it was not a political party because ‘they do not intend to nominate 
candidates to stand as members of the Association’.61 Plowman, who was a 
founder of the Voters’ Association noted that this attempt at creating a non-
party organisation was ‘unsuccessful’.62 In April, Special Branch was 
reporting that the ‘traditional Bermudian rugged individualism’ was re-
asserting itself as candidates withdrew from both the Voters Association and 
the PLP.63  
 
The ‘outstanding’ success of the PLP at the May election, however, seems to 
have shocked the conservative political establishment. Special Branch 
reported that the party’s success was ‘indicative of a high degree of 
organisation’ and suggested that ‘if it can avoid internal differences, it will no 
doubt emerge as a force to be reckoned with’.64 An editorial in The Royal 
Gazette struck a note of panic for conservatives:  
 
The PLP was far better organised than most Bermudians had 
imagined. If other groups in future elections are to compete, they 
too must organise – and organise now instead of waiting until 
the next general election is upon them.65 
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Yet it was also the advent of a Responsible Government constitution in the 
Bahamas in January 1964 that spurred these ‘rugged individualists’ to 
organise properly.  
 
It was not until February 1964, however, that Special Branch reported the 
stirrings of a new political party in Bermuda to turn the Voters’ Association 
into something more cohesive. Plowman noted that those lobbying for the 
creation of this new group included centrists such as Kit Astwood, former 
Liberal Party of Canada activist Dr John Stubbs and dentist Dr Stanley 
Ratteray, who then gained the public support of leading members of the 
oligarchy.66 The founders of this shadowy ‘new party’, which was not 
expected to ‘materialise for about a year or so’ were listed as Tucker, (Henry) 
Vesey and James Pearman, although other research suggests there were other 
founders, including Dudley Spurling and Ernest Vesey.67 Meanwhile, on the 
central committee were Astwood, (Ernest) Vesey, John MS Patton and 
Gilbert Cooper. Special Branch noted that the leaders of the new party were 
‘greatly impressed by the structure, operation, and success of the United 
Bahamian Party’.  
 
Despite this, in many of its policies the new party’s ‘embryo’ constitution 
‘closely followed’ that of the PLP in stressing integration and a focus on 
education.68 In Tucker’s view, there would be ‘little difference’ between the 
UBP and PLP except the UBP wanted to achieve the same objectives ‘without 
jeopardising the economy’ while ‘he felt it was safer for Bermuda to trust its 
future to experienced people’.69 This was the coded language of gradualism. 
While the parties agreed on some social policy issues, key divisions would 
emerge over the issues of constitutional and electoral reform and especially in 
the rhetoric of the two parties. 
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In summary, the incubation of the UBP was in part a response to nudging by 
London towards moves to end segregation in education, the Bermuda 
Regiment and the civil service, which was given greater urgency after the 
1965 BELCO strike and riot. The party was also the manifestation of the 
desires of key members of the oligarchy to counteract the effect of the PLP, 
which, following the May 1963 election, had found itself in a position to 
‘present a united front’ and, which it was thought ‘may possibly use its block 
vote for bargaining purposes’.70  The PLP supported integration in education, 
the revision of trade union legislation, rent control, health and dental care for 
everyone, the ‘introduction of direct taxation’, tighter immigration and 
constitutional reform.71   
 
After the UBP’s founding in August 1964, when 24 previously independent 
members of the legislature (22 whites and 2 blacks) would flock to its banner, 
the party would go on to adopt variants of these policies, for instance 
constitutional and educational reform and the implementation of a new land 
tax, which by April 1968 would account for ‘approximately seven per cent of 
Bermuda’s annual revenue’.72 This was an indication not of how progressive 
the UBP was but of how socially conservative, in comparison to other 
‘revolutionary and socialist’ parties, the PLP was in many respects.73 The key 
differences between the parties would not be over social policy but over issues 
such as immigration, questions of constitutional and electoral reform and the 
different modes of discussing (or denying) race. 
 
 
3. Old habits die hard: A party cooked up in social clubs 
aided by incumbency, links with Martonmere and the 
reappearance of paternalism 
 
As this section will show, the UBP’s cultivated ‘broad church’ image was 
something of an illusion. This was because the party had been dreamed up not 	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on the picket line or in protest marches but in the stuffy rooms of social clubs, 
business boardrooms and in the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce. In its 
earliest days, the party was less than candid about its true origins whilst also 
depending on old habits of paternalism and patronage. The evidence also 
suggests that the UBP benefitted during its period of legislative majority 
between 1964 and 1968 in two ways. Firstly, it had the tacit support of 
Governor Lord Martonmere. Secondly, it was able to take credit for the 
growing, tourism-based prosperity. 
 
Paternalism could operate through systems of racial difference. In the latter 
variant, the end of slavery in Bermuda had seen paternalism become the 
manner by which a white elite exercised a degree of control over former 
slaves. In this situation, ‘a black [Bermudian was] likely to be indebted to a 
white because the white’s family bequeathed property to his parents or 
grandparents, gave a loan to his uncle [or] provided a job for his father-in-
law’.74 Paternalism also had a political variant, called patronage. This 
phenomenon has been defined as ‘negotiations whereby political support is 
offered in return for political positions and resources’. 75 
 
This chapter will uncover how the ‘opening up of the voting system’76 and the 
creation of party politics resulting from the Parliamentary Elections Act 1963, 
led to the development of the system of party-political patronage. This 
occurred in parallel with the creation of the UBP party machine, which drew 
strength from existing habits of race-based paternalism and from unofficial 
incumbency. Patronage in the UBP was primarily exerted by Tucker. As well 
as being the leader of the UBP and the chairman of Bermuda’s largest bank in 
1967, he was also director of the Bermuda Electric Light Company and of the 
Bermuda Telephone Company, and chairman of the Bermuda Broadcasting 
Company.77  
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This is not to suggest the UBP’s non-white members were blackmailed into 
joining the UBP. It is merely argues that the power dynamic created by the 
nature of the oligarchy and the totemic leadership figure of Tucker may have 
played a significant role alongside the motivations of belief and conviction in 
decisions over whether to participate. The racial dynamic of paternalism 
mingled with political patronage was key since the UBP’s political survival, 
and its hold on and consolidation of power, depended upon the recruitment of 
black candidates. 
 
The UBP was forced to engage in a battle to cover up the fact that it was not a 
grassroots movement. Evidence from Government House suggests the UBP 
strenuously attempted to ‘give the impression’ of being something it was not. 
This was true in two senses. As the next two sub-sections will show, the party 
subscribed to an old idea of paternalistic gradualism, in which whites tutored 
blacks in the habits of power. This was something that the leaders of the  
party could not admit to believing in. Meanwhile, it also aimed to be 
perceived as the result of a spontaneous demand for ‘another party’ by 
citizens in constituencies across the island.  
 
3.1 The reappearance of gradualism and the oligarchical 
exercise of power behind the scenes 
 
By Martonmere’s arrival in June 1964, there is evidence of an attempt to 
deceive the public even before the new party had been created. According to a 
Special Branch report, the aforementioned founding members were not to be 
officially involved initially. Instead, it was proposed ‘that selected persons in 
the various parishes…will be approached and requested to call small 
integrated meetings in their homes’. This was to be done ‘with a view to 
forming another party and approaching the MCPs to take action’: 
 
Apparently the whole idea is to give the impression that the 
people want another Political Party and the MCPs can then 
follow through as if they were acting in the best interests of their 
constituents.78 	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It is unclear if this operation met with any success. By June, however, 
discussions were under way ‘with regard to setting up a permanent campaign 
office for the party with the possible introduction from abroad of a party 
organiser’. It was not until August 1964, however, that the new group, now 
called the United Bermuda Party, was finally announced. Twenty-four MCPs 
signed the UBP’s new statement of general intent. It advocated reform of the 
constitution to Responsible Government and the lowering of the voting age 
from 25 to 21’ but ‘saw no need for any further change in the franchise’.79 By 
October, Tucker had been elected leader of the parliamentary group, while it 
was not until mid-1965 that the party expressed any intent towards the 
abolition of the ‘plus’ vote which gave a single extra ballot to property owners.  
 
How successful was the UBP at recruiting members in its first few months? It 
seems the PLP was drawing larger crowds than the UBP. PLP meetings in 
February 1963 attracted between 150-190 people and in April 1964 there 
were joint PLP-BIU meetings that attracted between 300 and 120 people 
respectively. These were followed by what the Joint Intelligence Committee 
believed to be ‘the largest political meeting ever held in Bermuda’ organised 
by the PLP at the Devonshire Recreational Club on April 23, with an 
attendance of approximately 1,000. These meetings, however, were linked to 
specific industrial disputes at King Edward VII Memorial Hospital and 
BELCO which may have inflated the numbers. Yet, in October 1964, 500 
people attended a PLP meeting following the founding of the UBP. In 
contrast, the first meetings of the UBP between August and November 1964 
were only attracting between 80 and 120 people.80 However, by October 
1965, the UBP had 1,000 paid-up members.81 
 
The evidence also suggests that the UBP benefited from the fact of its 
unofficial incumbency between 1964 and 1968 in two ways. Firstly, it was 
able to take credit for the growing tourist-based prosperity, to be discussed in 
more detail below. Because of this, the party claimed that the PLP was a 	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threat to this prosperity should it get into power. Secondly, it had the tacit 
support of Martonmere. The attitude of the Governor to the founding of the 
UBP in August 1964 can be gauged by the way in which he rejected PLP 
requests for the dissolution of parliament and for new elections. Because of 
this, PLP MCP Lois Browne-Evans later claimed that ‘Roland Robinson the 
politician asserted himself over Lord Martonmere’.82 PLP Leader Walter 
Robinson believed Martonmere was an ‘old Tory who had a great deal to do 
with getting those fellows to form a party. They were constantly in 
consultations at Government House’.83  
 
This remains the view of the PLP today. They argue that the UBP ‘was formed 
with the sanction’ of Lord Martonmere.84 Asked to respond to this allegation 
shortly before his death in 1989, Martonmere said: “I don’t think I would 
claim that. I knew what was going on though… [Tucker and I] both knew how 
the other was thinking.”85 Martonmere’s close relationship with Tucker was 
further brought to light when he said of the 1966 Constitutional Conference 
that he was ‘in complete agreement’ with Tucker and ‘wanted to see 
Bermudians as Bermudians, not white Bermudians or black Bermudians’. He 
added of Tucker:  
 
He had the attributes of leadership. He had the ability to make 
wise and thoughtful decisions. We found out that we had the 
general interests of Bermuda at heart – racial harmony and the 
Government putting into effect commonsense policies.86 
 
The mention of ‘racial harmony’ alludes to the UBP language of non-
racialism and the denial of deep tensions between black and white. This very 
slogan would come to be a part of the UBP’s political rhetoric during elections 
in the mid-1970s.  
 
Significantly, throughout most of his parliamentary career between 1938 and 
1958, Tucker had been arguing vehemently against universal suffrage and 
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desegregation of hotels, restaurants and even tennis clubs. In May 1938, the 
year he was first elected for Paget, he argued against women’s suffrage 
because he was ‘afraid it will lead to universal suffrage which I feel will be 
detrimental to Bermuda’. A few years later he called himself a ‘self-confessed 
reactionary and an unashamed conservative’. His rhetoric revealed him to be 
an unabashed racist too. ‘It is not really undemocratic’, he burbled, ‘to 
recognise that the world is divided into superior and inferior people’.87  
 
Tucker’s history as a racist was simply too long for him to have jettisoned all 
of such beliefs overnight. As a result, the multi-racial approach of the UBP 
was something of a pragmatic conversion and also resonant of the ‘multi-
racialism’ of Blundell’s NKG, in which it was tacitly accepted that only 
‘responsible’ people ‘of all races’ would be granted the right to vote.88 Tucker 
and Martonmere formed an alliance to create a ‘multi-racialism’ for 
particular circumstances in Bermuda, where members of a black middle-class 
interested in stability were ready to take up the UBP cudgel, during a period 
when ‘principles of human rights’ had ‘undermined established notions of 
racial superiority.89 
 
3.2 The key role of Sir Edward Trenton (ET) Richards 
 
Sir Henry was smart enough to know a man with brains, and he 
kept ET close to him.90  
 
Born in the city of Berbic in British Guiana on October 4, 1908, Edward 
Trenton Richards had moved to Bermuda to work as a teacher at age 28.91 
After training as a barrister, he was then elected to parliament for Warwick 
Parish in 1948 and had worked on key select committees on race relations in 
the early 1950s. He and other black MCPs such as WL Tucker, Dr Eustace 
Cann, Hilton G Hill and Russell Pearman successfully lobbied for the ending 
of segregation in hotels and restaurants, which was achieved through a change 	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in the law in 1960, and for universal suffrage, a form of which was enacted in 
1963 with the Parliamentary Elections Act.92 
 
The period 1964-1965 saw the UBP win a major coup in its recruitment of 
Richards to its cause. This chapter suggests that Richards was attracted to the 
UBP in part because it was associated with the hierarchy. However, this 
chapter also aims to bring the idea of personal agency back into discussion 
about Bermudian politics. Though one of Bermuda’s foremost civil rights 
campaigners, Richards was also a conservative and an Anglophile. As a result, 
his individual philosophy was in tune with the UBP.  
 
 The career of Richards provides a new case-study of the operation of black 
conservatism in white hegemonic political environments. The portrayal of 
earlier black conservatives in the US, including William Hannibal, Edward 
Brooke and Booker Washington, saw them as ‘depoliticising their struggle’, 
accommodating to ‘white cultural power and racism’ and embodying values 
such as ‘thrift, patience, hard work and moral rectitude’ in their careers.93 
Ondaatje argues that later black conservative intellectuals embraced ‘self-help 
and the “gospel of business success”’ during the 1970s and 1980s, in a context 
which saw racism as ‘an unfortunate blemish on an otherwise perfect past’.94  	  
A jarring new discourse of racial legacies was inconvenient for conservatives 
who had to play into a white denial of history for political ends. Richards’ 
career provides a glimpse of black conservatism at work in a majority black 
country that was nevertheless overlain by British cultural hegemony. Blacks 
who also identified as conservative had to walk a difficult tightrope in such 
circumstances. As television ownership on the island increased, this was a 
period in which image mattered more than ever in politics.95 Steinhorn and 
Diggs-Brown argue that television gave ‘white Americans the sensation of 
having meaningful repeated contact with blacks without actually having it’.96 	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The symbolic resonance of prominent black Bermudians such as Richards 
joining the UBP distorted the truth of white oligarchical power behind the 
scenes. 
 
August 21, 1964 was the birthday of the UBP. In the new UBP parliamentary 
caucus of 24, the only two blacks were Richards and George Ratteray. 
Richards’ participation was certainly a coup for the UBP as he had chaired the 
joint select committee in the House of Assembly that wrote the bill outlawing 
segregation in restaurants and hotels in 1960 (The Innkeepers’ Act). Richards 
explained that he decided to ‘go to the right to keep the right as left as 
possible’.97  
 
Born in 1909, Richards had moved to Bermuda after, in the same manner as 
the first English settlers98, his aunt had been shipwrecked on the island and 
lost everything. She decided to stay and teach, and he decided to follow her. 
While in Bermuda he won a scholarship to study law at Middle Temple in 
London. After surviving near misses with German bombs during the Blitz, he 
returned to start his own law practice. ‘Dragooned into politics’ by the head of 
the BIU Martin Wilson, he became an MCP in 1948.99 Calvin Smith, who was 
taught by Richards in the black secondary school Berkeley Institute, described 
what he thought were Richards’ motives in taking the more conservative road 
to reform. He said his teacher ‘was no submissive person’: 
 
He was a Guyanese who had witnessed the bloodshed between 
the Indians and the Blacks. He is characterised as the supreme 
Uncle Tom. He was none of that. He was a very brave, bold 
man.100 
 
Richards’ son Bob, who is currently Bermuda’s Finance Minister, said his 
father was cricket-obsessed, and had formed his impressions of Britain when 
studying to be a lawyer there during the Blitz of 1940. Richards noted: “He 
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thought Britain was the greatest thing since sliced bread.”101 He also said he 
saw politics in terms analogous to those of cricket:  
 
 [Cricket] was the avenue where descendants of slaves and 
descendants of slave masters got to see who was who on the field 
of play instead of looking down the barrel of a gun.102  
 
Following the deaths of EF Gordon in 1955 and WL Tucker in 1960, Richards 
became, along with the older Cann and Hill, one of the most prominent black 
politicians of the period. At Berkeley, he had taught many black Bermudians 
who had been elected to parliament in the late 1950s and in the 1963 general 
election. Ironically he later faced many of them down in debate across the 
House of Assembly. He was at the heart, however, a conservative. As 
described by his son:  
 
He was a traditionalist and he wasn’t going to support anything 
that he considered to be radical. The PLP had a socialistic 
agenda, a throw out the white man agenda. They were looking 
for retribution.103 
 
In a less kind analysis, fellow barrister Arnold Francis remembered:  
 
Edward was a traditionalist and would not simply overturn the 
system. I think upon analysis that he is so traditional that it 
appears he would support any given hierarchy.104 
 
Understandably more partial, Richards notes that his father 'wanted to be part 
of a movement that brought races together’.105 The irony was that race riots 
would lead to the declaration of a state of emergency during the general 
election campaign in 1968, only four years after the UBP had been formed as 
the majority group in the House of Assembly. Finally, Richards suggests his 
father was influenced by his pragmatism above all.  
 
He saw the UBP as a practical way of moving Bermuda forward 
together. He understood there was no way we could move 
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Bermuda forward and burn down Front Street [the centre of 
oligarchical business power] at the same time.106 
 
Richards’ biographer J Randolf Williams suggests that Richards ‘lost several 
friends and was berated, jeered and hated by certain blacks’ because of his 
decision to join the UBP. “Out of the condemnation sprang derogatory 
nicknames: Uncle Tom, Oreo, and the black man with the white heart.”107  
 
Hill offered a nuanced answer to the question of whether he believed 
Richards was an ‘uncle Tom’.  
 
We are trained in white lifestyles and in all of us there is a bit of 
an Uncle Tom…. We’d never know if it was true… I think he knew 
what was going on. Blacks were being manipulated by Front 
Street to allow them to hold a semblance of control.108 
 
Hill’s analysis is prescient, although the claim of ‘manipulation’ perhaps 
downgrades the role of personal agency in decision-making. The very fact 
that many people chose to abjure the UBP’s entreaties to become candidates 
attests to the power of free will in this dynamic, even if power relations and 
the prospect of advancement may have exerted a pressure on decision-
making. 
 
3.3 “If the country does well, you will do well”: Black 
Bermudians decide whether to campaign for the UBP, 1964-71 
 
Coloured Bermudians who support the UBP are often attacked as 
Uncle Toms. It is claimed by the drivers of the hate-train that we are 
being used.109 
 
The suggestion above that blacks who joined the UBP were ‘being used’ is too 
simplistic an explanation on its own for why blacks such as Richards, George 
and Stanley Ratteray and Russell Pearman joined the UBP. Black 
Bermudians joined the UBP for a variety of reasons, ranging from 
conservative convictions, and a belief in integration, to personal admiration 
of Tucker. It is also argued however, that in the background, the exercise of 	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power and influence by the oligarchy and the incumbency of the UBP were 
significant contextual factors. The party was, in part because of the attacks 
referred to by James above, conscious of the need to show that politicians 
such as Richards were not merely an embodiment of a ‘token’ black presence.  
 
The UBP knew that it would have to fight the next general election, which did 
not have to be held until 1968, as an ‘integrated’ party. Tucker seems to have 
personally led the task of recruitment. He met with moderate although not 
comprehensive success. The author of this project spoke to several people 
who were politically passionate and ambitious yet who rejected the overtures 
of the UBP to get involved. Others were more persuadable. The case studies 
of three people who joined the party in the 1963-1972 period will be 
examined, as will two of those who refused. 
 
Devout Presbyterian Quinton Edness joined the UBP out of a mixture of 
personal convictions and a friendship with and admiration for Tucker.110 As 
managing director of ZBM, in the mid 1960s, Edness was a successful 
executive. He attended the party’s very first meeting in 1964, which was well 
attended but at which there were only two other black people, ET Richards 
and (later party chairman) Stanley Ratteray. “I went to the meeting. I didn’t 
know I was actually going to go and join up.”111  Edness said he was 
profoundly affected by the way in which Tucker spoke just before the meeting 
began.  
 
Tucker said, ‘If there is anybody in this room who thinks we are 
starting a party just for the white people then I want them to 
leave now, because it is the black people who have been 
suppressed’. No one left.112 
 
Clearly Tucker’s leadership qualities and eloquence were a factor affecting 
whether some candidates decided to pledge support. Edness explained at a 
meeting a couple of months later in his home parish of Warwick that Tucker’s 
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speech ‘brought tears to my eyes’. “Afterwards I went up and said I was going 
to join”.113  
 
Edness said the party’s commitment to integration (‘we started out being an 
integrated party from the get go’) was an important part of the decision for 
him to join. Thus, for Edness, it was more the party’s purported social role of 
unification that appealed to him more than its ‘economic philosophy’. At that 
point, however, Edness had not agreed to become a candidate. Tucker 
appealed to Edness to change his mind. Despite this, Edness demurred, 
repeating that he ‘did not want to be in frontline politics’.114 Tucker would not 
take no for an answer however and this is key. Edness announced his 
candidacy for a seat in Warwick the next day. He was elected in 1968 and by 
1970 he was a member of the Cabinet.  
 
Thus it seems likely that Edness was profoundly moved to sign up as a 
candidate, in large part by his personal connection and respect for Henry 
Tucker. Edness described how he viewed Tucker:  
 
He was my idol. He was an authoritative type guy and he had a 
personality that you didn’t argue with. He would listen and then he 
would make a decision and when he said his conclusion that was 
it.115  
 
This style could have been understood as arrogance or as disregard of 
someone else’s opinion. In another view, it was an admirable, confident kind 
of charming, cajoling and arm-twisting charisma on the model of Lyndon 
Baines Johnson. However, it was paralleled by Tucker’s personal position of 
power in the Bank of Bermuda and as chair of the Board of Governors of ZBM, 
Edness’s place of work.  
 
Tucker had intervened in Edness’s life on two occasions. Firstly he had helped 
him to get a bridging loan to finish the construction of his Warwick house 
when he had otherwise been refused by personnel at the Bank of Bermuda. 
Secondly, Tucker had intervened to prevent Edness being fired from his job 	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when other bosses had tried to have him dismissed.116 The connection 
between Tucker and Edness was one of personal regard but also must be seen 
in the context of Bermuda’s system of paternalism, with Tucker as a doyen of 
various enterprises with a great deal of influence. While Edness already 
supported the party due to its commitment to integration, Edness’s decision 
to stand for the UBP was a result of connections which were not just based 
upon personal affinity and admiration but also utilitarian, as well as Tucker’s 
high-handed style. 
 
By the following election in June 1972, ET Richards had taken over from 
Tucker as Government Leader (then Premier). Then PLP senator Arthur 
Hodgson said the appointment of Richards as party leader in 1971 was 
recognised ‘at the time as being proof of UBP desire for integration’.117  In the 
run-up to the 1972 election, Tucker announced plans to stand down from his 
seat in Paget East. To fill his spot, he turned to John W Swan, a black real 
estate entrepreneur, who was then, according to him, building about 40 
percent of the houses on the island and who also managed a ‘substantial’ 
saving and loan company.  
 
Swan said his relationship with Tucker began before politics entered the 
conversation, when he convinced him as head of the Bank of Bermuda to 
support him in constructing his first building in the City of Hamilton. 
According to Swan: “I said to Tucker that you need a symbol of black progress 
and he supported my loan position.”118 Although Swan probably already 
supported the party, the decision to stand as a candidate was therefore 
arrived at in the context of a personal, business-related interaction with 
Tucker. The 36-year-old Swan went on to top the poll in the primary for the 
UBP stronghold of Paget East prior to the election in June 1972.119 After being 
selected, his election there was a foregone conclusion. He later served as 
Minister for Home Affairs and then Premier of Bermuda from 1982 until 
1995.  	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Personal beliefs and ideology were significant orienting mechanisms in 
decisions about whether to join and to stand for the UBP. The party’s 
ostensible commitment to racial ‘integration’, which meant blacks gaining 
some of the rewards of the unbalanced Bermudian economy, was a sine qua 
non for some who joined and ran as candidates.  
 
But another important reason for candidates agreeing to stand was personal 
considerations, interests and connections with Tucker. There was also a belief 
that, since the UBP had taken on the mantle of the incumbent government, 
both before the 1968 and afterwards, then blacks who wanted to make 
effective change needed to be a part of it. Mother, housewife and former 
teacher Helene Brown, who along with her sister Gloria McPhee, stood and 
won seats for the UBP in the June 1972 election, noted that she was actually 
‘PLP-inclined’ in terms of her beliefs. However, in choosing which party to 
stand for she suggested she was using ‘my thinking brain and not my feeling 
brain’. As she explained: “A black person joining the party in power can 
accomplish more for black people.”120 The UBP, therefore, gained a great deal 
from its position of incumbency, which, as the previous chapter argued, was 
partly thanks to its tacit support from Martonmere and Whitehall, and the 
dominant hold of its key leaders on the legislature and over key economic 
institutions and employers, such as the Bank of Bermuda.  
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Figure 11: UBP MCP and Member for Education Gloria McPhee. 	   	  
© Bermuda National Archives, from Barbara Harries Hunter, The People of Bermuda: 
Beyond the Crossroads, (Toronto, 1993). 	  
 
 
It is also important to examine the reasons some people have given for their 
active decision not to join the party. In the 1950s and early 1960s, more and 
more black Bermudians gained the opportunity of going away to college in 
the United States, Canada and Britain. When they returned home, several 
people described how they faced pressure to nail their colours to a party mast 
and join the fray.  
 
One such person was Alex Scott. Scott’s great grandfather John HT Jackson 
had been Bermuda’s second black Member of Parliament. His uncle Albert 
Jackson became the independent president of the Senate and his aunt Louise 
Jackson was a UBP member and later MP. Arriving to study fine arts and 
design in Philadelphia in 1960, Scott’s college roommate was from Northern 
Rhodesia (which was in 1964 to become independent as Zambia). Scott said 
he had been embarrassed that his African friend had been able to tell him 
more about the colonial governance structures at work in Bermuda than he 
could. “The winds of change were blowing through Africa. But our political 
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passage was far more conservative.”121 But he said that due to this experience, 
he ‘began to appreciate and to put into context where we were in Bermuda 
and where we should be in the future’.122 On returning to Bermuda, Scott 
faced some pressure to join the UBP. The future chair of the party, and Scott’s 
dentist, (Stanley) Ratteray, and Stubbs attempted to recruit him.  
 
Despite his UBP supporting aunt, Scott refused: “I resisted the notion of 
continuing in any way what was. Henry Tucker was advocating change but it 
was on his terms.”123  However, this was ‘not a wise business move’ for his 
nascent advertising agency. Despite this, Scott explained that he joined the 
PLP because ‘they were the ones pushing for social change and economic 
fairness. They were leading the way.’124 In 1993, he became a PLP MP, served 
as Works and Engineering Minister and, between 2003 and 2006, served as 
Bermuda’s Premier.  
 
Another person who rejected the UBP advances when he returned from his 
education abroad was Arthur Hodgson. After studying for a first degree in 
economics at college in Michigan, Hodgson was offered a Rhodes Scholarship 
at Oxford, which he took up in 1964. When he returned from Oxford, 
Hodgson said he ‘got an invitation to go and have a chat with Tucker’. But he 
explained:  “I didn’t go. I wasn’t interested.”125 Asked why he thought the 
UBP had been successful in recruiting some blacks, Hodgson said the attitude 
for many blacks, including one of his aunts at that time, was that ‘black 
people couldn’t run the country. You had black people who didn’t think there 
was any other option than to join the UBP’.126  He added: “You could always 
peel off about 20 percent of blacks who gravitated towards what they felt was 
superior culture, a dominant culture.”127 
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Hodgson suggested that he thought many blacks had joined the UBP when 
they came home because they were being ‘flattered’. “They found it flattering. 
Some of them were just flattered into joining the UBP.” Yet he added: “For 
the most part, the black people who joined the UBP were people who didn’t 
have a philosophy other than they saw that it was a personal opportunity.”128 
Thus, joining the UBP in his view was understood as a chance for self-
advancement.  
 
It is worth noting that Tucker’s position as a domineering figure could act as 
a turnoff in identifying the UBP too much with the legacy of the oligarchy. 
However, Tucker’s personal charisma and new stance on ‘integration’ seemed 
to attract centrists such as Edness. Political stances, such as those of Richards 
or Brown, who noted that she was ‘a little more conservative in my approach 
as I mellow with age’, were also significant. It is also suggested that Tucker’s 
economic and political influence helped him convince some candidates such 
as Swan to nail their colours to the UBP mast. Meanwhile, the party’s 
position of incumbency, in a Westminster system that gave leaders and 
parties the chance of staying power ‘over many decades’, also helped convince 
black candidates such as Brown to join up.129  
 
4. The UBP claims the credit for prosperity in the 1968 
election: Incumbency, tourism and the denial of race  
 
Unofficial incumbency allowed the UBP to claim Bermuda’s burgeoning 
prosperity as its mantle. Yet its linkage to the tourism industry led to it 
attempting to shape the way in which race was discussed in Bermuda. The 
party argued that its removal from power might threaten the burgeoning 
tourist boom that was occurring throughout the decade. This tightly linked 
connection between certain ideas of tourists, the realities of prosperity and the 
fear that even the discussion of racial legacies would wreck that fragility says 
something about the reluctant conservative discourse of race in 1960s 
Bermuda. However, the emphasis on tourism was an excuse not to discuss 
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race, and a poor rationalisation for further recalcitrance over electoral reform, 
rather than a valid argument against its acknowledgement. 
 
Bermuda’s tourism-based prosperity was vertiginous in its scale but also 
fleeting and fragile. This was related to the fact that the island’s prosperity 
derived from its status as a settler economy, which had been ‘developed to 
reflect internal economic interests rather than being structured to benefit 
external powers’. Over the centuries, Bermuda’s function was as an ‘economic 
innovator – living off the wealth created by others’, whether this was through 
salt-raking, privateering or tourism. This placed the island ‘in a prosperous 
position in terms of its economic relations with the dominant colonial and 
imperialist powers’.130 
 
Meanwhile, from the beginning of the 1960s, ‘the advent of cheaper airfares, 
and the growth of cruise-ship tourism in a leisure era... caused tourism to 
expand in volume’.131  Between 1950 and 1970 there was a 446 per cent 
increase in the number of tourist arrivals. The period 1960 to 1970 saw an 
increase in tourist bedspaces from 4,444 to 6,840. Meanwhile, between 47 
and 51 per cent of the workforce was employed in the ‘personal service’ field 
catering to visitors. 132 The fact that tourism was ‘the primary stimulant of 
economic growth’ meanwhile, was seen as dependent on a particular language 
of race.133 Brown describes how during the 1980s, the UBP government made 
strenuous efforts ‘to hide Bermuda's pervasive racial tensions in deliberately 
misleading tourist advertisements’.134 According to MacDowall, a paternalistic 
elite ‘consciously developed [Bermuda’s] role as the trend-setting island 
resort’ in which ‘carriage-trade tourism’ was its unique selling point and a 
retrograde image of the island was cultivated. As one advert in the 1970s 
noted: “You liked Bermuda the way it was'. So that's the way it is.”135 
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Figure 12: Bermuda Tourism advertisement aimed at the US market, 1960s 
© Bernews website  
http://bernews.com/2013/09/photos-bermuda-tourism-ads-from-the-1960s/ 
  
 
While also pointing to the social reforms it had enacted, the UBP platform 
noted that ‘the jobs created by Bermuda’s steady tourist development have 
given us virtually full employment.”136 As UBP candidate Lancelot Swan 
argued on April 4, 1968: “The UBP gets things done… We have a stable 	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government; we are financially solvent and we have one of the highest 
standards of living in the world.”137 The converse of this was an attack on the 
PLP that suggested ‘they would ‘induce the voters into socialism’ which would 
‘be very bad for the colony because it would drive away foreign capital’.138 
 
However, a focus on prosperity, in particular on the burgeoning tourism 
industry, led to use of the rhetoric of denial on race relations that may have 
unhealthily repressed problems and led to social upheavals later on. Richards 
implored in December 1968: “Stop this talk of race and of black and of white - 
but tell of being Bermudian.”139 The trouble was that Bermuda was riven by 
very different ideas of what it meant to be Bermudian, a fact that had its very 
roots in a trenchant racial schism that had been reinforced by colonialism.  
 
Deracialised rhetoric may have been linked to other factors. Firstly, the UBP 
knew that if a purely racial politics developed in Bermuda they would lose out, 
since their base vote of whites were a minority of the population. As Arthur 
Hodgson put it, the UBP took lessons from the Bahamas and ‘realised that if 
this black party [the PLP] went on they would eventually be displaced’.140 
Secondly, however, the denial of race as an issue was linked to the strange 
excuse that Bermuda’s economy was seen as potentially fragile and tourists 
and ‘foreign capital’ would easily be scared away. The UBP presented an idea 
of ‘racial harmony’ as a key theme partly because it claimed it believed 
‘[integration was] right and just’.141 However, the party also argued that 
Bermuda’s ‘general prosperity’ depended on it: “Bermudians know that an 
expanding tourist trade can be built only with a sound government and with 
people living in harmony.”142  
 
This belief was buttressed by research which had been commissioned in 1963 
in a private capacity by Tucker and Harry Butterfield, who were both heads of 
Bermuda’s two largest banks. This report, by economist professor J Henry 	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138 Ibid, April 6, 1968.  
139 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 178.  
140 (Arthur) Hodgson interview, December 19, 2011. 
141 UBP election manifesto 1968. 
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Richardson, argued that ‘without a prosperous tourism industry, Bermuda’s 
economy could fall to one half or even one third of its present level’. It added: 
“Tourists are very sensitive and many of them are deterred from visiting 
places where there is tension for political or social reasons.”143  There was not 
much separating this and Tucker’s suggestion in the 1950s that changing 
Bermuda’s segregation laws ‘ahead of opinion in the US…would be the surest 
way to starvation that we know’.144 Prosperity, thus, acted as a key 
rationalisation for continuing both formal segregation and then informal and 
paternalistic gradualism in Bermudian politics. 
 
It is also important to note that Bermuda’s tourism industry also depended on 
a particular type of higher-end clientele. A report by English town and country 
planner Thornley Dyer had advised the Government in spring of 1963 that it 
should, ‘become more exclusive. Keep up the price but give value for money. 
Dyer added: “Bermuda should cater for the sophisticated, and by that I mean 
sophisticated the fuller sense.” He went on:  
 
Above all stay Bermudian in the traditional meaning of that 
word.  Press…the charm and beauty of the islands, the courtesy 
and kindness of the inhabitants, the dignity and tidiness of public 
institutions, from the Governor inspecting a guard of honour at 
the opening of parliament to a Boy Scout church parade. 
 
Even more provocative than this coded language was the suggestion from 
Dyer that Bermuda build ‘another Tucker’s Town development closer to 
Hamilton to cater to the very wealthy who like getting away from it all’.145 
Tucker’s Town, located on a peninsula at the island’s south-east end, was a 
particular source of racial grievance because blacks living there in the 1920s 
had been forcibly removed from the area so that an exclusive enclave for 
wealthy tourists could be carved out.146  
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Thus, UBP unofficial incumbency at a time of a tourism boom placed it in a 
unique position to argue for its own political victory at the 1968 election. 
Tourism encapsulated the two things that summed up the UBP well. Firstly, 
the party was founded on the denial of the social legacies of racial 
discrimination. It gained power from the fact that in the 1970s ‘certain strata 
of the black community’ did benefit from the reforms of the 1960s as a result 
of ‘the interplay of the civil rights movement’ and ‘the integrative logic of 
administrative capitalism’.147 This meant a few black middle-class candidates 
felt free to welcome the march towards the sunny uplands of burgeoning 
prosperity, which saw Bermuda’s economy growing at a rate of eight per cent 
between 1967 and 1971.148 As UBP candidate Vincent Bridgewater would put it 
in May 1976: “Basically I am a capitalist pig. The more I get, the more I 
want.”149 
 
The tourism boom, therefore, also reinforced the UBP’s identity as, in the 
words of one internal party memorandum from May 1974, a ‘businessman’s 
party’.150  In elaborating this identity, however, it perpetuated a particular idea 
of British-infused Bermuda. The unspoken suggestion was that tourists were 
white and the people who waited on them were black. Elite engagement with 
issues of race and the economy was tied up with their political success. As the 
next chapter will show, this political attempt to control discussion may have 
led to a reaction, in the form of a home-grown Black Power movement, from 
mid-1969 onwards. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The history of the first years of the UBP is a useful illustration of the idea 
that, although ‘the number of blacks elected or appointed to high office’ rose 
‘by leaps and bounds’ between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, that 
increase did not ‘demonstrably’ improve ‘life in the black community’.151 By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Reed, Black Revolution, 64. 
148 Pitt et al., Report…into the 1977 Disturbances, 1. 
149 Gazette, May 5 or 6, 1976. 
150 Attachment to Bermuda Cabinet memorandum 249/75, May 3, 1974, BNA. 
151 Reed, ‘Black Revolution’, 64.  
	   135	  
1964-5, British representatives in Bermuda and the UBP were moving in 
tandem in pursuit of a tacitly shared goal: that of marshalling change in a 
‘responsible’ direction. As Alex Scott put it in his description of Tucker: “If 
you are being run out of town get in front of the group and make it look like a 
parade.”152 The UBP and Government House were essentially working 
together to advocate ‘integration’, which presupposed a white majority where 
there was none. Such an idea was buttressed by the colonial British 
hegemony.  
 
By the 1960s, decolonisation, retrenchment and the desire to ward off 
embarrassment on the international scene became overriding British 
objectives. Until the late 1950s, the white Bermudian establishment was 
resisting pressure towards democratisation and liberalisation that had been 
heralded by London, in Bermuda’s case, as early as 1948. There was a 
moment of slight dissonance, represented by Gascoigne’s ruffling of 
conservative Bermudian feathers from 1959 onwards, and then recalibration 
in the early 1960s.  
 
As the previous chapter argued, the UBP was the result of that recalibration 
of relations – in which a status quo of white supremacy, both in terms of 
electoral laws, discriminatory practices and stark economic inequality, was 
being shifted so that new forms of the first two covered up the preservation of 
the third. The UBP was not just a political idea or the product of a desire for a 
particular policy outcome, but an embodiment of a holistic fear of the loss of 
a certain idea of Bermuda.  
 
This vision of Bermuda was believed to be conducive to the tourism industry 
as well as for British strategic anxieties. The key communication point 
between the British representatives and Bermudian leaders was Tucker, who 
was seen as a kind of enigma; someone who could tap into and influence two 
distinct sets of leaders – right-wing white business leaders such as himself 
and the conservative and moderate black middle class; professionals, 
business-leaders and executives such as Richards, Edness and Swan.  	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In this sense, the UBP version of integration, both espoused and embodied by 
the party in 1964-1971, should perhaps be seen as more of a pragmatic means 
to an end than as an end in itself. The international context was the passing 
of the Civil Rights Act in the US in 1964 following the outpouring caused by 
the assassination of President John F Kennedy. It was overlain by the victory 
of a Labour Government in October 1964, and the 1965 Race Relations Act in 
the UK. Yet, at the same time as attempting to end segregation, Tucker tried 
to neutralise race as an issue, meaning that even in the moment of first 
acknowledgement, there was an attempt to deny.  
 
Perhaps it is obvious to state that a commitment to ‘integration’ was a sine 
qua non for some budding black UBP candidates. However, the testimony of 
those who were recruited indicates that personal interests and status were at 
least amongst their motivations for joining the party, as was the UBP’s 
position of incumbency. In short, white Bermudian racism was so bound up 
with class and inequality that those who were doing well in the current 
system did not see the need for any radical change. Indeed, some blacks such 
as Richards viewed the PLP as a threat, not just to prosperity, but also to 
ideas of stability and order.  
 
Finally, this chapter has argued that the very fact and nature of Bermudian 
prosperity, with its connection between certain British-infused images of 
Bermuda and racial discrimination, may have helped encourage an already 
powerful tendency to freeze out discussions of race in conservative political 
rhetoric. As the next chapter will show, this repression may have helped 
encourage campaigns of both violence and civil disobedience at the extra-
parliamentary level.  
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Chapter Three  
 
‘The furthest to fall’: Violence and the approach of the 
UBP, Government House and Whitehall to Bermuda’s 
internal security, April 1968 - July 1973 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The first chapter showed how Britain colluded in the oligarchy’s structurally 
entrenched domination of Bermuda’s constitutional reform process in 1963-
1968. This undermined Britain’s already fragile ability to set agendas in 
Bermuda. It also helped the UBP to carve out a semi-legitimised space for the 
oligarchy’s traditionally privileged position. The second chapter demonstrated 
how the first four years of the UBP’s existence played upon patterns of this 
dominance, while evolving a new language of racial denial.  
 
This third chapter will detail the way in which these two processes came 
together both to help fuel a violent challenge to the social and political order 
and to shape the colonial-settler state’s response. The overarching argument 
of this thesis is that, by failing to challenge, and frequently aiding the UBP, 
Whitehall actually exacerbated a situation in which the task of setting agendas 
on the ground became more difficult as the security situation deteriorated. 
 
In January 1967, shortly after the Constitutional Conference in which the UBP 
had largely got its way on constituency boundaries questions, a Colonial Office 
civil servant, TM Jenkins, suggested to a Foreign Office counterpart that he 
saw ‘no real risk of internal disorder in the immediate future’ in Bermuda.1 
Yet, in April 1968, three days of rioting began in Hamilton and spread into the 
parishes of Devonshire and Warwick.2 The period from summer 1969 until 
1972 saw the creation of a Bermudian branch of the international Black Power 
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movement, called the Black Beret Cadre (BBC).3 This group was linked, at 
least in the official mind, with a series of protests and demonstrations but also 
attacks on property through 1970. From 1971, the BBC increasingly went 
underground. In September 1972, Police Commissioner George Duckett was 
murdered at his home in Devonshire. In March 1973, Governor Sir Richard 
Sharples and his Aide-de-Camp Captain Hugh Sayers were shot and killed at 
Government House. 
 
This chapter will argue that the power-sharing arrangement enshrined in the 
new constitution of June 1968 meant two conceptions of the idea of ‘internal 
security’ reigned supreme. On one hand, as we saw in chapter two, the UBP 
leadership saw challenges to orthodox conceptions of law and order largely 
through an economic prism, understanding insecurity to be a threat to 
Bermuda’s fragile tourism economy. An Executive Council Memorandum in 
January 1973 by the member for tourism DeForest Trimingham noted 
tourists’ ‘increasing …sensitivity and demand for a crime-free, unpolluted 
environment’.4  
 
On the other hand, evidence shows certain elements within the UBP aimed to 
use the threat of violence to pursue other agendas. As Kalusa argues, 
conservative white settlers in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia used the murder of 
European housewife Lillian Burton in May 1960 to ‘intensify their crusade to 
crush African nationalism’. In Bermuda, attacks on key symbols of authority, 
such as arson and bomb attacks on colonial monuments, may have been seen 
by some as an excuse to advance conservative demands to abolish jury trials. 
While violent acts may have increased the determination of conservatives to 
‘re-constitute and reinforce their own power’, in Bermuda these calls were 
kept behind a carefully-cultivated front of moderation and usually made 
behind closed doors through unaccountable bodies.5 This may have given 
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5 Kalusa, Killing of Lilian Margaret Burton, 71-2. 
	   139	  
conservative reactions to violence a more repressed dimension than the 
official record suggests. 
 
It should be remembered however that, even after June 1968 changes that 
increased the power of the House of Assembly, Government House retained 
responsibility for internal security, the Police and Bermuda’s armed forces 
under section 62(1) of the Bermuda Constitution, while until April 1973 the 
Governor also chaired the Executive Council (thereafter to be called the 
Cabinet).6 This chapter will focus primarily on the way in which Government 
House set the agenda for dealing with issues of security in concert with 
Whitehall. But the colonial state increasingly drew local ministers into the 
process of dealing with security problems, whilst security issues became the 
ground on which they elaborated their conservative image of Bermuda. 
 
Three local and colonial contexts set the mood for how Governors Lord 
Martonmere (1964-1972) and Sir Richard Sharples (1972-3) dealt with the 
threat and reality of violence. Firstly, there was the historical-institutional 
context in which the Governor was able to declare a state of emergency at any 
time he felt the security situation was getting out of control.7 While 1963 saw 
unprecedented political reform, that year also saw the passing of three laws 
which were ‘designed to curb any mass activity’: the Prohibited Publications 
Act, which enabled the Governor to ban any publication from entering 
Bermuda; the Public Order Act, requiring permission for the holding of any 
public procession, and the Emergency Powers Act, which gave the Governor 
‘absolute power in the event of his declaring a state of emergency’.8 
 
The ways in which states of emergency were used by British personnel in 
British Guiana as part of ‘a strategy… designed to oust’ radical political leaders 
such as Cheddi Jagan have been detailed by Ashton and Killingray.9 It will be 
suggested that fears of unrest had the power to create crises of confidence and 
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political disputes within the construct of British-Bermudian power-sharing 
over two institutions that had traditionally been used to keep order: the 
Bermuda Police Force and Bermuda Regiment. 
 
To start with, Bermuda’s Police Force was a symbol of mutual understanding 
between the ‘assertive yet fearful’ class of whites that ran Bermuda and a 
racist, paternalistic and security-obsessed Government House.10 Brown has 
shown how Bermuda Governor Major General James Willcocks (1917-1922) 
encouraged moves by the House of Assembly to transform Bermuda’s then 
largely-black police force into a body staffed by white Englishmen. As 
Willcocks noted:  
 
The presence in the Colony of European troops and sailors who 
must be supervised by the Police as well as the yearly influx (of 
tourists) renders it most desirable that white Police should be 
available in sufficient numbers.11  
 
This chapter argues that, by the late 1960s, the Police Force was a factor in 
worsening racial tensions and the increase in violence, while it also became a 
vulnerable symbol of colonial power. In June 1969, the Bermuda Police Force 
was ‘266 strong, of whom about 170 are from the UK’.12 As in other parts of 
the British colonial sphere, this European-dominated body, in a majority 
black country, may have exacerbated racial tensions. This also occurred in 
Hong Kong, Fiji, British Guiana and Malaya. And it led to instances of 
widespread ‘racial prejudice’ in European police inspectors serving in Africa 
and Palestine.13  
 
However, as Killingray and Anderson argue, during the 1950s and 1960s, a 
process began whereby colonial police forces underwent an ‘uneasy political 
transition’ from a role as the ‘principal agency of colonial control’ into ‘an 
institution at the service of a new independent government’. This saw police 
forces expanded in the context of decolonisation. Forces also came under new 	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pressures as their image as ‘the feared alien, a man who could be relied upon 
to carry out the instructions of his colonial masters’ was increasingly 
contested in political debate. Meanwhile, increased powers granted to the 
Police during states of emergency ‘inevitably meant that policing operations 
were being conducted in a hostile and therefore more difficult environment’.14 
This chapter argues that the use of curfews during states of emergency in 1968 
and 1973 may have exacerbated racial tensions that led to further violence.  
 
Two other local institutional traditions contributed to a kneejerk reaction of 
involving British military forces when it was deemed order was under threat. 
Despite the closure of the Royal Naval Dockyard in the late 1950s, Bermuda 
served as the headquarters of the Senior Naval Officer of the West Indies 
(SNOWI). This officer, who in 1970 was Commodore Martin Lucey15, acted as 
Island Commander of Bermuda in the NATO chain of command, reporting to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Atlantic under the Supreme Allied 
Commander of the Atlantic, based in Norfolk, Virginia.  
 
In November 1971, SNOWI exercised operational control over two frigates in 
the Caribbean from his headquarters, which also included administrative 
facilities, secretarial functions, stores, transport and a small intelligence 
staff.16 Significantly, an army intelligence officer, attached to SNOWI’s staff, 
sat on the Bermuda Intelligence Committee (BIC), an expatriate-run body of 
eight members, chaired by the Chief Secretary (from April 1973, known as 
Deputy Governor), that tied Bermuda’s Police, military and intelligence 
functions together. This group was, at least until 1973, nearly delinked from 
any form of local political accountability.17 It is argued that SNOWI’s presence 
in Bermuda, and his presence on the BIC, made it easier and more tempting 
for Government House to call on frigates in times of perceived need. This 
probably had the effect of exacerbating colonial shows of power between 1968 
and 1973. 
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Government House reactions to perceived threats and realities of violence 
may have also exacerbated race relations because they were conditioned by 
fears of ‘disloyalty’ within Bermuda’s armed forces. The Bermuda Regiment 
consisted of ‘a part-time infantry unit of about 400 (headquarters and two 
companies)’. In June 1969, it was  ‘80 per cent’ black [and] could raise 250 
men for duty at short notice. From these two platoons (each 35 strong) would 
be available for riot control duties’.18  
 
However, fears were raised over whether the British authorities could rely on 
this body in situations of disorder because of the influence of the BBC, which 
became active in July 1969. Swan shows how 60 soldiers were discharged 
from the body in October 1970 due to fears of ‘insubordination’ and ‘high anti-
white feeling’ linked with sympathies to Bermuda’s Black Power movement.19 
This thesis builds upon Swan’s argument that these events led both 
Government House and the FCO to question the function of the Regiment. 
This may have created conditions for an over-dependence on the perceived 
necessity to have UK troops ready to fly to Bermuda.  
 
Thirdly, a UBP commitment to law, order and ‘stability’20 dovetailed nicely 
with Government House’s approach to security. This was founded in imperial 
ideas of stoicism in the face of challenge. Even after he arrived in Malaya 
following the murder of High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney in October 
1951, Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton viewed security measures, in which 
he was surrounded by a ‘human wall of uniformed police’, as ‘harmful’ to his 
dignity and ‘lowering for British political prestige in Malaya’. These attitudes 
were ‘still prevalent’ in the 1970s and part of the British ritual that ‘stressed 
the art of forgetting’.21  
 
This chapter will argue that because of a mix of naivety and denial about the 
nature and scale of Bermuda’s social problems, important precautions for 	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safety were not taken following the murder of Police Commissioner George 
Duckett in September 1972, while the provocative effect of the trappings that 
came with the office of Governor was acknowledged in London yet ignored 
due to political sensitivities. 
 
Along with this combination of institutional issues, traditions, and 
complacency in Bermuda, there were three wider global trends impacting the 
way in which London approached Bermuda’s internal security between 1968 
and 1973. Firstly, issues of internal security were bound up with wider British 
foreign policy approaches to tackling the perceived threat of Soviet 
Communism. Walton has argued that intelligence is the missing dimension in 
the historiography of British decolonisation.22 Not much was documented 
about the FCO’s ‘secret propaganda unit’23, the Information Research 
Department (IRD), until it was closed down by Foreign Secretaries Tony 
Crosland and David Owen in the late 1970s. Founded in 1948, the unit was ‘a 
secret organisation’, founded at the beginning of the Cold War ‘to gather 
confidential information about Communism and produce factually-based 
anti-Communist propaganda’.24  
 
However, as leadership of the anti-communist movement passed to the 
Americans in the 1950s, IRD’s ‘sights’ settled on any targets deemed to be 
‘anti-British’, becoming active in the Middle East, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.25 Swan’s revelation of how the IRD 
became active in Bermuda in 1970 is an important contribution to the 
historiography. However, he does not explain what the IRD was nor does he 
place the unit’s operations within any international context.26 This chapter 
argues that the IRD and the BIC were part of a wider British approach to 
issues of disorder during this period, about which most Bermudian Cabinet 
Ministers, let alone the public, were not told. The unit also became involved 
not just in propaganda but also in helping to both formulate and ‘project’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Walton, Empire of Secrets.  
23 Murphy, Intricate and Distasteful subject, 766. 
24 Hugh Wilford, Information Research Department, 353; Lyn Smith, Covert British 
Propaganda, 67-83; Lashmar and James, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, 83–93. 
25 Guardian, January 27, 1978.  
26 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 130-4. 
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government policy for the UBP as it came under attack from Black Power 
activists. 
 
Secondly, Britain’s approach to the issue of security was bound up with the 
way in which it was believed that the country could be ‘embarrassed’ on the 
international stage. For instance, senior FCO official AJ Fairclough suggested 
to Bermuda’s Chief Secretary JW Sykes that the Wooding Commission report, 
ordered by Martonmere following the 1968 riots, might contain ‘awkward or 
embarrassing’ passages for the UK.27 This was a period during which Britain 
was increasingly being scrutinised for its actions by the United Nations (UN) 
and by bodies such as Amnesty International, which were ‘willing to condemn 
British brutality’.28 The beginning of the 1960s saw ‘rebellion at the 
periphery… supercharged by international politics’ as the UN took a more 
forceful role in lobbying for decolonisation.29 Especially between 1955 and 
1960, the UN had grown exponentially and, following Suez, in the eyes of 
some British policymakers, had changed ‘into Frankenstein’s monster’.30 By 
1967, 60 nations ‘smaller than Scotland’ had ‘gained freedom and a seat’ in the 
organisation.31 and, from 1960, the body’s Committee of 24 had begun 
relentlessly lobbying for immediate decolonisation and sponsored visiting 
missions to remaining colonial territories.32  
 
From 1963 when the body took up the issue of the tortured endgame of the 
British presence in Aden33, the Committee of 24 became ‘a political factor of 
importance in all delicate colonial situations’.34 By the late 1960s, the Labour 
Government was conflicted about its presence on the Committee of 24, yet 
ministers remained highly sensitive to proceedings in the body. This changed, 
however, when the UK, under a new Conservative administration, withdrew 
from the Committee on January 11, 1971.35   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Fairclough to Sykes, November 22, 1968, FCO 58/333, TNA. 
28 Ball, Assassination culture of Imperial Britain, 250. 
29 Darwin, Empire Project, 117.  
30 Louis, Public Enemy Number One, 186. 
31 Nielsen and Ward, Cramped and restricted at Home?, 11.  
32 Louis, Public Enemy Number One; Drower, Britain’s Dependent Territories, 44. 
33 Ashton, Keeping Change within Bounds, 49. 
34 Louis, Public Enemy Number One, 200. 
35 Ibid, 198-206. 
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Issues of politics, race and colonialism collided as an international Black 
Power movement interacted with locally entrenched communal divisions. 
Indeed, the 1960s was a decade that experienced the ‘interaction of global and 
local politics’, leading to a wave of civil unrest across Europe, the US and the 
Caribbean in the period 1968-1970.36 In part, the Black Power movement was 
a result of the fact ‘that the ideals of freedom and dignity’ in the Civil Rights 
movement ‘had not been realised’.37 
 
It will be argued in this chapter that the conditions for violence were inflamed 
partly by a political reaction to racial grievances and economic inequality in 
Bermuda, for it was believed by leftist activists that UN scrutiny could have a 
chastening effect on British actions. This strategy could have both positive and 
negative consequences for the forces of reform. On the one hand, Britain was 
rightly being held to account at a global level for its actions in colonies for the 
first time. On the other hand, the prospect of UN intervention in Bermuda 
may have led to cosmetic constitutional solutions to problems.  
 
UN influence was linked to the third contextual factor affecting perceptions of 
security: that of British policy in the Caribbean. This was because the sending 
by Britain of 300 paratroops, at the cost of £250,000, to restore order in 
Anguilla in March 196938 exposed the shortcomings of the constitutional 
status of Associated Statehood, created in 1967 for six Eastern Caribbean 
islands.39 Under this model, based upon the UN model of Free Association, 
states theoretically gained control over their own internal security, while 
Britain retained responsibility for defence and external affairs. Since, ‘the 
boundary separating internal from external affairs usually tend[ed] to be 
blurred’ however, ‘the non-colonial nature of this so-called partnership’ was 
‘highly compromised’.40  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Prince, Global Revolt of 1968, 851; see also Ryan, Black Power Revolution of 1970. 
37 Reed, ‘Black revolution’, 63. 
38 Draft Statement of Defence Estimates, January 27, 1970, CAB/128/47, TNA; for a first-
hand account of the aftermath of the Anguilla ‘emergency’, see Posnett, Scent of Eucalyptus, 
128-131. 
39 Drower, Fistful of Islands, 14. 
40 Cox-Alomar, Britain's withdrawal from the Eastern Caribbean, 74-106. 
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From 1969 onwards, Britain moved towards a more uncompromising stance 
when it came to the protection of Governors’ reserved powers over internal 
affairs. The Anguilla experience ‘ended the experiment in devolving internal 
security responsibilities to islands that were still under its dominion’.41 By 
1969, ‘British governments recognised that Associated Statehood had neither 
fulfilled its local objectives nor satisfied the critics at the UN’.42 ‘Caribbean 
dissatisfaction and London’s frustration…resulted in successive British 
governments expediting the independence of the Associated States’, while 
further use of the constitutional model itself was abandoned.43 
 
However, Associated Statehood continued to be seen throughout the 1970s by 
UBP ministers such as John Sharpe as the ideal model of a constitutional 
relationship embodying both freedom and the resort to what Tucker called a 
‘big brother’ if security deteriorated.44 This chapter will argue that the British 
Government bolstered its resistance to UBP efforts to lobby for control over 
internal security in part because of the accession of a Conservative 
Government in June 1970, which jettisoned the Associated Statehood policy. 
It was also impacted by a severe breakdown in law and order in Northern 
Ireland during 1969 and the stationing of British troops there.45 Sensitivity to 
issues of security in the House of Commons increased as a series of sectarian 
attacks on the British mainland was initiated with a bomb exploded in 
London’s Post Office tower in October 1971.46 However, this chapter will also 
suggest that, caught between UBP reluctance to entertain independence and a 
desire to cut back on commitments, London largely gave in on the substance 
of Associated Statehood, as the FCO was gradually convinced to weaken its 
own control over security in constitutional reforms that took effect in April 
1973. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ashton and Killingray, lxxx. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Williams, Keeping a Line Open, 480. 
44 Gazette, October 18, 1973 and August 2, 1977. 
45 Sandbrook, State of Emergency, 226. 
46 BBC News, On this day, October 31, 1971. 
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This chapter will tackle the issue of security in two main parts. The first 
section will address the root causes of violence, examining the way in which 
grievances against the police, and alienation founded in materialism and 
economic inequality helped lead to riots in April 1968. It will also suggest that 
political provocation was aimed at an international audience.  
 
The second section will address how the colonial-settler state reacted to the 
onset of insurgent-style attacks on colonial symbols between 1970 and 1973. 
The response came in the form of IRD intervention and also constitutional 
tinkering.  
 
Finally, it will be suggested that the FCO and UBP refused to make adequate 
security changes in the midst of threats against the Governor and Police 
Commissioner. In addition, following the murders, there was an unwillingness 
to consider scaling back on the Governor’s living arrangements, in spite of an 
appeal from Sharples’ widow to Prime Minister Edward Heath that the 
flummery associated with the job of Governor like a ‘red rag to a bull’ for Black 
Power activists.47 
 
 
1. The local origins and the global context of civil 
disobedience and violence 
 
In February 1971, head of the FCO’s West Indies department Richard Posnett 
visited Bermuda on a fact-finding mission shortly before taking up his new job 
as Governor of British Honduras (soon to be renamed Belize).48 After 
submitting a report in which he advocated reform of Police community 
relations, the inauguration of a new Ministerial Code of Conduct and, 
crucially, a change in constituency boundaries to make them more equal, 
Posnett noted: 
 
Of all the territories I visited in my recent trip in the West Indies, 
Bermuda was the one where I thought we might have furthest to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Kinnear to FCO, May 1, 1973, 63/1095.	  
48 Posnett describes his trip around the Caribbean in Scent of Eucaplyptus, 132-3. 
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fall and where perhaps there might be the widest gap in 
communications between the establishment and black dissenters.49 
 
The contours of this gap had emerged the previous year as dissent, protest and  
then violence gripped the island between 1968 and 1973. First an international 
Black Power conference held on the island in July 1969 helped inspire two 
years or so of civil disobedience by the BBC. This paramilitary body’s first 
public meeting was held in November. Its leaders were Dionne Bassett, Ben 
Aaharon and Jerome Perinchief. By April 1970 it was believed by Government 
House to have 40 members but ‘perhaps 4-5,000 supporters’ (or more than 
ten percent out of a population of 48,000).50  
 
By the beginning of that year, the BBC was organising events such as the 
Memorial to Malcolm X in Victoria Park on February 26, a march through 
Tucker’s Town, and a boycott of the Berkeley School Sports’ Day with the 
demand that black studies be taught in Government high schools.51 On August 
8, 1970, activists burned a Union flag at Hamilton City Hall to express 
‘indignation at the [British Government’s] benign response to the Sharpeville 
incident’ and the lack of Bermudian condemnation of the Heath government’s 
decision to end a hiatus on the sale of British arms to apartheid South Africa.52  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Memorandum by Posnett, April 20, 1971, 823. 
50 Summary of meeting at Government House, April 14, 1970, 44/408; Memorandum by 
Allott, December 16, 1966, 95/277. 
51 The uncertain reaction of authorities to how to deal with action such as this can be seen in a 
quote in the same document: “Police feel sure if they have to intervene to preserve law and 
order violence will ensue but reaction of bulk of coloured Bermudian population to this is not 
known.” SNOWI to Ministry of Defence, London, March 25, 1970. FCO 44/406, TNA.  
52 Swan, Black power in Bermuda, 139. 
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Figure 13: Hamilton’s City Hall, where the BBC burned the Union flag in August 1970 in 
protest at the resumption of British arms sales to South Africa.  
© Benedict Greening, January 2013. 
 
 
 
The period 1968-1970 also saw rioting. Violence began on the evening of April 
25, 1968 in part due to tensions between younger, black Bermudians and 
police following confrontations at a fair held by a group called the Committee 
of 25, to raise funds for handicapped children.  
 
On the evening of the fair, on a day which also saw the island’s annual Floral 
Pageant in the afternoon and a PLP meeting at which the party launched its 
election manifesto, teenager Kenneth Galloway was told to leave the fair by a 
white ex-policeman, Paul Butterworth, after he had been let in by a black 
police constable, PC Foggo. Following Galloway’s arrest after he swore at 
Butterworth, an angry crowd gathered outside the Police Station.53 As the 
night went on, rioters attacked shops, breaking windows and starting fires. 
Damage was estimated at £30,000 to 40,000. The night after, Martonmere 
described how gangs ‘roamed streets, smashing windows, throwing stones and 
petrol bombs and erecting road blocks’.54 Order was restored after the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Wooding, Springer and Browning, Bermuda civil disorders, 17. 
54 Martonmere to FCO, April 27, 1968, 16/91. 
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imposition of a curfew, a short-term ban on meetings and the arrival of a 
company of Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers from Britain.55  
 
On October 2, 1970, a protest by about 300 people outside Hamilton City Hall 
descended into a riot in which businesses and public buildings were smashed 
or burned. The rioting led to arrests for 25 cases of attempted arson, 13 cases 
of malicious damage, two for shooting and two for malicious telephone calls.56 
A feared attack on Bermuda’s Police Operations Centre, which prompted ‘12-
hour shifts and more men on the ground’, did not occur.57 
 
As the assassinations of 1972 and 1973 will testify, this was also a period of 
targeted yet unattributed acts of violence directed at symbols of colonial 
power and British heritage.58 On March 22, 1970 there was an arson attack on 
Hamilton’s Sessions House, a building that dated back to the 1820s.59 Then, 
on Easter Sunday, 1970, a bomb blast wrecked the 350-year-old Devonshire 
Church.60 In the summer of 1970, there were indications that activities were 
becoming more targeted. On September 5, 1970, the Police received a letter, 
written on air-mail notepaper, which had been sent to Tucker. The note read:  
 
Hatred for you is a constant topic amongst the blacks of this 
island. It is a fact that you are largely responsible for much of the 
discontentment & mental confusion that they experience. It is a fact 
that you must die.61 
 
The letter added: “We predict your death before the summer has ended.” It 
went on to spell out a Death List: “1) You…Sir Henry Tucker 2) George 
Duckett 3) Lord Martonmere 4) Optional.” It was signed: “Your Enemy…The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Cabinet conclusions, CC(68), 28th conclusions, May 2, 1968, 10, TNA; Wooding, Springer 
and Browning, Bermuda civil disorders, 25. 
56 Martonmere to FCO, October 9, 1970, 44/406. 
57 Martonmere to FCO, October 7, 1970, ibid. 
58 Martonmere to FCO, March 25, 1970, op. cit. 
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Black Ghost”.62 It will be suggested that the gravity of this note was not quite 
realised at the time of its receipt. 
 
It will also be argued that violence and disorder were partly the result of an 
organic response to the heavy-handedness of the predominantly white Police 
force during the 1960s. However, the campaign of civil disobedience and 
violence that germinated in 1969 was also part of a local political response to 
both local economic and racial divisions and events occurring in a global 
context, supercharged by UN scrutiny and an international Black Power 
movement. 
 
1.1. ‘Instruments for maintaining white supremacy’?: The 
problem of colonial policing on a divided island, 1968-73 
 
 
In the immediate aftermath of riots in Hamilton and throughout parts of 
Pembroke, Devonshire and Warwick parishes between April 25 and 27, 1968, 
Martonmere had announced a Commission of Inquiry into their cause in the 
hope that this news would ‘take the heat out of present situation’.63 This 
Commission was headed by Chief justice of Trinidad Sir Hugh Wooding, Dr 
Hugh Springer of the Commonwealth Secretariat and LPR Browning, who was 
a former police commissioner in Jamaica. The Commission met in Bermuda 
between August 26 and October 2 and published their report in early 1969.64 
The violence resulted partly from ‘the implications plainly deducible of an 
assumption by Butterworth of white superiority and of PC Foggo's 
subservience to it’. “All this inevitably led to an eruption which when it began 
there was no holding back.”65 
 
The report also noted that the riots themselves may have been prolonged 
because of grievances against Police brutality that were being stoked as the 
riots progressed. Young people interviewed later alleged that, on April 28, a 
Policeman… 	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63 Martonmere to FCO, April 28, 1968, 16/91. 
64 Unknown to AM Palliser, January 13, 1969, 13/2501. 
65 Wooding, Springer and Browning, Bermuda civil disorders, 28. 
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…accosted and ordered [a boy who was waiting for a bus] to move 
on and that when he did not….the police beat him with sticks and 
flung him into a Police truck.66  
 
Other instances of ‘summary Police harshness’, related to the enforcement of a 
curfew between 7pm and 6am and a ban on meetings of five or more people.67 
Members of the Commission believed the enforcement of the curfew in 
Warwick against people who had no knowledge of its imposition led to arson 
attacks in the Dunscombe Road area. 
 
The report stated that the disorders were the result of ‘not just events which 
occurred’ on the first night but ‘a build up of resentment resulting from events 
with the Police over a long period of time’. Meanwhile, one of the targets of 
the rioting had been a Hamilton furniture shop, the management of which 
was ‘regarded as exploiting the working people’ by ‘offering them unusually 
attractive terms for the hire purchase of household furniture’ which led them 
to ‘undertake commitments which many were unable to meet’.68  
 
This was an unsettling aspect of a landscape ‘transformed by consumerism 
and social mobility’69 and ‘rapidly increasing affluence,’70 characterised by the 
fetishisation of material goods. There was also stark disparity between the 
economic positions of blacks and whites. According a 1974/75 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey, black Bermudian households earned on average $2,300 
less than white households.71   
 
The commission suggested one of the causes of the riots was the harsh way in 
which certain Police officers enforced motorcycle laws in force since 1949. 
More crucially, the Police’s ‘wide interpretation’ of a March 1966 change in the 
1936 drugs law, which allowed officers ‘to stop and search without warrant 
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69 Sandbrook, State of Emergency, 13. 
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any person reasonably suspected of having in his possession any narcotic 
drug’.72  
 
Tellingly, in the 16-week period leading up to the riots, while 103 people were 
searched under this law, a ‘mere’ 11 were found in possession of any narcotic 
drugs. Finally, the report noted the fact that the riots were ‘exacerbated by the 
fact that the Police force is largely alien’. Because of this, officers were 
‘identified with the power structure’ and seen as ‘instruments for maintaining 
white supremacy’.73   
 
These poor relations help set the context for the murder of Duckett more than 
four years later. On February 16,1971, intelligence indicated that Duckett was 
being described by BBC activists as ‘a mercenary and a killer who has virtually 
a free hand in suppressing black people’.74  Duckett was murdered at his home 
in Devonshire Parish on September 9, 1972. He was reaching up to fix a 
security light on the porch at about 9pm when he was shot in the back with a 
.22 revolver. His 17-year-old daughter Marcia, who had been watching 
television at the time, was also shot in the chest but survived. The forty-one-
year-old Duckett, from Widnes in Lancashire75, had served in the Welsh 
Regiment as a National Serviceman and in the Royal Army Educational Corps 
as a sergeant instructor. From November 1952 until December 1966, he had 
worked as Assistant Superintendent of Police in Nigeria. He had arrived in 
Bermuda to become Commissioner in December 1969.76  
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Figure 14: Police Commissioner George Duckett, who was shot and killed in his home in 
Devonshire Parish, Bermuda on the night of September 9, 1972.  
© Rosemary Jones, Bermuda: Five Centuries, (Bermuda, 2004). 
 
 
 
Metropolitan Police CID voiced suspicions that the BBC was involved in 
Duckett’s murder, noting that activists were heard to suggest at a meeting 
where they discussed fomenting revolution: “We must get Duckett first.” Even 
the CID report admitted that Duckett was ‘not popular’ with a large section of 
the community. The report speculated that this was ‘perhaps as a result of his 
leadership and forceful approach to would-be rioters and political 
demonstrations by extremist organisations’.77 His murder was certainly 
welcomed by some.  Arthur Hodgson, then a leading activist in the PLP, said:  
 
I remember there was a party going on and somebody announced 
the news that Duckett had been killed and everyone cheered and 
turned the music up louder. It was sort of like at last we are taking 
a stand; you see a victim being bullied and he hits back for once.78 
 
Thus, the riots of April 1968 revealed a gap between authorities and black 
Bermudians that was to widen into a chasm by 1972. Although the murder of 	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Duckett was wrenching for the authorities, its apparently isolated nature 
allowed it to be swept under the carpet as simply any other crime. As a result 
racial grievances remained unaddressed as the 1970s wore on. 
 
1.2. ‘Considerations other than purely local’: The United 
Nations, Black Power and the international politics of protest 
 
Harold Wilson noted in 1964:  
 
We cannot maintain a world role by military strength alone. 
Acceptance of the British role depends on the image we present in 
our relations with foreign and Commonwealth countries.79  
 
This attitude was part of a recognition that Britain’s world role was changing 
in the context of the international institutions of a ‘new world order’.80  
 
The UN was to assist the rise of new states, themselves the result of 
decolonisation, which in their turn became involved in the 
international diplomacy of subsequent decolonisation.81  
 
This section will argue that civil disorder in Bermuda was part of a local 
political response to the new international arena in which decolonisation 
played out. The Black Power and PLP activists who shaped this response, such 
as PLP MCP Pauulu Kamarakafego (also known as Roosevelt Brown) and 
Hodgson, also aimed to use the new realm of global scrutiny to bypass the 
traditional colonial asymmetry of local legislatures, Government House and 
Whitehall. Gordon’s 1946 appeal to Creech Jones led to ostensible hand-
wringing in London but had failed to achieve anything due to the political 
collusion of Government House with the oligarchy. It was time now for a new 
approach. 
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(i) PLP acknowledgement of the power of violence and the 
international context  
 
Violence, protest and countervailing repression and pre-emption lurked 
perennially beneath the surface of discussion about race in Bermuda. It 
cannot be denied that PLP politicians had come close to advocating 
insurrection in their speeches between 1964 and 1968 election. As PLP MCP 
Browne-Evans was described telling a party meeting on October 20, 1964: 
 
She got so angry over the whole state of affairs that sometimes she 
would like to use the sheer weight of the Negro majority against 
the people. This would be a real massacre, but the coloured people 
didn’t do this.82  
 
On the night of the riots, April 25, 1968, PLP candidate Austin Thomas had 
said at the party’s manifesto launch: “It’s going to get real hot this summer 
and its going to be PLP heat.”83 The Wooding Commission report argued that 
the PLP’s ‘positively racial’ campaign rhetoric ‘cannot have failed to have a 
major influence on those who participated in the disorders’.84   
 
Politicians were attempting to articulate the fact that young black Bermudians 
felt themselves to be on a ‘bandwagon of the powerless’ who were ‘only able to 
make an impression on this society…through violence’.85 It also points to the 
feeling that the democratic inheritance of a black majority seemed to have 
been stymied by ‘constitutional’ means, while ‘a sense of solidarity’86 that had 
been found during segregation was being affected by a wider trend of 
‘fragmentation’ among oppositional movements.87  
 
Bermuda had begun to be ‘considered’ in the third of the three sub-
committees set up by the UN’s Committee of 24 for the examination of 
dependent territories in late 1964. Bermuda was investigated as part of a 	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group that included British Honduras, the Falklands, the Bahamas, the Turks 
and Caicos, Cayman Islands, Leeward and Windward Islands, Barbados, 
Grenada and the British Virgin Islands. The membership of the sub-
committee investigating the island included Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, 
Madagascar, Uruguay and Venezuela.88 Through 1964, activists such as WG 
Brown and BIU president Dr Barbara Ball attempted to attract attention to 
social and political demands for reform in Bermuda.89  
 
It seemed to have been understood that potential violence might play a role in 
attracting the attention of the UN to Bermuda. As Browne-Evans was alleged 
to have lamented in October 1964: “Although the PLP did not preach violence 
the British are not inclined to take action unless there seems to be violence”.90 
This view elided into the reported view of PLP activist Hodgson in October 
1968 that:  
 
The UN will do very little unless it can be shown that 
Bermuda is in a state of unrest…Unless unrest can be 
provoked, no action will be taken by the UN.91 
 
By November 1968, officials in Government House were worrying that rioting 
in April and what it viewed as the potential for more violence in the summer 
of 1969 would show Britain in a negative light on the world stage. This was 
chastened by a context in which Martonmere believed, that ‘having suffered a 
defeat at the polls …the PLP had ‘decided to appeal for support’ in the UN ‘in 
the hope that international opinion will bring pressure to bear on the British 
government to agree to another constitutional conference’.92  
 
On December 14, it was reported that a draft resolution sponsored by twelve 
African and Asian countries reaffirmed ‘the inalienable right of the peoples of 
these territories to self-determination and independence’ and called for the 
UN to render all help to the peoples of these territories in their efforts freely to 	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89 Bermuda and the UN, June 4, 1964; for the reference to Ball see also Local intelligence 
committee report for September 1964, October 5, 1964, 1031/4766. 
90 November 7, 1964, ibid. 
91 Bermuda Intelligence Committee (BIC) Report, October 1968, 58/333. 
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decide their future status’.93 With the Committee of 24 due to resume its 
proceedings in February, FCO official Len S Price wrote to Scott that the PLP 
were ‘looking for any opportunity to make trouble’ by ‘having Bermuda 
discussed’.94  
 
 
(ii) The First Regional Black Power Conference, June-July 1969  
 
By June 1969, the FCO was worrying about how it should respond to plans by 
Kamarakafego to hold the First Regional International Black Power 
Conference (BPC) in Bermuda from July 10 to July 13, 1969. The question was 
whether to allow the conference to proceed, with British troops present as a 
‘deterrent’ to potential disorder, or whether the conference should be banned 
through a change in local legislation. These discussions were conducted with 
the UN very much in mind. The UK’s mission at the UN told the FCO on June 
10 that because there were ‘Bermudan (sic) petitioners in New York….if the 
decision is made to send troops to Bermuda, we must reckon on a debate in 
the Committee of 24’.95  
 
An allusion to the international politics of decolonisation, is instructive here. 
Britain worried about the effect that the stationing of troops in Bermuda 
might have on the combustible border dispute between Guyana, independent 
since 1966, and Venezuela. In early January, Venezuela had backed the 
abortive Rapununi uprising in the disputed area.96 As Bristow noted, such a 
‘movement of troops’ might lead the Venezuelans, who were members of the 
UN sub-committee ‘to suggest parallels which would be awkward for the 
Guyanese’.97 
 
The considerations about whether to intervene militarily, providing troops ‘to 
maintain law and order’ during the conference, went to the very highest level, 
with Prime Minister Harold Wilson briefed and involved in the final decision 
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to send in troops.98 Defence Secretary Denis Healey worried ‘there is a very 
real danger that the commitment will become a continuing one’.99 However, 
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart decided sending in troops should 
accompany a decision not to ban the conference. In a note to Wilson, Burke 
Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, summed up the plan to send in 85 officers and 
men of 45 Marine Commando Unit to reinforce the marines stationed on the 
two frigates Arethusa and Mohawk.100 The Bermuda Government also denied 
the presence of many would-be attendees through ‘comprehensive 
immigration controls’ and a Stop List.101 
 
The BPC, officially sponsored by the PLP, attracted 1,500 registrations and 
passed off without incident. A keynote speaker was the Trinidadian historian 
and respected activist CLR James, who was a mentor of Kamarakafego.102 
James stated on the opening night that the US and other imperialist nations 
were ‘in full retreat before the tremendous forces unleashed by revolutions in 
Europe, Africa, Asia and the Caribbean’.103 The presence of troops on the 
island was a reflection of the views of one delegate who said that ‘as soon as 
Black people began to speak about their problems, colonial forces reacted with 
slogans of law and order’.  
 
What were the consequences of the BPC? According to Swan, the conference 
had ‘ramifications for Black Power globally’ as well as leading to the 
emergence of the BBC, as activists who were ‘the angry children of Malcolm X 
and Sally Bassett’104…embraced ‘the major tenets of the BPC resolutions and 
attempted to put them into action’. In Martonmere’s view the BPC left ‘scars’ 
in Bermuda.105 As the next section will show, the BBC would be responsible 
for awakening white Bermudians and British colonial officials to legacies of 
injustice and for doing that in a bloody and brutal manner. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98  Memorandum (secret) from Denis Healey to Michael Stewart, June 23, 1969. 13/2885. 
99 Ibid, 
100 Memorandum from Trend to Wilson, June 23, 1969, op. cit. 
101 NRL Bristow to Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committees, June 12, 1969, 13/2885; Swan, 
Black power in Bermuda, 88. 
102 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 78; James, Grimshaw and Hart, American Civilization. 
103 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 88.  
104 Ibid, 92. 
105 Op. cit, 88 and 92. 
	   160	  
 
2. Pulling the strings: The response of the Colonial State 
to issues of internal security, April 1970-1973 
 
The symbolic and even romantic resonance of activists from all over the world 
coming together for the BPC to express black pride was tarnished and 
traduced by a campaign of bombings, threats, and assassinations that took 
place in Bermuda between 1970 and 1973. The way in which the FCO in 
London and Government House and Tucker’s UBP government responded to 
these events is instructive.  
 
Firstly, this period showed how accustomed the UBP was to Government 
House dealing with security problems through grand displays of military 
power rather than through social remedies. Moreover, intervention by the 
IRD at the behest of a secret local security committee bolstered the UBP in its 
circumvention of constitutionally-guaranteed civil liberties. Secondly, the UBP 
then reacted to the campaign of violence with plans for constitutional reform 
that the FCO resisted at first and then partially acquiesced to. There was also a 
failure to take basic security precautions in advance of the crimes, while, 
finally, the reaction of both the UBP and Government House to violence 
showed a mix of panic and a reluctance to minimise the degree of imperial 
trappings enjoyed by the Governor. 
 
2.1 ‘Improving the projection of government policies’: The 
covert Anglo-Bermudian response to the challenge of Black 
Power 
 
Bermuda’s new constitution meant that Government House and London 
increasingly faced pressure to recalibrate how they organised intervention in 
Bermudian affairs. Governors resorted to calling in frigates, with or without 
troops aboard, time and again. The riots of 1968 led to Martonmere having 
HMS Leopard docked in Hamilton Harbour even as people voted in the 
island’s first election under an unadulterated universal franchise. Martonmere 
believed this was a ‘deterrent’ to violence, yet it may have been more akin to a 
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provocation.106 Similarly, in March and April 1970, HMS Mohawk, HMS 
Jupiter and HMS Sirius all spent time in Bermuda as the BBC planned a 
protest at City Hall.107 In March 1973, both before and after Sharples’ 
assassination, Sirius, carrying Royal Marines, and HMS Minerva were in the 
area of Bermuda.108  
 
British troops also paid periodic visits to the island. The arrival of the 
‘company of 45 Commando Royal Marines and the Royal Marine detachment 
of HMS Mohawk’ and their reinforcement by ‘Wessex helicopters of 72 
Squadron Royal Air Force’ in July 1969 was not as unusual as it seemed.109 
For instance, on the night the Governor was killed, there was already ‘a 180-
strong force of the 1st Parachute regiment’ conducting exercises on the 
island.110  
 
Martonmere’s dependence on British troops may have resulted from his fears 
that the citizen-staffed Bermuda Regiment was compromised by Black Power 
sympathies and that this would lead to ‘insubordination’.111  He wrote to 
London on January 3, 1969:  
 
[The Bermuda Regiment Commanding Officer] could not be 
absolutely sure of the allegiance of his troops should they be faced 
with a riotous mob containing their relatives. He could only ‘hope 
and believe’ they would remain loyal.112 
 
Martonmere coupled this with the view of the Commissioner of Police that 
‘Bermudianisation should not be allowed to impair the efficiency of the police 
force’.113  Worries about the Regiment were raised time and again, and as 
Swan shows, a feared insubordination during a visit by Prince Charles, in 
October 1970, days after widespread rioting, led to the discharge of 60 men.114  
This fear led to Royal Marine guards being deployed at Government House 	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during the Prince’s visit.115 This overreliance on the British military led to an 
emphasis on the deployment of colonial symbols in response to violence. 
 
By March 1970, however, Government House was ready to spearhead a new 
covert approach to bolster the UBP Government. On March 25, SNOWI was 
reporting to the Ministry of Defence that the BBC had provoked disorders in 
two school sports fields and carried out a sit-down in Mid-Ocean Golf Club 
while there had also been an ‘arson attempt on House of Assembly’. SNOWI 
worried that ‘violence’ would ‘ensue’ if Police intervened to restore law and 
order.116 The same day, Martonmere wrote to London that the BBC was 
‘rapidly becoming a serious threat to security’ while he added that the 
organisation now had ‘effective leadership and rapidly increasing support 
among young, black people’.117  
 
This same telegram revealed something else. Martonmere said the BIC had 
‘recommended’ to the UBP government that ‘assistance be sought from IRD’ 
and that ‘a request may be made shortly for a representative to visit 
Bermuda… with a view to mounting a propaganda campaign against [the 
BBC]’.118 This moment represents the confluence of two covert bodies charged 
with security in both Bermuda and London. The BIC had a membership of 
eight, including the Deputy Governor as chair, the Attorney General, the 
Cabinet Secretary, the Police Commissioner, the head of Special Branch, the 
Labour Relations Officer, the adjutant to the Bermuda Regiment and an army 
intelligence officer attached to SNOWI’s staff. One of the purposes of the 
monthly reports were ‘to keep the Secretary of State informed of 
developments which could affect public order’.119 The most crucial of its five 
terms of reference was: 
 
To keep the security situation in Bermuda under review, including 
threats to public order and stability, subversion, sabotage and 
espionage, and to prepare a monthly intelligence appreciation of 
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the situation for the Governor, members of the Governor’s Council 
and the Secretary of State.120 
 
Twelve copies of these were circulated to the Foreign Secretary, the Security 
Liaison Officer in Washington, who was a representative of the Security 
Service and advised the FCO on ‘matters of intelligence and protective security 
policy’, [SNOWI], the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the head of the 
UK’s mission at the UN in New York.  
 
Until late 1973 at the earliest, this part of the Bermuda national security state 
seems to have been completely disconnected from the elected part of it, with 
very little coordination between the two. One copy of the report was presented 
to the Government Leader but via the means of the Cabinet Secretary. 
Meanwhile, in November 1973, Deputy Governor Ian Kinnear suggested that 
‘there would be merit in adding someone, preferably a Bermudian, who could 
speak on educational matters’. However, he added that ‘it was accepted’ that 
the committee ‘could only function effectively if the members had the 
complete trust of Special Branch and that this would inevitably limit the 
field’.121 
 
It was an unnamed member of the BIC who had first suggested the IRD be 
invited to help the Bermuda Government. On April 2, this was discussed at an 
inter-departmental meeting in London. Between then and April 9, the FCO 
warned Martonmere that the potential impact of the IRD’s help should not be 
overestimated ‘since the particular manifestation of the Black Berets … seems 
to us part of the world-wide problem of youth and race, to which there is no 
single or easy answer’.122 On April 9, the FCO responded to fears on the part of 
IRD personnel that its cover had been blown, noting: 
 
All members of [the BIC] including the person referring to IRD in 
the first place have been warned never to use the term again and 
to be highly circumspect in their knowledge of it.123 
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By April 14, however, a representative from IRD, John Rayner, AJ Fairclough 
and the OPA MJ Macoun were on the island. That day, two meetings were 
held at Government House. The first and longest, between 10am and 3pm, 
involved Martonmere, Fairclough, Macoun, Rayner, Sykes, SNOWI, Duckett 
and the diplomatic service officer, Jack W Clewley. They discussed ideas for 
‘improved immigration control – if this were necessary to operate an 
expanded Stop List’. But ‘no conclusions were reached’.124 At the second 
meeting that day, the group was joined by Tucker, Attorney General John 
Summerfield and Executive Council Secretary WW Wallace. Fairclough 
suggested a ‘two-pronged’ approach in which the Government would take 
‘steps - with guidance from a FCO information [IRD] expert – to damage the 
image of the [BBC]’. An important part of this would be ‘stressing Government 
achievements in coordinated promotional speeches by politicians, and could 
include subjects such as low-cost housing, increased salaries [and] 
improvements in education’. Tucker agreed with this ‘in principle’. 125   
 
The IRD’s Rayner then outlined the ‘possible forms of a counter-propaganda 
campaign’ with a ‘coordination between the positive, overt activities’ and 
‘more indirect propaganda…[with] attempts…made to influence the news 
media’ and, possibly ‘exposure of the enemy’. The meeting also discussed 
changes to the law, including ‘provisions to control public meetings’ or the 
takeover of buildings, the ‘possible prohibition on wearing of uniforms under 
the Public Order Act’ and ‘the inadequacies of the jury system’.126  
 
On August 15, Tucker made a speech in the House of Assembly in which he 
argued that ‘racist organisations’ were trying to ‘disrupt society…to effect by 
force changes which should properly be achieved by democratic, 
parliamentary process’.127 The next day, a memorandum written to 
accompany a meeting at the FCO laid out the different measures it was 
thought the UBP government should take to deal with the BBC ‘threat’. These 
included: 	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1) Legislation to discourage the portrayal of violence on 
television and films 
2) Increased use of powers of deportation and of the Stop List in 
relation to non-Bermudians 
3) Tightening up of anti-discrimination legislation 
4) Examination of the possibility of redefining in legislation 
certain offences (e.g. incitement of violence, citation etc) in such 
a way as to make it more difficult for individuals to encourage 
others by indirect means to contemplate violent action without 
bringing themselves up against the law 
5) Arranging visits to Bermuda by suitable moderate and 
outstanding blacks  
6) Arranging more subtle briefing of local news media 
7) Maintain(ing) an unattributable anti-black power 
propaganda campaign. 
 
Added in handwriting at the bottom of the memorandum were headings 
including ‘youth and welfare’, ‘education’, ‘trade union field’ and ‘churches’.128 
What is striking is the comprehensiveness of ideas, covering domestic areas 
such as education and labour relations only recently delegated to a 
‘responsible’ government in the much-heralded 1968 constitution. What this 
really revealed was that it was very hard to disaggregate ‘internal security’ 
matters from internal affairs issues such as education or labour relations. As 
official J Morgan noted, ‘many of the aspects [of the plan] concern[ed] the 
internal affairs of Bermuda for which we are not directly responsible’.129 
 
The line between foreign and domestic affairs was blurred in IRD work 
relating to wider conflagrations of disorder on British soil. The British 
Government was soon employing some of the IRD personnel who had worked 
in Bermuda in Northern Ireland. Former Reuters and BBC journalist Hugh 
Mooney helped with UBP ‘propaganda’ during a ‘six-week assignment’ as part 
of the Special Editorial Unit in April 1970. This section ‘produced articles for 
order’. “One of the functions of the unit was to secure clearance of intelligence 
reports for exploitation in the press and elsewhere.”  
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Mooney later gave evidence to an inquiry about how he was sent to ‘apply IRD 
techniques to indirect propaganda’ in Northern Irleland in 1971, despite the 
fact that the FCO and the IRD were ‘reluctant to get involved in the United 
Kingdom’.130 He described how he helped army personnel with news 
management in ‘a last-minute, improvised, damage-limitation exercise’ 
following the Bloody Sunday massacre, during which 14 civilians were killed 
by British troops in Derry, Northern Ireland in January 1972.131 This shows 
how security in Bermuda was being dealt with by a network of personnel who 
operated in a subfusc part of the imperial twilight. Just as counterinsurgency 
techniques were ‘copied and adapted’ from one part of the British-dominated 
world to another through the 1950s, propaganda techniques honed against 
Black Power activists in Bermuda were adapted for use in the deteriorating 
security situation in the UK itself.132 
 
One segment of the UBP implementation of IRD proposals brought the 
hammer down on freedom of expression. The government passed the 
Offensive Behaviour Act in July 1970 and the Printed Publications Act in May 
1971. The first piece of legislation was aimed at giving the authorities a tool to 
keep BBC activists off the streets. This was achieved in late October 1970 when 
Bassett and Perinchief were arrested after they burned a Union flag. The 
second piece of legislation specifically ‘intended to restrict the propaganda 
activities of the BBC’ by forcing the registration of publications such as the 
BBC’s newspaper Liberator.133 According to Swan’s research, by August 1971 
BBC meetings had been reduced from three to one a week. By the summer of 
1972, the BBC was barely referred to in BIC meetings.134  
 
Ironically, the effect of these Bills was that, while squeezing the BBC out of the 
public eye, they encouraged BBC links with Bermuda’s criminal underworld, 
particularly its penal population. While ‘repression contributed significantly 
to the extermination of opposition’, it did not finish the job.135  On January 11, 	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1971 Bassett, Aaharon and Perinchief were sent to jail for ‘offensive behaviour’ 
or handling ‘seditious literature’. While in prison, they made contact in prison 
with Burrows, who would, in mid-1976, go on to confess to the killings of 
Duckett, Sayers and Sharples.136   
 
The other impact of the confluence of IRD advice and UBP illiberality was a 
crackdown on the rights of defendants in jury trials. This highlights the effect 
the IRD seemed to have had in emboldening the UBP to act on its repressive 
instincts. In 1971, defendants’ counsel and the Crown had the right of five 
peremptory challenges of prospective jurors in advance of criminal trials. 
Strains of conservative opinion had expressed unhappiness with this 
arrangement since the late 1960s. A 1969 report by the Bermuda Police 
Association noted that ‘guilty men’ were ‘being allowed to go free’ because of 
such measures. This report proposed the abolition of the rights of defence 
lawyers to challenge any juror ‘except for cause’. The Wooding Commission 
report dismissed this, noting that some officers seemed prejudiced against 
black Bermudians. 137   
 
However, following its discussions with IRD, the UBP flew in the face of the 
Wooding Report. In October 1971, in discussions in advance of passing a 
Jurors Act, it proposed reducing the number of challenges available. On this 
occasion, it backed off after the Bermuda Bar Association ‘strenuously and 
unanimously opposed’ the attempt.138  However, following the murders of 
Sharples and Sayers in March 1973, there were ‘rumblings’ amongst UBP 
cabinet ministers that ‘the jury system should be abolished’ because it was 
believed it would be ‘impossible to empanel a jury [to try the suspected 
murderers] which is either unbiased or free from intimidation’.  
At the time however Richards, a barrister, noted that he was ‘against any 
precipitate move in this direction’.139  However, he ominously noted, without 
explanation, that ‘there are one or two possible steps…which would help 
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alleviate the fears which [had] been expressed’.140 By April 1974, however, the 
UBP would feel emboldened to go ahead and pass an amendment to the 
Criminal Code that reduced the number of available peremptory challenges to 
three.141  
 
However, with the 1971 Jurors Act that eventually passed, the UBP was more 
successful in following through on the worries expressed regarding the 
‘inadequacies of the jury system’ in the meeting with the IRD. The ‘one or two 
steps’ that Richards mentioned above included the ‘broadening’ of the use of 
Special Juries in March 1974.142 These devices had been reintroduced by the 
UBP in 1971 after having been abolished in the UK for criminal cases in 1949 
and in Bermuda during the 1950s. The law allowed a mysterious Revising 
Tribunal to restrict the pool of available jurors to ‘fit and proper persons’ who 
were assessed on the basis of ‘education, qualifications, occupation or 
experience’.143 As Kawaley argues, this retrograde law ‘sought to turn back the 
political clock’ and was ‘in violation of the letter and spirit of section six of the 
[Bermuda] Constitution and the right to a fair and impartial trial by jury’.144   
 
The work of the IRD represents perhaps the clearest evidence of direct British 
intervention, behind the scenes and at the level of high politics, in matters of 
local ‘internal affairs’. This saw the FCO intervening in ‘internal affairs’ on an 
extra-constitutional level. It was done in a covert and ill-defined way, on the 
basis of an emphasis on short-term stability rather than on tackling endemic 
colonial and racial legacies through social reform. Because of this there was a 
focus on censorship, incarceration and the erosion of the basic rights of 
criminal defendants that had been supposedly protected only three years 
before in the 1968 Constitution. As the next section will show, these actions 
were paralleled by an attempt at politically-inspired constitutional 
engineering designed to enhance the ‘prestige’ of the UBP government. 
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2.2 No more Anguillas: ‘Presentational’ constitutional reform, 
November 1970-April 1973 
 
As shown above, the UBP and FCO worked together to build a package of 
policies that were a response to the exigencies of the security situation rather 
than a result of a genuine impulse to address social or economic divisions. 
This process revealed two things. Firstly, it exposed political anxieties on the 
part of the UBP. Secondly, it elucidated a relationship of frustration but also of 
implicit trust in what the FCO’s permanent under-secretary of state, David 
Scott, called the UBP’s ‘moderate and sensible policies’.145 As the UBP 
approached the prospect of a general election, to be held by May 1973 at the 
latest, some of the same impulses would shape discussions over a new package 
of constitutional reforms that would affect how much responsibility each part 
of the government held for internal security.  
 
Up until April 1973, Government House control over the issue was tempered 
by an informal practice of consultation between the Governor and UBP and 
government leader. In November 1970, it was suggested at a UBP committee 
on constitutional reform, headed by Member for Finance John Sharpe, that 
the ‘Government Leader should have greater control over internal security’.146 
As Sharpe would argue on a trip to London in the summer of 1971, the UBP 
hoped London would agree to make Bermuda an Associated State to remedy 
this. 
 
Ministers expressed a marked reluctance to do this.147 The experience in 
Anguilla in March 1969 was fresh in the FCO mind and it was thought Britain 
could be ‘embarrassed’ if more powers were delegated to local ministers. As 
Home wrote to Martonmere in June: “Anguilla is a good example of an 
internal matter which at the same time had serious defence and external 
affairs implications for Britain.”148  
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It was also suggested that internal security was a particularly sensitive area for 
Douglas-Home politically. As Shaw put it: “The maintenance of law and 
order… is the aspect… in respect of which parliament and public opinion hold 
him particularly responsible.”149 This resistance might also have been 
bolstered by the fact that Northern Ireland had brought security issues to the 
forefront of debate at Westminster. As Kinnear put it in May when explaining 
how he had tried to tell Sharpe that there was ‘no prospect’ of delegating 
powers over security to UBP ministers: “Internal security was a particularly 
sensitive subject in the House of Commons.”150 
 
However, these discussions also revealed that the objections of the FCO to 
delegation were not so much objections of principle, but politically contingent. 
Such fears led to suggestions that delegations of security responsibilities ‘were 
not now acceptable because of the dangers if such delegated powers got into 
irresponsible hands’.151 Scott gave the argument a Cold War dimension when 
he suggested that ‘these days, it was often difficult to distinguish between 
matters of external defence and internal subversion’. He added that the UBP 
would be ‘well advised’ to note that any new constitution would be applicable 
to successors ‘who might have very different views on the future of the 
colony’.152 
 
Despite this resistance, the FCO was also under pressure to make some 
concession because the UBP was opposed to independence. The party’s stance 
stemmed from a fear that, as Sharpe put it, the move ‘could stimulate internal 
disaffection’ by removing ‘the element of restraint represented by the fact that 
British troops could be called in if the worst came to the worst’.153 As FCO 
official JW Maslen argued:  
 
The [internal security] aspect is in fact the strongest element in 
Bermuda’s desire not to seek independence, and if we are ever to be 
rid of our responsibility for the island we must seek a solution to 
the [internal security] problem.154 	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The FCO was also under pressure to give the UBP government a further public 
relations victory in the run up to the General Election. At a meeting between 
Tucker, Sharpe and ministers in London in November, Sharpe suggested the 
constitutional reform proposal was part of a package that was ‘a gesture to 
show they appreciate the need for progress.’155  Sir James McPetrie, who had 
been sent by the FCO to Bermuda to advise on the reforms, put it more 
bluntly, noting: “Nothing less than a substantial delegation of responsibility 
would effectively enhance the prestige of the Bermuda Ministerial 
Government.”156 
 
As a result of this pressure, the FCO agreed to meet the UBP demands 
‘presentationally’ with a cosmetic change in the constitution. This would 
involve ‘a provision empowering the Governor to consult either the leader of 
Government or the Executive Council collectively’ on internal security 
matters. However, the proviso was that this was done on the Governor’s 
‘discretion and on the clear stipulation that he was not required to act in 
accordance with the advice tendered’.157 
 
The change was contained in the package of reforms that were agreed during 
August and September of 1972 by Douglas-Home and the new Government 
Leader Sir Edward Richards.158 These changes created a new Governor’s 
Council, along lines already established in Gibraltar, in which ‘in addition to 
two officials [the Chief Secretary and Attorney General] the Premier, Deputy 
Premier and at least one other minister’ would be consulted regularly, and 
without prejudice, by the Governor over internal security matters.159 The 
changes were debated in the House of Assembly in late October and came into 
effect in April 1973, only a month after Sharples’ and Sayers’ murders, events 
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which would spur in British officials grave doubts about the system of 
executive power-sharing.160  
 
This solution seemed to allow the ‘prestige’ of the UBP government to be 
enhanced while the FCO did not technically really give away any of powers. 
However, the move may have undermined the Governor’s ability to set 
agendas. Technically he did not give up any powers. Practically, there was a 
world of difference between operating in isolation and operating in 
‘consultation’ with the UBP. 
 
2.3 Repression, panic and denial in the midst of 
assassinations, September 1972 – May 1973 
 
This sub-section will suggest that the murders of Duckett, Sayers and Sharples 
in 1972 and 1973 were met with a mix of repression and denial on the part of 
both UBP officials and in Government House. However, it also led to a belief 
on the part of some officials that the Governor’s constitutional position 
exposed the occupant of the office to unnecessary dangers. This led to a 
newfound desire to push Bermuda into independence. Despite the death 
threat list received by authorities in 1970, the state of security at Government 
House was highly inadequate. Smith wrote that when he interviewed Sharples 
‘the only sign of security was a Bermuda police constable who opened the 
front door’.161 Another press report following the murder painted a picture of 
the security at Government House, ‘a turreted grey and white mansion set 
back from Blackwatch Pass on the outskirts of Hamilton’: 
 
The security by the standards of 1973 is almost comical. 
Townspeople in Hamilton frequently vault the low fence to take a 
walk in the Government House grounds at night.162 
 
This was the security that protected the former Conservative MP and Home 
Office Minister Sharples as he and the 26-year-old Sayers took the Governor’s 
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dog for an after-dinner walk on Saturday, March 10, 1973.163  As they chatted 
at the top of the stone steps that led down into the 45-acre garden, the dog ran 
down the steps ahead of them.164 At that moment someone hiding in the 
darkness below the steps shot the dog, then shot Sayers twice, and then 
Sharples twice. Each were hit twice with bullets from the .38 caliber pistol. 
Sayers died instantly. Sharples called out for help but died shortly after hitting 
the concrete. 
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Figure 15: Sir Richard Sharples and his wife Lady Pamela Sharples. © Gordon Hireson, 
Kiwanis Club of Bermuda pictorial tribute to Sir Richard Sharples: Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief (Bermuda, 1973). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Sir Richard Sharples and his ADC Captain Hugh Sayers. 
© Gordon Hireson, Kiwanis Club of Bermuda pictorial tribute to Sir Richard Sharples: 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief (Bermuda, 1973). 
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Figures 17 and 18: Police crime scene photographs taken following the murder of  
Sir Richard Sharples and Captain Hugh Sayers. 
© London Metropolitan Police, National Archives, London, UK. 
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The murders had led to fears in the FCO about the ‘political stability’ of 
Bermuda.165 Acting Governor Ian Kinnear, who wrote to London in May of the 
possibility that ‘outside influences are at work’ in the murders thought they 
may be ‘part of a plan to undermine authority and to exacerbate racial 
tensions, with a view to forcing Bermuda to independence and a black 
government’.166 Worrying about how to secure prosecutions against people 
suspected of the murders ‘against whom we have very little evidence’ in 
October 1973, Sharples’ successor Sir Edwin Leather suggested that ‘we may 
have to use unorthodox measures’. He wondered ‘what prospect there is of us 
getting some specialist advice on the lines [of IRD]’.167 
 
Another reaction on the part of Government House was a panicked desire to 
escape from Bermuda. Ian Kinnear told London that the Governor’s political 
role of maintaining internal security meant he could ‘unjustifiably become… 
the target of a frustrated minority’. Because of recent constitutional changes, 
meanwhile, it was difficult for Britain to take the action that was needed to 
‘integrate’ the 75 per cent expatriate police force. Bermuda’s colonial status 
was ‘an anachronism’. In summary, he proposed a policy of slowly nudging 
Bermuda towards full sovereignty: “I believe we must actively encourage 
Bermudians to think seriously whether their colonial status is now more of a 
burden than an asset to them”.168 In receipt of the memo, FCO official D Reid 
noted that Kinnear’s recommendations were  ‘sound and very much in line 
with FCO thinking’.169 
 
While the FCO planned an escape route, the UBP played on British habits of 
denial. Kinnear had noted his view that ‘the unreality of the traditional pomp 
and ceremony’ was provocative to black Bermudians and that ‘Government 
should look for a more modest Government House’.170 On April 6, Sharples’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Leather, Annual Report 1973, February 7, 1974, FCO 63/1220, TNA. 
166 Kinnear to FCO, May 1, 1973, 63/1095. 
167Leather to Sir Duncan Watson, October 16, 1973, FCO 63/1100, TNA. 
168 Op. cit.   
169 D Reid to Mr Roberts, May 15, 1973, 63/1095. 
170 Kinnear to FCO, May 1, 1973, ibid. 
	   177	  
wife Pamela reinforced this point, writing to Heath recommending that 
another, less ostentatious residence be found: 
 
The mere fact of “them up there and us down here” is a physical 
fact and often mentioned… This is not the right house for the 
job…It is resented by very many and it’s easy to understand.171 
 
Despite this appeal from the wife of a murdered governor, someone who had 
been a sailing companion of the Prime Minister, Downing Street official AC 
Acland noted that Richards believed ‘it would not be right at the present time 
to abandon the property…. which would be regarded as a panic measure’.172 
Writing back rather apologetically to Sharples, Heath noted that although he 
was ‘in substantial agreement’ with what she said, this was ‘a subject on which 
we have to pay attention to the views of the Bermuda Government’.173 As a 
result, no change was made to the Governor’s living quarters (the Governor 
lives in the same house to this day), even though as Acland noted, its ‘three-
mile circumference’ made it very difficult to defend.174 The fact that Downing 
Street deferred entirely to Bermuda’s view, however, shows just how much 
influence local ministers had on security decisions by this stage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  
In its report on the causes of riots that broke out in April 1968, the Wooding 
Commission noted that the UBP was ‘under pressure to prove’ that its policy 
was that of a ‘new nationalism… the demand for a Bermuda for all 
Bermudians’.175 This links into a phenomenon, of a ‘new nationalism’ that was 
in the process of being sculpted in former dominions such as Australia and 
Canada during the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter, and the previous two 
chapters, have suggested that Bermuda’s ‘new nationalism’ was not so much a 
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result of an organic sense of nationhood, nor part of a conscious UBP plan, 
but a part of a response to deteriorating law and order in 1968-1973.176 
 
The roots of violence were to be found largely in local circumstances that saw 
worsening relations between Bermuda’s largely white and English-run Police 
Force and younger, black Bermudians. Yet it should also be remembered that 
the wider context of violence was the legacy of the denial of Bermuda’s black 
majority from the higher echelons of power and a starkly unequal division of 
society into a richer white segment and a poorer black majority.177  This was 
reinforced by the developments detailed in chapter one, by which the oligarchy 
entrenched its power by political means in an unfair constitutional setup 
sanctioned by London.  
 
Yet this chapter has suggested that the spread of protest, intimidation, threats 
and murder in 1970-1973 was also the result of a confluence of communal 
political divisions and international political trends that saw the actions of 
governments in British-controlled territories held under a more penetrating 
spotlight of accountability. This could also lead to isolated attempts to create 
‘disorder’ in Bermuda for the sake of the international audience. Secondly, it 
also led, more constructively, to a Black Power Conference in which globalised 
ideas about black identity were discussed. This conference also led to the 
creation of the BBC. 
 
The FCO propaganda campaign to ‘project’ government successes and to 
‘expose the enemy’ in response to this may have helped to entrench UBP 
complacency and conservatism. Meanwhile, constitutional reform, aimed at 
bolstering the ‘prestige’ of the UBP, was agreed to in the aim of meeting short-
term electoral exigencies. This change was acquiesced to by a Heath 
government that was facing ‘a fundamental choice about Britain’s position in 
the world’ in the midst of ‘the “Nixon shocks” in economic policy and the turn 
towards China’.178 Both the intervention by the soon-to-be-disbanded IRD and 
the constitutional changes set in train in 1971-2 must be seen in the context of 	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an ‘old world [which] was dying’ and a ‘new one [which] was struggling to be 
born’.179  
 
Because they were half-measures, the April 1973 reforms may have critically 
undermined the British ability to lead events in Bermuda. In September 1975, 
Governor Sir Edwin Leather pointed to the ‘political impossibility’ of his being 
able to ‘take action which was in any way contrary to the view of Bermuda 
Ministers’.180  This was not a situation in which British responsibilities could 
be looked after, nor British interests pursued. As we will see in the chapters to 
come, this may have led to disastrous consequences in 1977. 
  
Meanwhile, the assassination of Sharples was an isolated example of how 
foreign policy during the Heath years was not quite ‘a mare tranquilitatis by 
comparison to [his] Government’s domestic troubles’.181 The panicked 
telegram from Kinnear following the murders symbolises the reactivity of 
British policy towards Bermuda. Habituation to the ‘art of forgetting’ also led 
Government House to neglect security measures that might have prevented 
the assassinations. Finally, the refusal to countenance a change in the 
Governor’s living quarters displayed a degree of stubbornness and distraction 
in the context of economic and industrial strife in 1973, which was a prelude 
to the ‘worst economic crisis since the war’.182 However, the correspondence 
also reveals the extent of deferral to the UBP that even Heath felt necessary in 
a matter that directly affected the security and image of the British 
government representative in Bermuda.  
 
The murder of the Governor was a cold-blooded and brutally symbolic act that 
spoke to the way in which both colonial and racial grievances had combined 
and been supercharged at an international level. The UBP had not taken bold 
steps to tackle the legacies of this segregation. Nor did the rigged political 
system inspire any confidence. Rather, these omissions and legacies left 
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divisions to fester and widen. Far from simply being a matter of institutions 
and documents, democracy’s most significant asset is both the experience and 
expectation of a steady and peaceful transfer of power. This was not to come 
about until the PLP victory in 1998.  The next chapter will detail the way in 
which the UBP continued to carve out its role at the level of high politics and 
in the trappings of power. Its denial of racial legacies, and refusal to address 
them, would undermine both the UBP leadership and Bermuda’s wider social 
stability. In this atmosphere, political change, and UBP agenda-setting, would 
lead to something of a crisis of confidence surrounding the office of Governor, 
to be discussed in chapters five and six. 
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Chapter Four 
Electoral success, the creation of the office of Premier 
and racial dissension within the UBP, December 1971 
- August 1977 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The first three chapters of this thesis showed how two linked processes played 
out between 1963 and the early 1970s. Firstly, the process of Bermudian 
constitutional change produced a situation in which Britain’s ability to set 
agendas on the ground was curtailed. This process gathered pace in part 
because reform was based upon particular ‘kith-and-kin’-oriented ideas about 
Bermuda, channeled via ‘acceptable’ voices such as Tucker, and refracted 
through Martonmere’s political bias. As Acting Governor Ian Kinnear 
suggested in May 1973, the two packages of constitutional reform in 1968 and 
1973 had produced ‘an unsatisfactory situation which could become 
increasingly embarrassing to Her Majesty’s Government’.1  
 
The second process detailed in this thesis was rooted in the domestic political 
paradigm patrolled by the UBP. The UBP provides a new example of the forms 
that the denial of racial legacies could take. The party’s commitment to 
integration was initially branded as a challenge to the old order. Indeed its 
creation occurred in the context of a process of modernisation in the civil 
service. This, under the pressure of protest and civil disobedience, unpacked 
the extreme status quo of state-sanctioned apartheid.2  
 
However, as chapter two argued, the UBP also remained a product of 
oligarchical paternalism that aimed to deny history for short-term economic 
and political convenience. The UBP’s social panacea - ‘integration’ – may have 
been a genuine conviction on the part of some party figures. However it was 
also a tool for bolstering an image of ‘racial harmony’ conducive to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 IAC Kinnear to FCO, May 1, 1973, 63/1095. 
2 See for example, Statement by Tucker in the Bermuda House of Assembly, Integration of 
Primary Schools, January 29, 1971, BNA.   
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development of the island’s tourism industry.3 As this chapter will show, the 
unacknowledged demons of race came back to haunt the party’s unity in the 
1970s. 
 
The abuse of incumbency has been described as an ‘impediment to democratic 
consolidation’ which can enhance the ‘phenomenon of political 
godfatherism’.4 This chapter will argue that the UBP made full use of its 
incumbency by engineering constitutional change in a political way. The first 
process detailed above, by which the FCO lost the ability to set agendas in 
Bermuda, was accelerated by Richards’s enhancement of his party’s political 
position vis-à-vis Government House. This occurred not just with an election 
victory in 1972, but also with ‘partly symbolic’ constitutional reforms that took 
effect in April 1973.5 This introduction will suggest, firstly, that the UBP’s 
political incumbency was protected by features of the constitution that gave it 
an advantage during elections vis-à-vis the PLP. Secondly, it will examine the 
notion of leadership in majoritarian democracies.  
 
1.1. ‘A façade of democracy’?: In-built electoral advantages for 
the UBP and combined racial and colonial grievances 
 
The UBP’s political strategy between 1971 and 1977 involved the ‘co-option of 
the centre’ which reconstructed a ‘socially mixed but essentially conservative 
coalition’ both to institute some reforms while preserving the main elements 
of the status quo.6 Messaging emphasised the UBP government’s experience, 
along with ideas of prosperity and ‘racial harmony’.  
 
However, UBP incumbency also depended upon electoral advantages that had 
been written into the Bermuda constitution in 1968. Historian and journalist 
Ira Philip has called Bermuda’s electoral arena in this period a ‘façade of 
democracy’, in which the constitution was used as one of the ‘key instruments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Gazette, April 4 1968.  
4 Nwanegbo and Alumona, Incumbency Factor and Democratic Consolidation, 125-130. 
5 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 231. 
6 Manning, Bermudian Politics in Transition. 27.  
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of the containment policies of the oligarchs’.7 In the words of Browne-Evans: 
“Each vote doesn’t have equal value.”8 Philip charges that gerrymandered 
voting districts ‘guaranteed the Establishment at least 14 seats in the 40-seat 
House of Assembly’.9 However, Johnston and Payne argue that ‘neither party 
was either advantaged or disadvantaged by biases within the electoral 
system.10 What is more important for the purposes of this chapter, however, is 
the symbolic significance that these electoral inequalities would take on. 
 
The second more serious allegation involved the continued enfranchisement 
of Commonwealth citizens who had lived on the island for three years, which 
also brought cultural and racial questions – particularly about Bermuda’s 
place in a wider British network - into the heart of elections. Philip argues that 
a 5,743 increase in the foreign-born population between 1960 and 1970 meant 
that, in marginal constituencies ‘the balance of power [was] held by foreign-
born voters’ who were ‘largely white, British-born’ and had ‘a vested interest 
in maintaining the political status quo’.11  
 
It was claimed such voters overwhelmingly supported the UBP and helped 
bolster the party’s majority. However, Brown has convincingly argued that 
‘there is no justification in asserting that [the non-Bermudian vote] has 
decided which party comes to power’.12 However, although, it may not have 
been enough to put the PLP in power, the power of the Commonwealth Vote 
as a symbol of white power undermined the legitimacy of the ground on which 
elections were fought in the 1970s.  
 
Meanwhile, the UBP had already used its incumbency to tip the demographic 
scales to their advantage. As the Royal Commission Report of 1978 noted, 
between 1960 and 1970, the ‘relatively slow growth of the black population 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Philip, Freedom Fighters, 241-242. 
8 Mid-Ocean News, June 3, 1972. 
9 Philip, Freedom Fighters, 241-242. 
10 Johnston and Payne, Electoral Reform in Bermuda, 217. 
11 Philip, Freedom Fighters, 243. 
12 Brown, Race and Party Politics, 115. 
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arose from natural increase, while ‘the faster growth of the white population 
stemmed from highly selective immigration’.13 
 
While they may not have decided which party won elections in 1972 and 1976, 
however, such advantages probably enhanced the size of the UBP majority, 
while they acted as powerful reminders of the linkage between UBP 
incumbency, cultural colonialism and racist legacies. Late 1974 saw the 
creation of the UBP Black Caucus, a body that reflected an increasing 
disaffection amongst leading black members in the UBP.14 This group’s 
formation was inspired by the creation in the United States of the 
Congressional Black Caucus in 197115. As Burchall argues, UBP blacks ‘turned 
to black America for help and advice’, despite the fact that in America blacks 
were a ‘disadvantaged…minority group’ while in Bermuda they were the 
‘demographic majority’. It was a hint that UBP blacks ‘still felt controlled and 
powerless – as if they were still shackled and chained’.16 
 
Thus, constitutionally-inscribed electoral advantages enjoyed by the UBP were 
accompanied with dissatisfaction within the party amongst many leading 
black members. As this chapter will show, the resistance of the UBP 
leadership towards addressing such grievances would lead to a situation in 
which the UBP’s incumbency became associated with a feeling of alienation 
amongst black Bermudians in their own land.   
 
1.2. Enhanced Bermudian executive power 
 
In December 1971, when Tucker stepped down as Government Leader, and 
gave way to Richards, the position was not as powerful as it would become. 
The Governor, for example, still chaired the Executive Council.17 This would 
change following Richards’ accession, as he continued the process of reform 
that had begun under Tucker in 1971.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Pitt et al, Report…into the 1977 Disturbances, 19. 
14 Brown, Struggle for reform, 131. 
15 Miler, Constituency Motivations of Caucus Membership, 885-920. 
16 Burchall, Fine and Wine, 143. 
17 Record of conversation between Sharpe and Godber on May 27, 1971, 823. 
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Reforms that brought about the creation of the position of Premier in April 
1973 contained the potential to place the British Government at a distinct 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the elected Bermudian government. Firstly, because of 
the colonial connection, the prestige of leaders could be further entrenched by 
reforms that were agreed at the level of high politics thousands of miles from 
Bermuda. Secondly, the UBP was in a position to use constitutional tinkering 
in a political way that enhanced the ‘prestige’ of the UBP government for the 
domestic audience vis-à-vis Government House. Thirdly, however, these 
advantages could be reinforced or made a liability by a leader’s identity and 
style. While the creation of the position of Premier enhanced high political 
freedom of action it also made the job even more attractive to potential rivals. 
 
Firstly, the Westminster-model already gave the Government Leader 
considerable powers of patronage and also provided constitutional space in 
which to operate. It was characterised by five elements: concentration of 
power in a collective and responsible Cabinet, accountability of ministers to 
parliament, a constitutional bureaucracy with a non-partisan and expert civil 
service, an opposition acting as an executive-in-waiting and parliamentary 
sovereignty with its unity of the executive and legislature.18 As Bishop argues, 
the adaptation of the Westminster model to the Caribbean produced a system 
‘where leaders often hang on for eternities, shaping the state forcefully in 
accordance with their considerable powers of patronage’.19  
 
The diffuse nature of the British constitution also meant the proliferation of 
secret cabinet committees in which successive ministers could make key 
decisions away from the scrutiny of MPs or the public. The chapter argues that 
Bermudian political development was ensconced in this constitutional culture. 
A change in 1973 placed the Premier at the head of Executive Council, yet this 
person was also afforded a unique degree of freedom in which to discuss 
constitutional change and build relationships with FCO officials and 
politicians. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18Rhodes. And Weller, Westminster transplanted and Westminster implanted, 1–12; Bishop, 
Slaying the ‘Westmonster’?, 422. 
19 Bishop, Slaying the ‘Westmonster’?, 423. 
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Secondly, the Government Leader was also afforded a growing degree of 
political power and prestige in the view of Bermuda’s domestic electorate. 
This period saw high political office gain real meaning and gravity in 
Bermuda. This chapter follows Schumpeter’s leadership model of democracy, 
in which elections involve ‘not only the people choosing agents but also the 
people consenting to these elected individuals acting as a special type of 
agent’. The Prime Minister is someone whose actions provide the ‘personal 
touch’ to government but whose power is restricted by sub-leaders and in 
which ‘competition’ for leadership is a prime element. However, it also casts 
some leaders as possessing ‘extraneous’ or ‘undeserved’ competitive 
advantages.20  
 
Similar to the case of British Prime Ministers, Bermudian Government 
Leaders and Premiers could, following the 1968 and 1973 constitutional 
reforms, ‘achieve an above-parties leadership of public opinion’.21 The 
importance of incumbent political leadership in the UBP’s identity and style of 
governing and campaigning, was reinforced by institutional factors, such as 
the increase in parliamentary sovereignty, embodied in the creation of a 
‘Responsible Government’ model in 1968, in a ‘winner takes all’ system of 
majoritarian rule.22  
 
Finally, however, personalities, identities and management skills became a 
more integral part of governance as the position of Premier was enlarged. 
Richards’ accession as Government Leader was a major symbolic coup for the 
UBP since this was the first time a black person had taken the reins of top 
political leadership in Bermuda. However, leadership was a double-edged 
sword. This chapter argues that, while the UBP benefited from the focus on 
leadership under Richards, it became a victim of this very fact under John 
Sharpe, whose time as Premier was the start of a period of ‘poor leadership, 
political blunders and ineffective rule’.23  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Paul Brooker, Leadership in Democracy, 3-5. 
21 Brooker, Leadership in Democracy, 114. 
22 Daily Gleaner, (Jamaica), October 2, 2005.  
23 Brown, Struggle for reform, 132. 
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The creation of the Black Caucus epitomised and widened latent divisions 
based on personal animosities that, in August 1977, would lead to Sharpe’s 
ousting as Premier by members of his own party.24 Only 14 years after the 
inauguration of Bermudian party politics, the country witnessed a coup 
similar to Margaret Thatcher’s ousting in 1990, an event which signified the 
precariousness of her ideology as a political force and vulnerability of the 
office of Prime Minister.25 
 
This chapter will examine this period in two parts. The first part will cover Sir 
Edward Richards’ period in office from 1971 to 1975. It will begin by 
examining how the UBP combined its in-built advantages with a resonant 
political move to win the General Election of 1972 by a landslide. Secondly, it 
will show how constitutional reform was inspired by a political desire on the 
part of the UBP to counteract charges that they were being controlled by 
colonial puppet-masters in London. Richards and the UBP were able to use 
the secretive channels of high political constitutional debates with London to 
their advantage. 
 
The second part will examine the less successful Premiership of Sharpe. It will 
examine how Sharpe’s time as Premier was undermined by Bermuda’s less 
healthy economic performance. This occurred as disunity within the UBP 
burst into the open. The UBP’s in-fighting was in part an embodiment of the 
attempt of the Black Caucus to push the party into addressing racial legacies. 
However, factionalism was also founded in resentment towards Sharpe’s 
particular leadership style. 
 
2. The secretive ‘loner’ behind the new office of Premier: 
Sir Edward Trenton Richards 
 
The accession of Sir Edward Trenton Richards in December 1971 to the 
leadership of both the Government and the UBP was greeted by some as a 
harbinger of change. Arnold Francis, who had been one of the PLP’s first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid, 133-4. 
25 Alan Watkins, Conservative Coup, 31. 
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MCPs, noted: “If [the UBP] were prepared to have a black leader at that 
crucial time, they must be serious about desegregation and progress.”26 
However, Richards’ record as a reformer has been called into question. 
Richards’ biographer argues that ‘a great many people were soon 
disillusioned, for [Richards] did not move as quickly [at changing the status 
quo] as they had expected’.27 This was also the perception of political 
opponents. Arthur Hodgson, who took office in 1972 as PLP member of the 
Legislative Council, later judged Richards to be a ‘token’.28  
 
The UBP possessed two particular advantages during this period: political 
incumbency strengthened by ongoing electoral success and a shrewd, rather 
single-minded leader. Richards’ ‘conservative’ outlook meant he was more of 
an adaptive and managerial leader than an innovative or entrepreneurial one 
in terms of policy.29 However, the accession of a black man to the leadership 
of the country scored ‘a significant ideological victory in what can only be 
considered a deftly executed political move’ on the part of the UBP.30 Under 
Richards’ leadership, the UBP went on to win a landslide victory in the June 
1972 election, securing the party in power. Secondly, Richards was a bold and 
tough negotiator vis-à-vis the FCO in his battle to enhance the prestige of his 
leadership during constitutional reforms that took effect in April 1973. 
 
 
 
 
2.1. ‘David versus Goliath’: The UBP election campaign of 
June 1972 
 
The May 1968 election had been a three party contest, with the centrist 
Bermuda Democratic Party (BDP), led by Francis, taking 6.69 per cent of the 
vote, while independents had taken 2.34 per cent of the vote.31 In 1968, some 
19,123 people – or more than 91.4 per cent of registered voters – had cast 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 215. 
27 Ibid, 217. 
28 (Arthur) Hodgson interview, December 19, 2011. 
29 Brooker, Leadership in Democracy, 8; Richards discusses the legacy of his Premiership in 
Sun, January 3, 1976. 
30 Brown, Race and Party Politics, 117.  
31 Sun, June 8, 1972. 
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37,688 ballots (for two candidates in each seat) in 20 constituencies. In that 
election the UBP had won 30 seats (and 56.6 per cent of the vote) and the PLP 
10 seats (and 34.37 per cent of the vote).32 The first past the post system 
meant the BDP went away with no seats and shortly afterwards disbanded.   
 
On June 7, 1972 the UBP would virtually replicate this victory. Why did the 
white-controlled UBP win so decisively in a majority black country? As the 
introduction suggested, the electoral system, particularly the influence of the 
Commonwealth citizens’ vote, favoured the UBP. In an interview with the 
Bermuda Recorder, Browne-Evans ‘laid the blame’ for the PLP defeat partly 
‘upon the (UBP’s) gerrymandering of the electoral districts’.33 However, as the 
introduction argued, UBP incumbency was not solely dependent upon these 
advantages. 
 
 
Figure 19: Progressive Labour Party Leader Lois Browne-Evans (1968-1972 and 1976 -1985). 
© Bermuda National Archives, from Barbara Harries Hunter, The People of Bermuda: 
Beyond the Crossroads, (Toronto, 1993). 
 
 
 
This was because the UBP also won its large majority as a result of superiority 
of organisation and message. In the first week of April 1972, a new ‘American-
style primary’ process for selecting constituency candidates was launched. In 
19 of the 20 constituencies, adoption meetings were spread out over three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid.  
33 Recorder, June 8, 1972. 
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weeks in late April and early May.34 At one meeting on May 2, to adopt 
candidates for Paget East, 500 members turned up.35 A newspaper reported 
that the system helped to increase party membership ‘from 100 to over 2,500 
in a matter of months’.36 On May 4, 250 activists attended a ‘clinic’ to learn 
the techniques of canvassing. At a meeting on May 12, hundreds of leading 
activists were given an in-depth briefing on the party’s manifesto 
commitments on constitutional reform.37   
 
In addition, due to its connections to business and the oligarchy, the UBP was 
also better-funded than the PLP. The party used the same public relations 
firm from Canada that they had used for the 1968 election.38 The PLP 
meanwhile was using a local firm of advertisers run by Bermudian public 
relations consultant Alex Scott. By the second week of May the UBP platform 
had been printed and large amounts of advertising had been booked.39 As 
Scott said in 2011:  
 
We were donating our services to the PLP while the UBP was 
spending hundreds of thousands of dollars bringing in the talent. 
It was a David and Goliath battle.40 
 
In a first for Bermuda, the UBP made use of a computer to ‘help it decide 
where it should apply its full canvassing strength and at which section of the 
community it should aim its election propaganda’.41 Arthur Hodgson noted: “I 
remember the 1972 campaign in particular. I was running the [PLP] 
campaign. We spent $10,000 in ‘72 and the UBP spent $100,000.”42 A glance 
at the issues of the weekly, black-owned Bermuda Recorder newspaper for the 
three weeks before the election reveals a total of only two advertisements for 
the PLP and eight advertisements for the UBP. Browne-Evans countered by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Gazette, May 5, 1972. 
35 Ibid, May 3, 1972. 
36 Op. cit., May 5, 1972 
37 Op. cit., May 12, 1972 
38 Op. cit., May 5, 1972. 
39 Op. cit., May 6, 1972. 
40 Scott interview, December 20, 2011. 
41 Gazette, May 16, 1972. 
42 (Arthur) Hodgson interview, December 19, 2011. 
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urging people ‘not to be fooled by all these glossy pamphlets’.43 The disparity 
in the conservative Royal Gazette is even more stark. 
 
According to real-estate magnate John Swan, who was elected in June 1972, 
‘the UBP was controlled by whites’.44 But, following on from the accession of 
Richards, the party made another move to reinforce its image as a multi-racial 
party by June 1972. Tucker had indicated his desire to retire both as 
Government Leader and as an MCP in early December 1971. He picked the 36-
year-old John Swan as his successor to become representative for his safe, 
overwhelmingly white Paget East seat. According to Swan: 
 
[Tucker] said to me ‘Bermuda has been very good to you….you 
obviously will make an equal contribution in politics as you have 
done in your business so I would like you to run for my seat’.45 
 
Swan topped the polls in a UBP primary in Paget East in May, beating 
incumbent MCP DeForest Trimingham into second place.46 Meanwhile, on 
December 30 1971, Richards had been elected leader of both the government 
and the United Bermuda Party by a unanimous vote by his fellow MPs. 
Overnight, the UBP had placed one of Bermuda’s foremost parliamentary 
campaigners against segregation, one of Eva Hodgson’s Second Class Citizens, 
First Class Men, at the head of the white oligarchy’s political arm.47 
 
Finally, the UBP was running both on a record and on a vision, held together 
by a clear, if somewhat utopian, brand: ‘The United Way’. Adverts pointed to 
achievements in the past four years such as free hospitalisation for children.48 
This strategy paid electoral dividends. The UBP secured 19 per cent of the 
black vote in 1972.49  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Gazette, June 2, 1972. 
44 Swan interview, August 9, 2011. 
45 Ibid.  
46 The results were: John Swan 250, DeForest Trimingham 234, Harry Cox 217, Richard 
Pearman 116, Commander Geoffrey Kitson, 74. Gazette, May 3, 1972. A few days later, PLP 
leader Lois Browne-Evans said the UBP was trying to ‘prove a point by having a black man 
(Swan) top the poll’. Gazette, May 6, 1972. However, Browne Evans also said Swan had been 
chosen by the UBP because the party had said:  ‘This is a good Negro, vote for him.” Recorder, 
June 8, 1972. 
47 Hodgson, Second Class Citizens, First Class Men.  
48 Gazette, June 1, 1972. 
49 Manning, Politics in Transition, 199. 
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UBP literature and press advertisements were generally positive, although 
attacks on the PLP were reserved for firebrand speeches at public meetings, 
where candidates accused the PLP of being, for instance, a party of sectional 
trade union interests that was overpromising with ‘rotten carrots’.50 In 
contrast a full-page advert entitled ‘Bermuda on the move together – The 
United Way’ showed a black and a white worker in hardhats conferring over 
blueprints. Key phrases were: “A better quality of life - A stable cooperative 
society – a buoyant economy– promises kept the United Way – a reason to 
continue the United Way.”51 At its final rally at Hamilton’s Rosebank Theatre 
on June 6, activists were shown a film called ‘Look around you’, extolling the 
party’s record since 1968.52 At the final rally, Richards attacked the PLP as a 
threat to ‘peace and plenty’, warning people not to vote for the PLP, the party 
of ‘violence and destruction’.53  
 
On June 7, 1972, the UBP won thirty seats to the PLP’s ten.54 The vote share of 
the UBP with 61.3 per cent and the PLP with 38.7 per cent, reflected the fact 
that the nine percent of votes that had previously gone to the BDP and 
independent candidates, now split almost evenly between the two main 
parties. Of these votes, about 4.7 per cent went to candidates from Richards’ 
party and 4.3 per cent to Browne-Evans’ party.55  
 
The story of the 1972 election suggests a starkly uneven electoral playing field 
that the UBP exploited to the full. Added to this, a combination of financial 
and organisational advantages and a clear message built on a record of 
relative prosperity and a symbolic shift in leadership helped the UBP win a 
landslide victory. This would leave the UBP in a position to consolidate the 
constitutional position of the local government vis-à-vis Government House, a 
project it had embarked on in late 1970 but which Richards now took to with 
single-mindedness. The next section will suggest, however, that despite his 	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51 Ibid, May 1972 
52 Op. cit, June 1, 1972.  
53 Op. cit, June 7, 1972 
54 Ibid. 
55 Op. cit.  
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electoral success, Richards was still subject to pressures from the oligarchy in 
resisting moves by more liberal British officials to foist on Bermuda a 
Ministerial Code of Conduct, which would guard against conflicts of interest in 
office. 
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Figure 20: Sir ET Richards, UBP 1972 General Election Manifesto.  
© United Bermuda Party 1972 General Election Manifesto,  
From the private papers of JC (Kit) Astwood 
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Figure 21: The front and back pages of the United Bermuda Party  
General Election manifesto, June 1972. © United Bermuda Party 1972 General 
Election Manifesto, from the private papers of JC (Kit) Astwood 
 
 
 
 
	   196	  
 
2.2. An Anglo-Bermudian culture of secrecy and Bermuda’s 
‘sinister… white knights’: The debate over the Ministerial 
Code of Conduct 
 
As has been suggested, because of its size and the number of different 
positions of influence held by elected politicians such as Tucker, the potential 
for conflicts of interest was significant. As well as heading the Bank of 
Bermuda, Tucker had held directorships on the Bermuda Drug Company, 
Bermuda Aviation Services, Bermuda Fire and Marine Insurance ‘and many 
others’.56 This was also true of Richards, who before becoming Government 
Leader had been simultaneously the member for Immigration and Labour, 
Deputy Government Leader, Senior Vice President of the Bermuda Football 
Association, Chair of the Berkeley Educational Society and a director on the 
boards of the Bermuda Sun newspaper, the Union Printery, the Dismont 
Robinson liquor company, Capital Broadcasting, the Bank of Bermuda, the 
Bermuda Telephone Company and Radio Cabs Ltd.57  
 
It was clear, however that FCO support for the introduction of a Ministerial 
Code of Conduct to guard against such conflicts was propelled not by wariness 
of the white oligarchy but by fear of the PLP alternative. On his trip to 
Bermuda in early 1971, Posnett had spoken to several members of both parties 
and found mixed views on whether ministers should be part or full-time. One 
UBP Executive Council member, he said, ‘took the view that the issue was too 
important for compromise, that a full ministerial system must be introduced’. 
Posnett added that the UBP parliamentarian ‘thought it vital that the system 
should be hanged under the present regime before another, perhaps less 
scrupulous, Government could be elected’.58  
 
In another memorandum of April that year, however, another official took a 
different view, arguing that, although Bermuda required ‘checks and balances’ 
to prevent corruption, the lessons of white minority corruption in the 	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57 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 201. 
58 Memorandum by Posnett, April 20, 1971, 823. 
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Bahamas should not be transferred too uniformly to Bermuda. In the 
document, the FCO’s Overseas Labour Adviser (OLA) G Foggon wrote:  
 
Bay Street [in the Bahamas] and Front Street have a slightly 
sinister sound and are very often linked together but my own belief 
is that Bermuda has been more fortunate than the Bahamas in the 
quality and probity of its ‘white knights’.59  
 
However, by October 1971 the FCO indicated that the idea of a Code of 
Conduct was not something it was ‘prepared to dispense with’, especially 
‘should some other party form a future government in Bermuda.60 FCO 
officials started pushing Bermuda along such lines. Scott wrote hopefully in a 
telegram to Martonmere in April 1971:  
 
No doubt, [the Government] will be making proposals for members 
to become full-time and relinquish their private and professional 
interests. I would assure you that we would give every support to 
such reforms.61 
 
Finally, the matter was laid down to the Bermuda Government as a type of 
quid pro quo for the wider package of April 1973 reforms in an August 1972 
telegram from Home. As the Foreign Secretary told Richards, the change of 
style of ‘Member’ to ‘Minister’ would be ‘acceptable’ provided that ‘as is 
customary in such circumstances a Code of Ministerial Conduct was also 
introduced’.62 In October, Richards wrote back to London that the code would 
‘be made public on some suitable occasion’. He added: "At that time the code 
will also be supplied to Ministers for their observance.”63 
 
However, by February 1973, Sir Edward had changed his mind, noting in a 
memorandum that ‘the code should not be published’. The reason, he wrote, 
was that ‘the document might well be used in attempts to make political 
capital out of alleged breaches of the code, either in the past or in the future’. 
Richards continued:  
 
I propose therefore that, instead of publishing the code, a copy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Foggon to Posnett from, April 30, 1971, ibid. 
60 D Blain, Dependent Territories General Department, to Mr. Powell, October 11, 1971, op. cit. 
61 Scott to Martonmere (circa April 1971), op. cit. 
62 Home to Martonere, August 16, 1972, BNA. 
63 ExCo memorandum 458/72, October 27, 1972, ibid. 
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should be sent, as a matter of routine, under confidential cover, to 
each minister as and when he takes office.64 
 
Richards seemed to believe that the Ministerial Code of Conduct would be 
effective even if ministers were not subjected to it under the public spotlight. 
This suggests that he had either bought into the oligarchical realities of UBP 
rule or that he felt constrained by some colleagues’ resistance to reform. A 
Ministerial Code of Conduct may have represented too much of a change for 
the bulk of leading UBP politicians who also had private concerns and were 
able to successfully merge the two jobs into a profitable enterprise. As a UBP 
member of the Executive Council told Posnett:  
 
Even present members who were above reproach inevitably 
obtained some advantage in their private business arising 
from their membership of the Executive Council.65 
 
It could be argued that this episode points to the residual power of the 
oligarchy behind the UBP curtains. The episode may also reveal something of 
the secretive nature of Richards. This was a trait also pointed to by Leather 
shortly after Richards’ resignation. Leather wrote to London that Richards 
had a ‘passion’ for ‘playing his cards close to his chest’.66  
 
It is unclear when the Ministerial Code of Conduct was finally made public in 
Bermuda. By June 2012 it had been published.67 However, it should be added 
that in attempting to keep the code secret, Richards was doing no worse than 
Bermuda’s colonial rulers in London. The Code of Conduct for UK ministers, 
contained in the document “Questions of Procedure for Ministers”, was only 
revealed to the public in 1992 following an Open Government initiative by the 
Prime Minister John Major’. It was not until after the Nolan Committee in 
1995 that a full Ministerial Code of Conduct was published (in June 2001).68  	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65 Memorandum by Posnett, April 20, 1971, 823. 
66 Leather, Annual Report for 1975, FCO 63/1411, TNA. 
67 Bermuda Government, Ministerial Code of Conduct, June 2012. 
68 UK Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code of Conduct, May 2010. 
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2.3 ‘Improving our status, both at home and abroad’: 
Reforming the constitution, 1971-5 
 
The UBP’s negotiation of constitutional reform between 1971 and 1975 led to 
several outcomes. Firstly, it led to an about turn by Britain’s Foreign 
Secretary, Home, whose reluctance to contemplate major change was 
gradually worn down by Richards. Secondly, Richards’ single-mindedness 
revealed him to be shrewd and stubborn, but also suggested he was keen on 
enhancing the status of Premier for both political and personal reasons. 
Finally, this process revealed Richards beginning to bypass the traditional 
mediator of Government House and form relationships with FCO officials 
himself.  
 
Throughout 1971, a UBP caucus committee had been preparing a raft of 
proposed constitutional changes. The first of these included the suggestion 
that the Government Leader, not the Governor, should preside over the 
Executive Council (soon to be renamed Cabinet) meetings. The second was 
that Britain should ‘formally consult’ with the Bermuda government over key 
appointments, in particular over the process of appointing the Governor.69 
Bermudian ministers did not feel they had been consulted enough over 
Martonmere’s appointment in 1964.70 Meanwhile, at a key meeting between 
Bermudian officials and FCO bureaucrats and Godber, Sharpe noted:  
 
The Governor’s continuing to preside over Executive Council has 
been used by the Opposition to exemplify the continuance of 
colonialism in Bermuda. These opposition charges had made 
some impact within the community.71 
 
In January 1972, weeks after Richards took office, he endorsed before the 
Executive Council the report written by Sharpe for the UBP’s caucus 
committee on constitutional reform. Sharpe had also suggested changing the 
names of the Executive Council to the ‘Cabinet’, and Members of the Colonial 
Parliament (MCPs) to Members of Parliament (MPs). Sharpe added he hoped 
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the changes would ‘improve our image and “status” both at home and 
abroad’.72  
 
As chapter three argued, the UBP aimed to use constitutional change in a 
political way to shore up its support. The changes that were eventually put 
into effect in April 1973 were not a foregone conclusion however. The British 
Government was resistant to the idea of being pushed further, given that the 
1968 constitution was ‘the furthest advance possible for a territory that has 
not yet declared its wish to proceed to early independence’.73 Roberts believed 
Sharpe’s proposals were ‘open to objection on the grounds that they involve 
the erosion of present powers and the position of the Governor’.74  
 
Scepticism about constitutional advance was reinforced by political bias. 
Kinnear pointed to a view amongst some British officials that ‘the opposition 
PLP would be unable to produce a government of the same calibre as the 
UBP.75 Because of this clear bias, Richards as UBP Government Leader was in 
a strong position to argue his case. Yet Home indicated in an August 1972 
telegram that the changes ‘would be difficult for [the British Government] to 
accept’ and formal consultation over key appointments would ‘not be 
possible’.76  
 
That both Richards and Sharpe invested so much into it was partly due to the 
political reasons above. Yet there was also a desire to consolidate the position 
of Government Leader into something more prestigious and powerful. 
Perhaps this was something Richards felt particularly keenly, given that he 
was constrained not just by the colonial bureaucracy from above, but also by 
the oligarchy on his right and the PLP on his left.  
 
The requested change of name from Government Leader to Premier in April 
1973 was indicative of this. This was being pushed by officials in the FCO such 
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as the UBP’s British constitutional adviser McPetrie. However, the idea was 
contested by Posnett in London, who argued that the change of title from the 
Government Leader to Premier was not ‘orthodox’. The title of Premier was 
only used in British Honduras out of the West Indian territories and there it 
had only been done ‘as a sop because the territory was in every other way 
ready and willing to go to independence’. Posnett suggested the title of Chief 
Minister be used instead, ‘unless or until Bermuda indicates that they wish to 
proceed to independence. They could then change to Prime Minister after a 
constitutional conference’.77 
 
The fact that Richards succeeded in having the title changed is indicative both 
of his negotiating skills and his desire for that title. Richards was ‘very jealous 
of his [own] position’, according to Leather.78 And in July 1974, FCO official 
MP Preston described Richards as a Colonial Premier who was ‘inclined’ to 
stand on his ‘dignity’ and made several requests to the FCO for ‘VIP treatment’ 
when he was travelling to and from London. During a visit earlier that year, 
for example, he had asked for the luxurious Alcock and Browne suite to be 
made available for him at London Airport ‘at the cost of £40 to the UK 
taxpayer’. ‘British Airways’ Monarch Lounge was apparently not good 
enough’, noted Preston sarcastically.79  
 
In the late summer of 1972, fresh from his election victory in June, Richards 
and the FCO went head to head on the key aim of removing the Governor as 
chair of the Executive Council and gaining a right of at least informal 
consultation over who the Governor would be. On arriving back in Bermuda, 
Richards told the Executive Council that Home had changed his mind. While 
the Premier would preside over the newly-named Cabinet, the Governor 
would preside over the new Governor’s Council, in which the Chief Secretary, 
the Attorney General, the Premier, Deputy Premier and ‘at least one other 
minister’ would be consulted on issues of internal security.80  
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Meanwhile, the FCO had also agreed to informally consult the UBP on the 
appointment of subsequent Governors. The changes, having been approved by 
the UK’s Privy Council, were put into effect on April 13, 1973. This process 
revealed Richards to have won the negotiation battle with Home, who had 
initially told Bermuda ‘it would not be possible’ for the Premier to chair the 
Cabinet. However, Home had completely reversed his position by September 
1972. Richards’ goal had been to entrench is own power, or in the words of his 
successor David Gibbons, ‘to try and build up the Premier’s position’.81  
 
A final round of constitutional negotiation, in the last half of 1975, this time 
over an abortive bid to pass control over the running the Police force, revealed 
something of the operating style of Richards.82 As the next chapter will show, 
the tenor of his trip was heavily influenced by the fact that both Richards and 
certain FCO bureaucrats had fallen out with Leather since the latter had 
become Governor in August 1973. Gibraltar and General Department official 
EG Lewis told FCO colleagues Leather was ‘persona non grata’ to Richards 
and his ministers and that ‘this view is also endorsed in this office’.83  
 
At the time of the trip in September 1975, Leather suggested Richards ‘had 
suddenly gone abroad once again without a word to anybody’.84 During 
Richards’ meeting in London on September 15, he complained to Sir Duncan 
Watson that ‘they had had problems working the present constitution 
particularly since the arrival of the present Governor’ and he ‘made clear that 
he would not wish the present Governor to remain after the end of his three 
years in mid-1976’. This meeting revealed Richards attempting to build 
relationships with the FCO over the Governor’s head.85 
 
A few months later, Leather would describe Richards as a ‘loner’: “On many 
occasions he did not even inform his cabinet of his endless constitutional 
talks.” Leather added that he ‘really believe[d] [Richards] refused to accept 
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that everything said on those occasions was immediately reported to me’. 86 In 
contrast to the friendly relations between Tucker and Martonmere, this was a 
time of triangular diplomacy between London, Government House and 
Richards, with the UBP attempting to gain an advantage vis-à-vis Leather. 
 
Richards was a secretive and controlling leader who enjoyed the cut and 
thrust of high politics. Leather had acknowledged, in a 1973 telegram to 
London, the ‘de facto’ reality that it was the ‘duty of the Governor…to enforce 
the law of Bermuda enacted by a democratically elected Government’.87 
Richards was maximising the space that the constitution provided him, 
essentially by-passing a Governor he did not get on with in order to conduct 
negotiations over reform with London directly. However, he may also have 
been maneuvering to enhance his position vis-à-vis the still powerful 
oligarchy. In addition, constitutional tinkering was believed by the UBP to 
have a political benefit in giving lie to the PLP charge that London was still 
running Bermuda’s affairs. 
 
3. ‘Too nice and too weak’: Sir John Sharpe and his ill-
fated Premiership, December 1975–August 1977 
 
Richards stood down from the leadership in December 1975. He did this in a 
typically secretive way, not revealing his intentions to his successor even to his 
deputy Sharpe until mid-September.88 By August, Leather was telling the FCO 
that the 54-year-old Sharpe was the ‘obvious successor’ to Richards, an 
‘outstanding politician and the anchor man of the present government’.89  
 
Born in Bermuda in 1921, Sharpe had gone to university in Canada. During 
World War Two, he had served with the Royal Canadian Air Force attached to 
the RAF in England. On returning to the island, he ‘started with a local firm of 
commission agents as dock checker and clerical assistant, then became 
salesman’, then personnel director and vice president of the company. He had 	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attended the 1966 Constitutional Conference and was awarded a CBE in 1972. 
Married to a Canadian with one son and one daughter, this former football 
and cricket player’s interests included reading and gardening.90  
 
Sharpe’s period in office was not a happy one, and his leadership style was 
resented by many of his colleagues. According to Gloria McPhee, the MP and 
Cabinet Minister who led the UBP Black Caucus from its creation in 1974 until 
its gradual disintegration in the late 1970s, ‘the deterioration in the leadership 
came about quickly’.91 Saul, who served under Sharpe as the Permanent 
Secretary for Finance, said he was ‘too nice and too weak’.92 Yet, no detailed 
work has been done to analyse why it was Sharpe was ousted or what this said 
about the UBP.  
 
This section suggests that debates within the UBP between 1975 and 1977 both 
reflected and exacerbated racial tensions in Bermuda on a wider scale. While 
the demands of the UBP Black Caucus were essentially ignored by Sharpe, as 
Richards had downplayed them before him, his leadership position became 
increasingly untenable as he showed he was not able to assert his will. 
Animosity towards him was increased by his mixture of micromanaging and 
indecisiveness. However, Sharpe was also the victim of a situation that had 
seen the position of Premier grow in stature since 1971. This undermined 
party unity by increasing the desire of fellow Cabinet ministers to get their 
hands on the job.   
 
3.1 The mask comes off: Racial tension within the UBP, 1974-
1976 
 
Racial divisions had been bubbling within the UBP since its inception. Blacks 
who had joined the party in the 1960s were conscious of the attack that they 
were being used by the white oligarchy. During Richards’ tenure, the UBP was 
riven from late 1974 onwards by the formation of a Black Caucus, consisting of 	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eight MPs and Legislative Council members. Although the group was revealed 
in a newspaper report in December 1974, it was not until spring 1975 that they 
submitted a report to Richards.93  
 
This document is remarkable for its candid analysis of Bermudian racial 
attitudes. “Many Bermudians are doubting the sincerity of the UBP and its 
proclaimed philosophy of racial partnership”. The report added that ‘too many 
black youths continue to give the letters the meaning ‘Used Black People.’ 
 
Even more revealing were the ‘stereotypes’ of black men in particular that 
signatories to the report suggested had been perpetuated by the Government’s 
actions:  
 
The road to the economic marketplace has been fraught with 
roadblocks…Therefore it has sometimes and still is more gratifying 
to stimulate and satisfy themselves e.g. illegitimacy and riots. 
[Anger and frustration of psychological deprivations have led to 
the stereotype of the virile black male].94 
 
The report called for an increased focus on increasing black representation 
within the party, increased focus on Bermudianisation of the workforce and 
on upward social mobility and education.  
 
On receiving the report, Richards appointed a committee of black and white 
MPs to study it.95 However, Richards was not publically in solidarity with the 
Black Caucus. On first being approached by McPhee about it, he said: “You 
don’t expect me to be a part of it do you?”. After being turned over to 
Richards’ deputy Sharpe for consideration by the UBP caucus, it was ‘flatly 
rejected’.96  
 
A second report, signed by seven of the ten black parliamentarians was 
submitted in January 1976. It specifically called for more black participation 
in party affairs; an increased focus on ‘a comprehensive, ‘racially-integrated’ 
educational program to ‘remove the excuse of whites who withdraw their 	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children from the public schools’; for a new economic development program, 
including a manpower survey, equal employment opportunities, a 
governmental agency with the power of enforcement a body to help small 
business; a program of action to ‘meet the problem of non-Bermudian 
workers’ and a strengthened Race Relations Council.97 McPhee was never 
informed whether this report was accepted by her colleagues.98 
 
Three changes were engendered by the formation of the UBP Black Caucus 
and their lobbying. Firstly, both the UBP leadership and Government House 
now at least had to acknowledge the presence of organised and public 
pressure from within its ranks to develop policy in a certain direction. It is 
clear that Sharpe, who took over from Richards as Premier in December 1975, 
was unimpressed by the Black Caucus’s demands. Yet they led, for instance, to 
an apparent policy shift in the 1976 General Election manifesto, which 
proposed reorganising the Ministry of Labour and Immigration into the 
Ministry of Human Resouces, Employment and Industry. As the Bermuda 
Sun noted in May 1976: “Follow-up proposals to the Black Caucus report are 
in the UBP manifesto”.99 This promise never seems to have been implemented 
however.  
 
Moreover, the force that the group was exerting on the UBP was noticed by 
Leather, who worried that what he understood as ‘strong pressure potentially 
for a black Premier’ by the Caucus might prevent the succession of his 
favoured candidate Sharpe into the office of UBP leader. In August that year, 
an FCO memorandum revealed that Leather told top officials: 
 
For some time [Sharpe] has been regarded as ‘heir apparent’, and 
the Governor regards his succession as in the best interests of 
Bermuda and [Her Majesty’s Government].100 
 
Secondly, the hostile reception that the caucus received within the party’s 
leadership structure added to the sense of grievance that animated the group 
as time went on between 1974 and 1977. This much could be seen from the 	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note in the first report that referred to ‘rumour-mongering, the downright lies 
and the refusal to believe our repeatedly stated aims’ that followed the 
submission of the first report.101  
 
Perhaps something of the establishment’s insouciance was indicated by 
Tucker when he told the Bermuda Sun in April 1976 that he thought the Black 
Caucus was ‘not a very serious matter’, yet symbolic of ‘a party that’s had a big 
majority for quite a long time’. Because of this, he actually suggested it might 
be a good thing if the UBP lost some seats in the upcoming election.102  
 
In fact the attitude of the establishment to the caucus was ruthless. Minister of 
Sports Lancelot Swan had joined the caucus but left it after only a few 
meetings ‘after being threatened with the loss of his portfolio’.103 And Black 
Caucus member (and Immigration and Labour Minister) Jim Woolridge 
alleged: “We had a Judas present in our midst, who conveyed everything that 
transpired to [Sharpe] and the white members of the party’.104  
 
There were more mixed noises coming out of the UBP as the election 
approached in May 1976. In January, Richards had said he believed the Black 
Caucus was ‘a healthy sign’ and ‘to the advantage of the UBP and the country 
as a whole’. Meanwhile, he told the public on the eve of the election that the 
second report had been ‘unanimously adopted by the regular caucus and by 
the party’s central executive and was now a valid document of the UBP’.105  
 
However, Stanley Ratteray would later reveal that the growing challenges to 
Sharpe’s leadership of the UBP were in part related to his handling of the 
second report in the early part of 1976. Sharpe’s treatment of the report, he 
said, ‘did not redound to the credit of the UBP. Nothing was done about it for 
too long… and Black Caucus members were discredited as a result’.106 
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The third sign of growing divisions within the UBP was a split along axes other 
than race. Some MPs, such as Lancelot Swan, had initially joined the Black 
Caucus and left. Some never joined at all, such as ET Richards and Quinton 
Edness, and one person, John Swan, joined but did not sign the reports when 
they were published. In fact, a line was left for Swan’s signature but it was left 
blank.107  Asked why he did not join the caucus in 2012, Edness said he 
thought Black Caucus’s goal ‘was legitimate but I didn’t agree with their 
method’: 
 
I never joined because my fights were always in the open caucus. 
There was always a threat in a political party that when you start 
forming little power bases it can lead to the destruction of [the] 
party.108 
 
Meanwhile, by the spring of 1976 there was also, according to a report in the 
Bermuda Sun, a ‘growing clique of rebel, predominantly white UBP MPs’ who 
were dissatisfied with Sharpe’s leadership.109 These factions were to coalesce 
into a larger Reform group by February 1977 that would oust Sharpe from the 
Premier’s office, in part due to his reluctance to accept the Black Caucus 
recommendations. As Ratteray said when the group resigned en masse from 
the Cabinet in February 1977: “The leader of the party has to bear 
responsibility for the handling of the [second Black Caucus] report.”110  
 
What is striking about Black Caucus and the party’s response to it is the chasm 
of difference between what was said in public and in private. In public, 
members of the group ‘denied that it constituted a breakaway group, and said 
that the aim was to further the party’s declared intent to unite Bermuda’.111 
Meanwhile, members of the oligarchical leadership, such as Tucker, told 
journalists he thought the group was a ‘constructive effort’.112 In private UBP 
meetings, however, ‘pandemonium broke loose’, and ‘whites became very 
antagonistic’. In the words of one witness, ‘it was an inquisition, demeaning 
and embarrassing, especially in light of the fact that we were trying to help the 	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UBP’.113 This suggested that the discussion of racial issues was still very much 
something done behind closed doors in conservative Bermuda.114 
  
The Black Caucus revealed that the vaunting UBP rhetoric of racial unity was 
not even believed by many of the party’s black MPs and most of its black 
Cabinet Ministers. This glimpse beneath the surface of the party highlights the 
extent to which it was felt, even during Richards’ premiership, that Tucker 
and the oligarchy still pulled the strings away from the limelight. However, as 
this section suggested, the Black Caucus episode of 1974-6 was just the 
opening to a period that saw the party split into various factions. By 1977, this 
squabbling would cost Sharpe his job as Premier. 
 
 
3.2 ‘A dissident faction’ with ‘no cause and no leader’: The 
ousting of Premier Jack Sharpe 
 
When the general election votes had been counted in the early hours of May 
19, 1976, it was clear that the UBP had won, but had been given a bloody nose 
by the electorate for the first time in its history. Its lead in the share of votes 
was nearly halved to 11.1 per cent, compared with a 22.6 lead from 1972. 
Although it had won 55.5 per cent of the vote (against the PLP’s 44.4 per cent) 
on a turnout 4.3 per cent lower than in 1972, it had lost four seats. Despite 
this, for the first time ever, the House of Assembly now had a majority of black 
faces, with 21 black MPs (13 in the PLP and eight in the UBP) compared to 19 
whites (18 in the UBP and one in the PLP).115 
 
Why had the UBP struggled this time in contrast to 1972? To start with the 
economy experienced a ‘slight recession’ in the summer of 1975; put another 
way the economy was ‘taking a breather after a long period of expansion’.116 A 
measure of how things had changed in two years can be seen by the fact that 
through 1973, although inflation continued at an annual rate of about ‘ten per 	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cent’, Bermuda had enjoyed a ‘state of overemployment’.117 Despite this, the 
completion of a number of major building projects towards the end of that 
year threatened to create some unemployment. During 1975, the 
unemployment rate climbed to over two per cent, although recovery started in 
September.118 By December 1975, Leather reported to London that the island’s 
inflation rate had been 4.5 per cent and its maximum rate of unemployment 
1.6 per cent.119 
 
1974 and 1975 had also been years of intense industrial action and momentous 
events in the justice system. For instance, in February 1975 garbage had 
accumulated and freight had gone unloaded as a public sector strike had 
virtually paralysed Bermuda on the eve of a visit to the island by Queen 
Elizabeth II.120 In the summer of 1976, meanwhile, the courts were about to 
try Burrows for the murders of Duckett, Sharples and Sayers. Racial 
animosities were bubbling within both of these events. The General Election 
held on May 18, 1976 exposed faultlines that would help contribute to the 
ousting of Sharpe just over a year later.  
 
This was partly because the election represented a moment in which the UBP 
found itself on the defensive. Two of its key claims – economic competence 
and unity based upon supposed ‘racial harmony’, had been shaken by events. 
First of all, inflation and unemployment during 1975 had dramatised 
frustrations about immigration and about the Commonwealth Vote, which the 
PLP attempted to channel. As PLP member Una Butler Joell said at a party 
rally in May 1976: “Often we feel like aliens in our own land.”121 Meanwhile, 
the attempt by the UBP Black Caucus to push the government into addressing 
the issue of race appeared to give lie to the image of the UBP as the 
embodiment of ‘racial harmony’. 
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Figure 22: The UBP platform published in the Bermuda Sun  
on May 1, 1976. © Bermuda Sun 
 
 
 
The forcing of Sharpe’s resignation also partly came about because of personal 
animosity towards him rooted in perceptions of his ‘liberalism’. It was also a 
result of his support for independence, an issue which could ‘split [the] party 
from top to bottom.122 More importantly, his management style was 
overbearing.  
 
The spark that revealed the rift was ironically a dispute between two of the 
UBP’s key liberal voices, Sharpe and Dr John Stubbs. Stubbs had released to 
the media the telex of a message from Sharpe that had asked him to resign 
from the Legislative Council.123 On February 14 1977, four Cabinet ministers 
and a parliamentary secretary resigned their posts, forcing a vote of no 
confidence in the Premier in the UBP caucus. Sharpe won this by 15 votes to 	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10.124 However, in March a special high-powered committee led by Tucker and 
Richards recommended to Sharpe that he ‘make way for a new Premier’ by 
December 1977.125 By August 18, he had already bowed to the inevitable and 
resigned ‘as a result of continuing pressure by dissidents’.126  His successor 
was the scion of a wealthy white family of Hamilton merchants, Finance 
Minister David Gibbons.  
 
The story of Sharpe’s ousting reveals the multifarious tensions at work in the 
UBP. The residual influence of the Black Caucus was present. In the view of 
the FCO in September 1977, a ‘major reason’ for the dissidents’ campaign 
against Sharpe was the belief that ‘a coloured Premier would present a better 
face in competing with the PLP.’127 And one of the key recommendations made 
by the high-powered committee in March was that the party implement new 
machinery for the election of officers, the effect of which would be to 
‘centralise authority’ with the object of ‘facilitating the participation of more 
able, young, black people - often now blocked by reactionary elements in the 
party at constituency level’.128   
 
Secondly, there is evidence that personal animosity to Sharpe had been 
brewing since before he even became Premier. For instance, FCO official PC 
Duff suggested that Sharpe believed resignations at the beginning of 1977 
were the result of the fact that ‘he had blocked two of them in a deal with First 
City National Bank when he was Minister of Finance’.129 
 
Thirdly, electoral performance may have been a significant factor. Dissidents 
blamed Sharpe for the loss of four seats at the General Election. Meanwhile, 
the UBP majority of 12 would soon be whittled down further by a UBP by-
election loss in Sandys North in early 1977, an event which added to the 
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pressure on Sharpe to resign.130 FCO West Indies and Atlantic Department 
official PC Duff wrote after his resignation that the UBP ‘party hierarchy 
blamed’ Sharpe for these losses.131 
 
Finally, unhappiness rooted in perceptions of Sharpe political ideology and his 
leadership style132 were suggested as reasons for his ousting. Following 
Sharpe’s resignation, Governor Sir Peter Ramsbotham noted that he had been 
forced out by his fellow MPs as a result of his ‘alleged indecision, and his 
liberalism’.133 Deputy Governor GP Lloyd said he believed Sharpe was ‘far too 
ready to bend with every breeze that blows’.134 Ministers and MPs had an even 
more scathing view. These were set out in a press release by McPhee in 
February, which accused Sharpe of ‘moving towards a dictatorial Premiership’ 
characterised by ‘indecisiveness’, ‘shortsightedness’, ‘playing off one person 
against another’ ‘continual interference’ and ‘being unable to take an overview 
of [the] task at hand’.135  
 
Dr Clarence Terceira revealed how, as Party Chairman, he had been forced to 
try and resolve the differences between Sharpe and  ‘four different factions’ in 
the UBP who were naming him as the reason for ‘legislation not going 
through’. One key grievance, Terceira revealed, was dissatisfaction with 
Sharpe’s taking the role of chairman of the caucus at the same time as being 
Premier.136 Woolridge backed this up, claiming he thought Sharpe had to go 
because he ‘began to interfere with decisions made by individual ministers’ 
and that Sharpe ‘took the attitude that it would be his way or the doorway’.137  
 
Even more revealing is the manner in which Leather viewed these leadership 
squabbles. When Leather wrote his final dispatch as Governor in April 1977, 	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Sharpe was still attempting to hold on to power.  His observations should be 
understood in light of the fact that Leather was one of Sharpe’s strongest 
supporters. Leather railed against the dissidents, Stubbs and Harry Viera, as 
‘dishonourable and unprincipled’, while expressing fears that as long as they 
remained in the UBP, it would be impossible to unite the party under any 
leader. He denounced the rest of the party’s MPs as ‘nice people but naïve 
people, all of whom want the Premier’s job’. He worried that the UBP’s 
divisions would lead to the PLP being the ‘beneficiary’. He suggested that the 
onslaught on Sharpe by a ‘dissident faction’ with ‘no cause and no leader’ 
suggested something of Bermuda’s political immaturity:   
 
In this very sophisticated, highly organised society the one thing 
which is new here is ‘party politics’. No more than a handful know 
the ground rules of the game, many do not even know there are 
rules.138 
 
Leather’s support was not enough to save Sharpe. By now Bermudian party 
politics had taken on a life of its own, independent of the colonial dimension. 
Sharpe’s ousting reveals something of the poisonous personal disputes that 
the creation and bolstering of the office of Premier had stoked from burning 
embers. This in-fighting was largely personal, with marriages of convenience 
between right-wingers such as Viera and liberals such as Stubbs. When 
Sharpe became Premier, disquiet about an unpopular colleague holding the 
levers of power combined with latent discontent founded in racial divisions. 
As a result, discontent burst into a rather public struggle for the leadership of 
the party. This was something that led to disquiet in Government House and 
at the FCO.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the period 1971 to 1977 witnessed the evolution 
of the domestic Bermudian political scene in two key ways. Firstly, 
constitutional reform occurred in the context of the secret space of the British 
constitution but in a manner that essentially left Britain at a disadvantage. 	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Secondly, UBP internal party politics revealed themselves to be crippled by 
the persistence of the oligarchy behind the scenes, racial divisions and 
personal factionalism that turned its fire on Sharpe. 
 
The 1972 election victory ascribed the UBP with newfound legitimacy which it 
then built on with a host of constitutional changes in April 1973. The way in 
which debates over the Ministerial Code of Conduct unfolded, however, 
revealed the persisting influence of the oligarchy. Richards decided to meet 
the FCO halfway in their demands, agreeing to distribute a Code of Conduct to 
his ministers but refusing to make it public. Like the process of constitutional 
change, this revealed a strong sensitivity to the political vulnerability of the 
UBP and its oligarchical image. Paradoxically, it also confirmed the power of 
this legacy, and vitiated any cleansing effect that the Code of Conduct might 
have had. 
 
The removal of the Governor as chair of the Executive Council in April 1973 
was a major victory for Richards vis-à-vis the FCO. Richards had, through his 
single-mindedness, overcome Home’s initial resistance. His new position as 
Premier gave him enhanced prestige both at home and in the meeting rooms 
of the FCO.  
 
However, these reforms confused decision-making in the area of internal 
security. This episode is redolent the Heath Government’s weakness of 
purpose in foreign policy, apart from in the European sphere. In fields such as 
Rhodesia, Home’s initiatives ‘came to nothing’, while there were also abortive 
contacts with France over nuclear cooperation.139 Indeed, ‘he was a reactive, 
not a creative Secretary of State’.140 Instead of clear and firm lines of 
negotiation in Bermudian constitutional reform, Home initially resisted and 
then gave into UBP demands, allowing ad-hoc reform with no coherence of 
purpose. Bermuda became an Associated State in all but name, with perhaps 
the largest degree of autonomy of any of Britain’s remaining territories. 
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The second way in which the Bermudian political scene evolved was the 
unmasking of the UBP on two of its key political branding strengths. The 
UBP’s election victory in 1972 had been ensured through a variety of in-built 
advantages, organisational superiority, a clear message and two deft political, 
if perhaps tokenistic, moves that symbolised a passing of the torch from 
Tucker to Richards and Swan. The election result was a personal triumph for 
Richards who then felt emboldened in his constitutional reform negotiations 
in London that September.  
 
However, the economy stalled in 1975, in the midst of the rise of world 
economic ‘stagflation’ and higher fuel costs and industrial action at home. 
This led Bermudians to question whether the UBP was as economically 
surefooted as its leaders boasted. Secondly, the founding of the UBP Black 
Caucus in 1974 suggested that the UBP’s claim to embody ‘racial harmony’  
was not	  as	  true	  as	  it	  may	  have	  originally	  appeared. 
 
The accession to office of Sharpe in December 1975 was also politically 
problematic. After the symbolic changing of the guard with Richards’ 
accession, the UBP now seemed to be moving backwards. Tucker still pulled 
the strings from the shadows. And Sharpe’s ascent to the newly padded-out 
job came at a time when racial tensions in the UBP were already being aired in 
public. Moreover, Sharpe was already unpopular with a number of his own 
ministers and MPs due to his actions as Finance Minister. Meanwhile, the fact 
that Sharpe was a proponent of independence may have also guaranteed him 
the bitter opposition of several of his party colleagues, especially Gibbons who 
was ardently opposed to independence. 
 
The UBP’s victory in the 1976 election did not save Sharpe from his ruthless 
colleagues. His ousting was the result of resentment at his leadership style and 
personal animosity. Finally, party opponents were hungry to hold the recently 
enhanced power of Premier themselves. Party politics in this individualistic 
culture was a new phenomenon and there was now a prize to be fought for.  
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This chapter has demonstrated how the complexities of the British role in 
Bermuda were gradually proliferating throughout the period 1971 to 1977. 
Leather did not just have to deal with a new and complex party political 
situation, combining internal party disunity with attacks from an increasingly 
emboldened opposition. He also had to deal with a changing and unclear 
constitutional setup.  
 
The next chapter will discuss the way in which Leather and the FCO 
responded to these shifts. It will suggest that the changing Bermudian political 
scene, and the increasing space afforded to Bermudian Premiers, made the 
exercise of the job of Governor increasingly problematic. However, Leather 
also made enemies within the Bermudian political establishment and at the 
FCO.  
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Chapter Five  
Ensuring ‘good government’ or ‘accelerated 
decolonisation’? Discussions over British ‘contingent 
liabilities’ and the paradoxical job of Governor, 1971-
1977 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter Four detailed a process whereby the UBP government gained 
confidence in dealing with the FCO and opted out of communicating with 
London via the cipher of Government House. Electoral success gave local 
ministers a new standing in FCO eyes and Richards took advantage of this. 
What remains to be understood is the way in which British personnel and 
institutions adapted to these rapidly evolving circumstances. This chapter 
suggests that the enhancement of the UBP’s political position was 
accompanied by an obfuscation of Britain’s role in Bermuda. This is revealed 
in debates over the job of Governor and the notion of ‘good government’. 
 
As an FCO brief in August 1975 suggested, until the 1960s, ‘the Governor’s 
role in Bermuda was pre-eminently that of a local leader of society’.1 This 
would begin to change, however as decolonisation acquired ‘a sense of 
inevitability’ during that decade.2 By 1965 the British government was ‘bent 
on liquidating the last remnants of colonialism’.3 While colonies remained, 
however, Britain was still understood by FCO bureaucrats to be responsible 
for ‘good government’.4 Such a commitment could be interpreted in different 
ways. In Martonmere’s eyes in 1971:  
 
The present [UBP] government was the best which Bermuda could 
get… a Government led by the likes of the present opposition would 
wreak havoc with Bermuda’s economic and social fabric, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Brief by EG Lewis, August 7, 1975, 86/340. 
2 Schreuder and Ward, Australia’s Empire, 389. 
3 Cox-Alomar, Britain’s Withdrawal from the Eastern Caribbean, 74 
4 FCO Brief, date and author unknown, mid-1975, FCO 63/1332, TNA.  
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[Britain] had a responsibility to see the continuation of good 
government.5 
 
This chapter will argue, however that such an interpretation of ‘good 
government’ was incorrect, since it implied a political bias and nullified 
Britain’s mediation role, implied by her legacy as an imperial power that had 
historically gained much from her dominion. It was, however, in the large 
amount of freedom granted to Governors for interpreting such notions that 
problems for Government House during period 1971-1977 lay. 
  
From 1967, the abortive experiment in Associated Statehood contributed to a 
British policy that was ‘arbitrary’ and lacked uniformity.6 Drower, Hintjens 
and Hodge and Taylor all point to problems of governance that arose as 
Britain attempted to reconcile pressure to grant autonomy to local 
governments whilst also retaining a certain degree of power to set agendas.7 
Overseeing a full and egalitarian transition to full democracy was Britain’s 
sacred responsibility after centuries of complicity in slavery and segregation. 
However, Bermuda should be treated as a case study of the way in which she 
failed to live up to this historical ‘trusteeship’ during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
This introduction will argue that there were three reasons British governance 
was incoherent in the 1970s. The first reason was that Bermuda was treated by 
some as a privileged case amongst British colonies. The economic dimension 
of British withdrawal from the Eastern Caribbean, which ‘played a seminal 
role throughout’, was not present in the case of Bermuda.8 The FCO believed 
there to be a ‘common Western interest in Bermuda’s prosperity and stability’, 
and Bermuda’s importance to the UK in particular derived from ‘her strategic 
position [e.g. as a staging post] and as a market for British goods 
[approximately £10.4 million in 1972]’.9 However, the management of her 
finances was understood by London to be ‘conservative and cautious’ and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Memorandum by Posnett, April 20, 1971, 823. 
6 Cox-Alomar, Britain’s Withdrawal..., 74. 
7 Drower, Fistful of Islands; Hintjens and Hodge, Governing unruliness; Taylor, British 
colonial policy in the Caribbean. 
8 Op. cit, 75. 
9 Brief by Lewis, August 7, 1975, 86/340. 
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island was ‘intensely proud that Bermuda had never received or asked for a 
penny of economic aid from anybody’.10 
 
As a result, while other islands were viewed as ‘shameless mendicants’ who 
were ‘always complaining loudly about the past’, and trying to make 
‘exorbitant demands for the future’, Bermuda was seen as self-sufficient.11 In 
the early 1990s, British territories received some £31 million in aid from the 
UK, but Bermuda as not one of them.12 Fiscal conservatism, combined with 
the domination of the UBP by whites, may have reassured the more 
reactionary elements at the FCO and Government House that what Frederic 
Bennett had called ‘mutual confidence and friendship’ remained secure.13  
 
While the benefits of being a British colony actually could mean something 
material (for example, in the case of aid for Montserrat14) or strategic (in the 
theoretical protection of the Falklands from Argentinian invasion), Bermuda 
is an example of the way in which the British colonial connection could take 
on something of a sentimentally comforting form for conservative Bermudians 
and occupants of Government House. The intangibility of this reality must 
have flummoxed officials such as Ted Rowlands, (Labour’s ‘Minister for 
Decolonisation’) as they attempted to push independence onto Bermuda from 
1974 until 1979.15 This gap in perceptions can be discerned throughout 
correspondence between Bermuda and London. 
 
Secondly, this was also a period during which Britain’s attentions were 
increasingly focusing on domestic difficulties, such as Northern Ireland, 
rampant inflation and labour confrontations. This was a period of ‘malaise’ 
and the ‘loss of a sense of purpose’ that became even more acute from October 
197316 until the public sector industrial action siege of the Winter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10Leather, Annual Report for 1973, February 7, 1974, 63/1220. 
11 Cox-Alomar, Britain’s Withdrawal..., 79. 
12 Drower, Fistful of Islands, xii. 
13 Hansard, June 19, 1967. 
14 Clegg and Gold, Decade of progress and prosperity?, 116-117. 
15 Drower, Fistful of Islands, 30. 
16 Sandbrook, State of Emergency, 12. 
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Discontent in 1978-1979.17 As one of Wilson’s senior advisers noted in his 
diary on September 1975: “This is the psychology of national decline ...That is 
why no economic plans will make any difference. The state of mind is that of a 
loser.”18  How this psychology affected Britain’s role in Bermuda is one of the 
topics of this chapter. 
 
In other areas it has been argued that far from encouraging stasis however, 
these problems helped crystallise a new way of understanding Britain’s 
identity.19 Lane has suggested the image of the Labour Government’s 
‘profound lack of confidence’ in foreign policy between 1974 and 1979 ‘owes 
more to the back-projection of Conservative Party hagiography’ than to 
reality. While there is some truth to the point that, for instance in Rhodesia, 
actions during the 1970s ‘laid the foundations for the foreign policy successes 
of the 1980s’, this is not true in Bermuda’s case.20 Foreign Secretary James 
Callaghan’s reinvigoration of the Anglo-American alliance and his occupation 
of the ‘middle ground’ in the Cold War came at the price of an unhealthy 
admiration of Henry Kissinger’s version of realpolitik, involving a sacrifice of 
principles for expediency.21 
 
Sharpe had already quizzed Conservative Minister of State Godber in 1971 
about whether Britain’s ‘closer involvement with Europe’ would lead to it ‘no 
longer desiring to maintain its responsibilities in Bermuda’.22 And as Leather 
revealed in 1973, ‘being thrown out of the Sterling Area was regarded ‘as 
betrayal by many of Britain’s best friends’ in Bermuda.23 As UBP politicians 
reacted to these changes by attempting to carve out a greater local leadership 
role, the question was whether the UK’s policy in the Caribbean dependencies 
would remain, as one Anguilla politician described it, ‘aggressively non-
interventionist’.24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Pimlott, Wilson, 671. 
18 Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, 499-500. 
19 Harrison, Finding a Role, 441. 
20 Lane, Foreign and Defence Policy, 154 and 166. 
21 During the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, for instance, Callaghan ‘left the running of policy to’ 
Kissinger ‘with disastrous results’, Hitchens and Kellner, Callaghan, 142. 
22 Record of meeting between UBP ministers and Godber in London, November 17, 1971, 823.  
23 Leather, Annual Report 1973, February 7, 1974, 63/1220. 
24 Hintjens, Alternatives to Independence, 41. 
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Thirdly, the nebulous job of Governor took on a new meaning, as the Premier 
gained the chair of the Cabinet from April 1973 onwards. Stephanie Williams 
argues that little has been written about Governors in the history of the British 
Empire, who often appear ‘as little more than ciphers [and are] remembered 
as founders or innovators or villains’.25 The period 1971-1977 saw Sharples 
murdered. His successor, Leather, was to experience a complete breakdown in 
his relationship with the Government Leader (and after April 1973, Premier). 
This breakdown in relations, over Leather’s ‘perceived interference in local 
affairs’, became a ‘serious political concern’.26  
 
Leather later pointed to two reasons for the turmoil. Firstly, he said, it was 
because ‘we were faced with a totally unprecedented situation’ of a breakdown 
of law and order. Secondly, he said, ‘we were subject to a constitution which 
was not designed to deal with such a problem’.27 This allusion to the failure of 
the constitution contrasts starkly with his assertion in early 1974 that the 1973 
constitutional amendments had made the system the ‘vastly more attuned to 
the realities of effective power’.28 More succinctly, as he wrote of the 
constitution in April 1977: “It works.”29 The apparent contradiction begs a 
question: Was it the man who failed Bermuda or was it the case that the 
constitution simply did ‘not, in itself, make for good government’ as Kinnear 
put it in May 1973 in the aftermath of Sharples’ assassination?30 
 
Although he records the breakdown of relations that occurred between 
Leather and Richards between 1973 and 1975, (JR) Williams does not make 
any suggestion about the effect this had on governance and leadership. This 
chapter will attempt to address this gap. As (Stephanie) Williams argues, “All 
(Governors) agreed that no one in London understood their jobs, or 
appreciated the difficulties they had to face”.31  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Williams, Running the Show, 2.  
26 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 259. 
27 Ibid, 260. 
28 Leather, Annual Review for 1973, April 7, 1974, 63/1220. 
29 Leather, Valedictory Dispatch, April 7, 1977, 44/1454. 
30 Kinnear to FCO, May 1, 1973, 63/1095. 
31 Williams, Running the Show, 10. 
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There were two problems. Firstly, there was the question of managing what 
Grocott calls a ‘careful balance of interests’ between Whitehall and the local 
‘community’.32 Was it a Governor’s role to lobby for British interests vis-à-vis 
Bermuda or vice versa? The 1973 constitutional reforms muddied these 
waters. Wiener suggests that, depending on the closeness of relations between 
a Governor and local politicians, officials at Government House could 
sometimes gang up with local political leaders against the metropole.33 This 
had also occurred in Kenya during the 1950s, as Governor Sir Philip Mitchell 
‘disappointed a rather impotent Colonial Office by always siding with the 
settlers in his racially restrictive view of Africans’. As a result, Mitchell was 
‘the unwitting architect of the unfolding loss of control’ that led to the Mau 
Mau rebellion and horrors of repression on the part of the colonial state.34 
Leather also seemed somewhat willing to read British interests through the 
kaleidoscope of settler-infused Bermuda, while this situation may have been 
exacerbated by the fact that he was a former Conservative politician operating 
in what he seemed to think was his own private little kingdom, thousands of 
miles from the Labour Foreign Secretaries (from February 1974 onwards) who 
were his bosses.  
 
The second problem, as this chapter will show, was that Leather was 
increasingly torn between his public and private roles in Bermuda itself. His 
public role involved a certain degree of political leadership. However, this was 
paralleled by a private, mediation role as a kind of ‘father confessor’ for the 
different political parties.35 The evidence suggests the rip-tide forces on both 
axes helped to confuse Leather. The three factors detailed above created a 
situation in which a debate was spurred over just what ‘good government’ 
implied.  
 
Firstly, this chapter will examine how Leather’s interpretation of the job of 
Governor threatened Government House’s relations both with the FCO and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Grocott, Good Soldier, but Maligned Governor, 421. 
33 Wiener, Empire on Trial, 109. 
34 Lewis, Nasty, Brutish and in shorts?, 210. 
35 Louis, British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 100. 
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UBP politicians. Meanwhile, his time in Bermuda also encouraged a view 
amongst UBP politicians that future occupants of the office should be more 
‘low key’. Secondly, this chapter will engage in a wider examination of British 
foreign policy, seen through the lens of discussions on Bermudian 
independence, begun by Premier Jack Sharpe in early 1976 but eagerly taken 
up by the FCO. Finally, this chapter will examine the way in which the FCO set 
about replacing Leather. It will be suggested that a mix of circumstances and 
mistakes, as well as the informal power of veto held by the Bermudian 
Premier, led to delays in the new appointment. As the next chapter will argue, 
these helped contribute to further problems in 1977. 
 
2. ‘If he did not muzzle himself, someone else would’: Sir 
Edwin Leather as Governor, July 1973 – April 1977 
 
This section will argue that Leather’s personal interpretation of his job helped 
lead to a deterioration in relations between Government House and UBP 
Ministers because he refused to keep quiet on matters that local politicians 
believed to be their responsibility. Secondly, and paradoxically, Leather also 
fell out with FCO personnel because he was believed to be insubordinate to 
the Foreign Secretary. Finally, his period in office also helped to expose what 
were some of the more latent contradictions in the role of Governor itself.  
 
Born in 1919 in Hamilton, Ontario, Sir Edwin Leather had served as a Captain 
in the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion in England and fought on D-Day. He 
wrote a manual, Combat Without Weapons, for the Home Guard. From 1950 
until 1964, he was the Conservative MP for North Somerset. A strong 
supporter of the European Community, he was a founder of the One Nation 
Tory group and a popular speaker at Conservative Party conferences.36 
According to David Owen, Foreign Secretary from 1977 to 1979, Leather was 
‘quite a character’:  “Everybody knew him. He used to be on Any Questions.”37 
Interviewed in the 1980s about why he had been chosen as Governor, Leather 
said he thought Heath had selected him ‘for three reasons’: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Daily Telegraph, April 6, 2005. 
37 Lord Owen interview, May 23, 2013. 
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I had a lot of experience in the post-colonial world. He [felt he] 
owed me something ‘after my voluntary service to the party’, and 
the British Government wanted to break the established mould of 
the type of Governor that came here – the British gentleman.38  
 
A few months after arriving, Leather wrote back to London a rosy report of the 
way in which he felt the constitution worked, much in contrast to Kinnear’s 
report just after the assassinations.  
 
Leather noted that, since he was no longer chairing the Cabinet he was ‘not in 
a position to influence the Government in any way’ in its discussions. Even 
though this idea seems odd, given that he was tasked with maintaining 
internal security, Leather noted that one positive effect of the reforms was an 
increase in consultation between Government House and ministers in 
Governor’s Council over matters of security, ‘which Ministers have, in the 
past, tended to regard as something unpleasant’.39 Despite this 
characteristically optimistic analysis40, Leather was brushing over the 
awkward fact that his responsibility for internal security necessarily led to his 
getting involved in political matters while maintaining both an even-handed 
neutrality and a clear appraisal of British interests. As will be shown, the FCO 
would, by 1975, express its view that Leather had misinterpreted his role. 
 
2.1 ‘Refusing to be a eunuch’: Leather ‘ruffles the feathers’ of 
UBP ministers 
 
UBP Finance Minister Jack Sharpe had noted in November 1970: 
 
It was clearly important that there should be mutual trust and a 
good working relationship between the two sides of government if 
the present constitution was to be made to work.41 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 249. 
39 Leather, Annual Review 1973, February 7, 1974, 63/1220. 
40 Following an incident of alleged police brutality against a youngster, for instance, the FCO 
were sceptical of Leather’s opinion on the ability and credibility of the Police Force. They 
suggested a visit by the FCO’s OPA MJ Macoun in October 1973 because ‘clearly things are not 
as rosy as this letter seems to indicate’. JC Philip to MP Preston, October 3, 1973, FCO 
64/1094, TNA.  
41 Minutes of the UBP committee on constitutional reform, November 10, 1970, 823. 
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Leather’s time of sharing power with Richards would see such hopes dashed, 
in part, because he seemed ambivalent about what his role in Bermuda was. 
On one hand, he recognised that constitutional changes in 1968 and 1973 
meant that ‘it is the Premier of Bermuda who has the power in his hands, not 
the Governor’.42 However, he also brought a paternalistically Greater British 
patriotic timbre to his new role. In 1974, he complained in a BBC interview 
that there had not been enough Royal visits to Bermuda, an accusation FCO 
personnel somewhat bitterly dismissed.43 Reporting on the visit of the Queen 
to Bermuda in July 1976, during which the Queen’s Jubilee Committee raised 
approximately $1,250,000, Leather glowingly suggested that ‘the best cement 
for British-Bermudian relations will continue to be Royal visits’.44  
 
 
 
Figure 23: Governor Sir Edwin Leather with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in  
Bermuda in 1975. © The Royal Gazette 
 
The difference between Richards and Leather was that while Richards was 
tasked with the public relations function of leading the nation politically, 
Leather was tasked with the political power and responsibility that it was now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Williams, Peaceful Warrior, 249. 
43 Interview of Leather by Chris Drake, BBC Today radio program, on April 11, 1974. FCO 
63/1221, TNA.  
44 Annual Report 1976, 44/1454. 
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understood should be exercised by the Governor’s office behind the scenes. 
Ominously, Leather also reported that Ministers were ‘extremely sensitive 
about what they regard[ed] as interference in matters reserved to the elected 
Government under the constitution’.45 This theme would crop up routinely 
and become more serious as Richards and Leather fell out. The breakdown in 
relations occurred because Leather was seen to be commenting and 
interfering in local politics. As a result of such perceived ‘interference’, PLP 
leader Walter Robinson brought a motion of censure against the Governor to 
the House of Assembly in August 1973, a month after Leather arrived, which 
the UBP voted down. 46  
 
Leather did not believe he should be quiet. Speaking at the Royal Air Forces 
Association (Bermuda) Battle of Britain anniversary dinner on September 16, 
1973, he told the audience:  
 
I can see the case for no Governor at all. What there is absolutely 
no case for is an eunuch Governor! And no responsible human 
being could expect me to be a mute Governor.47 
 
Quoting Churchill, Leather added: “The lessons of courage, of duty, of loyalty 
are just as important today as they were in 1940, even in this crisis-drenched 
age”.48 On April 11, 1974, Leather was interviewed by Bermuda’s union-funded 
newspaper Worker’s Voice. He suggested the island’s electoral system unfairly 
favoured the UBP. Richards saw this as a major trespass on the government’s 
prerogative under the 1968 constitution. Deputy Governor Lloyd wrote to 
London that Leather had ‘undoubted energy, enthusiasm and flair for public 
relations’ but added that these at times can ‘lead him to play an active and 
public part in affairs which local Ministers, rightly or wrongly, regard as their 
preserve’. He added that he expected ‘a few more ruffled ministerial feathers 
(and gubernatorial plumes)’.49 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Annual Report 1973, 63/1220. 
46 Gazette, August 1973; FCO 63/1227, TNA. 
47 Gazette, September 17, 1973. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Lloyd to MP Preston, May 7, 1974, 63/1227.  
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As the murder of Sharples showed, the job may have been seen and treated as 
a sinecure by politicians in London, but its potential for attracting violence 
and criticism in Bermuda was increased by the large amount of money that 
was spent on the Governor’s household and entertainment function. 
According to Pamela Sharples, the ‘minimum number of staff’ was seven 
living-in and five dailies’, although Martonmere had had 19 servants.50 Shortly 
before he was assassinated Sir Richard Sharples was verbally assailed in the 
House of Assembly for holding a ‘lavish’ birthday party for his dog Horsa. One 
MP said: “I’d like to know where the money for the dog food comes from.”51 It 
is not known whether Sharples spent taxpayers’ money on this party. The 
Governor’s salary, from April 1972, was $30,000 Bermuda dollars (or 
£12,500), but he also had a housekeeping and entertaining allowance of 
$22,000 (£9,100).52 By 1975, Leather seemed to be earning $33,750 per 
annum. And by 1977, the salary was down again to $31,477.48 and the 
housekeeping allowance was at $20,000.53  
 
During Leather’s time as Governor, however, housekeeping expenses 
rocketed. In part this was down to the fact that Government House was a 
turreted, Italianate ‘mansion’54, built in 1892, which Leather and his wife 
regarded as ‘the only suitable building in Bermuda’ to serve as Government 
House.55 By July 1975, following a change for the 1973/1974 financial year, it 
appeared that the Governor was spending an astounding $66,000 (or 
£28,374) per annum on housekeeping expenses and $13,200 (£5,675) on 
entertaining. This was far in excess of any other British territory, including 
Hong Kong. Although the Governor of Hong Kong, then Sir Murray 
MacLehose, earned more than Leather (£26,316 as against £14,509), he spent 
only £2,105 on household and entertaining combined.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Lady Sharples to Heath, April 6, 1973, 15/1313. 
51 Daily Express, March 12, 1973.  
52 JDB Shaw to Sir Duncan Watson, March 12, 1973, FCO 63/1102, TNA. 
53 Governor’s office, 1977/1978 estimates, FCO 44/1467, TNA.  
54 Daily Telegraph, March 12, 1973. 
55 Lloyd to NF Green, March 30, 1977, 44/1467.   
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Figure 24: Government House, on Langton Hill in Pembroke Parish. 
© Gordon Hireson, Kiwanis Club of Bermuda pictorial tribute to Sir Richard Sharples: 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief (Bermuda, 1973). 
 
It is revealing that the FCO believed that this expense was necessary because it 
was what Bermudians demanded. An FCO brief explained the cost away as 
being due to the ‘local cost of living and the style which the Governor has 
traditionally been expected to maintain’.56 As FCO official Nick Larmour 
noted in 1976, men with private incomes were often sought for the post of 
Governor ‘because the Governor’s pay and allowances bore little relationship 
to his high expenses in Bermuda’.57 Not all officials were happy with this 
degree of flummery, however. Kinnear described how he was ‘struck by the 
unreality of the traditional pomp and ceremony’58; something Leather later 
fondly described as ‘the unending social and ceremonial part’ of the job which 
accompanied the role.59  
 
Chapter five suggested that Leather’s controversial style, and the acrimonious 
relations between him and Richards, meant the latter began to appeal over his 
head to the FCO to complain about him. This was the beginning of a nexus of 
UBP-FCO relationship-building at the expense of Government House, 
marking out a shift in British-Bermudian relations over the period 1971-1977. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Brief by Lewis, August 7, 1975, 86/340. 
57 EN Larmour to FCO Private Secretary, July 21,1976, 73/347. 
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At a meeting in London with officials in December 1973, Richards was ‘very 
critical of the way the Governor sometimes rushes into action without 
apparently any thought’.60 On April 29, official MP Preston wrote to 
colleagues about Richards’ many complaints about Leather that he was ‘an 
impulsive talker, talked in the wrong places, and had upset a lot of people at 
first’.61  
 
This was part of a shift that saw the UBP becoming more confident in dealing 
with London. For instance, an FCO official noted in April 1974, only months 
after Leather arrived, that Richards had advised the Governor that ‘if he did 
not muzzle himself someone else would’.62 As the last chapter suggested, 
Richards began a tradition of UBP ministers ‘conduct[ing] his own external 
affairs’63; so much so that, by 1977, Leather believed that ‘as far as [the 
Governor’s] responsibility for ‘external affairs [was] concerned…[his successor 
could] virtually forget it’.64  
 
Most significantly, Leather’s unorthodox behaviour presented the UBP with 
an opportunity to express discontent about the constitution. In late 1975, 
Richards was conducting constitutional talks with London, without Leather’s 
knowledge, attempting to push the British into further constitutional 
concessions on the administration of the police. As Richards told the FCO on a 
visit to London in September, there had been ‘problems in working the 
present constitution particularly since the arrival of the present Governor’.65  
Thus, Leather’s behaviour was being used as a bargaining chip in a bid to 
demonstrate that the constitution needed to be reformed further on UBP 
terms. 
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2.2 ‘Putting the interests of Bermuda first’: Leather falls out 
with personnel at the FCO 
 
A breakdown in relations between FCO officials and Leather exacerbated the 
situation. Between immediately after his arrival in 1973 and late 1975, when 
Richards stood down as Premier, Leather was increasingly isolated. This was 
because the FCO was privately getting frustrated with Leather’s actions too. 
He had caused anger in March 1974 when he left Bermuda to visit 
Martonmere in the Bahamas without seeking permission from London. 
Considering whether they should rebuke him, FCO officials suggested that ‘in 
the special case of… Leather, who is somewhat impatient of regulations, it 
might be needlessly provocative to appear to chide him’.66  
 
However, another incident nearly brought matters to a head. Leather insisted 
on going to Tokyo to help launch a Bermuda-registered ship. The trip was 
funded by the shipping company, something that was against FCO 
regulations. When civil servants told Leather he must convince the Bermuda 
Government to fund the trip, he wrote back to say that this was ‘unjust, 
unreasonable and discriminatory’ and would create ‘acute political 
embarrassment to all concerned’.67  
 
By November 1974, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan had had enough. He 
asked when [Leather’s] appointment ‘could be terminated, on what terms he 
was appointed and what action would be need to be taken to bring his 
appointment to an end’. Political differences between Callaghan (Labour) and 
Leather (Conservative) may have played into this. Callaghan was told that it 
would be possible to remove him before the end of his term in office on July 
15, 1976, yet warned that removing him before that date ‘would present 
practical and more particularly political difficulties’.68  
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Meanwhile, Leather had also fallen out with civil servants at the FCO, 
especially Preston, then in charge of the Bermuda brief. A note from Preston 
suggesting to Leather that he was planning to be away from Bermuda for too 
long in the summer of 1975 led to Deputy Governor Peter Lloyd being rebuked 
for having informed London about his plans to travel to Canada, the UK and 
Jamaica to ‘to address Rotary international’, and take part in fishing and golf 
competitions.69 He wrote to Lloyd: “I regard this letter of Preston’s as officious 
and impertinent. I am not a civil servant… How long leave I take is a matter 
between me and the Premier.”70 For Preston this was the last straw. In a 
memorandum to colleagues he wrote: “I am afraid it is clear that [Leather] 
regards his allegiance to the Secretary of State as minimal”.71 This, as well as 
some other illuminating observations, was the gist of a letter by EN Larmour 
to colleagues on August 14, 1975:  
 
From the FCO point of view [Leather] has shown himself quite 
unaware of his responsibilities towards HMG and regards himself 
entirely as a Bermudian governor putting the interests of Bermuda 
first. He is energetic, full of sound ideas about race relations and 
gets around his parish. But he is a vain man.72 
 
These cross-cutting animosities played into the growing uncertainty visible 
both at Government House and the FCO over exactly what role Leather was 
expected to play in Bermuda. 
 
2.3 Walking ‘something of a tightrope’: Contradictions in the 
role of Governor 
 
Throughout 1975, several attempts were made to try and pin down definitions 
of the job of Bermuda Governor. An August 1975 brief by Gibraltar and 
General Department official EG Lewis noted that the Governor’s most 
important role was ‘acting as “father confessor”’ to Bermudian ministers, 
exerting influence ‘through wise counsel’ and ‘uniting the different 
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communities of the island’. This was an evocation of the Governor’s neutral 
role. 73  
 
Yet, Leather also had a political role, evidenced by his powers in ‘external 
affairs, defence, internal security and the police’.74 As deputy under-secretary 
at the FCO Sir Duncan Watson told Bermudian ministers in November 1975, 
the functions of Governor were ‘partly those of a constitutional monarch’ and 
‘partly those of an executive’, an amalgam which necessitated a ‘marrying of 
interests’.75 This is reflected in the view of a former Governor of Montserrat 
that the role was, in theory, ‘halfway to being a constitutional monarch, acting 
on the advice of Ministers in most matters and taking his own decisions in 
those areas reserved for him’.76  
 
The political power and influence given to Leather as Governor had been seen 
by him as part of a responsibility to help shape the development of the island, 
especially in the management of its external affairs. Yet, as Sharpe complained 
to the FCO in December 1976, the problem with having politicians appointed 
as Governor was that there was a tendency for them to ‘appear as though they 
[were] still running for office - engaged in a popularity contest even with the 
Government’.77 The implication, voiced by civil servant Anthony Galsworthy, 
was that someone ‘who was capable of keeping a low profile’ would be a better 
fit for Bermuda.78  
 
Yet, as will be made clear in the next chapter, the Governor still had powerful 
functions, for instance the power of life and death in the exercise of the 
prerogative of mercy and because of this was required to take views on 
matters. Leather’s personal political views were clear. He felt Sharpe’s 
accession as Premier following Richards’ resignation was ‘in the best interests 
of Bermuda’. He also felt that Browne-Evans, the leader of the PLP from 	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spring 1976, was someone who would ‘cross the line’ between ‘political 
opposition… and criminal activity… either without realising it or caring’.79 
Moreover, he felt that if the PLP won the 1976 General Election ‘[as seemed 
very unlikely]…he could not really see himself working with them’.80 This bias 
undermined the office of Governor, however, since the job was best 
interpreted as a neutral job of mediation that should be combined with a clear 
appraisal of British interests and responsibilities. 
 
Leather’s proclivity for prolixity in sensitive matters was not a harmless and 
forgivable problem. He crossed the line of negligence when he suggested both 
to the Daily Mail in December 1973 and to the BBC in April 1974 that the 
murderers of Sharples, Duckett, Sayers, Doe and Rego had been caught, 
before they had faced inquests or trials on the charges.81 The identity of those 
who had been caught was known throughout the island as the arrests had 
been reported in the local press. This was a gross betrayal of the defendants’ 
rights to a fair trial, enshrined in section six of the Bermuda Constitution 
1968. It may have prejudiced potential jury members in subsequent court 
proceedings. Richards was right when he complained to London that 
Leather’s actions could ‘cause considerable difficulty if the men were brought 
to trial’.82  
 
Trans-Atlantic complaints about Leather mounted so that by July 1975, 
Gibraltar and General Department official JS Champion was ‘proposing to 
recommend to’ the Dependent Territories Senior Appointments Board that 
Leather’s term of office ‘should not be renewed when it expires in July 1976’.83  
It is clear from the record that three officials in particular, Lewis, Larmour 
and Preston, were scheming for Leather’s removal. However, by September, 
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Leather had not yet been informed that he would not be able to serve for 
another four-year term as Martonmere had done. 
 
Watson was a ‘conservative, pipe-smoking Yorkshireman’ who served as the 
FCO’s ‘troubleshooter’. He described his mission as ‘the orderly and peaceful 
dissolution of our empire’ and believed that ‘Britain had the wisdom and the 
power to de-colonise skilfully, to foster democracy and free trade unions, 
and…block Moscow's ambitions’. Watson had been the FCO’s head of secret 
intelligence and security during the Mau Mau uprising and had arranged the 
Wilson-Smith talks on HMS Fearless in 1968.84  
 
Watson was called in to help ease Leather out of his job. He thought he might 
break the news of Leather’s firing to him when he visited Bermuda in October 
and November 1975.85 Before this, however, he arranged a meeting with 
Leather when the Governor was in London, in September 1975. The 
discussions the two had over lunch are revealing in showing how the job of 
Governor in an advanced territory was subject to widely differing 
interpretations, even within the FCO. Leather told Watson he felt his job was 
‘misunderstood’ by the FCO, describing the… 
 
…political impossibility of the Governor taking action which was in 
any way contrary to the view of Bermuda Ministers, even in 
matters for which he constitutionally retained special 
responsibilities.86 
 
Leather believed that because he was dependent on the Bermuda Government 
‘for supply’, he had ‘responsibility without power’.87 Watson meanwhile told 
Leather that his job was also to ‘represent the Secretary of State’. Walking the 
bridge between lobbying on behalf of London and ‘maintaining the confidence 
of his ministers’ would be difficult but, Watson said, ‘he was in a position to 
influence Ministers by persuasion on issues where a conflict of interests arose 
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between the two’.88 In a follow up letter, Watson said the job of Governor in a 
territory with a constitution as ‘advanced’ as that of Bermuda would always 
involve walking ‘something of a tightrope’.89  
 
By July 1976, Leather had been told the Bermuda Government had ‘refused to 
agree to his suggestion that his term be extended’, something that ‘was rather a 
blow’ for him.90 However, he was leaving the job at an unpropitious time, 
when Bermuda was grappling with issues of sentencing in the Duckett, 
Government House and Shopping Centre murders. Meanwhile, it was believed 
by the FCO that keeping local Ministers onside was particularly important. 
This was because, particularly following the election of the Labour 
Government in February 1974, FCO ministers were ‘seeking to encourage 
moves towards independence in [Britain’s] remaining territories… especially 
those such as Bermuda which [were] economically viable’.91 
 
3. Bending over backwards ‘in the British interest’: The 
FCO hopes to depart Bermuda with ‘indecent haste’  
 
FCO discussions about the prospect of Bermudian independence revealed that 
views of Britain’s role on the island evolved during the period 1971-1977. 
Whilst in the early 1970s, Britain was seen as having locus standi in 
Bermuda’s internal affairs, this view would change during the mid-1970s as 
the Labour Government brought in a policy of ‘accelerated decolonisation’. 
This policy would not last, however, and by 1977, ministers were beginning to 
believe that Britain’s interests would not necessarily be served by attempts to 
‘nudge’ Bermuda into independence. 
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3.1 The weakening of the commitment to ‘good government’, 
1971-1975 
 
On the one hand, some senior officials believed Britain’s role was ensuring 
‘good government’. As senior official Sir Leslie Monson wrote in a June 1972 
memorandum: “We must plan on the assumption that HMG will carry 
ultimate responsibility for good government for a prolonged period.”92 In 
Monson’s view the role of Governors would be ‘increasingly concerned with 
economic development and the improvement of services’. He added:  
 
The organisation of such activities, together with continuing 
responsibility for the civil service and for internal security is 
adding to the workload placed on the Governors themselves at an 
alarming rate. 93 
 
It is interesting that senior officials were speaking in such terms at this late 
stage of decolonisation. However, these comments should be seen in the 
context of decisions that had been made between 1970 and late 1971, when a 
study for halfway house solutions, similar to Associated Statehood, had been 
carried out ‘but scrapped’. From thereon, ‘the only choice available to most of 
Britain’s territories was between continuing dependence or outright 
independence’.94  
 
However, a change of government in 1974 would begin to move the emphasis 
at the FCO away from ideas of ‘good government’ and towards ‘accelerated 
decolonisation’. As one senior FCO civil servant would note of the Eastern 
Caribbean in 1978:  
 
It seems to me that we should terminate association with, if 
necessary, indecent haste and cease to have any responsibility for 
these islands before they blow up in our faces like a series of 
powder kegs.95  
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Documents throughout 1975 stated that Bermuda fell ‘into a group considered 
fit for accelerated decolonisation’.96 This was in part because Bermuda had 
met the tests for decolonisation, because she was ‘economically viable (with 
one of the world highest levels of GNP per head), [was] commercially 
sophisticated and [had] advanced to a Ministerial form of government’.97  
 
Britain had recently shown intransigence over moves by Bermuda to gain 
more control over decision-making in the areas of shipping and civil 
aviation.98 Although the suggestion was denied by Watson when he visited the 
island in November 1975, the perception amongst Bermudian ministers was 
that… 
 
…UK authorities deliberately made it difficult to make progress on 
matters such as civil aviation licensing and shipping manning 
standards in order to force Bermuda into independence.99 
 
In light of the consistent refusal to countenance Associated Statehood for 
Bermuda, it is important to speculate on the reason for this shift towards 
‘accelerated decolonisation’ in Bermuda’s case.100 The record of a meeting 
between Rowlands and Richards in London in November 1975 is insightful. 
Rowlands started off by reiterating that Britain was ‘encouraging the 
movement amongst our dependencies from internal self-government to 
independence’. He then elaborated on the reason for this:  
 
Because of the present constitutional position we were from time to 
time dragged into issues… in which we had no standing. People 
still considered that they could appeal to HMG as ultimately 
responsible even for Bermuda’s internal affairs.101 
 
This suggestion that Britain had ‘no standing’ in issues of ‘internal affairs’ was 
an unprecedented admission, indicating a shift of emphasis between the 	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Conservative Government and the Labour Government, and perhaps even 
between Labour ministers and their civil servants. In 1971, senior FCO official 
CG Mortlock had mentioned how the ‘maintenance of law and order’ was one 
aspect of the British government’s responsibilities for ‘good government’ in 
colonies.102 However, Rowlands’ view was the Britain should no longer be 
concerned with ‘good government’ or ‘internal affairs’. This difference of 
interpretation highlighted the ambiguity of Britain’s responsibilities in 
Bermuda, while it also highlighted the brief moment under Wilson between 
1974 and 1976 when the FCO was pushing Bermuda towards independence 
more forcefully than ever.  
 
As a result, the FCO would even attempt to stiffen the UBP’s resolve as Sharpe 
expressed his intention to begin an island-wide conversation on independence 
during his Premiership. As Preston noted in December 1975: “The Bermuda 
Government wish to be seen by their public as gaining from HMG a significant 
constitutional advance.”103 However, senior FCO bureaucrat HSH Stanley 
suggested to Sharpe that his government’s Green Paper on independence, 
published in July 1977, was ‘so unenthusiastic about independence as to 
convey an impression of hesitancy unworthy of his Government’.104 Stanley 
added that it was indicative of an ‘attitude of indecisive timidity’ that ‘may 
work against…our policy of encouraging Bermuda to go independent’.105 
Meanwhile, during a meeting between Sharpe and Rowlands on April 20, 
1977, Rowlands said the British Government was ‘anxious to give cover to the 
Bermudan (sic) Government against critics who were opposed to 
independence. This was in the British interest.”106  
 
Perhaps the British desire to be rid of Bermuda speaks to the gravity of the 
economic crisis then concerning ministers and officials in London. While 
Bermuda did not receive aid from London, there was always the danger that 
an internal security situation would require Britain to divert resources 
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towards sending troops there.107 In December 1974, Wilson had been warned 
by economist and Energy Minister Lord Balogh about ‘possible wholesale 
domestic liquidation [of the British economy] starting with a notable 
bankruptcy’. Adding that ‘the magnitude of this threat is quite incalculable’, he 
warned: “Should inflation accelerate further, a deep constitutional crisis can 
no longer be treated as fanciful speculation.”108 Despite this context, Wilson’s 
approach to ‘accelerated decolonisation’ may have been part of ‘the first 
hesitant beginnings of a renewed British engagement with the rest of the 
world’. Despite the undoubted need for such revisionism, however, it also 
seemed that Britain underplayed its focus on ‘principles of socialist 
internationalism’ when it came to its faltering and timid interaction with 
Bermuda’s oligarchy.109 
 
3.2 The sidelining of FCO concerns about Bermudian electoral 
iniquities, 1971-1977 
 
The effect of Labour’s new policy of ‘accelerated decolonisation’ seems to have 
led to the sidelining of FCO concerns about the iniquities in Bermuda’s 
electoral system. Reformers in Bermuda were arguing that the answer to 
problems of governance in Bermuda was not independence but constitutional 
reform. A PLP press release suggested in February 1976 that an independent 
Bermuda under the UBP would mean the ‘present structure of power’ 
remained ‘unchanged’, creating a situation in which ‘the only difference would 
be that the oligarchical powers would be absolute’.110  
 
What is striking, in answer to Lane’s rosy view of Labour’s period in office, is 
the extent to which previously-expressed concerns about electoral boundaries 
seem to have taken a back seat between 1971 and 1977. Previous chapters 
showed how between 1964 and 1972, Martonmere had resisted changes to the 
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PLP gaining power. At the time, Posnett had argued that Martonmere’s view 
was ‘wrong in democratic principles’ and ‘also liable to lead later to an even 
more violent swing to the other extreme when the swing comes’.111 The term 
‘violent’ was prescient, given the riots that broke out in 1977. Posnett was 
joined by Scott, who believed it was ‘in the long term interest of Bermuda that 
this problem be tackled firmly as soon as possible’.112  
 
A Boundaries Commission, headed by James S Duncan, was appointed in 
December 1971, yet, stacked as it was with two UBP appointees John Plowman 
and Jim Woolridge, and only one PLP representative, Arthur Hodgson, it 
made only minor changes and it was not tasked with addressing the main 
point about constituencies being straitjacketed by parish boundaries, nor with 
the more serious problem of Commonwealth citizens being given the right to 
vote after three years’ residence.113 This was despite the fact the FCO admitted 
in December 1977 that the votes of such people may ‘have been important in 
the marginal seats’ at the 1976 election.114  
 
Between 1971 and 1977, the issue of constituency boundaries seems to have 
virtually disappeared from the FCO radar. In 1975, a draft brief only alluded to 
an ‘understanding’ that the UBP government was ‘planning changes to the 
PLP advantage’. And in records of meetings between UK and Bermudian 
ministers the issue does not seem to have been raised.115 An optimistic letter 
from Ramsbotham in September 1977 suggested that the new Premier, 
Gibbons, was seeking residents’ ‘opinions’ on the ‘expatriate or residential 
vote’ and that a ‘White Paper [on possible constitutional change] would then 
follow probably next summer’ but these suggestions seem vague.116 It was not 
until the outbreak of violence in December 1977, moreover, that the 
boundaries issue was raised in any serious way by the FCO, when it was again 
admitted that the PLP’s argument ‘does have some force’.117  	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This somewhat contradicts (Lord David) Owen’s claim that ‘human rights’ 
were the ‘leitmotif’ of his time as Foreign Secretary, which began in February 
1977. In Owen’s defence, as he was briefed to tell the House of Commons in 
December 1977, ‘inequalities between electorates [in Bermuda] are less than 
in the UK’.118 Owen explained that his negotiating position on Bermudian 
independence had been: “Get your black and white relations right and then we 
will look at the issue.” He added his recollection that ‘we were pushing 
Gibbons to make more changes to be more open to blacks’.119  
 
It is true that pressure of this sort occurred, but there is little evidence of FCO 
lobbying on the subject before riots struck in December 1977. Crucially, a 
meeting between Sharpe and Owen in April 1977, at which Sharpe 
optimistically thought that ‘in practice independence would come in three or 
four years time’, there was no record of Owen having raised the issues of the 
franchise nor constituency boundaries.120 Indeed, such reforms were left to be 
recommended in the report of the Royal Commission headed by Lord Pitt, 
published in February 1978.121 
 
This section has argued that British policy was characterised by a gradual shift 
away from ideas of ‘good government’ towards a policy of disengagement that 
was partly inspired by events on the ground in Bermuda, which had seen the 
Governor targeted by a ‘frustrated minority’, but also by wider policy changes 
in London as a new Labour Government came to power in February 1974. One 
minister voiced his belief that Britain had ‘no standing’ in Bermuda’s internal 
affairs – an erroneous view given Britain’s remaining constitutional 
responsibility for internal security. Meanwhile, Britain’s history in Bermuda 
left her with a more profound moral responsibility to ensure openness, 
pluralism and accountability in her democratic topography. ‘Accelerated 
decolonisation’ was accompanied by an apparent lack of concern about 
Bermuda’s electoral iniquities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Notes by Duff, December 5, 1977, FCO 44/1464, TNA.  
119 Owen interview, May 23, 2013. 
120 Record of a discussion between Sharpe and Owen in London, April 19, 1977, 73/347. 
121 Pitt et al, Report into…the 1977 Disturbances, 36. 
	   243	  
 
 
 
 
4. ‘Things have moved rather quickly here’: The ‘messy’ 
process of searching for Leather’s successor, 1976-77 
 
Between late 1975 and the summer of 1976, Leather’s term in office was 
extended until March 31, 1977. This was likely because Leather had a much 
closer relationship with Sharpe than he had had with Richards. There were 
four aspects to the Anglo-Bermudian handling of the search for Leather’s 
successor. Firstly, there was a lack of care shown in the fact that the Governor 
oversaw Bermuda’s judiciary at a time of judicial proceedings following high-
profile murders. Secondly, there was a desire to find someone who was more 
sensitive to constitutional niceties than Leather. Thirdly, the process was 
crippled by indecisiveness on the part of Sharpe, who had an effective veto 
over the decision. Finally, the decision became caught up in wider global 
staffing changes at the FCO. 
 
4.1 The FCO and the UBP believe there is ‘no urgency’ in 
finding a successor 
 
Firstly, there was a general lack of care about the fact that Leather was 
presiding over a process of judicial mercy that could lead to the last executions 
on British soil. In September 1975, it was expected therefore that Leather 
would have given way to his successor by mid-1976. The problem was that this 
turnover in senior personnel was happening at a critical time in the judicial 
and sentencing proceedings of Erskine Burrows, sentenced to death for 
murdering Sharples, Sayers and Duckett in July 1976; and Larry Tacklyn, 
sentenced to death after having been found guilty in October 1976, alongside 
Burrows, of killing Mark Doe and Victor Rego during a robbery at the 
Shopping Centre supermarket in Hamilton in April 1973.122 The Governor had 
the grave responsibility of deciding whether Tacklyn and Burrows should be 	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reprieved from the sentences of hanging under his prerogative of mercy 
power. In April 1977, Leather told London he had ‘extremely mixed’ feelings 
about ‘not being able to fulfill his responsibilities to the final curtain’.123 
 
Leather’s worries exposed a crucial failing in the transatlantic handling of the 
personnel changeover. In fact, Leather’s successor would not be in place until 
September 1977, at which point the events in the sentencing process had 
proceeded all the way to the Judicial Panel of the Privy Council in the House 
of Lords. It was a daunting welcome for someone inexperienced both in 
Bermudian politics and in the nuances of the job of Governor.  Despite this, 
the minutes of a meeting between Owen, and Sharpe noted that ‘there was no 
great rush to get a new Governor to the Island.”124  
 
4.2 The FCO aims to appoint someone who can operate an 
‘advanced constitution’ 
 
Secondly, the problems experienced during Leather’s period in office from 
1973 onwards had created a desire to find someone who was capable of 
handling ‘advanced-type constitutions’, who was loyal to the FCO itself and 
the Foreign Secretary and subtle enough to understand constitutional niceties. 
As an official explained in early 1977, the new Governor’s work ‘will probably 
have more political content, but will entail less public prominence’.125 
 
The first names were circulated more than a year after this process could have 
begun. Two civil servants were proposed. The first recommendation was 56-
year-old Harry SH Stanley, who ‘originally joined the Commonwealth 
Relations Office’ and ‘whose subsequent experience has been in Africa’. Also 
proposed was former Sudan political service and judiciary officer Donald F 
Hawley, who was 55 at the time.126 These suggestions are an indication that 
the FCO had been frustrated by Leather’s lack of loyalty to the department and 	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his inability to handle the complexities of Bermuda’s constitutional setup. As 
was noted by Stanley, Sharpe ‘and his colleagues favoured an appointment 
from the Diplomatic Service’.127 
 
4.3 The process is delayed by Sharpe’s indecision 
 
This second point links into the third aspect of the handling of this process: 
the acute indecision displayed by Sharpe, upon whom the FCO were 
depending to sign-off on the proposed name. The names of Stanley and 
Hawley had in fact been put forward after Sharpe indicated he ‘would be very 
ready to accept… someone with experience of advance–type colonial 
constitutions’ when he visited Bermuda in September 1976.128 As Premier, he 
had an effective veto on the name, in the informal convention that saw him 
given ‘a chance to comment on a proposed appointment before the 
submission [was] made to Her Majesty’.129  
 
By December, with Sharpe’s apparent blessing, the FCO had decided to 
recommend Hawley’s name to the Dependent Territories Senior 
Appointments Board, which indicated that it thought Hawley was ‘admirably 
suited to the task’.130 Thus, it seemed the process was nearly complete, and 
only awaited a final sign-off by Crosland, and then the Queen. 
 
The major spanner in the works was that Sharpe kept changing his mind.  In 
fact as early as December 7, he had indicated that he was having ‘second 
thoughts’ to which FCO official Ewen Fergusson understood ‘he tends to be 
prone’.131 Sharpe asked whether a political heavyweight such as Attorney 
General Lord Elwyn-Jones, former Ambassador to the US and former Bank of 
England Governor George Baring (the Earl of Cromer) or the African-
Trinidadian former chair of the Greater London Council Lord Pitt of 
Hampstead might be available. These suggestions were in spite of his 	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comments that he had ‘reservations’ about having another politician, but 
certainly wanted someone with ‘an interested and agreeable wife with the 
social graces’.132  
 
By March, Fergusson had had enough of Sharpe’s dithering: “It is all rather 
messy… Moreover the timing is now very tight.”133 By April, the FCO was 
getting worried and aware of press reaction to the delay. Official CG Forster 
noted:  
 
One of the problems is that over the last six months Mr Sharpe has 
come up with a series of different names at different times… The 
appointment of a new Governor is now overdue.134  
 
Britain’s deferral to the UBP left them dependent on the changing whims of 
Sharpe in making this crucial appointment.  
 
4.4 The decision-making process is caught up in a wider 
departmental personnel change 
 
These three factors snowballed into a final fourth factor: a changeover in 
personnel at the top of the Foreign Office and an entanglement with wider 
personnel issues. David Owen took over as Foreign Secretary from Tony 
Crosland, who died on February 19, 1977. The evidence suggests that the 
process of appointing a new Governor became entangled in Owen’s decision to 
remove Sir Peter Ramsbotham from his position as British Ambassador to the 
United States and, controversially, to replace him with Callaghan’s son-in-law 
Peter Jay.  
 
Born in 1919, Ramsbotham was the younger son of Conservative politician 
Herwald Ramsbotham and attended Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford 
before joining the army in 1943. He served as political officer in Germany and 
Austria after World War Two and joined the Foreign Office in 1950. According 	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to the Daily Telegraph’s 2010 laudatory obituary of Ramsbotham, he was a 
former head of mission in Cyprus and ambassador to Iran, and combined a 
‘brilliant mind and a diffident manner’.135  
 
Ramsbotham was not popular, however, with Wilson, Callaghan or Owen. 
Owen described how during his and Callaghan’s first visit to Washington to 
meet with the new President, Jimmy Carter, who had been inaugurated on 
January 20, he had decided to remove Ramsbotham because the Ambassador 
did not get on with Callaghan. Owen noted that it also ‘became clear… that we 
had an Ambassador who wasn’t seen as a politically enough aware figure, that 
the PM was not going to use politically’.136 The ‘rationale’ was that a relatively 
young Carter ‘would bond better with a young Ambassador’.137 It was part of 
the dilemma of ‘how to get alongside this new President’.138 
 
The prospect of Ramsbotham’s ejection from the Ambassadorship in May, 
after three years of serving under three Presidents, meant a job had to be 
found for him. At a meeting between Owen and Sharpe on April 19, ‘the 
primary purpose’ of which, for Sharpe at least, was the discussion of the 
Governorship,139 Sharpe suggested ‘it would not hurt to have a man of 
distinction, someone like a retiring Ambassador from Washington’. Owen 
replied that ‘he would look carefully at this’.140 The April 19 meeting was the 
moment when Sharpe’s latest whim coincided with the political convenience 
of London. By May 10, Owen sent Sharpe a telegram in which he noted he was 
‘very happy to find when we met that our thinking was on exactly the same 
lines’ and in which he officially suggested Ramsbotham for the Bermuda job.   
 
Before Sharpe could reply even, the decision to move Ramsbotham was 
announced to the press. Ramsbotham was described as ‘delighted and 
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honoured’ to accept the appointment.141 This was not quite true, as 
Ramsbotham would acknowledge years later when it became apparent that he 
was angry at having been effectively demoted.142 According to the Daily 
Telegraph:  
 
The switch was made at very short notice, and was accompanied 
by a clumsy smear campaign in which Ramsbotham was 
portrayed as a "fuddy-duddy" and an "old-fashioned snob".143   
 
This was what Donoughue sarcastically called a ‘dirty briefing against sweet 
old Ramsbotham’.144 It was carried out by Callaghan’s press secretary Tom 
McCaffrey in the midst of a press war with the FCO. Ramsbotham would later 
describe how he found the move ‘annoying’ because ‘I was just beginning then 
to be really useful… It was silly to change’.145 
 
Ramsbotham made clear that he was not very keen on going to Bermuda. He 
said when asked where he would like to go that his first choice was Hong 
Kong. The trouble was that Hong Kong’s highly successful and popular 
(Labour-leaning) Governor Sir Murray MacLehose, who had been there for six 
years already, had just been reappointed and ‘wanted to stay for another five 
years’.146 As Ramsbotham recounted: “It went on like that until finally they 
came in and said, blushing a little bit, Would you go as Governor and 
Commander-in-Chief to Bermuda?”147  
 
It should be remembered that Ramsbotham had never worked as a Governor. 
He had been an Ambassador in Tehran and the US, and was experienced in 
diplomatic nuances but not with the exercise of executive power. He had been 
High Commissioner in Cyprus in the late 1960s. Cyprus was already 	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independent at that point and most of his time was spent working on handling 
delicate negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.148  
 
Thus the Bermuda job was more of a sinecure or a consolation prize for 
someone looking to play out his time quietly, as senior diplomat Paul Gore-
Booth had put it to Ramsbotham, ‘under a palm tree’.149 For this reason, he 
was the wrong person to send to Bermuda during this period. Despite nearly 
20-odd months in which to find Leather’s replacement, the name of 
Ramsbotham had only been in circulation for less than a month. This was 
captured in a message from Fergusson to colleagues on May 11 in which he 
noted that ‘since my last message, things have moved rather quickly here’.150 
 
There was worse to come. Ramsbotham’s arrival in Bermuda was further 
delayed by dithering that saw the absence of a Governor during crucial 
months that saw judicial wrangling over Tacklyn’s appeal to the Judicial Panel 
of the Privy Council in the House of Lords. Sharpe was not initially able to tell 
the Bermuda press when Ramsbotham would arrive. In a private 
communication to Ramsbotham from Lloyd, it was revealed he would not be 
able to permanently move to Bermuda until late August or early September 
due to a ‘personal problem’.151 The crucial events that transpired in Bermuda 
at the end of 1977 may have been made more likely by the tortuous and rather 
arbitrary process by which Bermuda’s Governor was appointed.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how ambiguities and contradictions in the role of 
Governor could quickly be brought into the light by one flamboyant 
individual. Leather’s behaviour from the moment he arrived suggested he still 
believed he had a public, political role to play. He filled this role in a manner 
that indicated he saw himself as Bermuda’s paternal debate-framer and 
international champion. He did not, however, see himself as the advocate of 	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British interests on Bermudian soil. As Labour Minister Chris Mullin would 
opine his diary in 2001, Governors of British territories were ‘big fish in very 
small pools. Amiable, graying men in their fifties, coasting towards 
retirement’. He added: “Once in the post they tend to go native and make all 
sorts of unreasonable demands.”152  
 
This was a view that contrasted with perceptions that Governors should 
operate power in a way that placed relationships on British terms, as was 
arguably the view of more conservative ministers such as Callaghan, who 
viewed British ‘contingent liabilities’ primarily through the lens of short-term 
domestic politics and economic exigencies. The alternative view was of Britain 
operating power as a means by which she could meet her historically-accrued 
responsibilities. Such a view had been espoused in the Labour Party by MPs 
such as Brockway, Driberg and Lestor, arguably, in the Conservatives, by Iain 
MacLeod and at the FCO by Posnett. 
 
Understandably perhaps, Leather misunderstood the political role he was 
expected to play; one that exercised power behind closed doors, away from 
public scrutiny – the ‘father confessor’ in public who exercised great power in 
private. The role had been clouded by ad hoc constitutional reforms in April 
1973, implemented in part to suit the political demands of the UBP. In 1973, 
the Governor had been removed as chair of the Executive Council. The new 
Governor’s Council proved to be a repository of ambiguity, in which 
Bermudian ministers were ‘consulted’ over Leather’s reserved powers of 
internal security and external affairs. The question was: who made the final 
decision? 
 
Without the power to set agendas, how could Leather meet his responsibility 
to help provide ‘good government’? As Leather complained, in carrying out his 
role he was dependent upon ‘supply’ from the UBP government. ‘Good 
government’ necessarily involved internal affairs, and even if he was not 
chairing it, the Governor should have at least had a leading permanent role 
within the Cabinet if he was to fulfill his responsibilities properly. The 	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problem was that pragmatic constitutional reforms exacerbated the 
incoherence of ‘anachronistic’ arrangements that Kinnear presciently 
denounced shortly following the murders of Sharples and Sayers.153 This 
incoherence was exacerbated by internal security problems. It would have 
implications for the judicial and mercy processes and contribute to civil unrest 
in December 1977. 
 
One of the problems was that former Conservative MP and Canadian Leather 
saw himself as more of a Commonwealth citizen than as a representative of 
the British government (especially a Labour government). This chapter argues 
that Leather saw in Bermuda an imperial vision of a post-colonial 
Commonwealth. Whereas ‘the official attitude to…the adoption of British-style 
institutions in parts of the Empire not populated by European settlers ranged 
from ambivalence to outright contempt’, Bermuda was in Leather’s eyes a 
perfect ‘projection of the British or English character overseas’.154  
 
The steadfast adherence to this view was part of an attempt to fill the ‘moral 
and political vacuum’ that existed ‘as the Commonwealth rapidly expanded 
beyond the old empire of kith and kin’. Leather’s friend Heath oversaw ‘a low 
point’ in Britain’s relations with the Commonwealth over the issue of arms 
sales to South Africa. Leather embodied and attempted to promote an older 
view of the Commonwealth; a particular vision of British-dominated and 
white-led stability.155 An outcrop of this was his fervent belief that ‘the best 
cement’ for British-Bermudian relations was Royal visits.156  
 
Leather’s unique stamp on the job also rapidly brought into the light some of 
the contradictions embodied in the advanced Bermudian constitution. How 
could he balance his responsibility to personify British interests with those of 
providing leadership in and championing the interests of Bermuda? On 
several occasions, Leather revealed that he saw himself more as Bermuda’s 
Foreign Minister, for instance traveling to Japan for the ship naming 	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ceremonies157 and building stronger relations between Bermuda and 
Canada.158 His interpretation of the job was unacceptable to London because 
he refused to follow Callaghan’s orders and became hostile whenever 
reminded of his duties. 
 
The evidence showed that the FCO saw the responsibilities of the Governor’s 
job as a cross between an Ambassador, constitutional monarch and ‘those of 
an executive’. This was the nub of the matter, as Bermuda was fast evolving 
from a colony into a quasi-independent ‘Dominion’-type territory. Leather 
could not play the reserved constitutional monarch, since he was political, 
biased towards the UBP and outspoken. Meanwhile, he would not be allowed 
to play the role of ‘executive’ either, at least not in public, because UBP 
Ministers now saw themselves, owing to their artificially inflated electoral 
mandate, as the big parrot fish in a tiny lagoon. This led to a mutual FCO/UBP 
interest, from Leather’s time onwards, in finding ‘low key’ people to fill the 
role.  
 
Meanwhile, the UK’s stance on independence indicated changing priorities 
between 1971 and 1977, between the years of Conservative and Labour 
government and between the administrations of Wilson and Callaghan. 
During the Heath government there was an initial reluctance to nudge 
Bermuda to independence. The term ‘good government’ was misleading since 
it seemed to suggest the UK somehow had monopoly on efficient and 
equitable forms of governance. However, its more profound significance was 
that it symbolised Britain’s continuing responsibility to ensure that the history 
of oligarchical-domination was not able to replicate itself for a new age. In this 
task, the British definition of ‘good government’ was revealed to be severely 
slanted towards conservative and myopic notions of ‘stability’.  
 
When Labour came to power in 1974, Wilson appeared to be in favour of 
‘accelerated decolonisation’. This view, based on the idea that Britain no 
longer had real ‘standing’ in Bermuda’s internal affairs, risked Whitehall 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Preston to Watson, March 18, 1974, 63/1227. 
158 Leather, Annual Report 1976, 44/1454. 
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taking its eye off the problems in the island’s electoral arrangements which 
amounted to a real source of grievance for many Bermudians. The problem 
was that Britain was prepared to let the UBP call the shots. The UBP had no 
interest in changing the system until forced to (as they did in 1979 following 
the riots). Despite Owen’s suggestion that he wanted Bermuda to get its 
‘black/white’ relations right before independence, there is no evidence of any 
pressure being brought to bear on these matters in the years 1972-1977.159  
 
Finally, because the FCO took its lead almost entirely from the UBP and did 
not exert leadership or decisiveness, the job of Governor was not filled as 
quickly as it should have been. As a result of a combination of these delays, 
Sharpe’s power of veto combined with his natural indecisiveness, and the fact 
that the process became caught up in wider personnel changes, meaning that  
the job of Governor was filled by someone with no experience of Bermuda. 
Nor had Ramsbotham any experience of the quasi-monarchical life and death 
powers of Governor. As the next chapter will argue, this may have contributed 
to the debacle that led to the last hangings on British soil in 1977. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Last Hangings on British Soil: The Royal 
Prerogative of Mercy, the Creech Jones Doctrine and 
the hangings of Erskine Durrant Burrows and Larry 
Winfield Tacklyn  
 
 
I had never realised what it means to destroy a healthy, conscious 
man. When I saw the prisoner step aside to avoid the puddle, I saw 
the mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of cutting a life short 
when it is in full tide.1 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The final chapter will examine how Bermudian political dynamics, whereby 
the UBP were privileged constitutionally vis-à-vis Government House and 
electorally vis-à-vis the PLP, affected the way in which Britain exercised its 
responsibilities over the justice and mercy processes in 1977. This would be 
revealed following the killings of Governor Sir Richard Sharples, Captain 
Hugh Sayers, Police Commissioner George Duckett and two civilians, Mark 
Doe and Victor Rego. Bermuda had the dubious distinction of being the last 
British-controlled territory in which executions occurred when Erskine 
Burrows and Larry Tacklyn were hanged in the early hours of December 2, 
1977.2 
 
This chapter thus offers a dramatic insight into the last days of the British 
Empire in the 1970s and highlights dilemmas over questions of intervention 
that are relevant to this day. The debate about the death penalty and its social 
impact took place in the context of a wider push for Britain to pull out of 
Bermuda. What becomes clear is the way in which British officials realised 
they were not completely in control. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Orwell, The Hanging, 97-8. 
2 For accounts of the arrests, trials and sentencings of Burrows and Tacklyn, see Darrell, 
Acel’dama; Williams, Lois; Williams, Peaceful Warrior; Harries Hunter, The People of 
Bermuda; Swan, Black Power in Bermuda; Moir, Ramsbotham and Gibbons, Partners in 
Peace and Prosperity; and for an account of the riots that followed Jones, Bermuda: Five 
Centuries and Burchall, Fine as Wine. 
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This was, in part, because the British Empire operated through a ‘highly 
decentralised power structure, resting on a variety of local collaborators’.3 Yet 
in Bermuda, the situation had been taken to a new extreme during the 1970s 
as the UBP had attained a state of independence that posed a challenge to the 
British Government’s political will to intervene. The lead-up to the hangings 
revealed the way in which a Labour government policy that was ‘basically 
reactive to the wishes of colonies’4 came up against notions of ‘trusteeship’5, 
forcing imperial dilemmas into Cabinet and parliamentary discussions. 
 
Williams argues that Tacklyn’s lawyer Lois Browne-Evans believed the 
conviction and execution of her client and Burrows represented a kind of 
‘divine retribution’ by the ruling oligarchy following a politically-charged set 
of murders.6 Meanwhile, Kawaley argues that Tacklyn and Burrows may have 
been deprived of their constitutional rights during their trials on murder-
charges stemming from the armed robbery of the Shopping Centre 
supermarket in April 1973.7 
 
This chapter will build upon these arguments, suggesting that the process by 
which the British Government decided whether or not Tacklyn and Burrows 
should be granted mercy was unclear and caught up in a set of personal 
relations and political circumstances that obscured real questions about 
whether or not the men had been the victims of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
In the words of Swan, the Burrows and Tacklyn cases exposed the ‘racial 
dynamics’ of Bermuda to the glaring light of day.8 However, these dynamics 
also became caught up in wider issues relating to the exercise of diffuse, global 
power via Britain’s superannuated constitution. These hangings were also a 
result of a diminution of leadership on the part of a supposedly progressive 
UK government faced with a Bermudian justice system biased towards the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Murphy, Britain and the Commonwealth, 279. 
4 Drower, Fistful of islands, 29. 
5 Hyam, Understanding the British Empire, 211-237. 
6 Williams, Lois 192. 
7 Kawaley, Fair Cross-Section Principle, 522-546. 
8 Swan, Black Power in Bermuda, 179. 
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cause of execution. Metropolitan political fragility and constitutional 
ambiguity added to a diffuse culture of complacency that reached from 
Bermuda’s Cabinet Office to Government House, Whitehall and even 
Buckingham Palace. Firstly, the story of the last hangings on British soil is a 
case study of the way in which the superstructure of empire and questions of 
racial difference and justice could interact to produce civil disorder. Secondly, 
this episode provides a demonstration of the way in which centralised, largely 
unregulated, quasi-judicial power allowed politicians to obscure lines of 
accountability. 
 
1.1. ‘The language of the unheard’: The explosive potential of 
‘justice’ in the context of colonial institutional racism  
 
The aftermaths of the cases of Rodney King and Mark Duggan provide 
examples of the explosive effect that charges of institutional discrimination 
can have in connection with the operation of law enforcement and justice.9 As 
Dr Martin Luther King Jr argued, rioting is the ‘language of the unheard’.10 
What this comment suggests is a link between systems of institutional 
representation and agglomeration and a violent popular response in the event 
of such institutions appearing to have failed to work fairly.  The existence of 
such a conjunction between discrimination in political and legal institutions 
could take on a multifarious character throughout the British Empire. Here, a 
mix of unaccountable transnational institutions and local legal systems helped 
to make ‘whiteness an objective fact’.11 The field of crime and punishment was 
a key arena in which the tensions of imperial repression played out. 
 
The Wooding Commission report following the 1968 riots pointed to what it 
viewed as the tendency of certain officers within the police to display ‘perhaps 
a contempt for the black Bermudian and his entitlement to fairplay and 
justice’.12 However, institutional racism seems to also have extended to the 
highest reaches of the UBP government, Government House and the FCO. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lawrence Vogelman, Big Black Man Syndrome, 571-578; Martin, Beating of Rodney King, 
307-326. 
10 CBS News, King interview, September 27, 1966. 
11 Garner, Whiteness, 31. 
12 Wooding, Springer and Browning, Bermuda civil disorders, 50. 
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Black Caucus described in Chapter Four, showed that there was a widespread 
perception of racial discrimination within the UBP. And previous chapters 
have shown instances of animus on the part of Martonmere at least towards 
what he saw as ‘extreme black elements’.13 Finally, Swan has detailed the 
‘racist’ comments contained in at least one report written by an IRD officer.14  
 
This is relevant to this chapter because the Governor had the power to oversee 
the Bermudian justice system and appoint judges under Section 73 (2) and (3) 
of the Bermuda Constitution.15 This chapter will argue that the justice system 
in Bermuda was flawed and unbalanced. Leather, who oversaw the operation 
of justice believed Burrows and Tacklyn to be guilty. Politics was also allowed 
to enter into the operation of justice via the involvement of the Premier in the 
decision of whether Tacklyn and Burrows should hang.  
 
Claims of institutional racism were not enough to prove that it existed. 
Although basic pride in ‘British justice’ based on the idea of equality before 
the law was paralleled by ‘inequality of power’ between ‘between white and 
non-white races’,16 Wiener argues that, although flawed, the ideal of the rule 
of law ‘never ceased to exert its pressure on the practice’ of the law. In this way 
the contradictions of British law were often exposed and ‘the Empire itself 
[was] put on trial’.17  
 
However, there is evidence that the rule of law could also be used as a cover-
up for crimes committed in the name of British imperial stability. Mass 
executions in times of ‘civil emergency’ found their way into the operation of 
British imperial power in the mid-20th century.18 David Anderson describes 
how Britain tried about 3,000 Kikuyu on capital charges, and sent 1,090 
people to the gallows.19 He elucidates the ‘grimly ironic’ way in which the 
British kept documentary records of these events in ‘meticulous, voluminous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Posnett memorandum, April 20, 1971, 823. 
14 Swan, Black power in Bermuda. 
15 Bermuda Constitution Order 1968.  
16 Wiener, Empire on Trial, 2. 
17 Ibid., 6. 
18 For a first-hand account of a hanging in Burma in the 1930s, see the account by Orwell, who 
worked as a policeman there, The Hanging. 
19 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 6-7. 
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detail’.20 The central issue relevant to the Bermuda case is the question of 
whether it was racism that enabled a similar disparity between the trappings 
of due process and the reality of the brutal use of state violence. 
 
 
1.2 The death penalty in dependent territories  	  
Even after it was banned for homicide in 1969, capital punishment remained a 
politically explosive issue. Firstly, the political debate about whether the death 
penalty would remain banned was unsettled, with key Conservatives, such as 
leader Margaret Thatcher, arguing that it should be brought back for terrorist 
murders in the context of a sectarian bombing campaign.21 Secondly, Britain’s 
remnants of empire provided a space in which both the British Foreign and 
Home Secretaries (in Jersey and the Isle of Man) retained responsibility for 
dealing with death sentences handed down by colonial judges in Dependent 
Territories.22 
 
In Bermuda, the death penalty had been in use since the English had settled 
on the island in 1609. In 1695, for example, an Indian man called Captive had 
been found guilty of fatally stabbing a man. He was hanged at Flatts inlet and 
his head was displayed on a pole.23 The last hanging in Bermuda before 1977 
however, took place in 1943. In that period, seven cases had been commuted 
by the Governor.24 
  
Despite the permanent banning of the death penalty in the UK in 1969 and 
1973, the death penalty remained enshrined in Bermudian law until 2000.25 
However, in 1975, UBP MP for Devonshire South, William Cox, introduced a 
private member’s bill for the abolition of capital punishment. Cox claimed he 
‘was denounced for his stand and incurred hostility from several of his UBP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Op. cit., 7 & 8. 
21 Owen, Time to Declare; Draft statement by JAB Stewart, April 29, 1977, FCO 44/1463, TNA.  
22 Memorandum by Lord President of the Council Michael Foot MP, to Cabinet, February 21, 
1978, (CP(78)21), TNA. 
23 Bernhard, Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 207.  
24 Clive Rose and Clive Whitmore, “Reprieves and executions between 1954 and 1965 in the 
United Kingdom”, Gen 103(77)1, October 10, 1977, CAB 130/991, TNA. 
25 Amnesty International website, January 7, 2000. 
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colleagues, “especially the red necks”’.26 In a free vote, following a lengthy 
debate, it was decided to retain the death penalty for murder by a majority of 
25 to 9.27 Given the death penalty had been banned in the UK, and the 
Crown’s and Government House’s responsibility for justice under the 
Bermudian constitution, the stage was set for a potential clash between colony 
and metropole.  
 
The banning of the death penalty in the UK led to an intriguing question about 
Britain’s proper role as the colonial power. After 1969, the UK suggested to the 
remaining overseas territories that they should, of their own volition, ban the 
death penalty for murder. All remaining territories did this except seven.28 
These territories were the Bahamas (which subsequently went independent in 
1973), and Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Belize, Cayman Islands, Hong 
Kong, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos, all of which remained colonies 
until 1980 and beyond.  
 
Depending on the level of publicity that cases of capital punishment received, 
executions thus had the power to, in the words of FCO minister Rowlands, 
‘embarrass’ the British Government, especially when it was under a Labour 
Government that hangings had been abolished.29 Following the last UK 
execution in 1964, however, hangings did occur in overseas territories on 
three occasions before 1977; in Hong Kong in 1966, in the British Virgin 
Islands in 1972 and in Belize in 1974.30 Executions also occurred in 
independent Commonwealth Countries where the Queen remained the Head 
of State: in Trinidad and Tobago in 1975 and Bahamas in 1974.31  
 
There is evidence that the ongoing use of executions in these places was 
worrying for Cabinet ministers and civil servants. The high-profile nature of 
the Bermuda cases, which had seen the first murder of a Governor since the 
1950s but also the killing of someone who was a former MP and Government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Williams, Lois, 199. 
27 Ramsbotham to FCO, February 15, 1978, FCO 40/923, TNA.  
28 WE Quantrill to RJ Stratton, December 6, 1977, 44/1464. 
29 Record of meeting between Gibbons and Rowlands, October 6, 1977, 44/1456. 
30 Rose and Whitmore, Reprieves and executions, 130/991. 
31 Minutes of Cabinet committee meeting, October 13, 1977, ibid. 
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Minister, created a situation in which these fears of ‘embarrassment’ were to 
be realised. However, the way in which this case was dealt with depended 
upon individuals who were operating in a particular institutional context. 
 
 
2. A culture of sinecure, the Royal Prerogative and 
inadequate systems of oversight 
 
As has just been suggested, Governors were granted the power of saving or 
killing someone under the Bermuda constitution. This section will suggest 
that this power was supplemented by power granted to them by the Royal 
Prerogative. It also suggests that the way in which Tacklyn’s and Burrows’ 
appeals for mercy were handled in the second half of 1977 was couched in an 
institutional culture of entitlement and sinecure. In this atmosphere, as in 
most offices, petty disputes accompanied the personnel management 
decisions made by Cabinet Ministers. Secondly, however, this section lays out 
the argument that the British Constitution itself placed too much power in the 
hands of single individuals such as Cabinet Ministers and Governors. Thirdly, 
it suggests that this power was insufficiently regulated. 
 
2.1 The potentially fatal consequences of ‘inherit not merit’32  
 
The last chapter detailed the way in which Ramsbotham’s route to the 
Governorship of Bermuda was characterised by a combination of personnel 
turnover, indecisiveness, procrastination and events in other parts of the 
British diplomatic service in the spring of 1977. This chapter develops that 
point by suggesting that the patronage power granted to the Foreign Secretary 
could come back to haunt him in the exercise of his office by affecting 
relations and communications between London and Bermuda.  
 
Recent grassroots campaigns in Britain have highlighted the way in which 
deference to the aristocracy and the Royal Family could compromise selection 
procedures for posts in public institutions that should be based on merit.33 
Research has exposed the myth of meritocracy in British society, suggesting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Merit not Inherit website. 
33 Ibid.  
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instead that many of Britain’s business leaders between 1900 and 1970 
advanced their careers on the basis of ‘elite self-recruitment’.34  
 
A ‘core stratum’ based on wealth, privilege, status and informal relationships 
may also have heavily influenced the culture of advancement in the FCO.35 
The manner of Ramsbotham’s posting to Bermuda was decided in the context 
of his dismissal by Owen and his replacement with Callaghan’s son-in-law, 
Peter Jay. The decision at the time caused a press scandal because it exposed 
the avuncular and supposedly down-to-earth Callaghan to charges of ‘naked 
nepotism’.36  
 
For his part, Owen suggested that this decision had been made on the basis 
that he thought Jay would do a better job.37 However, this claim has been 
called into question by second-hand evidence. Labour MP Neil Kinnock was 
reported to have told Alan Clark in March 1978 that ‘Jay got Owen his job 
rather than the other way around’38, suggesting the US Ambassadorship was 
part of a process of payback for Owen’s advancement into the FCO at the 
unusually young age of 38.  
 
This chapter argues, however, that Ramsbotham was given his job because he 
was a senior figure essentially with nothing to do at that point as he had been 
fired from Washington. In effect, this was an unintended result of the ‘inherit 
not merit’ system. Since Jay’s and Owen’s jobs were possibly the result of 
horse-trading on their parts, and since Ramsbotham as the son of a 
Conservative MP was not politically affiliated with them, the Bermuda posting 
was something of a compensating sinecure, aimed at tiding him over in the 
two-and-a-half year period during which he still had to earn his pension.  
 
In Ramsbotham’s words in 2001: “What on earth were they going to do with 
me?” After being offered the Bermuda post, he ‘had to say “Yes” because I had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Stanworth and Giddens, Economic Elite; Nicholas, Myth of meritocracy, 1. 
35 Ibid., 1.  
36 People, May 30, 1977; Donoughue, Downing Street Diary 2, 162.  
37 Owen, Time to Declare; Owen interview, May 23, 2013. 
38 Clark, Into Politics, 115. 
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to earn my living and there was nothing else going’.39 More pointedly, he 
noted: “I was at Eton and Magdalen, I was the son of a Viscount, I wasn’t 
[Owen’s] man.” According to Ramsbotham, Owen ‘was very Labour, not SDP 
yet, but very Labour-conscious at that time, and allowed it to spill over in his 
role as Foreign Secretary’. The incident left a further sour taste in 
Ramsbotham’s mouth because following his removal, in his view, he was 
‘smeared in London’ through press briefings in two tabloid newspapers.40  As 
this chapter will reveal, bitterness towards Owen over the way in which 
Ramsbotham had been transferred contributed to a breakdown in 
communications that helped to undermine the mercy process. 
 
2.2. The Royal Prerogative of Mercy and the operation of 
quasi-judicial powers 
 
As noted, the death penalty had been commuted by Bermuda Governors on 
seven occasions since 1943.41 This had been done under an area of the British 
Constitution called the Royal Prerogative, a type of arbitrary power in which 
the executive branch of Government, nominally the Crown, but in practice the 
Government of the day, was able to take action without the permission or 
scrutiny of parliament.42 Under this shady area of unaccountable power, the 
British Crown had the right to commute a death sentence or completely 
pardon someone of a crime, in practice following advice from the Secretary of 
State. 43   
 
In the 19th century, Governors, as local representatives of the Crown had also 
been given the right to exercise this prerogative of mercy, which meant they 
could either pardon the offender or commute the sentence. However, as was 
confirmed in the House of Commons by Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech 
Jones in August 1947, the ‘legal position’, as advised by the Lord Chancellor, 
was that the Governor’s ability to use the prerogative of mercy did ‘not entirely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Bain, Ramsbotham interview, 42-3.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Owen in the House of Commons, Hansard, December 6, 1977, 44/1464. 
42 Barnett, Britain Unwrapped, 8. 
43 Ibid. 
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empty the King of his own prerogative of mercy’.44 The Secretary of State 
could intervene with a recommendation of mercy only if a Governor had 
chosen not to use her or his own power to commute and only if she or he 
believed a ‘miscarriage of justice’ had occurred. 
 
Owen acknowledged that he was obliged, under the powers delegated to him, 
under the Royal Prerogative, to make what he called a ‘semi-judicial decision’ 
in the case of Tacklyn and Burrows.45 Gardner argues that ‘quasi-judicial 
decisions… involve determining a dispute between competing claims, or 
making findings of fact, or deciding whether to impose sanctions on anyone’.46 
Effectively, prerogative power entitled Owen to take an independent decision 
to recommend to the Queen whether or not to grant Tacklyn and Burrows 
mercy. Just what scope this gave Owen to question whether justice had been 
done in the trials is unclear. Owen claimed he was not in a position to judge  
whether it was fair to use a Special Jury in the Shopping Centre trial. ‘That’s 
not a judgment I can take,’ he argued.47 
 
However, in September 1975 senior civil servant Sir Duncan Watson seemed 
to take a different view. In such cases, the Foreign Secretary… 
 
…would have to take into account all the facts of the individual 
case and the state of local opinion and law, as well as the political 
considerations that might arise.48  
 
This wide ambit appeared to give Owen the power to take into account much 
more than the simple facts of the case. 
 
This use of quasi-judicial powers revealed two ridiculous realities of the 
British constitution. The first of these was the reliance on the idea that a 
human being operating in isolation could make ‘quasi-judicial’ decisions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Creech-Jones, Hansard, HC Deb August 11, 1947 vol 441 cc230-3W. 
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48 Record of conversation between Watson and Leather, September 8, 1975, FCO 63/1333, 
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without being influenced by personal opinions, political interests or 
circumstances. Since he was a politician, what was there to stop Owen from 
being influenced by his own political considerations in taking this decision? 
Indeed, the conflict between law and politics, Owen admitted, was a ‘very 
sensitive nerve in our constitution’.49  
 
Secondly, the decisions taken under the power of Royal Prerogative, in which 
Owen was formally advising the Queen what to do, revealed the very 
significant role that the Queen still played in British political life. Far from 
being an unelected irrelevance, the Monarch and Head of State remained a 
significant factor in the way such decisions were made. As Owen suggested:  
 
In this particular situation you have to play this by the book. If you 
get it wrong it also harms the Queen because, although it’s not her 
decision, it is also seen as her decision. 50 
 
It will be argued that the atmosphere in which this decision was made was 
characterised by two features of the political context.  
 
The first was the relatively conservative nature of Callaghan’s Premiership. 
Although a relative progressive on some issues such as race and labour 
relations, Callaghan ‘could be intensely conservative’ and he was leading the 
country at a time of ‘deep public anxiety about crime and morality’.51 
Meanwhile:  
 
Any criticism of the police, the armed forces or the trade unions 
was guaranteed to provoke [Callaghan], while, like [Harold] 
Wilson, he nursed a profound admiration for the Queen and the 
Boy Scouts.52  
 
These were also years in which both Conservative and Labour governments 
had been forced onto the defensive in debates about whether to bring back the 
death penalty for crimes committed by Northern Irish sectarians.53 	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50 Ibid. 51	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53 Record of Cabinet Meeting, April 4, 1973. CAB 130/674) and Cabinet Conclusions, February 
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Secondly, Callaghan’s government had been forced into a pact with the 
Liberals in March after losing its small majority and was on the defensive 
from Margaret Thatcher’s rejuvenated Conservative Party which led Labour in 
the polls by between 4½ and 11 per cent in September 1977.54 ‘The late nights 
were eating away at Labour’s morale: barely a week seemed to pass without a 
one nail-biting defeat or other’, while ‘the Tories scented blood’ and ‘the mood 
inside the palace of Westminster felt more confrontational than at any time 
since the War’.55  
 
2.3. Constitutional Conventions and the Creech Jones 
Doctrine  
 
Nevertheless, conventions regulated the ability of British Governments and 
Governors to exercise mercy in capital punishment cases. Dicey defines 
conventions, as distinct from legal sources of the constitution, such as statute 
or common law, as… 
 
…understandings, habits or practices which, though they may 
regulate the…conduct of the several members of the sovereign 
power…are not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced by 
the courts.56 
 
Moreover, conventions have an ‘inherent flexibility’ and ‘change over time’. 
Undemocratically, ‘quite how and why they change is difficult to see at the 
time and becomes apparent only with hindsight’.57  
 
On August 11, 1947 Creech Jones promulgated his convention in response to 
the case of a convict called Apedwa from the Gold Coast in a speech in the 
House of Commons. Creech Jones was concerned to try and clarify the 
procedure for how a sentence of death should be commuted. There was 
ambiguity over who was ultimately responsible for commuting a death 
sentence. Creech Jones’ statement ruled out legislation to clear this up. 	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However, he argued that intervention by the Secretary of State in London on 
behalf of the Crown, that is use of the Queen’s Prerogative of Mercy, should 
generally be avoided. He said this was for reasons of administrative difficulty. 
However, in the summary, he argued: 
 
For the Secretary of State to intervene would be…. contrary to the 
common sense of the situation, since the Governor, knowing all the 
circumstances, is in a better position to judge whether the 
prerogative of mercy should be exercised in any particular case.58 
 
He also noted that there could be exceptions to this general rule or convention: 
 
I do not, however, say that, if some exceptional case were brought 
to the Secretary of State's notice in which there were an indication 
that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, he would shut his eyes 
to it. The Secretary of State would communicate with the Governor 
as the case required.59 
 
This convention set out what came to be general practice. Creech Jones 
summed it up by noting that he was  ‘convinced that to follow any other course 
would seriously impair the administration of justice in the Colonies’.60  
 
The Creech Jones doctrine clarified that the power of life and death over 
people convicted of capital crimes lay in the Governor’s hands. This 
convention was far from unambiguous however. As Barnett points out, 
conventions are ‘unwritten, binding rules which regulate the conduct of the 
institutions and personnel of government’ and ‘nowhere are these written 
down in any authoritative document’.61 Bafflingly, breaking a convention may 
be unconstitutional but not unlawful. This was a nebulous set of rules on 
which to base decisions of life and death. It is suggested that the ambiguity of 
these rules was politically convenient because it allowed politicians to claim 
legal justification for their decisions even if such justification was 
questionable. In Barnett’s words: “Conventions lurk in the shadows of the 
constitution, rarely obvious but always influential.” 62 
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2.4 Two Exceptions in the Observance of the Creech Jones 
Doctrine 
 
Practice across the dwindling expanse of the British Empire from 1947 until 
1977 showed that the Creech Jones Doctrine was not observed uniformly by 
British Governments. There were two types of exception. One was rather 
underhand; the second an overt and flagrant breach.  
 
Firstly, the Creech Jones Doctrine had been ignored by then-Foreign 
Secretary Alec Douglas-Home in the spring of 1973. The minutes of a later 
Cabinet Committee meeting quote Owen referring to the fact that the Creech 
Jones Doctrine had been ‘breached’ in the case of Tsoi Kwok-Cheong in Hong 
Kong.63 Despite the decision of the Governor of Hong Kong to execute Tsoi, 
Home had intervened and ‘advised’ the Queen to commute the sentence. An 
official defended this decision as being related to the fact that, because the 
Executive Council was unelected, unlike in Bermuda for example, the UK 
Government had more grounds on which to intervene.64 However, in a 
Cabinet Committee paper prepared in the autumn of 1977, officials insisted 
that ‘in the Tsoi case, Her Majesty’s Government’s decision was based on 
considerations of UK policy quite unrelated to Hong Kong’.65  
 
The death penalty could also get caught up in diplomatic relations. Posnett’s 
account of his time as Governor of Belize reveals that, in making decisions 
over whether to grant mercy, he had to take account of the views of the 
Foreign Secretary in Britain. For example, he describes how Callaghan 
intervened to pressure him to ‘reconsider’ his decision to recommend the 
death sentence be carried out in a case where a white American had shot the 
another dead in Belize in 1974.66  
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Posnett said initially that he ‘was not prepared to alter my decision unless it 
was on [the Belizean] ministers’ advice’.67 At this point the Belizean 
government, sensitive to the fact that the crime had caused ‘outrage’ locally 
and that the advisory committee was ‘unanimous’ in support of death, still 
wanted the man hanged. However, as Posnett adds, he ‘reminded them of the 
importance to Belize in the longer term of the continued political and financial 
support of both the UK and US governments’. As a result, ‘they quickly saw 
the point and decided that it was not in the political interests of Belize to make 
this a sticking point’.68 
 
The above account suggests that, far from intervening only in the case of a 
‘miscarriage of justice’, as specified in the Creech Jones doctrine, Foreign 
Secretaries of both Labour and Conservatives stripes, including Callaghan 
himself, had intervened to disregard the spirit of the Creech Jones principle 
when it politically suited them. There is also evidence that pressure was 
exerted upon the Governor of Hong Kong by the Foreign Secretary to 
commute sentences after its last execution in 1966 before reverting back to 
Chinese rule in 1997.69 
 
As Barnett suggests, conventions ‘develop and change over time to meet new 
requirements’.70 As will be suggested, the regulation of Royal Prerogative 
power was left to conventions which were open to a wide degree of 
interpretation. 
 
 
3. Stacking the deck of justice in favour of convictions 
 
This section will argue that the period between 1971 and 1976 saw 
Government House and the UBP working in concert to secure the convictions 
of Burrows and Tacklyn following their arrests in 1973. Chapter three showed 
how the UBP brought in illiberal laws, such as the use of Special Juries and 	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limitation on the rights of peremptory challenge in the early 1970s. As 
Kawaley argues, the use of a Special Jury, by which jurors were chosen by a 
body called a Revising Tribunal on the basis of their ‘education, qualifications, 
occupation or experience’71, may have amounted to a breach of Tacklyn and 
Burrows’ rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury under section six of the 
Bermuda Constitution.72 This section argues that the Special Jury was used in 
a context that saw the Bermudian justice system subject to the personal biases 
of Leather, whose power over the justice system was only diffusely accounted 
for in the Bermuda Constitution, and who wished to distance the British 
Government from his decisions by bringing the UBP into them. 
 
 
3.1 The politicisation of justice in advance of the trials of 
Erskine Durrant Burrows and Larry Winfield Tacklyn, 
October 1973- November 1975 
 
On October 18, 1973, Erskine Burrows was arrested in one of what Leather 
called ‘the densest and loneliest patches’ of ‘dense bush’73 on the north-east 
edge of the City of Hamilton by Police officers Neville Darrell, Clive Donald 
and LE Smith.74 On April 6 of that year, two employees of the Shopping 
Centre supermarket had been shot dead after having been tied up and robbed. 
On August 1, a taxi driver had been sitting by the side of the road when two 
men demanded money at gunpoint and then shot him twice before running 
away.  On September 25, a man ‘fitting Burrows description’ robbed the Bank 
of Bermuda in Hamilton at gunpoint of $30,000 in cash before escaping on a 
mobylette. Burrows at that moment was also a suspect in the murders of 
Sharples and Sayers, on March 10, and of Duckett, on September 9, 1972.  
 
Another suspect was Larry Tacklyn, already in prison and serving a sentence 
of 15 and a half years (later reduced by the Court of Appeal to 14 and a half 
years on December 4) for the armed robbery of Masters’ Hardware store in 
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Hamilton in 1973, possession of a revolver in a public place and unlawfully 
depriving another of his liberty.75  
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Erskine Durrant Burrows. © Bermuda Police Service, from Rosemary Jones, 
Bermuda: Five Centuries, (Bermuda, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Larry Winfield Tacklyn. © Bermuda Police Service, from Rosemary Jones, 
Bermuda: Five Centuries, (Bermuda, 2004). 
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Following his arrest on October 18 after a manhunt that ended at the junction 
of Friswell’s Hill and Parson’s Road in Pembroke Parish,76 Burrows first 
appeared in court on 23 October77 and was committed on November 23 to 
stand trial for the Shopping Centre murders and the murders of Sharples, 
Sayers and Duckett.78 It was not until June 23, 1975 that Burrows faced a jury 
for the charges but it was a Coroner’s Jury. They found him to be responsible 
for the murder of Duckett.79 On July 24, it found that Burrows and Tacklyn 
were both accessories before the fact to the Shopping Centre murders.80 In 
November, both were found by a Coroner’s Jury to be responsible for the 
murders of Sharples and Sayers.81  
 
The administration of justice is a grey area in the Bermuda constitution. It is 
not mentioned under the list of the Governor’s reserved powers under Section 
62. However, effectively, justice was in Government House’s hands because 
Section 73 empowered the Governor to select judges after consulting with the 
Premier, while Section 77 allowed the Governor to select judges for the Court 
of Appeal without reference to the Premier.82 The Governor meanwhile had 
the power to order inquests, which served as preliminary proceedings 
witnessed by juries, before trials even began.83  
 
The fact that inquests on the murders had been held before the trials would 
later be seized on by Tacklyn’s defence counsel Ian Ramsey QC. In early June, 
he argued that these proceedings caused ‘massive prejudice’.84 Further 
evidence of such prejudice was found behind the scenes. Chapter five showed 
that Leather was convinced of Burrows and Tacklyn’s guilt. He had already 
reflected this bias in January 1976, justifying his decision to order the inquests 
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by suggesting that ‘the worst result we could arrive at would be one that 
produced a trial and an acquittal’.85 
 
This episode also revealed an insight into the way Leather conceived of the 
dangers inherent in Britain’s colonial role. He was keen that politics should be 
brought into the administration of justice for wider constitutional reasons, 
rather than kept out of it in order to ensure the trial process was fair and seen 
to be fair. He suggested he was ‘determined that, at every stage, the Premier 
and Cabinet, not only went along with me, but that they should be seen by all 
Bermuda to have done so’.  Most crucially Leather added:  
 
At this stage in [Bermuda’s] constitutional development… nothing 
must be allowed to happen in such a manner that the local political 
leaders can wash their hands of it if things go wrong; we must 
make no move that can be blamed on ‘colonialism’.86 
 
This suggests that Leather was not interested in exercising his judgment in 
these matters in a rational and balanced way. Rather he seemed completely 
fine with letting his personal biases creep into his role. Bizarrely, he also 
revealed his desire that the British Government should politically distance 
itself from decisions it was constitutionally responsible for making. 
 
1976 was to be the year of what The Royal Gazette called ‘The Big Trial’.87  On 
May 25, Burrows and Tacklyn were arraigned in the Supreme Court on seven 
counts before Puisne Judge Earle Seaton. Three of the counts related to the 
Shopping Centre murders. The first four counts related to the killings of 
Duckett, Sayers and Sharples and a conspiracy charge in relation to them.88 At 
first they were due to stand trial together on all seven counts. However, 
Tacklyn’s lawyer successfully argued against this and Burrows was the first to 
stand trial.89 His first trial, on the three counts relating to the murder of 
Duckett, Sayers and Sharples, began in early June and lasted through the 
month.  
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During proceedings, Burrows handed a note purporting to be a confession to 
the chief prosecutor John Marriage QC. In the note, Burrows revealed his 
reason for killing Sharples and Sayers was to make ‘black people in particular, 
become aware of the…wickedness of the colonialist system’ in Bermuda.90 
Later he would send a note to Leather in which he ‘expressed regret that he 
did not kill more of the English colonial scum’.91 He was found guilty and 
sentenced to death on July 6. He was unrepresented by legal counsel at his 
own request and did not take the stand in his own defence.  
 
Tacklyn’s trial on the Sharples and Sayers murders began the next day. 
Tacklyn was found not guilty by majority verdicts after the jury deliberated for 
three and a half hours on July 20.92 He still had to face trial for the Shopping 
Centre murders, as did Burrows. This began on October 5. In this case, both 
Burrows and Tacklyn were tried together, unlike in the Sharples, Sayers and 
Duckett cases. A Special Jury of nine whites and three blacks took seven hours 
before delivering a majority verdict of guilty for both men. Tacklyn was also 
sentenced to death. 
 
Thus, the impartiality of Bermudian justice was compromised by the fact that 
Leather, who was responsible for deciding whether or not the trials should be 
preceded by inquests, was prejudiced. He already believed Burrows and 
Tacklyn to be the culprits of the crimes. In essence, Leather was not above 
politics but was acting as chief prosecutor from behind the scenes. It is also 
argued that Leather hoped to bring politics into the operation of justice, with 
the UBP taking part of the responsibility for the way events played out. 
 
4. Appeals for mercy and the decision-making processes 
in Government House and Whitehall 
  
The decision-making process by which both Government House and 
eventually Owen turned down appeals for mercy was compromised by 	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personal factors. These had seen the appointment of a Governor unsuited to 
his job. Meanwhile, there was animosity between Ramsbotham and Owen. 
These personal factors were accompanied by local dynamics that saw the UBP 
exert a dominating influence on Government House. Finally, the decision-
making process in London was overwhelmed by party political considerations.  
This meant questions about whether a ‘miscarriage of justice’ had occurred 
were effectively sidelined. 
 
4.1 Public intransigence and private misgivings at 
Government House 
 
An analysis of the process of Government House decision-making during 1977 
reveals a number of factors to be at work. Firstly, Government House’s 
apparent reluctance to go ahead with the executions was initially assuaged by 
expectations about an intervention through policy change in London that 
would have stopped hangings at a metropolitan level. Secondly, a shift in 
London’s position in October was not communicated properly to Bermuda. 
Thirdly, an uncertain and pusillanimous attitude on the part of Ramsbotham 
and a misinterpretation of his role as Governor left it to, fourthly, the UBP to 
make the final erroneous decision to hang the men. 
 
 
(i) Government House and the belief in London’s intention to 
abrogate the Creech Jones doctrine, March–November 1977 
 
Three different men sat in the Governor’s office throughout the year. Leather 
left office at the end of March. The Deputy Governor, Peter Lloyd, took over as 
Acting Governor during the summer until a new Governor was found. Lloyd 
was the son of former a Permanent Secretary at the Colonial Office. According 
to Posnett, who became Governor of Bermuda in 1980 while Lloyd remained 
in the Deputy post, he was an ‘able administrator’ who started his career as a 
district officer in Kenya.93 In May, Ramsbotham was appointed Governor of 
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Bermuda. He visited the island in June for a garden party on the Queen’s 
Birthday but did not arrive until September.94  
 
However, as suggested above, Government House seemed, from April 1977, to 
be cowed by the encroachment of politics into the ‘process of mercy’. This fact 
reflected Leather’s view that the Governor had lost the power to set agendas. 
Under section 23 of the 1968 constitution, Bermuda’s local advisory 
committee on the prerogative of mercy consisted of six people, including the 
Premier, the Attorney General, the Minister of Home Affairs and several 
anonymous ‘regular Bermudians’, appointed on the advice of the Premier.95  
 
The very presence of the Premier and his hand-picked placemen on this 
council politicised it, while it could be argued that the presence of the 
Attorney General on this body was prejudicial, as he was a prosecutor in the 
cases and was the representative of the Crown in the appeals. Thus, it was 
suggested, he had a vested interest in seeing the executions carried out.96 For 
their part, the FCO believed that the presence of the AG on the council was 
‘well supported by precedent’ and could ‘not be said to be objectionable’.97 
 
There is evidence of racial prejudice and insensitivity on the part of those on 
the advisory council. On April 25, this body advised, by a majority of five to 
one, that neither Tacklyn nor Burrows should be reprieved.98 Lloyd described 
to the FCO how members had told him that ‘the risk of creating martyrs [was] 
negligible and that any exacerbation of race relations should be neither 
significant nor lasting’. Meanwhile, those most likely to be upset by the law 
taking its course were ‘people who normally related to the Caribbean more 
easily than the UK’.99 On May 2, Lloyd ‘reluctantly’ decided to accept this 
advice and let the hangings proceed.100  	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Lloyd seems to have been holding out hope, however, that the men would not 
be hanged. This seems an odd hope from someone who, under section 22 of 
the constitution, had the power to ‘grant to any person a respite, either 
indefinite or for a specified period, from the execution of any punishment’ 
imposed by a Bermudian court.101  
 
However, it seemed that in April 1977, Lloyd knew the FCO was on the verge 
of taking action to ensure no more executions took place anywhere on British 
sovereign territory. As suggested, the Tsoi decision by Home had undermined 
the Creech Jones doctrine. All that remained to be done was for a conscious 
acknowledgement of that to be made as part of a policy change in London.  
 
It also emerged that when he was Foreign Secretary, Callaghan had effectively 
suggested that the formula was irrelevant. In 1974, he had minuted that ‘he 
saw no prospect of returning to the Creech Jones formula for the time being 
and of sustaining it when challenged in the House [of Commons]’.102 As 
official JAB Stewart would note, ‘the effect of Mr Callaghan’s minute would 
seem to indicate a ministerial decision to change this doctrine’. Stewart 
suggested in April 1977 that this was still the view of the FCO when he noted:  
 
There is no real constitutional reason why the Secretary of State 
should not consistently advise the Queen to commute death 
sentences in British territories in respect of which the Queen is 
petitioned to apply the prerogative of mercy. 103 
 
Lloyd was told of these developments. On May 31, HSH Stanley wrote to Lloyd 
that… 
 
Officials were inviting Ministers to consider abrogating the Creech 
Jones doctrine and drawing attention to the need for an early 
decision of principle because cases were pending ie. Burrows and 
Tacklyn.104   
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As a result of this understanding, Lloyd ‘encouraged [PLP leader] Browne-
Evans to arrange a petition to the Queen’.105 This is crucial because it suggests 
that the grassroots campaign led by Browne-Evans to save the men, which 
gathered pace in the next six months, was initially encouraged by Government 
House in the hope that it would provide a pretext (the petition to the Queen) 
for London to intervene. 
 
There was reason for Lloyd to be hopeful this would work. Owen accepted the 
recommendation of civil servants that the Creech Jones formula should be 
abrogated by July 20. A later report by former High Commissioner to Kenya, 
and later director-general of Mi5, Sir Anthony Duff noted:  
 
If his Ministerial colleagues agreed, as they were pretty certain to 
do, the FCO would inform the Governor officially before a 
statement was made in the House of Commons.106  
 
However, Lloyd was aware that delays were a possibility. Anxiously, he wrote 
to London pointing out that British ministers must be asked to ‘make up their 
minds quickly since delays could have law and order implications’.107 Lloyd’s 
hope for an ‘early decision’ however was to be disappointed, as the question 
was ‘referred back to officials’ by Callaghan in early August.108  
 
 
(ii) A change of mind in London is paralleled by a ‘sorry catalogue 
of errors’, September – November 1977 
 
Opinion in London changed between August and October. This change and 
the way in which it was communicated would lead to a falling out between the 
FCO and Government House and may have led to a situation in which the 
authorities were not prepared for civil disorders when they occurred.  
 
It is evident that, up until the end of September, Lloyd was still trying to 
prevent Ramsbotham from having to get involved. This is remarkable, since 
such decisions were one of a Governor’s gravest responsibilities. On 	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September 29, the recently-arrived Ramsbotham received a petition with 
6,000 Bermudian signatures (by the time of the hangings in the early hours of 
December 2, this had increased to 13,000)109 calling for mercy. A comment by 
Duff, written in retrospect, suggested Ramsbotham hoped this would be the 
end of the matter:  
 
[The] Acting Governor, having announced on 2 May the 
confirmation of the sentences, it would be unnecessary for the new 
Governor to take a view or get involved in any way.110 
 
Lloyd’s hope that Ramsbotham would be kept out of the controversy was to be 
dashed after Ministers decided on October 13 that they would not step in to 
abrogate the Creech Jones doctrine.111  In mid-November, meanwhile, Owen 
personally advised the Queen not to exercise the Prerogative of Mercy on the 
men’s behalf. 
 
Much to Ramsbotham’s dismay, he was asked by the FCO to review Lloyd’s 
May confirmation of the sentences. However, a paragraph in a telegram by the 
FCO, which informed Ramsbotham that Owen and his colleagues felt ‘unable 
to take a decision’ in this case, was removed by Owen. As a result, up until 
November 15… 
 
…The expectation within the Bermuda Government was that a 
reprieve would be granted and their responsibility would simply 
be to deal with whatever security difficulties might ensue.112 
 
This was confirmed in Duff’s suggestion that, when Ramsbotham replied to 
the FCO on October 27, ‘he had been given to believe that [Her Majesty’s 
Government] would not allow the executions to take place’.113 Ramsbotham 
later said he felt he had been kept ‘deliberately uninformed’ by Owen.114 This 
suggestion was somewhat backed up by Duff, who visited Bermuda at 
Ramsbotham’s request, and found that there had been: 
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A sorry catalogue of errors and failures in communication 
compounded by the absence of key officials from London at the 
crucial time and by the Secretary of State taking matters into his 
own hands and refusing to allow the explanations of Ministers’ 
decisions to be sent to Bermuda on the part of the FCO.115  
 
Creech Jones had noted when promulgating his doctrine that, in mercy 
decisions, the Secretary of State should ‘communicate with the Governor as 
the case required’.116 In this case, however, instead of close contact between 
two parts of the British government, there was obfuscation. This may have 
had law and order implications for events as they transpired. Duff’s report 
found that, because of the FCO’s shortcomings:  
 
[The Bermuda Government] continued to assess the risk to law and 
order in a situation in which reprieves would have been granted 
rather than a situation in which the executions had taken place.117 
 
The suggestion that Owen kept Ramsbotham ‘deliberately uninformed’ was 
called ‘disgraceful’ by Owen. He explained that he had removed the paragraph 
from the telegram because he felt ‘it put too much pressure on’ Ramsbotham. 
He noted that the fact that he had fired Ramsbotham a few months earlier 
‘made it even more important that I did not pressurise him’.118 Yet this case 
provides a stark contrast to the way in which Callaghan had pressured Posnett 
into stopping the execution in Belize in 1974.  
 
 
(iii) An abdication of Government House’s responsibility: 
Ramsbotham misinterprets his job, November-December 1977 
 
With Owen’s decision not to stop the hangings in London, the ball was now in 
Ramsbotham’s court. Why, then, did he, especially given his supposedly 
‘abolitionist convictions’ and his full ability to stop them, decide to let them 
proceed? Two reasons are suggested. Firstly, Ramsbotham did not quite 
understand what his role as Governor required him to do. The evidence 
suggests this former Ambassador and High Commissioner saw the job as 
involving more diplomatic than executive functions. Although one of the 	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reasons he gave for not wanting to be seen as having made the decision was 
because he felt ‘the safety [of him] and his family’ would be at risk, he also 
wanted to ‘retain the effective ability to work with and through the political 
parties on the main issues confronting Bermuda’:  
 
It was therefore important that he should not be associated with 
the hangings and thereby be labeled as a creature of the [white-
dominated] Government.119  
 
However, Ramsbotham also seemed to believe that, once the option of shifting 
the responsibility for stopping the hangings onto London’s shoulders had 
been exhausted, he had no choice but to do what the elected UBP government 
wanted. As he suggested in 2001, because of the advice of his ‘prerogative of 
mercy committee’ to let the hangings proceed, ‘I had no option’.120  
 
This was not true however. Ramsbotham’s responsibility was not to do what 
the UBP government told him but to exercise his own judgment. As the FCO’s 
‘troubleshooter’ Watson noted in a conversation with Leather in September 
1975, ‘the exercise of the prerogative of mercy was not part of the judicial 
process’. While the Governor was ‘constitutionally bound to consult the 
advisory committee on the prerogative of mercy’, she or he ‘was not bound to 
act in accordance with their advice’. Instead she or he ‘acted in his own 
absolute discretion, and had to take into account all the circumstances of the 
case’.121  
 
Ramsbotham’s misinterpretation of his job may have been a result of a 
combination of his inexperience of the role, and also his newness to Bermuda. 
It also may have been founded in the inherent ambiguities of the job itself. As 
chapter five made clear, the role combined a need for diplomatic even-
handedness with taking controversial political decisions. The only defensible 
way in which such decisions could be taken was in a spirit of openness that 
strictly followed clear guidelines, demonstrated even-handedness and 
respected due process. These were not evident in this case. 	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Ramsbotham’s reluctance to be seen to give the order to hang Tacklyn and 
Burrows was also tempered by a natural political affinity for conservative 
positions and a personal friendship with Gibbons.122 Ramsbotham, the 
younger son of a Conservative MP, owed his job as US Ambassador to Heath. 
Although he was apparently ‘a convinced abolitionist’123, his commitment to 
this cause was later belied by his suggestion that he believed Bermuda should 
retain capital punishment for a ‘closely defined range of premeditated 
murder’.124 Ramsbotham’s reluctance to challenge, or alternatively, his 
deferral rooted in affinity towards Gibbons, therefore created a situation in 
which the UBP was the decisive actor in these events. 
 
 
(iv) An Anglo-Bermudian misjudgment: Gibbons, the UBP and the 
final decision to execute, November-December 1977 
 
Thus, the fifth factor in the final decision was Gibbons’ ardent belief that the 
executions should go ahead as planned. He had told Owen in early October:  
 
I would be less than honest if I didn’t tell you that the vast the 
majority of Bermudians will not be happy about [the hangings 
being stopped] given the terrible nature of these crimes.125 
 
As matters reached a head in late November, the UBP would commit a major 
error of judgment. Owen described how he gave Government House one last 
chance to opt out of going ahead with the hangings by asking in a telegram at 
the end of November whether there were ‘any reasons of internal security’ 
that might be relevant for stopping them.126 
 
In making the final call, Ramsbotham said he ‘consulted the Premier [who in 
turn sought the opinions of some of his colleagues] and the Deputy Governor 
as well as the Attorney-General’. He continued:  
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They all considered that racial harmony, respect for law and order 
generally, and the security situation would suffer more if a stay of 
execution were granted. 
 
Duff later suggested this opinion was ‘very much in the face of the last minute 
scenes’.127 Indeed, the UBP argument beggared belief. As Owen suggested: 
“They got it wrong, let’s face it.”128 It either revealed a major misreading of 
the situation on the ground or sophistry employed to argue for hangings that 
the party leadership wanted to proceed regardless of the aftermath.  
 
Blame for this misjudgment should primarily be laid at Gibbons’ feet. As 
Owen suggests: “[Gibbons] wanted these people to hang.”129 This impression 
was backed up by UBP cabinet minister Quinton Edness, who said that, at the 
time, he believed Gibbons had left him out of a last-minute ring-around of 
Ministers, suggested by Ramsbotham, to see whether they ‘still wish to go 
through with this’. Edness said: “I was never called. I wasn’t called because 
the then-Premier knew what my position was. I was vehemently opposed to 
this.”130  
 
Interviewed in 2011, Gibbons revealed that he had been called at midnight on 
the evening of the hangings for a final check on whether the hangings should 
proceed. “The phone rang and the warden said ‘do they go’? I said of course. 
And I went back to sleep with a totally clear conscience.” He added that he 
believed the island was totally supportive of the decision, ‘although a few 
people came out and assembled’.131 
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Figure 27: Bermuda’s Sessions House where three days of rioting began following news that 
the last appeals had failed. © Benedict Greening, January 2013 
 
 
After having her last-ditch appeals turned down by the courts at 10.10 pm on 
December 1, Browne-Evans drove to the West End of the Island, where 
Casemates Prison was located at the old Royal Naval Dockyard, to tell her 
client that he would die within hours. She then went to a church and prayed. 
While she was doing this, however, groups of demonstrators had been 
gathering outside the Supreme Court building, housed within the Sessions 
House where the House of Assembly was also located.   
 
When news came that the hangings would go ahead, the protesters went on 
the rampage, setting fire to commercial property. Burrows was hanged at 4am 
on December 2, and Tacklyn at 4.30am. The violence spread out from the 
capital city and across the island. That night, a fire spread through the 
Southampton Princess hotel. Three people, including two tourists and one 
Bermudian hotel employee, died as the flames licked up the newly painted 
walls of the corridor on the top floor.132  
 
On December 3, Ramsbotham requested troops be sent to Bermuda to help 
quell the rioting. As a result, two planeloads of personnel, including 120 
soldiers of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, based in England, were shipped to 
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Bermuda, as well as 80 men from the Royal Regiment of Wales who had been 
guarding the Belizean frontier with Guatemala.133  
 
Although Callaghan immediately agreed to send in troops, it seems the need 
to take such drastic action caught him completely off guard. A press report on 
December 5 described how Callaghan was said to be ‘hopping mad’ that the 
Cabinet was given no option but to send troops to the island’ to quell the 
riot.134 Moreover, a firefighter strike was also on the cards in the UK and 
troops were thought to be needed in the UK over Christmas to stand in.135 The 
Bermuda situation was named by the Daily Mail as the ‘last straw’ in a more 
general ‘manpower crisis’ in the Army.136  
 
This section has suggested that Tacklyn and Burrows were hanged because of 
a refusal on the part of Ramsbotham to stand up to Gibbons. This may have 
been the result of tacit belief in the justice of the executions, out of 
pusillanimity, the result of a misinterpretation of his job or a combination of 
some or all of these factors.  The situation was exacerbated, however, by a 
failure of communication on the part of London. Rambotham would later 
believe this had been engineered deliberately by Owen. In any event, a process 
that should have been clear and above board was affected by a personal 
dispute. This was perhaps a result of both men trying to pass their 
responsibility for this difficult political decision onto the other. As the next 
section will show, the process of mercy was also caught up in metropolitan 
politics. 
 
4.2 ‘No alternative’?: The decision by the British Government 
not to abolish capital punishment ‘while a particular case is 
pending’ 
 
The decision on the part of the British Government not to stop the hangings in 
London was characterised by several factors. Firstly, this episode 
demonstrated an example of vacillation and climbdown by a Government that 	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had originally indicated its intention to reassert the right of the Foreign 
Secretary to stop executions in British territories. Then, following the 
Government’s change of heart over the Creech Jones doctrine in October, the 
spotlight focused on Owen. The evidence suggests that his interpretation of 
the doctrine was that it was the responsibility of Governors to take into 
account UK law as it stood. Thirdly, Owen also believed that in giving advice 
to the Queen on the prerogative of mercy he was not obliged to look at all of 
the facts surrounding the trials, although the doctrine bound him to stop the 
hangings if he believed a ‘miscarriage of justice’ had occurred.  
 
 
(i) The FCO’s vacillation over abrogating the Creech Jones 
Doctrine 
 
Section 2.4 above suggests there were exceptions to the Creech Jones 
doctrine, while an official also stated in April that there was ‘no constitutional 
reason’ why ministers should not intervene to stop all executions on British 
soil. The crucial period in which the decision over whether to abrogate the 
doctrine was made was mid-October, when two vital events occurred. Firstly, 
on October 6, the Judicial Council of the Privy Council refused Tacklyn special 
leave to appeal.137 This essentially meant that the course of justice had been 
run and a date now had to be set for the executions or the Queen had to grant 
mercy herself.  
 
Secondly, on October 13, a Cabinet committee, chaired by Lord President of 
the Council Michael Foot, but also consisting of Owen, Home Secretary 
Merlyn Rees, Defence Secretary Fred Mulley and Attorney General Samuel 
Silkin postponed making a final decision to pull back from the planned 
abrogation.138 This was essentially a decision not to save Tacklyn’s and 
Burrows’ lives. 
 
The ground for this meeting had been prepared by a meeting of civil servants, 
including representatives of the Cabinet office, the Lord Chancellor, the Home 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 CC Long to Rowlands, October 5, 1977, 44/1456. 
138 Ministerial Group minutes, October 13, 1977. CAB 130/991.  
	   286	  
Office, the FCO, and the Law Officers’ Department on September 21. The 
minutes of this meeting reveal fears about ‘push[ing] Ministers in the 
direction of preferring’ a certain option.139 Moreover, there was ambivalence 
about whether the death penalty should be effectively banned. The meeting 
noted, for example, that ‘there were circumstances in which the sentences 
might not be commuted, for example the murder of a Governor.’140 At the 
meeting of the Ministerial Group on October 13, a final draft of the paper 
detailing five options, completed by senior civil servants Sir Clive Rose and CA 
Whitmore on October 5, was presented. Ministers were shown the choices:  
 
1) An instruction for Governors to introduce legislation to abolish 
capital punishment 
2) Legislation by Order in Council  
3) A UK bill to abolish capital punishment unilaterally 
4) Removal from Governors of the power to exercise the 
prerogative of mercy 
5) A parliamentary statement abrogating the Creech Jones doctrine141 
 
As a result, in August, Governors in seven territories were consulted about 
which method of the five they preferred. Perhaps predictably, and because of 
their varying constitutional setups and political contexts, they went in 
different directions. While Lloyd in Bermuda and Hong Kong plumped for 
option 5 (abrogation by Owen in parliament), Belize chose option 2, BVI and 
Turks and Caicos chose option 3 and the Cayman Islands option 4. Montserrat 
expressed no preference.142  This lack of consensus helped stall the 
momentum of abrogation. 
 
As has been suggested, it was feared that the political fallout from the 
Bermudian hangings would be grave, not just at Westminster but around the 
world. West Indies and Atlantic Department for Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State at the FCO HAH Cortazzi noted: “The current Bermuda cases are being 
quoted in the context of probable adverse reactions at Westminster if the 
death sentences were carried out.”143  Essentially, the choice was between an 
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adverse Conservative reaction if the hangings were stopped, or a backbench 
Labour revolt if they occurred. The full force of this latter point was hinted at 
in the wake of the executions when 134 MPs signed an Early Day Motion 
calling for the Creech Jones doctrine to be abrogated. The motion ‘viewed with 
deep concern the racial disorders’ and ‘deeply regret[ed] the limitations’ 
imposed on the Foreign Secretary by the Creech Jones formula.144 	   
 
It was also feared, according to Governor of Hong Kong MacLehose, that the 
reaction there to executions in Bermuda, due to the publicity surrounding 
their cases, ‘would be strong’. This was because executions had essentially 
been abolished in Hong Kong by a unique combination of FCO cajoling 
behind-the-scenes and Gubernatorial discretion. In these circumstances, it 
was felt by officials, that the Foreign Secretary should be given a ‘greater area 
of control’ in relation to capital punishment. 145   
 
However, by October 13, ministerial feelings had changed. The committee 
noted that there could be ‘disadvantages’ in making a change while the Tacklyn 
and Burrows cases were pending because of the appearance of a kneejerk 
reaction to events: “It might be preferable to introduce any general change at a 
time when no case had been recently considered or was in the offing.”146  
 
In summing up the meeting, Foot agreed they would meet again (ie after 
Tacklyn and Burrows were dead) because ‘they wished to consider further how 
a change might most appropriately be made and its timing’.147 The Cabinet 
Committee’s decisions were endorsed by Callaghan himself on October 24. 
According to an inquiry by Duff, the Prime Minister ‘commented that the 
Foreign Secretary would probably have to let the law take its course in the 
Bermuda case.’148 
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(ii) Political and parliamentary considerations become crucial 
factors  
 
In an interview with the author in May 2013, Owen suggested that the fact 
that one of the murder victims was Sharples, a former MP and former 
Government Minister, did play a role in the Ministerial decision not to 
abrogate the Creech Jones principle. He detailed how the decision not to 
abrogate was a legal decision made by political appointees, such as Attorney 
General Sam Silkin and the Lord Chancellor Lord Gerald Austen Gardiner. 
Owen suggested they ‘would have known they were making a legal 
recommendation in a highly charged atmosphere’: 
 
[The question was] do you want to create another debate on the 
floor of the House involving Richard Sharples? The more you think 
of it the worse it was.149  
 
Owen also admitted that political factors such as the potential for a damaging 
debate in the House of Commons were also at play: 
 
You go to the House and you are effectively getting them to make a 
judgment on whether these particular men should be [saved], in 
the very emotive atmosphere that’s its going to be debated because 
a fellow MP known to all those people has been killed.150 
 
This is an admission that the hangings of Tacklyn and Burrows were allowed to 
proceed, even though Britain had banned the death penalty, in part because of 
the identity of the person who had been murdered. Other factors were also at 
play however. It is worth remembering that Callaghan had lost his majority in 
the House of Commons after the Westminster by-election in February 1977, 
and was relying on a pact with the Liberals (and informally the Ulster 
Unionists) voted through by Cabinet on March 23 to get legislation through 
from then until the autumn of 1978, when the Liberals ended the 
arrangement.151 An earlier document noted that a statement in the House of 
Commons abrogating the Creech Jones doctrine could have led to a debate and 
then a vote.  
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Michael Foot pointed out in a Cabinet Committee in February 1978 that it was 
‘questionable whether a Motion to abrogate the Creech Jones doctrine would 
be carried’.152 He also noted the political problems surrounding the topic at 
that time. For instance, Thatcher had visited Hong Kong in April 1977 and 
suggested ‘Hong Kong should be allowed to tackle its problems in its own 
way’, a veiled reference to the death penalty.153  Foot pointed out ‘there was a 
growing movement in the Conservative Party in favour of bringing back 
hangings in the UK for terrorist murders’. He added: 
 
There was a risk that this could become a major issue in a pre-
Election period. It would be a mistake to do anything at present 
which might increase that risk… it could encourage public debate 
of the domestic issues and weaken the general position of those in 
favour of the continued abolition of the death penalty.154 
 
Owen defended his original proposal to abrogate the Creech Jones doctrine, 
yet he acknowledged that ‘the force of the current domestic political 
difficulties’ would affect the timing of any political change.155 In summing up 
the discussion, Callaghan said ‘the present political climate in the United 
Kingdom made this an inopportune time’ to change the policy, yet Cabinet 
would consider the policy again ‘at an appropriate time’.  He also noted that 
‘the danger of stimulating public debate…should be pointed out’ to Labour 
MPs who were pushing for speedier change.156  
 
 
 
(iii) Owen does not believe that the Tsoi precedent applies 
 
The next two sub-sections focus on Owen’s actions after the rejection of the 
proposal to abrogate the Creech Jones doctrine. Despite this October 13 
decision, however, Owen still had the power to stop the hangings using his own 
Royal Prerogative advisory power. He chose, however, on November 15, to use 
his power to advise the Queen to reject the pleas for mercy. Following the 
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outbreak of riots and in a statement to the House of Commons on December 6, 
Owen argued that:  
 
Having satisfied myself that there were no grounds for believing 
that there had been a miscarriage of justice, I had no alternative 
but to advise Her Majesty not to intervene.157 
 
Owen noted that, under ‘present policy’, the Foreign Secretary did not advise 
the Queen to intervene ‘unless there had been an evident ‘miscarriage of 
justice’. This may have been technically true, but Foreign Secretaries, such as 
Callaghan in the case in Belize, had put pressure on Governors in the past. The 
Creech Jones doctrine had also been breached in 1973 with no evident 
backlash. However, Owen later explained that he ‘deliberately decided’ not to 
follow the Tsoi precedent, set by Home in 1973, ‘because the reading of Creech 
Jones is quite clear that you have got to follow the procedures which Creech 
Jones outlined’.158 
 
Owen’s reading of the Tsoi precedent is intriguing. He suggested that Home’s 
unilateral commutation of a death sentence in Hong Kong in 1973 had been 
read by ‘Governors all over the world’ as a signal that ‘abolition had taken’. In 
fact, ever since Tsoi, MacLehose had stopped executions from occurring. In 
Owen’s words: “[MacLehose] took the view that Parliament had spoken and 
therefore he would advise for clemency’. Thus, Owen implied that Tsoi should 
have been seen as a type of hint for Governors to commute on their own 
volition. However, Ramsbotham did not draw the same lessons as MacLehose. 
‘I think he wanted to play it all ways,’ suggested Owen.159  
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(iv) Owen does not include consideration of the use of the Special 
Jury in his deciding whether a ‘miscarriage of justice’ has 
occurred 
 
One of Owen’s responsibilities was to ensure he was satisfied there had been 
no ‘miscarriage of justice’ in Burrows’ and Tacklyn’s trials.160 In fact, he would 
later volunteer: “I am a doctor by training and I was hoping I could get him off 
on medical grounds but I was not able to do so”.161 However, when questioned 
later, Owen noted that he had not been ‘making a decision about justice’. For 
instance he added that it ‘was not my position to judge the procedures of 
selection of the jury. That’s not a judgment I can take’. As suggested above, 
however, it could be argued that it was Owen’s responsibility to take into 
account ‘all the circumstances of the case’. In fact, Tacklyn had been acquitted 
of killing Sharples and Sayers, while the Shopping Centre trial was 
questionable because of the possibly unconstitutional use of the Special Jury.  
 
Another legitimate question is why Owen did not anticipate the hangings 
could cause riots, given the island’s history of rioting in 1968 and 1970, which 
had involved British forces in the form of troops and frigates. Instead of 
analysing the situation objectively, based upon years of dealing with Bermuda, 
the FCO simply deferred to the judgment of Ramsbotham, someone who had 
only arrived on the island three months before. Ramsbotham’s suggestion, 
based on faulty UBP advice, that ‘there is unlikely to be the sort of 
confrontation that would attract public or parliamentary interest in Britain’ 
was taken as gospel.162 Despite this, Owen insisted that he and the FCO had 
‘no’ responsibility for the civil disorder that occurred because Ramsbotham 
had left him ‘no room for maneuver at all’.163 This statement seems 
extraordinary given that the FCO was well aware of the history and distinct 
possibility of civil disorder in Bermuda. 
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Owen was not proud of having taken the decision that led to the last hangings 
on British soil. “It’s not one of my personal, private moments of glory. You 
can’t complain. That’s life.”164 However, it’s not clear whether the same could 
be said of Buckingham Palace. According to a Privy Councilor who was with 
Elizabeth II when she received Owen’s advice on the case of Burrows and 
Tacklyn, the Queen made it clear that she supported at least one of the 
hangings. The Privy Councillor told Labour MP Chris Mullin that Her Majesty 
signed the death warrants ‘with a flourish’ while noting ‘indignantly’: “He’s got 
a cheek, asking me for clemency. Do you know, he even shot the dog?”165 
 
This section has suggested that Whitehall witnessed a major climbdown in its 
proposed policy of abrogating the Creech Jones doctrine during the summer 
and early autumn of 1977; a change that would essentially have given the 
British government the power to stop executions in dependent territories. 
This proposal was founded in both political and moral reasoning. Owen 
himself admitted that the doctrine placed him ‘in a difficult position’, partly at 
least because it ‘did not offer him protection against political pressures’.166 
The proposal to abrogate the convention fell victim more to short-term 
political calculations which were also linked to the identity of the person who 
had been killed.  
 
Despite his attempts to abrogate the doctrine and his Ministerial colleagues’ 
vacillation, Owen’s responsibility in the Bermuda case remains grave. He 
interpreted the Tsoi precedent in a way that did not allow him to intervene. 
Meanwhile, he also viewed his role in weighing up whether a miscarriage of 
justice had occurred particularly narrowly. Namely he refused to take into 
consideration the manner in which the jury had been selected, despite the 
possibility that the Special Jury law, reintroduced in 1971 was 
unconstitutional, contravening section six of Bermuda’s new bill of rights.  
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Conclusion 
 
The journalist and polemicist Christopher Hitchens argued that Jim 
Callaghan’s Labour administration was ‘sort of Weimar without the sex’, in its 
abandonment of principle and its ‘avuncular and dogmatic maintenance of a 
mediocre and deteriorating status quo’.167 Indeed, this episode seems to 
provide an example of noble principles being sullied by compromise and 
timidity, in answer to Morgan’s suggestion that the ‘cautious’ Callaghan’s 
Government oversaw a ‘constructive period in foreign policy’.168 This chapter 
also brings to light deeper realities about the nature of the British constitution 
and its application to superannuated colonial structures of justice and mercy.  
 
Several points need to be made in conclusion. Firstly, despite the new 1968 
constitution, which enshrined a bill of rights for Bermudians, the realities of 
Westminster-style government in Bermuda meant key principles of justice in 
Bermuda were bought off by the stacking of the deck in the favour of 
prosecutions and executions. Secondly, this chapter demonstrates a problem 
of personnel – in particular the shortcomings of a system that granted a 
Governor who has only been in office for a few months the power of life and 
death. Thirdly, it represents an episode of vacillation over the assertion of 
moral commitments in areas that were still under the remit of the Crown. 
Finally, it involves important issues of administration and accountability 
within the abstruse British constitution. 
 
Firstly, this argument must take into account the process of justice in 
Bermuda itself. As has been shown, there is a credible argument that Tacklyn 
and Burrows’ rights to a trial by jury, under section six of the Bermuda 
Constitution, were infringed unfairly with the use of the Special Jury. This was 
combined with Leather’s potentially sub judice comments through 1973 and 
1974, his decision to hold possibly prejudicial inquests and his desire to make 
the cases political. 
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Secondly, this episode involved a crisis of personnel. Bermuda had three 
Governors during 1977. All of these Governors claimed to be opposed to the 
death penalty. Yet, as Posnett notes, the perhaps impossible job Governors 
were shouldered with involved carrying out the law regardless of personal 
beliefs. Owen agreed that Governors were placed in a difficult position. They 
had to maintain good relations with elected politicians from different political 
camps. Meanwhile, they had controversial responsibilities for exercising the 
prerogative of mercy and maintaining law and order.  
 
In both of these last respects Ramsbotham failed to live up to his duties. First 
of all this period revealed there to be a fundamental lack of self-confidence 
within Government House. Ramsbotham, who viewed going to Bermuda as a 
major demotion, hoped he could avoid having to exercise his grave functions 
under section 22 of the Bermudian Constitution.169 Perhaps he believed he did 
not know enough about Bermuda; he also did not want to endanger his and 
his family’s safety. Ramsbotham also fell victim to the contradiction built into 
his role.  
 
Handling his task was even more difficult because he did not naturally seem to 
be very confident, and his communications with the FCO seem to have broken 
down. The relationship between Owen and Ramsbotham had been poisoned 
by their recent history. This may have helped ensure the executions because, 
as we have seen, Foreign Secretaries and Governors, such as MacLehose or 
Posnett, had worked together to engineer commutations in difficult cases in 
the past. Meanwhile, Bermuda Governors had commuted seven death 
penalties since 1943. That fact makes it all the more worrying that these 
hangings were allowed to proceed. 
 
Thirdly, the 1970s were changing Britain quickly. The country was being 
‘mortgaged to the IMF; there was ‘placemanship and jobbery everywhere’, 
‘clumsy and brutal’ attempts were being made to prosecute journalists with 
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‘cynical defence of the use of torture against Irish dissidents’.170 Meanwhile, 
since 1965, the country had enacted anti-sex discrimination laws, legalised 
homosexual sex and liberalised divorce laws.171  
 
Aspects of both Britain’s liberality and her decline can be seen in her 
treatment of Bermuda in 1977. Conservative symbols of empire such as 
Bermuda could be seen as sources of embarrassment. However, while Belize 
had been persuaded not to hang a white American as a result of Callaghan’s 
veiled economic and political threats, more strategically and economically 
secure places such as Bermuda were being deferred to. Meanwhile, short-term 
political and electoral considerations took priority over principled assertion. 
The fragility of the UK Government encouraged ministers to shy away from 
opening up an explosive issue.  
 
Finally, this case highlights problems with the British constitution itself. In 
particular, it seems conventions such as the Creech Jones doctrine were not 
clear enough to regulate the use of the great power of the Royal Prerogative. 
By 1977, the Creech Jones principle was outdated. Yet the very way in which it 
had been conjured out of thin air with a statement in the late 1940s spoke to 
its flexibility. This meant Owen could have simply ignored it, as Home had 
done in 1973. Alternatively, he could have recognised the irregularities 
inherent in the use of the Special Jury, which Britain had abolished in 
criminal cases in 1949, as well as the possibly prejudicial nature of Tacklyn’s 
trial. He chose to do neither. 
 
As the seven commutations between 1943 and 1977 attested, executions were 
often halted not for reasons of mercy or because they were ‘miscarriages of 
justice’. Home had commuted in the Tsoi case of 1973 because he did not want 
to encourage debate about capital punishment in the UK at a time of outrage 
at sectarian bombings on the British mainland. Thus, when Owen protested 
he had had ‘no alternative’ but to recommend to the Queen that the law be 
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allowed to take its course, this does not appear to be the whole truth. It was 
more likely a legalistic way of rationalising a political motivation.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has argued that the process of late decolonisation in Bermuda was 
characterised by two fundamental realities: the weakening, adaptation and 
renewed entrenchment of an ancient oligarchy by ‘democratic’ means; and the 
increasing weakness of a British colonial state that failed to wholeheartedly 
challenge this process. The metropole also provided vital support and comfort 
to the oligarchy at key moments. The ‘essential preconditions’ of British world 
power disappeared during the ‘strategic disaster in Asia’ and ‘cataclysm’ in 
Europe in the 1940s.1 However, while a weakening metropole and the 
superpower confrontation may help to explain the failure of Britain to 
‘impose’ a just constitutional and political settlement on its tiny possession in 
the North Atlantic, it does not forgive it.  
 
This thesis has sought to show how discourses of affinity could structure 
decolonisation on an island such as Bermuda where a white minority had 
engineered, over a long period, a cultural hegemony that inflated the 
significance of the British link. This concluding chapter will take each of the 
two themes in turn, suggesting that the UBP’s re-assertion of power 
represented something of a counter-revolution following the progressive gains 
of the civil rights movement of the early 1960s. In the process it stultified 
discussion about Bermuda’s legacies of racism. Secondly, this chapter will 
suggest that Britain lost control of the decolonisation process in Bermuda 
because the empire’s decentralised nature and its constitution created space 
for very personal interpretations of Britain’s role by Governors. This, in league 
with a habitual affinity towards local oligarchs, came at the expense of clear 
lobbying on behalf of British interests or human rights. 
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1. The counter-revolution of the oligarchy following the 
gains of the civil-rights movement 
 
The United Bermuda Party ceased to be in June 2011 by way of a furtive press 
release. Even the last two remaining UBP MPs in the House of Assembly did 
not seem to have been alerted to the party’s imminent demise.2 During its 
time in executive office from 1968 until 1998 however the UBP had been a 
virtually unstoppable political force, winning eight back-to-back general 
elections. Chapter one detailed how Martonmere and a mix of civil servants 
and centrist politicians helped engineer a constitutional settlement that 
privileged the UBP.  
 
In the midst of this, Bermudian democracy was still-born because of a denial 
of dignity to the island’s long-excluded black majority. Dignity was an 
important concept because it resonated with the long history of subjugation 
that did not simply evaporate in the midst of modernising or liberalising 
reforms. The UBP employed its privileged position and its majority in the 
House of Assembly to advantage during the period 1964-8, taking credit for a 
booming tourist economy, endorsing the end of segregation in schools and 
supporting political change and building up its multi-racial profile. 
 
1.1 Divide and rule: The elite bid to weaken black solidarity 
 
Chapter two argued that the denial of race employed in the rhetoric of the 
UBP during the period 1964-1968 was an arrogation in the context of 
hundreds of years during which race had been employed as a decisive 
criterion in every aspect of daily life. Non-racialism took on the character of a 
convenient religious conversion for those who had seen the light. Those 
mortals caught up in the legacies of history were cast out as heretics.  
 
White racial superiority was a ‘myth’ reinforced by writers, scientists and 
propagandists in Britain itself, especially from the 1860s onwards. However, 	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legacies of exclusion meant Bermuda’s black community had evolved a 
historical solidarity. The first years of the UBP asked black Bermudians to 
affect an immediate air of amnesia to this history; to break up a community 
that had been built to withstand hate. Some candidates were able to do this, 
either because, like Quinton Edness, they bought into the idea of ‘integration’ 
and saw it as the route to a better Bermuda. Some, such as Helene Brown, 
believed they could do more for blacks as part of ‘the party in power’; some, 
such as Sir ET Richards, believed in stability and order. 
 
Chapter two also suggested that the period 1963-1968 witnessed the final 
transfiguration of Bermuda into a post-colonial refuge for wealthy and 
sensitive tourists; an Anglo-American playground for the rich par excellence. 
This paradigm was intimately linked with race, since ‘segregation developed in 
[Bermuda and the Bahamas] mainly because of their dependence on the 
tourism trade with rich Americans’.3 With the closure of the Royal Naval 
Dockyard and the withdrawal of the British Army garrison in the 1950s, 
tourism attained an even greater significance for local employment.  
 
As a result, ideas of continued prosperity linked into the unofficial 
incumbency of the UBP (in the form of their legislative majority) to 
consolidate the party in power at the May 1968 election. A rhetoric of 
prosperity which focused on tourism, emphasising an image of peaceful 
harmony, was partly economically-inspired but also an appeal to stability at a 
time of a global fragmentation and a breakdown in law and order. This 
transition was eased by the presence of black candidates who helped to create 
an image of virtual integration, something that may have convince British civil 
servants as much as it did liberally-inclined white Bermudians that the days of 
racism were over.4   
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1.2 The resort to old illiberal habits in the face of violence 
 
From the mid-1960s, the sermon of non-racialism began to be contested in 
earnest by the PLP and then by the BBC. Chapter three showed how this 
exploded into protest and then violence between 1969-70 and 1973. Symbols 
of white and British heritage (from Governors and Police officers to churches, 
parks and nursery rhymes) were targeted. Resistance was the embodiment of 
the fact that, although the trappings of democracy had been bestowed on 
Bermuda, there had been no alternation in government; a requirement that is 
‘one of the core values in a democracy’.5 As one young man put it in 1977, ‘the 
same government had been in power since black people had been slaves’. 
 
However, chapter three also argued that the UBP used this moment to launch 
an attack on notions such as the right to a trial by jury and freedom of 
expression, both of which had been protected in the bill of rights contained in 
the constitution of 1968.6 The attack on these liberties so soon after their 
enactment was an act of betrayal by a scared, reactionary elite. It was also a 
reminder that, especially in the Caribbean, devices such as bills of rights had 
been seen by Whitehall more as devices to ‘try and lock in the constitutional 
status quo’ than as fundamental protections for individuals faced with state 
power.7  
 
Ironically, as Swan suggests, the incarceration focus of the UBP may have 
smoothed the path to the assassinations of 1972-3, although there could be no 
legitimate excuse for the cold-blooded violence, destruction and grief the 
murderers left in their wake. When the murders occurred however, both the 
UBP and Government House were quick to resort to coded messages about 
special measures that could be taken to ensure convictions in trials. This was, 
however, the re-assertion of an old habit that had not been evoked since the 
1950s. For instance, as High finds, Sections 13, 33 and 36 of the Bermuda Jury 
Act had been ‘designed for precisely [the] purpose’ of ‘arranging’ for ‘all white 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Lundell, Accountability and Patterns of Alternation, 145. 
6 See articles six and nine of schedule two of the Bermuda Constitution Order, 1968.  
7 Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonisation. 
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juries’ in high-profile criminal proceedings.8 The 1971 resurrection of Special 
Juries, the attempted consolidation of the use of these in 1974 and the attack 
on the right of peremptory challenge in jury selection embodied a new 
manifestation of ancient practice.  
 
1.3 The creation of the office of Premier and the by-passing of 
Government House 
 
The attempt to deny race that was implicit in the identity of the UBP was not 
something that could be sustained indefinitely. Chapter four outlined how, 
between 1971 and 1977, the UBP leadership grew increasingly distant from its 
backbenches. Richards, Sharpe and Gibbons spearheaded the carving out of 
the space of executive leadership in the office of Premier. Premiers, like 
diplomats and civil servants, operated most comfortably in the trans-national 
space of high political constitutional negotiations.  
 
Chapter four also showed how the UBP leadership fell out with Government 
House from 1973 onwards, and began bypassing it; in doing this it cultivated 
the notion of the Premier as the external face of Bermuda. ‘New Nationalism’ 
may have been largely sculpted through the ‘refashioning of official rites, 
national holidays, flags and anthems’.9 But it also materialised in the gradual 
shifts in the dynamics of personal interactions in the offices where power 
relationships were hammered out in secret. 
 
1.4 Institutional racism within the UBP 
 
Meanwhile, chapter four argued that the party itself was riven by disunity 
founded in Bermuda’s wider racial divisions. The UBP Black Caucus may have 
ascribed this group with a false minority mindset in a black majority 
country10, yet it also represented a real dissatisfaction with the public relations 
aspect of the party – which posited ‘unity’ in the face of another philosophical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 High, Racial Politics of Criminal Jurisdiction, 85.  
9 Stuart Ward is paraphrased in Darian-Smith, Grimshaw and MacIntyre, Britishness Abroad, 
10. 
10 Burchall, Fine as Wine, 143. 
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commitment to materialistic individualism. The rejection of the Black 
Caucus’s demands, however, acted as a fitting reminder that what was 
becoming a multi-racial rather than an exclusively white oligarchy retained 
control of the UBP behind the scenes. 
  
This truth was symbolised in the final climax of the UBP counter-revolution of 
the 1970s: the re-introduction of the use of the death penalty in Bermuda 
detailed in chapter six, which had been dormant since the 1940s. Successive 
Governors had commuted seven death sentences since then. However, the 
murders of five white men, and the attack on symbols of colonial power, in 
1972-3, led to a desire for vengeance. It was a twist of fate that in August 1977, 
the office of Premier passed from the hands of an ostensible liberal such as 
Sharpe into the hands of the reactionary Gibbons. As has been argued, 
because of his influence over Ramsbotham, Gibbons’ holds a large degree of 
responsibility for the fact that the hangings went ahead and were followed by 
street violence on an unprecedented scale, leading to three more deaths. 	  	  
2. The coalescence of affinity-based and pragmatic 
decolonisation vis-à-vis the honouring of historical 
responsibilities  
 
British decolonisation policy evoked the very nature of the empire itself. Its 
decentralised structure meant sober appraisals of British interest in Whitehall 
were threatened by adulteration from two sources. On one hand, the FCO 
could be subject to the tendency to go along to get along, sacrificing national 
interests in a bid to preserve diplomatic harmony. This was triggered by the 
‘acute’ awareness ‘of the US determination not to allow Britain to withdraw 
her existing responsibilities’ in the Eastern Caribbean during the 1960s and 
1970s.11 The compromise between US desires and the growing British desire to 
withdraw, under pressure from the UN and a weakening of the economy, 
however, was found in pursuit of comforting ideas of stability. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Williams, Keeping a Line Open, 480.  
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As chapter five showed, however, the other threat to a sober elaboration of 
British interests was the significant degree of personal interpretive power that 
a ‘man on the spot’ could apply in this field. The office of Governor was a 
privileged one, characterised by the flummery of a Victorian-era mansion, the 
title of ‘His Excellency’, a plumed hat, a copious expenditure on alcohol and 
an ‘entertainment allowance’. It also came with the danger of sentimental 
intoxication in a white man’s fantasy playground.  
 
As a result, notions of ‘influence’ could transmute into feelings of affinity with 
a dominant, white minority that was still diffusing British cultural standards 
across the island. Leather embodied this reality most clearly in his view that 
Bermuda’s social problems were best treated with a dose of Royal Visits. As 
this section will argue, British rationalisation of its global decline was 
paralleled by a resurgence of imperial affinity occasioned by knowledge of this 
attenuation in power. 
 
 
2.1 Providing new constitutional clothing for an oligarchy of 
affinity 
 
Chapter one detailed the way in which a starting point of agreement between 
Martonmere in Government House and a CO under Duncan Sandys began to 
cultivate Tucker as Bermuda’s new leader from 1963 onwards. It was at this 
moment that the partial stultification of the new Bermudian democratic 
settlement began.  
 
Following the election of a Labour Government in October 1964, however, 
constitutional reform took on the air of a compromise – the argument that 
since Bermuda’s Europeans were not as ‘savage’ as white Rhodesians, the 
handing-down of the compromise of a Responsible Government constitution 
would be the best Britain could hope for. Crucial was the provision, enshrined 
in the constitution, that constituency boundaries had to remain delimited 
within ancient parish boundaries. One significant aspect of this process was 
the material support offered to Tucker, for instance in the selection of 
constitutional conference delegates, by Lord Martonmere.  
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The second significant aspect in the creation of the new constitution was the 
abdication of Britain’s self-ascribed locus standi to ‘impose a solution’. For 
some Labour MPs such as internationalists like Tony Benn, Fenner Brockway 
or Tom Driberg, this was nothing less than a moral imperative founded in 
colonial legacies. As Hitchens notes in the context of a discussion of the 
partition of the Indian subcontinent, the ‘true term for this [omission was] 
betrayal’: 
 
The only thinkable justification for the occupation of someone 
else’s territory…is the testable, honourable intention of applying 
an impartial justice, a disinterested administration and an even 
hand as regards bandits and sectarians.12 
 
An anticolonial movement that increasingly spoke in terms of civil liberties, 
human rights and racial justice was overwhelmed by a cloying cross-party 
consensus attempting to explain away its own ‘pragmatic’ feebleness. British 
MPs such as Frederic Bennett, who had been groomed as a UBP candidate for 
the 1968 election, felt they could not ‘impose a solution’ as ‘friendship’ and 
‘mutual regard’ were ‘the only means we have left’. This was the deployment of 
the chetif state as cover up for the decolonisation of affinity – the tacit 
reinforcement of the oligarchical minority as an expression of Greater British 
white solidarity. It was also an abdication of responsibility towards Bermuda’s 
black majority after centuries of oppression by Britain’s favoured 
collaborators. 
 
 
2.2 The imperial connection as the convenient space for 
secretive leadership 
 
The period 1968-1973 saw the creation of a convenient space of executive 
power that stemmed in part from the close understanding between Tucker 
and Martonmere. Constitutional reform in 1968 had followed the 
Westminster model with one important exception. Whilst the British 
constitution contained a recognition of nominal Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
the Bermudian House of Assembly was disadvantaged at the hands of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hitchens, The Perils of Partition, 483-4. 
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executive with two powerful components. On one hand, a new position of 
Government Leader took a seat in the Executive Council. This was the first 
time an elected politician had taken hold of executive power in Bermudian 
history. Secondly, however, executive power was also held by the Governor, 
who both chaired the Executive Council until 1973 and also had access to 
logistical support from Britain’s security and propaganda services, and who 
was also empowered to call on military support. 
 
The attack on colonial symbols in 1968 and 1973 was partly a response to the 
fact that such symbols had been repeatedly employed in a bid to ‘restore 
order’, for instance the use of a frigate to ‘deter’ riots on election night in May 
1968. Working together, the two elements of the executive in Bermuda had a 
great deal of power. This was buttressed by the calling into service of the IRD 
– a late manifestation of Cold War paranoia reconfigured for battle with the 
Angry Brigades of the 1970s. The IRD’s covert role meant the FCO actively 
encouraged the undermining of constitutional protections that the British 
Government had been involved in formalising only two years before. 
 
Finally, as chapter three showed, the stoical and repressed response of the 
British to the assassinations, suggested by the refusal to stop using the 
Governor’s mansion despite appeals by Pamela Sharples – was reflected in the 
suggestion by Leather that Bermuda’s problems were not political but related 
to criminality. The social significance of the assassinations was swept under 
the rug. The UBP’s disinclination to change an economic status quo in which 
whites held the highest-paying jobs and the largest tracts of land fit too 
conveniently into the reality of a Governor’s mansion set in 33 acres of 
verdant gardens next to one of Bermuda’s poorest neighbourhoods. 
 
2.3 Increased confusion in the British role in Bermuda 
 
Chapter four showed how Government House and the FCO struggled to adjust 
to new constitutional realities, cemented by reforms in April 1973. These 
meant the UBP had gained an increased ability to set agendas, obfuscating 
unity of action in issues such as internal security, which were still considered 
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to be important elements in Britain’s ‘contingent liabilities’ in Bermuda.13 The 
increase in UBP power led to confusion over what civil servants understood as 
Britain’s role in Bermuda.  
 
The focus on ‘good government’ fit in with Conservative sensibilities between 
1970 and 1973. However, between 1974 and 1979, a Labour Government 
increasingly pined for Bermudian independence, meaning the focus on 
intervention was sidelined, as were concerns about electoral iniquities. 
Scholarship has focused on the problems that ad-hoc constitutional evolution, 
partly inspired by obtuse, short-term political demands, created for Britain’s 
role in its remaining territories. As former Governor of Montserrat David 
Taylor notes: “It was never intended that such constitutions should achieve 
the semi-permanent status which they have now acquired.”14 ‘The absence of a 
coordinated policy institution’ has resulted, as in the Bermuda case, in 
‘dramatic UK government interventions’ following emergencies.15 
 
This led to a recalibration following the revelation of a ‘complete lack of clarity 
about who was responsible’ during the humanitarian catastrophe caused by 
the eruption of a volcano in Montserrat in 1995-1997.16 Between the late 1990s 
and the present, Britain re-asserted its right to intervene in such matters as 
financial services, the environment and ‘better government’, focusing on the 
‘security, stability and prosperity’ of the 14 remaining territories.17 Recent 
criticism by MPs, however, has been directed at the UK Government for 
failing to live up to its duties in funding the protection of endangered 
species.18 
 
Secondly, however, this period also revealed that Leather was comfortable 
with a situation in which he did not set agendas and essentially acted as 
Bermuda’s almost ceremonial foreign minister. Leather was the embodiment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Hintjens and Hodge, Governing Unruliness, 199.  
14 Taylor, British colonial policy in the Caribbean, 338-9. 
15 Hintjens and Hodge, Governing Unruliness, 205-6. 
16 Ibid, 200.  
17 FCO White Paper, Partnership for Progress and Prosperity, FCO White Paper, Security, 
Success and Sustainability.  
18 The Guardian, January 16, 2014. 
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of Anglo-Bermudian affinities, for he privileged the UBP’s imperfect 
democratic mandate over any allegiance that he was meant to feel towards 
Britain’s (from March 1974, Labour) Foreign Secretaries. Bermuda, in 
Leather’s eyes, became one of the last redoubts of the Greater British, royally-
infused, white-dominated Commonwealth. 
 
At the same time, as chapter five argued, there was a more insular 
disagreement between Leather and Richards over the nature of his private and 
public role. This highlighted the potential problems of making political 
appointments to the post of Governor. This led to a more low-key articulation 
of the role from 1977 onwards. Governors were meant to be seen but not 
heard, exercising a more ‘neutral’ oversight role as ‘Father Confessor’ as 
opposed to ‘leaders of the local community’.  
 
 
2.4 A decision to have ‘no alternative’ in the process of mercy 
 
The Royal Commission report that followed the 1977 crisis over the hangings 
of Tacklyn and Burrows, and the ‘disturbances’ that followed focused largely 
on Bermuda’s socio-economic conditions and her political system. This led to 
the recommendation, unwelcome for Bermudian conservatives, that ‘only with 
independence can national unity be forged and pride in being Bermudian fully 
develop’.19 This report did not look in any detail, however, at the process by 
which Tacklyn and Burrows’ pleas for mercies were considered and then 
rejected. This thesis has attempted to remedy that gap.  
 
Chapter six argued three key points. Firstly, collusion between Leather and 
the UBP, in part enshrined via the constitution itself, meant the trials and 
appeals processes were compromised and may have amounted to a 
‘miscarriage of justice’ for Tacklyn, who was found not guilty of the murders of 
Sayers and Sharples and may have been tried in a prejudicial manner for the 
Shopping Centre killings. Cold-blooded crimes had occurred before. Yet the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Pitt et al, Report… into the 1977 Disturbances, 36. 
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murders of 1972-3 shocked whites because they were founded in a mixture of 
colonial and racial grievance.  
 
Secondly, the weakening and shrinking of the public role of the office of 
Governor meant that by 1977, occupants of the office such as Ramsbotham 
were displaying a distinct lack of confidence in the exercise of their power. 
Ramsbotham constitutionally had the power to stop the hangings whatever 
the UBP or his advisory council on the prerogative of mercy recommended. 
His lack of confidence, however, was exacerbated by a ‘sorry catalogue of 
failure’ in communication on the part of the FCO. Finally, it was cemented by 
Ramsbotham’s lack of experience of Bermuda, which led to him accepting the 
UBP’s critically flawed advice. 
 
Thirdly, as the FCO revealed, ‘there was no constitutional reason’ why Britain 
could not stop hangings in places such as Bermuda. However, a civil service-
propelled initiative to abrogate the Creech-Jones doctrine by which the 
metropole left decisions to Governors was trapped in political vacillation. 
Owen had the power to stop the hangings but essentially chose not to. His 
suggestion to parliament on December 5 that he had ‘no alternative’ but to 
advise the Queen that ‘justice should be allowed to take its course’ was, in the 
final analysis, designed to help him in a tricky political situation. As chapter 
six argued, Owen could have attempted to convince Ramsbotham to stop the 
hangings, as Callaghan had done with Posnett in Belize in 1974. As he 
revealed, however, the ‘history of firing’ warded him away from this course, 
leading him to be particularly guarded in his communications. 
 
Ironically, a Labour Foreign Secretary allowed hangings to go ahead, while a 
Conservative predecessor had stopped them. Owen could also have followed 
the Tsoi precedent, ignoring the Creech Jones doctrine as Douglas-Home had 
done in 1973. His suggestion that he chose not to do this because the Creech 
Jones doctrine left him ‘no room for maneuver at all’ is open to objection. As 
Owen’s own words suggest, he ‘deliberately decided’ he was not going to 
follow the Tsoi precedent on the basis of his subjective reading of what the 
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Creech Jones doctrine legally entailed. This justification implies a certain 
degree of freedom of interpretation.  
 
Owen’s inclination to hold back from intervening was couched, however, in 
the rhetoric of legalism in which hands were cast as regrettably tied. 
Moreover, the fact that hangings involved a case in which a former MP, 
Minister and Governor had been killed seemed to be regarded as a reason for 
ruling out the abrogation of the doctrine. After all, as Owen noted, this would 
have led to an emotional debate in the House of Commons. It was a debate, as 
Foot indicated, the government believed it may have lost and did not want to 
risk in a ‘pre-election period’. The brutal fact was that the process of mercy 
became caught up in political wrangling and events in the UK.  
 
Summary 
 
The essential themes of this story were determined by the fact that, far from 
being a managed process, British decolonisation was ‘largely determined by 
geopolitical forces over which the British themselves had little control’.20 
Between 1963-1977 this lack of control was entrenched by the UBP’s simple 
refusal to either to embrace the prospect of independence or make basic 
reforms to Bermuda’s electoral system, despite the ‘critical juncture’ 
represented by the Constitutional Conference of November 1966. 21 
 
Indeed, Britain ‘never exercised anything describable as global hegemony’, 
while imperial action and policy shifts depended on ‘an ever-varying mixture 
of linkages between metropole and peripheries — links of coercion, or 
persuasion, of economic interest, of emotional loyalty and more’.22 The force 
of such links meant Bermudian decolonisation took the path of ‘de-
dominionisation’ because they placed unrepresentative rulers in the position 
to set agendas. The idea of dominion status was a ‘characteristically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Darwin, Empire Project, 649. 
21 Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson note that ‘critical junctures’ are ‘major events that 
disrupt the existing political and economic balance in one or many societies’, Why Nations 
Fail, 431.  
22 Howe, British Worlds, Settler Worlds, World Systems…, 699. 
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ambiguous imperial invention’. It recognised ‘various states of self-
government while managing to convey overtones of continuing 
subordination’. Implicit in this was the idea of the ‘pan-Britannic overtones’ 
and linkages that were overpowering for officials such as Leather.23  
 
For oligarchs such as Tucker this meant that during the 1960s and 1970s, 
‘hyper-whiteness’ retained a private yet controlling hand in ‘a shadowless 
space of burning sunlight’; it ‘served as [a] permanent counterpoint to the 
perceived decay corroding the imperial centre.’24 Tucker’s UBP made just 
enough concessions to stay in power, while repressing a much-needed 
discussion of racist and colonial legacies. 
 
Bias towards the UBP at Government House meant a decolonisation of affinity 
took precedence over a decolonisation of pragmatism or principle. Britain 
treated Bermuda as a ‘white’ dominion in this period, despite the fact that she 
had a black majority that had been violently oppressed for centuries. 
 
In part this may have been because ‘the globalisation of decolonisation’ had by 
the 1970s created an international atmosphere that argued against increased 
intervention of any kind.25 However, from 1946 onwards, black Bermudians 
had attempted to appeal to the better angels of Britain’s nature without much 
success. They merely asked that the imperial state live up to its espoused 
principles without regard to the crippling affinities of Anglo-Bermudian 
collusion at the level of local politics.  A ‘multi-track strategy of operating a 
laissez-faire policy’ of decolonisation may have, in one sense, been ‘wise’, 
resulting in comparatively less bloodshed than the tortured French, Belgian, 
Dutch or Portuguese imperial disengagements .26  
 
However, continued colonial government came at a price, paid by Bermuda’s 
disenfranchised on behalf of those in power. This was embodied in the 
remaining influence of a shadowy constitution full of grey areas, in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hopkins, Rethinking Decolonisation, 212 and 219. 
24 Schwarz, White Man’s World, 80. 
25 Nicholas White, Decolonisation, 104. 
26 Drower, Fistful of Islands, 37. 
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nudges, winks, undertones and informal networks mattered. Hitchens refers 
to the ‘committee that never meets’ as an example of the British elite’s 
proclivity for secrecy:  
 
Like the ‘unwritten’ constitution or the ‘invisible earnings’ of the 
City of London, this is a definition and a method of exceptional 
convenience to those interested in ruling discreetly.27 
 
‘Ruling discreetly’ may have been in the interests of British politicians, ‘men 
on the spot’ and oligarchical politicians. However, this thesis has shown that 
colonial governance would be improved by clearer structures of accountability 
and more lucid definitions of terms such as ‘better government’, as the term 
‘good government’ is re-phrased for the 2012 White Paper.28 Such reforms 
would perhaps be less politically convenient for those elected to executive 
power. However, they would help Governors to manage an increasingly 
confused and contradictory job. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Hitchens, For the Sake of Argument, 215. 28	  FCO White Paper, Security, Success and Sustainability.	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